Delete comment from: Edward Feser
Let me point something out that I was assuming, btw. Atoms (and therefore molecules) are not numbered. There is no "sequential identity" for atoms or the molecules they create (at least that has not been discovered). If that WERE the case, then I could be persuaded that two otherwise identical people (and I agree - that is so unlikely as to be "practically" impossible) could not have the same sense of self.
But since, as far as is currently known, atoms and molecules do not have anything that distinguished one from another, then there wouldn't be any way to create a consciousness with them in one construction that another (perfectly identical construction) wouldn't also produce. If the atoms and molecules ARE somehow "stamped" with some sort of individual identity, then they could.
Think of a DVD - if you imprint a certain pattern of 1s and 0s on it, you get the movie "Ground Hog Day". If you print the PRECISE pattern on a different disc, you do not get "Stripes".
Mar 3, 2015, 9:36:05 AM
Posted to Descartes’ “indivisibility” argument