Delete comment from: Edward Feser
Imagine that I have a perfect double. By that I mean a twin who has not only the same genetic structure, but also the PRECISE same ATOMIC structure, and the PRECISE same energy transfers going on between brain cells, and so on. According to materialism/reductionism, I would then have to exist twice. Would "I" have two different experiences?
It could be said that at the moment I got different stimuli picked up by my sensory organs, my "two brains" would diverge in structure (due to having to process different input) and there would instantly (or at least VERY QUICKLY) be two completely different people, or sense of "I".
But if I use that same logic, which seems sound, then the person I was 1/2 second ago could not have the same sense of "I that "I" currently have, and "I" should be very unstable. And yet here "I" am, consistently behaving and sensing different things every instant.
I reject materialism.
Mar 2, 2015, 1:52:06 PM
Posted to Descartes’ “indivisibility” argument