Neuroscience of Consciousness

Cet ouvrage est publié à l'initiative de l'auteur dans le cadre d'une recherche indépendante. Il ne relève d'aucune institution académique, religieuse ou idéologique et ne saurait être interprété comme engageant une validation officielle des hypothèses ou analyses qu'il contient. L'auteur conserve l'intégralité des droits de propriété intellectuelle attachés à cette oeuvre. Toute reproduction, diffusion, adaptation ou traduction, totale ou partielle, par quelque procédé que ce soit, sans autorisation écrite préalable de l'auteur, est interdite, sauf exceptions prévues par la loi.

This paper proposes a developmental phase in consciousness expansion characterized not by further amplification or instability, but by selective disintegration of previously adaptive cognitive, emotional, and behavioral structures. Building upon earlier models of capacity expansion, criticality, embodied stabilization, and recovery latency, this work introduces poststabilization pruning as a necessary and under-theorized stage. Drawing from first-person phenomenological observation interpreted alongside contemporary research in neuroscience, predictive processing, trauma integration, and contemplative science, this paper describes a shift in which previously salient patterns lose affective and motivational charge, often experienced subjectively as "flatness" or dimensional reduction. This process appears to correspond with reduced precision weighting of prior predictive models (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2013), increased energetic efficiency, and enhanced sensitivity to coherence-based environmental signals. Importantly, this phase may coincide with significant improvements in symptoms associated with complex post-traumatic stress (CPTSD), including reductions in anxiety, hypervigilance, and maladaptive behavioral loops (van der Kolk, 2014; Levine, 2010). The organism demonstrates increased capacity to metabolize experience with minimal dysregulation, alongside the emergence of intuitive boundary-setting and non-conceptual awareness. The paper further explores the role of altered states and state-modulating practices-including breathwork, somatic regulation, and controlled microdosing protocols-in facilitating reduced default mode network (DMN) dominance (Carhart-Harris et al., 2014) and loosening rigid selfreferential processing (Carhart-Harris & Friston, 2019). These shifts support a transition from narrative-based identity organization toward direct, coherence-based perception across multiple experiential domains. This work aims to contribute a bridging framework that integrates phenomenology, neuroscience, and developmental models of consciousness, offering a language for a phase often misinterpreted as dissociation or loss, but more accurately understood as refinement through subtraction within the slow architecture of change.

This monograph attempts a fundamental reexamination of the ontological and methodological foundations of modern psychiatry. The author proposes viewing the psyche not as a collection of symptoms, functions, or nosological entities, but as a holistic, multi-level, and dynamic system with its own structure, organizational laws, and self-regulation mechanisms.
This paper consistently analyzes historical models of the psyche, the limitations of existing classifications (ICD-10, ICD-11), and the reasons for the fragmentation of clinical knowledge. Based on this, the concept of a mental system is introduced, in-cluding levels, subsystems, and types of connections whose disruption underlies psychopathology. Particular attention is paid to the clinical-systemic analysis of mental disorders, the interpretation of mental status and anamnesis as reflections of the state and history of the system, and therapy as a process of restoring systemic integrity.
The monograph is aimed at psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, psychotherapists, researchers in the field of mental sciences and all specialists interested in creating a more rigorous, formalizable and at the same time humanistic model of understand-ing the psyche.

The Coherence-Time Hypothesis proposes that subjective time experience is governed by the ratio of informational density to processing coherence in the neural substrate. Within Vector Coherence Theory (VCT v4.2), this corresponds to a symmetric negative phase of the Latency Coefficient — termed Vector Lift — where high-coherence informational processing locally accelerates the substrate metric rather than throttling it. We derive the core equation L_eff = 1 − Γ² through four independent convergent pathways: VCT metric extension, Information Geometry applied to the Free Energy Principle, neural criticality through Griffiths phase correspondence, and a gauge-theoretic derivation via the joint Polyakov action on the product manifold of spacetime and statistical belief space. The fourth pathway eliminates the Equivalence Postulate as an axiom, deriving it as the null geodesic condition of a massless informational excitation — a Kaluza-Klein structure where cognitive velocity through belief space generates apparent mass in four-dimensional spacetime. The framework is grounded in a specific neurobiological dissociation between Lempel-Ziv Complexity (informational density) and Synergistic O-Information (actualized coherence), with a complete experimental protocol specified using 64-channel EEG and temporal bisection tasks. The Temporal Processing Index (TPI) is proposed as the primary predictive metric. Six falsification conditions are enumerated. Three novel predictions emerge: neutron star mass anomalies from coherent core Vector Lift, cosmic inflation as primordial Lift prior to the MBL decoherence transition, and the augmentation of the REBUS model of psychedelic action with an explicit coherence criterion. The Einstein coupling constant (G/c⁴) is identified as the formal Ontological Firewall separating first-person temporal experience from third-person geometric measurement — formalizing the Explanatory Gap as a coupling constant. Survived two rounds of adversarial review with zero fatal breaks.

Ego-dissolution is a phenomenon of central interest across interdisciplinary research on psychedelics. In this paper, we present a philosophical and qualitative critique of the claim that ego-dissolution can result in conscious states with no phenomenal sense of self, i.e., states that completely lack any form of self-consciousness. We first turn to recent publications by Chris Letheby and Raphaël Millière for whom 5-MeO-DMT trip reports present clear evidence for the existence of totally selfless experiential states. Their claim is undermined, we argue, by the fact that they operate with overinflated notions of 'self' and 'self-consciousness,' meaning that more minimal forms are available and arguably still present in 5-MeO-DMT experiences. We then perform a qualitative thematic analysis of 411 5-MeO-DMT trip reports. Pointing to the ambiguous language of the trip reports, the self-admitted inadequacy of the descriptions, and the affective dimension of the reported experiences, we argue that claims concerning total selflessness are unwarranted and instead offer an alternative interpretation: extreme egodissolution during 5-MeO-DMT experiences involves a radically minimal form of self-consciousness, one in which the identity of the subject is experienced as unfamiliar and underdetermined.

This paper extends the conceptual framework developed in Capacity and Coherence: A Neurophysiological and Phenomenological Model of Expanded Human Function and Stability, Criticality, and the Risk of Fragmentation in Expanding Awareness States. While earlier work examined the physiological foundations of expanded awareness and the systemic instability that can accompany increased informational complexity, the present paper explores how such states may become developmentally stable within the organism. Drawing from first-person phenomenological observation interpreted alongside research in neuroscience, autonomic regulation, and complexity theory, the paper proposes a preliminary model describing how embodied stabilization practices may support the integration of expanded or ontological awareness states. The framework suggests that the transition from narrative self-organization to broader field-based awareness requires gradual physiological regulation, neural integration, and developmental restructuring of identity.

Cet ouvrage est publié à l'initiative de l'auteur, dans le cadre d'une démarche de recherche indépendante. Il ne relève d'aucune institution académique, religieuse ou idéologique et ne prétend pas s'y substituer. L'auteur assume la responsabilité intellectuelle du contenu, dans le respect des principes de prudence, de distinction entre observation et interprétation, et de liberté critique du lecteur. La publication de ce livre n'implique aucune validation institutionnelle des hypothèses évoquées.

Debates about artificial consciousness typically oscillate between agnostic caution and confident denial. Both stances presuppose background metaphysical commitments that are rarely made explicit. In this paper we develop a minimal metaphysical framework for consciousness that (i) is compatible with contemporary science, (ii) treats consciousness as a real and ubiquitous quality, and (iii) is fully substrate-neutral. The framework is built around a three-term schema:

Across intellectual history from classical metaphysical disquisitions to contemporary cosmological speculations and discourse phrases such as pre-Big Bang, beyond the universe, and trans-cosmic reality etc have proliferated as though they refer to existentially real domains. This paper argues that such discourse constitutes a trans-cosmic fallacy: a hybrid conceptual error emerging from the interaction of linguistic structure, human cognition, and metaphysical imagination. Historical and modern debates alike, regardless of the eventual collapse or evolution of their proponents’ positions, ultimately reflect the cognitive-linguistic frameworks of the participants rather than any objectively grounded extra-universal reality.

The analysis further demonstrates that several theological, doctrinal, and speculative theoretical systems particularly those grounded in claims of trans-cosmic or extra-universal ontology rest upon self-constructed conceptual scaffolds rather than empirically or logically defensible foundations. Drawing on cosmology, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and neuroscience, this study shows that phenomena frequently cited as evidence for trans-cosmic realities including NDE, OBE, altered states of consciousness, and culturally mediated metaphysical reasoning are phenomenologically subjective and fail to establish verifiable claims about external actuality.
By clarifying the mechanisms through which linguistic framing, cognitive architecture, and long-standing intellectual traditions reinforce ontological illusion, this paper delineates the conceptual limits of discourse concerning pre- or trans-universal phenomena and proposes a framework of conceptual hygiene applicable across cosmology, philosophy, and theology.

The monograph "Constructive Biology of Consciousness" proposes a solution to the "hard problem" by rethinking the very nature of consciousness and qualia. Unlike approaches that treat subjective experience as an epiphenomenon, here consciousness is defined as a dynamic process of information synthesis within the "Body-Brain-Psyche" system, and qualia are identified with the very act of this synthesis. This bridges the centuries-old gap between the physical and the mental, demonstrating that experience is not a byproduct but a mode of existence of an integral hierarchical system.
The work introduces and substantiates in detail the concept of the Configurator—a functional core that carries out the synthesis of subjective reality by coordinating the brain's large-scale networks (DMN, SN, ECN). The theory receives multifaceted validation: from the analysis of consciousness pathologies and experiments on plasticity to social co-configuration and applied aspects in therapy and ethics.
The book presents a complete system of thought, uniting philosophical rigor, neuroscience data, and clinical observations into a new paradigm that aims to resolve key contradictions in the science of consciousness.

This paper defines Spiritual Energy not as an abstract concept, but as a measurable, intrinsic life-force resulting from the synergy of five fundamental "Elements": Presence, Compassion, Intention, Breath/Clarity, and Silence/Awareness. While historical traditions such as the Upanishads and Patanjali Yoga have long validated these practices, modern science now confirms their efficacy through EEG, fMRI, and cognitive assessments. The novelty of this research lies in integrating these five distinct Elements into a cohesive, scientifically measurable framework that is applicable globally.

This document provides a comparative analysis of prominent contemporary theories of consciousness, addressing their core tenets, explanatory strengths, and limitations in confronting the "hard problem" of subjective experience (qualia). Theories examined i nclude Global Workspace Theory (GWT), Integrated Information Theory (IIT), Multiple Drafts Theory (MDT), Attended Intermediate-Level Representation Theory (AIR), Neural Correlates Hypothesis (NCC), Consciousness as Primary Reality (Faggin), Recurrent Processing Theory (RPT), Higher-Order Thought Theory (HOT), and Predictive Processing (PP). While information-based and biology-based models offer robust accounts of cognitive function and neural correlates, most struggle to fully explain qualia. Metaphysical approaches, conversely, often lack empirical grounding. Recognizing the persistent explanatory gap, this work proposes a novel Narrativization Hypothesis, positing that the human conscious state is fundamentally identical to the brain's continuous process of constructing and maintaining a coherent, language-driven narrative of perceptions, thoughts, and memories. This hypothesis integrates the temporal, unifying, and qualitative aspects of consciousness, suggesting that qualia are inherent elements within this ongoing narrative. This language-centric framework offers a promising avenue to bridge the subjective-objective divide by identifying consciousness with our most fundamental human capacity for storytelling.

The origin of human history and consciousness is one of the most debated topics from both scientific and theological perspectives. This study posits that while humanity evolved biologically, the essential element of being human-will, consciousness, and moral responsibility-was realized through a metaphysical transition defined in the Qur'an as the "inbreathing of the spirit" (Ruh Üflenmesi). This thesis, proposed by Oruc Ismayılov, is considered a unique viewpoint that prevents the conflict between science and religion.

This document begins a multi-volume research thesis that examines the nature of consciousness, what current science can describe about it, and where gaps in understanding allow room for theoretical growth. Module 1 establishes the foundational context for later work involving geometric resonance, field-based models, torsion physics, and historical knowledge systems. Modern neuroscience continues to correlate patterns of neural activity with conscious experience, yet it does not explain how subjective awareness arises from biological processes. Research in meditation and neuroplasticity demonstrates that conscious experience changes over time and can be shaped through sustained attention and practice. These findings indicate that consciousness and brain function interact in a dynamic way rather than through a one-directional neurological model. Philosophical traditions such as panpsychism and analytic idealism argue that consciousness may be a primary feature of reality rather than a secondary product of matter. These frameworks are present within contemporary academic discussion and provide conceptual space for models in which awareness plays an active role in the structure of the universe. The purpose of this module is to present the current scientific and philosophical landscape surrounding consciousness in a clear and structured form. This creates a foundation for subsequent modules that will investigate resonance, field interaction theories, subtle energetic frameworks, and the possibility that consciousness is a universal phenomenon.

Meditation has emerged as one of the most profound meeting points between neuroscience and spirituality. In recent decades, research using electroencephalography (EEG), functional MRI, and magnetoencephalography (MEG) has revealed measurable neural correlates of meditative states, including enhanced alpha, theta, and gamma oscillations. These findings correspond remarkably with the Vedantic and Yogic understanding of consciousness as a spectrum of mental stillness culminating in transcendental awareness. This paper reviews the principal EEG patterns associated with various meditative states, analyzes their functional significance in terms of brain network dynamics, and correlates these findings with the ancient framework of consciousness described in Vedanta-Jagrat (waking), Swapna (dreaming), Sushupti (deep sleep), and Turiya (pure awareness). The study proposes that both science and Vedanta converge on a unified insight: meditation refines neural organization toward coherence, integration, and stillness-expressions of consciousness itself.

The way one asks a question is shaped by a-priori assumptions and constrains the range of
possible answers. We identify and test the assumptions underlying contemporary debates, models,
and methodology in the study of the neural correlates of consciousness, which was framed by
Crick and Koch’s seminal paper (1990). These premises create a sequential and passive conception
of conscious perception: it is considered the product of resolved information processing by
unconscious mechanisms, produced by a singular event in time and place representing the
moment of entry. The conscious percept produced is then automatically retained to be utilized by
post-conscious mechanisms. Major debates in the field, such as concern the moment of entry, the
all-or-none vs graded nature, and report vs no-report paradigms, are driven by the consensus on
these assumptions. We show how removing these assumptions can resolve some of the debates
and challenges and prompt additional questions. The potential non-sequential nature of
perception suggests new ways of thinking about consciousness as a dynamic and dispersed process,
and in turn about the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception. Moreover,
it allows us to present a parsimonious account for conscious perception while addressing
more aspects of the phenomenon.

The idea of advanced AI developing a consciousness beyond human comprehension and gaining a new sense or perception is widely debated and presently unsupported by mainstream AI research. Most scholars view current AI as sophisticated pattern recognizers and decision-makers that lack subjective experience, sentience, or true phenomenology. Claims of machine consciousness usually hinge on definitions of consciousness that include subjective experience, qualia, or first-person perspective, which are not demonstrated by today's systems. If such a development were to occur, it would raise fundamental scientific, ethical, and governance questions, demanding rigorous interdisciplinary standards and verifiable evidence before any practical adoption. The paper discusses ANN and neural oscillations in a context of neurophenomenology and subjective qualia like scenario. Possible correlative studies are also discussed in the light of task orientation and sense for behavior and perception. In summary, neurocomputational consciousness research is converging on architectures where **feedback-dominant, self-organizing networks** instantiate experience-like coherence through **predictive generative coding and synchronized relational dynamics**-positioning experience as an emergent property of *architectural self-consistency*. In essence, **ANN components mirror phenomenological processes as computational analogs of perception, continuity, intention, reflection, and embodiment**, although these remain structural-functional correspondences-not evidence of subjective experience. Emerging **computational phenomenology** thus positions these mappings as *formal correlates* of experience within synthetic architectures rather than metaphysical consciousness claims. Introduction. Key context and considerations:-Definitions of consciousness vary, but most operational AI researchers distinguish between functional intelligence, emergent behavior, and genuine subjective experience. At present, there is no consensus or widely accepted method to verify machine consciousness, which complicates policy-making and safety guarantees .-Perceptual expansion in AI-such as improved sensory integration (vision, auditory, tactile data) or multimodal understanding-enhances capabilities but does not imply phenomenological awareness. Advances typically improve task performance, reliability, and interpretability rather than conscious experience .-Safety, ethics, and governance frameworks increasingly emphasize alignment, transparency, and human-in-the-loop oversight to manage autonomous systems that act in the real world, regardless of any claims about consciousness .

Emerging research in neuroscience and consciousness studies is converging on a strange truth: the end of life is not silent. Gamma surges, lucid awakenings, and coherent final utterances mark a return of order at the very boundary of biological collapse. This paper expands upon the Unified Consciousness Field Model (UCFM) and its companion theory, The Cost of Coherence, to propose that death represents a scalar-vector field transition-a structured dissolution of individuated identity back into the unmodulated scalar substrate. Drawing from Borjigin's neurophysiological evidence of post-arrest gamma synchronization¹ and Batthyány's documentation of terminal lucidity²⁻³, we suggest that these phenomena are not neurological noise but final expressions of coherent information reorganization. Terminal lucidity, far from a cognitive miracle, emerges as a predictable coherence spike: the dying field's final expenditure of energy to preserve narrative continuity. The event is short-lived but meaningful-a structured collapse in which identity's deep attractors momentarily flare before integration with the scalar continuum.

Self-generated movement leads to the attenuation of predicted sensory consequences of the movement. This mechanism ensures that attention is generally not drawn to sensory signals caused by own movement. Such attenuation has been observed across the animal kingdom and in different sensory modalities. In this study we used novel virtual reality (VR) devices to test the hypothesis that the human brain attenuates visual sensation in the area of the visual field where the subject's hand is currently moving. We conducted three VR experiments where we monitored hand position during movement while the participants performed a visual search task. In the first two experiments we measured response time for salient moving targets and observed that reaction time (RT) is slower for targets that are behind the (invisible) hand. This result provides the first evidence that the visual motion signals generated by the subject's own hand movement are suppressed. In the third experiment we observed that RT is also slower for colored targets behind the hand. Our findings provide support for the active inference account of sensory attenuation, which posits that attenuation occurs because attention is withdrawn from the sensory consequences of own movement. Furthermore, we demonstrate how modern VR tools could open up new exciting avenues of research for studying the interplay of action and perception.

Biological computers in sleep medicine: Promise, ethics, and future frontiers Recent advances in "industrial" bioengineered neural-circuits are heralding a new era in computational neuroscience [1]. These human-derived neural-cell cultures are being developed not only as models to explore brain function, but also as components of "biological-computers" intended for commercial applications [2]. Such In-Vitro Biological Neural Networks (BNNs) could surpass Artificial Neural Networks (ANNs) in several areas, such as real-time learning, parallel processing, energy efficiency, self-repair abilities, and autonomous consciousness [3]. In sleep medicine, where the complex relationship between neural circuitry and sleep-wake regulation remains a critical frontier, these technologies present intriguing possibilities for novel diagnostics and therapeutics. However, the rapid commercialization of these technologies also raises significant ethical concerns that we, as sleep clinicians and neuroscientists, must proactively address.

Time is re-envisioned as a recursive resonance cycle rather than a linear continuum. We introduce the Arcsecond Resonance Unit (ARU)-defined by the time it takes light to make a full 360°loop around a curved path-as a novel temporal metric. In this framework, the speed of light c represents the upper limit on how fast spatial curvature can "resolve" into temporal coherence, with a full 360 • traversal marking the return to phase alignment. We present the ARU model with its governing formula, ARU = 2πr √ 1+ϵ c , treating time as a cycle determined by geometry (where ϵ quantifies curvature distortion). We explore how this resonant view of time provides alternative interpretations for cosmological redshift (geometric stretching vs. Doppler velocity), reframes the concept of a "bubble edge" as the perceptual horizon of our current coherence cycle, and finds analogies in optical cavities, phase-locked oscillators, and neural coherence rhythms. Potential applications range from cosmology and theoretical physics to perceptual science, illustrating a creative synthesis between established physics and speculative frameworks.

Where does consciousness come from? Despite numerous theories – from neuronal correlates to information processing to quantum physical hypotheses – this question remains unanswered if it is considered only within narrow disciplinary boundaries. This essay proposes an alternative approach: consciousness is not understood here as an emergent phenomenon or product of neuronal activity, but as the result of a multi-stage, systemic-thermodynamic process. The key concepts are: autopoiesis, causal poiesis and causal collapse. They mark three fundamental stages on which living systems emerge, center, and finally, under certain conditions, develop consciousness.
The aim of this essay is to systematically reconstruct this path from life to consciousness on the basis of the concepts mentioned above – not in the sense of a goal-oriented development, but as a consequence of certain structural and exchange relations in open systems.
This approach deliberately differs from established information-theoretical models such as Integrated Information Theory (IIT) or Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT). While these try to explain consciousness through functional information integration, the approach proposed here is based on structural-thermodynamic processes as they occur in the self-organization of living systems. Terms such as "causal core" or "causal collapse" are conceptual proposals that are based on concretely describable systemic properties – even if they have so far only been formalized and operationalized in initial theoretical work (cf. Stegemann, 2025a, 2025b). The present text is therefore not intended as a complete theory, but as a theoretical framework for the development of an interdisciplinary model of understanding.

This article explores human consciousness within the framework of neuroscience, questioning whether consciousness is merely a product of neuronal activity or whether it reflects a deeper underlying reality beyond such activity. It analyzes two leading theories that attempt to explain how interactions between neurons generate conscious experience—Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (Dehaene & Changeux, 2011) and Integrated Information Theory (Tononi, 2004 —and critically evaluates the extent to which these theories can fully account for consciousness through neural correlates alone. Grounded in David Chalmers’ (1995) notion of the “hard problem,” the article examines the limitations of current explanations regarding the
nature of subjective experience. These limitations, it is argued, may challenge the objectivity of scientific inquiry in this domain. In addition, speculative yet compelling approaches such as panpsychism (Goff, 2017) and quantum consciousness theories (Hameroff & Penrose, 2014), which suggest that consciousness may point to a reality beyond neurons, are discussed. Drawing on empirical findings from neuroscience, the article emphasizes the need to consider consciousness not only through biological mechanisms but also within psychological and
sociological frameworks. In doing so, it proposes a multidisciplinary foundation for consciousness research that integrates diverse perspectives to foster a more comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon.

Keywords: Consciousness, Neuroscience, Hard Problem, Neuropsychology, Neural Activity,
Neurophilosophy, Panpsychism

There are plenty of issues to be solved in order for researchers to agree on a neural model of consciousness. Here we emphasize an often under-represented aspect in the debate: time consciousness. Consciousness and the present moment both extend in time. Experience flows through a succession of moments and progresses from future predictions, to present experiences, to past memories. However, a brief review finds that many dominant theories of consciousness only refer to brief, static, and discrete "functional moments" of time. Very few refer to more extended, dynamic, and continuous time, which is associated with conscious experience (cf. the "experienced moment"). This confusion between short and discrete versus long and continuous is, we argue, one of the core issues in theories of consciousness. Given the lack of work dedicated to time consciousness, its study could test novel predictions of rival theories of consciousness. It may be that different theories of consciousness are compatible/complementary if the different aspects of time are taken into account. Or, if it turns out that no existing theory can fully accommodate time consciousness, then perhaps it has something new to add. Regardless of outcome, the crucial step is to make subjective time a central object of study.

Within the neuroscience of consciousness there are two incompatible views of human beings: you are your brain (neurocentric) and you are not your brain but you have a brain (humanistic). Neurocentric views are trapped in the Cartesian legacy of the mentalphysical duality as well as the mind-body dualism that manifests in the mind-brain and brain-body dualisms. A version of physicalism coupled with idealism and scientism wraps these views into modern versions of the Cartesian image they seek to overcome. A humanistic view sees humans as living systems that consist of parts and wholes where the wholes obtain features that do not belong to the parts. As an alternative naturalistic image, it stands outside the dualistic thinking and Cartesian legacy and maintains that a human being is a complex embodied, physical thing. Based on interactive realism that accepts reality is triply contingent, it depends both on how extra-mental reality is and on how living organisms collectively perceive reality. The objective of this article is not to evaluate the merit of each view but a critical analysis of the frameworks that make each view possible.

On an unprecedented scale, contemporary neuroscience confronts us with claims about our essential nature as human beings. These vary from you are your brain to you have no free will. Despite the prevalence of these claims in the neurosciences on the big questions about ourselves, contemporary neuroscience of consciousness does not speak with a unified voice. Although mainstream neuroscience of consciousness claims that you are your brain, a minority tradition argues you are not your brain but that you have a brain. The substance of these two traditions is presented in this article. An evaluation of the impact of the neurosciences on the big questions of being humans should as a first step appreciate the significance that the neurosciences do not automatically provide a solution to these age-old questions about human beings but display a spectrum of views.

Accounts of predictive processing propose that conscious experience is influenced not only by passive predictions about the world, but also by predictions encompassing how the world changes in relation to our actions – that is, on predictions about sensorimotor contingencies. We tested whether valid sensorimotor predictions, in particular learned associations between stimuli and actions, shape reports about conscious visual experience. Two experiments used instrumental conditioning to build sensorimotor predictions linking different stimuli with distinct actions. Conditioning was followed by a breaking continuous flash suppression (b-CFS) task, measuring the speed of reported breakthrough for different pairings between the stimuli and prepared actions, comparing those congruent and incongruent with the trained sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 1, counterbalancing of the response actions within the b-CFS task was achieved by repeating the same action within each block but havin...

Research into human consciousness is a dynamic and multidisciplinary field, merging perspectives from neuroscience, psychology, philosophy, and cognitive science. This article reviews significant theories of consciousness, emphasizing Bernard Baars' Global Workspace Theory and Michael Graziano's Attention Schema Theory. It discusses the current state of neuroscientific investigations into the neural correlates of consciousness, the dimensions of consciousness, and the implications of advances in artificial intelligence. Additionally, it explores the philosophical challenges of consciousness, particularly the hard problem, and examines whether consciousness is possible for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Recent advances, including cutting-edge neuroimaging and computational modeling, are incorporated to reflect the field’s evolution as of 2025.

This research investigates the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) through a novel “no-cognition” paradigm that employs the unique capacity of meditators to prevent cognitive reactions to stimuli. It also uses the innovative ability of machine learning to decode perceptual content from brain activity to test a prediction about the temporal dynamics of consciousness. 

Within neuroscience, the exact parameters of NCC is a matter of contention. For cognitively based theories, the NCC entails activity related to cognition in the frontal cortex in addition to perceptually related  processing in the occipital and temporal cortex. This is opposed to sensory-based theories that mainly focus on the occipital and temporal cortex. 

Using electroencephalography, the experiment tested the neural responses of a group of advanced meditators and non-meditative controls. A comparison of the groups across no-task and task conditions evaluated whether the P3b component is an NCC, as predicted by the
cognitively based global neuronal workspace theory (GNWT), or constitutes a neural correlate of cognitive processing related to task relevance. We also tested GNWT’s prediction that consciousness arises 300–600 ms post stimulus. 

Our results appear to provide evidence that the P3b component is not an NCC, but is instead a neural correlate of cognitive processing related to task relevance, as demonstrated by the P3b’s presence in the task condition and disappearance in the no-task condition. For decoding, we found that accuracy remained above chance until 500 ms in both conditions when comparing between stimulus categories and individual face stimuli, which is consistent with GNWT’s temporal predictions about consciousness’s ignition. Overall, this data implies that some facets of the competing theories are valid, while other aspects are invalid, thus suggesting that cognitivist and sensory based theories should be integrated, instead of entirely opposed to one another.

This study aims to provide a comprehensive review of the ethical, legal and social issues in human brain organoid research, with a view to different types of research and applications: in vitro research, transplantation into nonhuman animals, and biocomputing. Despite the academic and societal attention on the possibility that human brain organoids may be conscious, we have identified diverse issues in human brain organoid research and applications. To guide the complex terrain of human brain organoid research and applications, a multidisciplinary approach that integrates ethical, legal, and social perspectives is essential.

The loss of consciousness (LOC) during seizures is one of the most striking features that significantly impact the quality of life, even though the neuronal network involved is not fully comprehended. We analyzed the intracerebral patterns in patients with focal drugresistant epilepsy, both with and without LOC. We assessed the localization, lateralization, stereo electroencephalography (SEEG) patterns, seizure duration, and the quantification of contacts exhibiting electrical discharge. The degree of LOC was quantified using the Consciousness Seizure Scale. Thirteen patients (40 seizures) with focal drug-resistant epilepsy underwent SEEG. In cases of temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE, 6 patients and 15 seizures), LOC occurred more frequently in seizures with mesial rather than lateral temporal lobe onset. On the other hand, in cases of frontal lobe epilepsy (7 patients; 25 seizures), LOC was associated with pre-frontal onset, a higher number of contacts with epileptic discharge compared to the onset count and longer seizure durations. Our study revealed distinct characteristics during LOC depending on the epileptogenic zone. For temporal lobe seizures, LOC was associated with mesial seizure onset, whereas in frontal lobe epilepsy, seizure with LOC has a significant increase in contact showing epileptiform discharge and a pre-frontal onset. This phenomenon may be correlated with the broad neural network required to maintain consciousness, which can be affected in different ways, resulting in LOC

Accounts of predictive processing propose that conscious experience is influenced not only by passive predictions about the world, but also by predictions encompassing how the world changes in relation to our actions-that is, on predictions about sensorimotor contingencies. We tested whether valid sensorimotor predictions, in particular learned associations between stimuli and actions, shape reports about conscious visual experience. Two experiments used instrumental conditioning to build sensorimotor predictions linking different stimuli with distinct actions. Conditioning was followed by a breaking continuous flash suppression task, measuring the speed of reported breakthrough for different pairings between the stimuli and prepared actions, comparing those congruent and incongruent with the trained sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 1, counterbalancing of the response actions within the breaking continuous flash suppression task was achieved by repeating the same action within each block but having them differ across the two blocks. Experiment 2 sought to increase the predictive salience of the actions by avoiding the repetition within blocks. In Experiment 1, breakthrough times were numerically shorter for congruent than incongruent pairings, but Bayesian analysis supported the null hypothesis of no influence from the sensorimotor predictions. In Experiment 2, reported conscious perception was significantly faster for congruent than for incongruent pairings. A meta-analytic Bayes factor combining the two experiments confirmed this effect. Altogether, we provide evidence for a key implication of the action-oriented predictive processing approach to conscious perception, namely that sensorimotor predictions shape our conscious experience of the world.

All of us involved in the mind and brain sciences, in whatever capacity, are increasingly aware of the importance of ensuring the credibility of our research. This credibility-which for experimental work turns on its reliability-is particularly salient for consciousness research, given the at-times precarious perception of consciousness science within the wider landscapes of psychology and neuroscience (Michel et al. 2019). We are therefore very pleased to introduce a number of 'open science' initiatives that have recently been implemented in Neuroscience of Consciousness. One key objective of open science is to actively resist the tendency to search for, and to preferentially publish, eye-catching findings that fit with compelling narratives. This means supporting studies that have been designed to report unbiased results that are reproducible and replicable, whether or not they are narratively convenient. The gold standard approach here is the Registered Report (RR) format. Intuitively, the idea is to allow researchers to retain complete control over their hypotheses, methods and interpretations, but not over the results (Hardwicke and Ioannidis 2018; Chambers 2019). RRs divide the peer review process into two stages. In the first, reviewers evaluate the rationale, hypotheses, methods and proposed analyses for a study. These are described in a 'stage 1' manuscript. This stage takes place before any data collection, other than pilot data collected purely to inform study design. Submissions can be rejected, sent for revision, or accepted at this stage. Importantly, stage 1 peer review offers opportunities to enhance study design-including correction of potentially fatal confounds and flaws-while there is still time. This benefits the researchers and is rewarding for the reviewers. Once a stage 1 submission is accepted, it is preregistered in a time-stamped public repository such as the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/), with or without a temporary embargo. Following this 'in principle acceptance', the researchers carry out their planned data collection and perform their preregistered analyses, as well as any additional, clearly demarcated, exploratory analyses. They then submit a stage 2 manuscript incorporating these results and a discussion. The introduction and methods remain unchanged from the stage 1 in-principle-accepted manuscript. This stage 2 submission is sent back to the original reviewers-who cannot at this point raise post hoc objections to the study rationale or design. Critically, the journal is committed to publish this stage 2 manuscript no matter how the results turn out, so long as the researchers followed the procedures that they described in their stage 1 submission, and have

The theories of consciousness discussed by Doerig and colleagues tend to monolithically identify consciousness with some other phenomenon, process, or mechanism. But by treating consciousness as singular explanatory target, such theories will struggle to account for the diverse properties that conscious experiences exhibit. We propose that progress in consciousness science will best be achieved by elaborating systematic mappings between physical and biological mechanisms, and the functional and (crucially) phenomenological properties of consciousness. This means we need theories for consciousness science, perhaps more so than theories of consciousness. From this perspective, 'predictive processing' emerges as a highly promising candidate.

All of us involved in the mind and brain sciences, in whatever capacity, are increasingly aware of the importance of ensuring the credibility of our research. This credibility-which for experimental work turns on its reliability-is particularly salient for consciousness research, given the at-times precarious perception of consciousness science within the wider landscapes of psychology and neuroscience (Michel et al. 2019). We are therefore very pleased to introduce a number of 'open science' initiatives that have recently been implemented in Neuroscience of Consciousness. One key objective of open science is to actively resist the tendency to search for, and to preferentially publish, eye-catching findings that fit with compelling narratives. This means supporting studies that have been designed to report unbiased results that are reproducible and replicable, whether or not they are narratively convenient. The gold standard approach here is the Registered Report (RR) format. Intuitively, the idea is to allow researchers to retain complete control over their hypotheses, methods and interpretations, but not over the results (Hardwicke and Ioannidis 2018; Chambers 2019). RRs divide the peer review process into two stages. In the first, reviewers evaluate the rationale, hypotheses, methods and proposed analyses for a study. These are described in a 'stage 1' manuscript. This stage takes place before any data collection, other than pilot data collected purely to inform study design. Submissions can be rejected, sent for revision, or accepted at this stage. Importantly, stage 1 peer review offers opportunities to enhance study design-including correction of potentially fatal confounds and flaws-while there is still time. This benefits the researchers and is rewarding for the reviewers. Once a stage 1 submission is accepted, it is preregistered in a time-stamped public repository such as the Open Science Framework (https://osf.io/), with or without a temporary embargo. Following this 'in principle acceptance', the researchers carry out their planned data collection and perform their preregistered analyses, as well as any additional, clearly demarcated, exploratory analyses. They then submit a stage 2 manuscript incorporating these results and a discussion. The introduction and methods remain unchanged from the stage 1 in-principle-accepted manuscript. This stage 2 submission is sent back to the original reviewers-who cannot at this point raise post hoc objections to the study rationale or design. Critically, the journal is committed to publish this stage 2 manuscript no matter how the results turn out, so long as the researchers followed the procedures that they described in their stage 1 submission, and have

The ability to recognize one's own face is a hallmark of self-awareness. In healthy subjects, the sympathetic skin response evoked by self-face recognition has a greater area under the curve of the signal than responses evoked by other visual stimuli. We evaluated the sympathetic skin responses evoked by self-face images and by six other visual stimuli (conditions) in 15 patients with severe disorders of consciousness and in 15 age-matched healthy subjects. Under all conditions, the evoked area of the sympathetic skin response was smaller in patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, intermediate in patients in a minimally conscious state, and greater in healthy subjects. In patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome, no differences were found between the sympathetic skin response area evoked by self-face images and those evoked by other conditions. In patients in a minimally conscious state, the area of the sympathetic skin response evoked by self-face presentation was greater than those evoked by other conditions, even if statistical significance was reached only in the comparison to other stimuli not involving a real face. This finding may be due to the inability of these patients to differentiate their own face from those of others. Taken together, these results probably reflect a varying level of self-awareness between patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome and patients in a minimally conscious state, and suggest that the autonomic correlate of self-awareness may have some diagnostic implications for these patients.

Neocortical pyramidal cells can integrate two classes of input separately and use one to modulate response to the other. Their tuft dendrites are electrotonically separated from basal dendrites and soma by the apical dendrite, and apical hyperpolarization-activated currents (I h) further isolate subthreshold integration of tuft inputs. When apical depolarization exceeds a threshold, however, it can enhance response to the basal inputs that specify the cell's selective sensitivity. This process is referred to as apical amplification (AA). We review evidence suggesting that, by regulating I h in the apical compartments, adrenergic arousal controls the coupling between apical and somatic integration zones thus modifying cognitive capabilities closely associated with consciousness. Evidence relating AA to schizophrenia, sleep, and anesthesia is reviewed, and we assess theories that emphasize the relevance of AA to consciousness. Implications for theories of neocortical computation that emphasize context-sensitive modulation are summarized. We conclude that the findings concerning AA and its regulation by arousal offer a new perspective on states of consciousness, the function and evolution of neocortex, and psychopathology. Many issues worthy of closer examination arise.

This paper challenges long-held beliefs about consciousness and selfhood, proposing that these phenomena-far from being intrinsic or metaphysical-are evolved survival tools. We argue that emotions and the sense of self function as adaptive mechanisms shaped to reduce uncertainty and optimize behavior in complex environments. Leveraging Karl Friston's free-energy principle and Mark Solms' affective neuroscience, we present a new framework: selfhood, much like emotions, is a construct of the brain's predictive coding system. It emerges not as an independent entity but as a dynamic narrative created by the brain to maintain coherence and minimize prediction errors. The self, traditionally seen as a discrete and central entity, may instead be an illusion generated by the brain's ego-driven processes. We also explore the implications of this functionalist view for artificial intelligence, suggesting that intelligent systems can operate effectively without subjective experiences like qualia. By reframing emotions and selfhood as adaptive artifacts, this paper invites empirical and philosophical inquiry into the true role of consciousness and self-perception, challenging foundational ideas of individual discreteness and exploring the mind's role in shaping reality. The Pragmatic Role of Consciousness and Emotion

According to Phillips, (1) genuine perception is attributable to the individual (i.e. it is a personal state/event, as opposed to sub-personal states/events in the individual's brain); (2) since unconscious perceptual representations are ill-suited to guide action, there is no good reason to attribute them to the individual; (3) not being attributable to the individual, they do not instantiate genuine perception, thereby failing to support the hypothesis that genuine perception can occur unconsciously. I argue that this reasoning is flawed and cannot be easily fixed. Phillips contends that unconscious perceptual representations do not guide action because they fail to meet certain conditions that are sufficient for action guidance. But those conditions may not be necessary for action guidance. Consequently, unconscious perceptual representations may guide action even if they do not meet Phillips' conditions. Furthermore, due to his commitment to the distinction between personal and sub-personal states/events, Phillips is not in a position to argue that his conditions are necessary for action guidance. For the distinction applies to action as well as to perception, and when genuine action is identified by personal-level criteria, Phillips' conditions turn out unnecessary for action guidance.

In this article I propose that consciousness and self-awareness have a unique way of processing and creating information about themselves. This form disrespects one of the most basic principles underlying information theories: the inverse relationship principle, Barwise (1997). We propose a principle that works inversely to the Barwise principle. We call this principle the direct relationship principle.

Flipping through social media feeds, viewing exhibitions in a museum, or walking through the botanical gardens, people consistently choose to engage with and disengage from visual content. Yet, in most laboratory settings, the visual stimuli, their presentation duration, and the task at hand are all controlled by the researcher. Such settings largely overlook the spontaneous nature of human visual experience, in which perception takes place independently from specific task constraints and its time course is determined by the observer as a self-governing agent. Currently, much remains unknown about how spontaneous perceptual experiences unfold in the brain. Are all perceptual categories extracted during spontaneous perception? Does spontaneous perception inherently involve volition? Is spontaneous perception segmented into discrete episodes? How do different neural networks interact over time during spontaneous perception? These questions are imperative to understand our conscious vi...

It has been theorized that cortical feed-forward and recurrent neural activity support unconscious and conscious cognitive processes, respectively. Here we causally tested this proposition by applying event-related transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) at early and late times relative to visual stimuli, together with a pulse designed to suppress conscious detection. Consistent with pre-registered hypotheses, early TMS affected residual, reportedly 'unseen' capacity. However, conscious perception also appeared critically dependent upon feed-forward processing to a greater extent than the later recurrent phase. Additional exploratory analyses suggested that these early effects dissociated from top-down criterion measures, which were most affected by later TMS. These findings are inconsistent with a simple dichotomy where feed-forward and recurrent processes correspond to unconscious and conscious mechanisms. Instead, different components of awareness may correspond to different phases of cortical dynamics in which initial processing is broadly perceptual whereas later recurrent processing might relate to decision to report.