The Court and the Jungle: Integrating Narratives of Privilege

Montserrat Cachero

Privileges are an unpopular. Inefficient from the economic point of view, they even have been considered as an obstacle for economic growth. From the political perspective, privileges denote weakness. A sovereign who grants prerogatives in exchange of financial and personal favors was not only vulnerable but evil. Despite that, it is obvious that we cannot consider privileges as a monolithic institution. In economic terms, privileges not always represented a loss for the society while a positive benefit for a few. In politics, privileges could have a strategic purpose instead of representing just weakness. This paper analyses the political, legal and economic institution of privilege. It focuses in the prerogatives granted by the Spanish Crown for the colonization of the New World. By connecting the negotiation process at the core of the colonial system (the Court) with the application of such privileges in the periphery (the jungle) we understand not only the reasons for privilege but also their social and political impact.

The Court and the Jungle: Integrating Narratives of Privilege Montserrat Cachero Vinuesa Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Center for History and Economics Research Project: Poly-centric States, HAR2013-45357-P This is a Preliminary Version. Please do not quote it without permission Abstract Privileges are unpopular. Inefficient from the economic point of view, they even have been considered as an obstacle for economic growth. From the political perspective, privileges denote weakness. A sovereign who grants prerogatives in exchange of financial and personal favors was not only vulnerable but evil. Despite that, it is obvious that we cannot consider privileges as a monolithic institution. In economic terms, privileges not always represented a loss for the society while a positive benefit for a few. In politics, privileges could have a strategic purpose instead of representing just weakness. This paper analyses the political, legal and economic institution of privilege. It focuses in the prerogatives granted by the Spanish Crown for the colonization of the New World. By connecting the negotiation process at the core of the colonial system (the Court) with the application of such privileges in the periphery (the jungle) we understand not only the reasons for privilege but also their social and political impact. Keywords: Privileges, Institutions, Spanish Empire, Connected Histories, Digital Humanities After the first journey of Columbus the Catholic Kings claimed to the Pope Alexander VI for confirmation of their rights as sovereigns of the new territories. Only a few months later, in 1493, the Spanish Pope issued a set of bulls called Inter Caeterea, Eximiae Devotionis and Dudum Siquidem. In the documents, the realm of Castile was awarded with the control over all islands and mainlands found and to be found, discovered and to be discovered towards the west and south, by drawing and establishing a line from ... the north, ...to ...the south, ... the said line to be distant one hundred leagues towards the west and south from any of the islands commonly known as the Azores and Cape Verde .1 With his blessing, the Holy Father forced the Spanish Monarchy to assume the responsibility of conquest, populate and Christianize the New World. The kings however had not the interest or the means for such an enterprise. Neither the monarchy nor the aristocracy had possibly achieved the conquest of America.2 The Crown used 1 All papal bulls have been transcript and, with the permission of the Vatican, uploaded to the web. They can be consulted at http://www.papalencyclicals.net 2 See Ots Capdequí (1952), p. 51. Also Bernal del Castillo refers to the same phenomenon in his chronicle about Mexico providing all sort of details. privileges as a positive incentive to attract private resources to the discovery of the New World. At this initial stage, professional merchants and navigators joined forces to explore new territories. The enterprise was privately funded, the monarchy earned a fifth of the total revenues and the territories, which were claimed on the name of the Spanish kings. The use of privileges allowed to the Crown to fulfill the papal commitment and guarantee the conquest and colonization of America. Despite the use of privileges in this case, they have been considered inefficient. The analysis of privileges has captured the attention of the Economic Theory creating a wide field of research. Especially during the 70s, when economists produced a great deal of papers and models. First Anne Krueger and after Gordon Tullock used the term rent-seeking to describe the activity of individuals negotiating with a political power to obtain any kind of special privilege or market restriction.3 This concept alludes to the state by which political decisions will make one or several persons win but when loosing the whole society.4 From a theoretical point of view, rent-seeking it is said to discourage innovation and production being considered indeed as an obstacle for economic growth.5 Economic Historians also had analysed privileges. For the Spanish Empire, Drelichman (2005) and Kennedy (1997) state that the willingness of the monarchy to grant privileges encouraged the most skilled human capital in engage in rent-seeking activities rather than in productive undertaking. The conclusions of their analysis seem to confirm the Economic Theory. Despite some historical inaccurancies, the research is restricted to urban economies and their results cannot be used as a general explanation for privileges. Economic activity in European cities during the 16th century was absolutely different from the New World. After 1492 America represented a challenge with more risk than potential benefits. In such scenario, privileges were a necessary evil. The Crown provided the right incentives to mobilized resources towards the new territories. This paper analyses such process connecting the negotiation of privileges in Europe (the Court) with the use of this prerogatives in America (the Jungle). We confront legislation with reality using evidence from letters, reports and trials. Conclusions show that privileges rather to become an obstacle contributed to territorial expansion and therefore economic growth. 1. The Court The period between the Discovery of America and the coronation of Charles V as Holy Roman Emperor in 1519 was convulsed. After the union of Iberian realms under the Crown of Castile accomplished by the Catholic Kings, the House of Trastamara was facing difficulties in the succession. The death of Isabela I in 1504 without a masculine heir forced the promulgation of her daughter Joanna as queen of Castile. The controversial personality of Queen Joanna and her health problems opened a period politically unstable. In less than three decades the realm 3 Although the term was used for first time by Anne Krueger, Gordon Tullock dedicated most of his academic career to rent seeking analysis. See Tullock (1993). 4 See Harberger (1954) (1959), Johnson (1958), Wemelsfelder (1960), Schwartzman (1960), Leibenstein (1966) and Tullock (1967). 5 See Murphy et. Al. (1991, 1993). was ruled by four different kings and several regents. This volatile political scenario was imprint in the character of the Court. The kings were permanently travelling from one city to other to visit their vassals. The sovereigns were looking for legitimacy and political support. The so-called Itinerant Court had different capitals until 1561. From the traditional capital of Castile in Burgos to the new imperial capital in Toledo and, from Valladolid to Granada, sees of the Audience. Councilors, aristocrats, bishops and high ranks speaking Flemish, French, German or Italian coexisted together in this heterogeneous Court. The new king, Charles V, was immersed in European political problems. The wars with France, the Ottoman threat and the conflicts among Italian States required constantly his presence. The monarch relied in the advice of his council. Suitors for royal favour knew about the influence of councilors and worked hard to have them on their side. The conquistador Diego de Ordás while his stay at the Court in 1530 demanded his nephew in Mexico to send him mirrors, Indian slaves, feathers and all sort of exotic products to earn the will of the councilors closed to the king. This circumstance of course was not unique of the extravagant Spanish Court and, in other realms, the situation was similar. For the case of Early Modern France for instance, Hilton Root states that economic privileges were held by individuals because of their special relationship with power brokers within the regime.6 Soldiers, bankers, noblemen and civil servants arrived to the Court to negotiate economic and political privileges for the New World. Territories controlled by the Aztec and Inca Empires were transformed into viceroyalties and preserved for the Crown however the Caribbean was still unexplored. As a matter of fact, the large coastline from Cartagena to the estuary of the Amazon River was on the table. The competition was hard and all of them requested a piece of the cake. Diego de Ordás, one of the men of Hernán Cortes, and Francisco de Orellana, captain of Pizarro in the conquest of the Inca Empire, happened to meet in the Court. The letters written by Ordás to his nephew and agent in Mexico describe the negotiation process. In the case of Ordás negotiation took nearly two years travelling with the itinerant Court from Madrid to Toledo, Burgos, Valladolid or Segovia. He was in constant need for cash to cover his expenses. For a soldier as Ordás the live in the Court was excessive. In one of his letters he affi ed that e pe ditu es ha e ee e o ita t, we wasted here in a day same that in a month in times of queen Isabela […] It is a sha e to ad it hat I had spe t .7 At least Ordás had important possessions to sell in Mexico but other conquerors were not that lucky. Some privilege holders after months of negotiation abandoned the Court with more debts than prerogatives. Ordás finally succeeded and received some of the most important encomiendas in Mexico, cattle ranch and the designation for governor of Rio Solís. Despite his triumph, Ordás remained in the Court hoping for permission to explore territory in the coast of Terra Firma. He certainly knew about economic resources of the area and, finally in 1530, the king awarded him with 200 leagues of land between Venezuela and the domains of the king of Portugal. 6 Root (1996), p. 9. 7 Otte (1959), p. XXV. Despite that, not all candidates were in the same position for negotiation. Some of them were closer to the sovereigns and, what is more important, had the funding to accomplish the mission of conquest and colonize the New World. After more than two decades of territorial expansion the kings were aware of the economic cost of expeditions. Not all privilege holders succeeded at finding partners to invest in their enterprise. In such situation applicants with endowment and means had a comparative advantage. When in the year 1528 Heinrich Ehinger and Hieronymus Sailer, agents of the Welser company, received Venezuela was not the result of a long negotiation. The king himself asked García de Lerma to convince the company to take part in the colonization of America. The Welsers had enough capital to recruit and pay soldiers, hire workers, provide equipment and weapons, cover allowances during the journey and guarantee supply during the settlement. The company owned ships, mines, textile production centers, financial networks and had a wide experience in slave trade. These are some of the reasons that can explain why the monarchy considered the Welser company the right choice for Venezuela. The reign of Charles V represented the maximum territorial expansion. When his office took to an end in 1556 most of the territory in the Caribbean had been incorporated to the Spanish Empire. The period under his son Philip II was focused on settlement and financial struggles more than expansion. This paper deals with the first stage. It analyses the prerogatives granted by the Spanish Crown during the period between 1492 and 1556, describing who, what, when, why and what for of these privileges. 1.1. Mapping Privileges Cedularios are collections of Royal Decrees and legal dispositions dictated by the Spanish Monarchy for its colonies since 1492 until the independence of America. The cedularios contains the legislation concerning the government of territories from the other side of the Atlantic. The dispositions included the confirmation of privileges granted by the Crown together with important pieces of information about political conflicts, trade, indigenous population, taxes, economic resources and even the Catholic Church. Even though royal decrees were sent to the colonies the scribes at the Court used to keep copies of all documents. Those copies have been preserved and can be consulted in the Archivo General de Indias in Seville. For some territories these cedularios have been partially transcript and printed.8 These sets of royal decrees represent a rich source of information to reconstruct the political life of some specific areas. At the first stage of the Spanish expansion legal dispositions refer to Hispaniola (Santo Domingo), Saint Joan (Puerto Rico) and Cuba. They knew about the existence of the continental coast but the discovery of gold mines in Santo Domingo reduced the activity in the 8 This paper used the Cedularios for the historical provinces of Cartagena, Santa Marta, Margarita, Venezuela, Paria, Marañón, Hispaniola, Cubagua and Cumaná. The territory analysed is the coastline between Cartagena de Indias and the estuary of Amazon River plus the current Dominican Republic and Margarita Island. In the bibliography are included full references of the printed Cedularios. Caribbean to the main islands. The exhaustion of mining, the arrival of migrants from the old continent and the establishment of pearl factories in Margarita and Cubagua acted as push factors for the exploration of the Terra Firma. With every expedition new political divisions appeared and new sets of royal decrees to regulate such territories. The following map represents the initial political boundaries among these territories. Map 1: The Caribbean in the 16th Century Source: Map of Alonso de Santa Cruz (1505-1567), Spanish National Library, Madrid This paper analyses information of cedularios from Hispaniola, Venezuela, Santa Marta, Cartagena, Margarita, Cumaná, Cubagua and Nueva Andalucía (provinces of Paria and Marañón). The period under analysis ranges from 1492 to 1556, year in which Charles V abdicated. In the different sets of royal decrees under analysis have been found more than 500 privileges granted to nearly 250 individuals. The information was coded and organized in a data base. I use Gephi to represent the network where each node was sized according to the number of privileges received. Results are shown in the following map. Map 2: Privileges granted by the Spanish Crown Source: Own elaboration with data from Cedularios It is possible to distinguish three main clusters in the graph, those individuals who are closer to the king Charles V, the group receiving privileges from the Empress, and agents negotiating with both sovereigns. At first sight it is obvious that the most successful nodes are central agents, we can affirm therefore that what really matters in this negotiation is not to be closer but to be in between. In terms of network analysis this is called betweenness. Betweenness centrality can be defined as the number of times a node acts as a bridge regarding others.9 In this case of analysis it is important not only to bridge but to bridge between major privilege grantors, the king and his queen. The graph also maps strong and weak ties. We can observe central clusters close to king Charles V and queen Isabel of Portugal and gatherings in the surroundings. These separate groups represent the activity of councilors and regents as privilege grantors. Cardinal Adrian of Utrecht personal councilor of the Emperor, Alonso Manrique de Lara Bishop of Seville and 9 For a summary about Social Network Analysis and History see Cachero Vinuesa (2016). member of the Council of Indies or even Philip II when was still a Prince were signing privileges on behalf of the king. Nodes linking those separate groups with the central clusters are agents who received privileges from different authorities. Individuals not always succeeded, either because they were not awarded with a privilege or because they could not find the necessary funding. It is extremely difficult to find information about the first option, specially using law as major source. In fact, the Crown would not dictate legal dispositions for agents failing at the negotiation process. To include those individuals as nodes in our network we would need personal information. Unfortunately, letters and personal records are pretty rare and information for the first half of the 16th century arises basically from official sources. Luckily we do have information about the second option, agents receiving a privilege but not enjoying it. As it was explained at the beginning of this section, for some individuals negotiation with the monarchy was a time consuming process. After receiving the privileges most of them lacked of financial resources to go America. Although some of them managed to obtain subsidies from the Crown for most of the people that was not an option and they had to apply for private credit. Non-tied nodes from the graph represent agents who did not succeed in finding financial resources and have to renounce to the privilege initially granted. This situation was not unusual especially for privileges which require a large investment like the exploration of a territory. That was the case of Juan de Espés in Nueva Andalucía or Alonso Luis de Lugo in Santa Marta. Colors represent destination of the privileges. The following table describes the palette and the percentage of privileges granted for every province. Note that Venezuela and Cubagua registered greater percentage of privileges. As a matter of fact, riches resources from the Coast of the Pearls attracted a great deal of traders especially during the decades from 1520 to 1540. Table 1: Privileges and Destination Source: Own elaboration with data from Cedularios This paper has explored so far the negotiation of privileges in the Court analyzing protagonist and destinations. Despite knowing who were receiving prerogative and how we still lack of information about the object of the negotiation. The next section deals with this subject and describes exactly what prerogatives were granted at the Court. 2. Taxonomy of Privileges The colonization of America adopted the form of public contracts between the Crown and one individual named as capitulation (capitulación). In the document the king transfers the power to explore, conquest and populate a territory. Having as reference the contract signed between Queen Isabela I and Christophorus Columbus in 1492, the documents conferred to the holder wide prerogatives.10 Being aware of such powers, the monarchy also imposed limitations. First, the new territories were not trading enclaves but part of the Kingdom of Castile. Second, Royal Officers must be part of the expedition to be witness of the resources from the New World. Third, Indians were considered subject of the Spanish Crown. Fourth, at least two members of the Catholic Church had to ship with the armada to protect the Indians from potential abuse.11 With the last condition the sovereigns pretended to fulfill the mission e t usted the Hol Mothe Chu h . Together with the general privileges from capitulation contracts the Spanish Crown also granted personal favours. With an exceptional character, these privileges were dictated in Royal Decrees. At this regard, the casuistic is pretty wide from personal positions in the local administration to high rank designation, trading licences, tax exemptions or travel licences.12 These personal privileges have been grouped in four different categories: Licences, Monopolies, Benefits and Other. Licences represent exceptions to the law. They can be defined as personal permissions to attempt an activity that for the society in general is forbidden. Trading licences, permission for alternative navigation routes or personal dispositions to regulate migration flow are included in this category. Monopolies are exclusive rights for economic activity in a specific area. Usually monopolies are associated with exploitation of natural resources but also we can find example of trade monopolies like the case of the Welser company.13 Benefits are special gift granted by the Crown. They normally allude to tax exemption or special subsidies. The last group is a mix of different privileges that do not fit in the other categories. Special permissions to use space at the dockyard or prerogatives related to the Catholic Church are examples of these privileges. The next graph shows results for the period analysed, the columns represent the proportion of privileges of every kind. 10 Dougnac (1994) analyses the capitulation from a legal perspective. 11 One of them was named Protector de Indios. 12 About the legitimacy of these dispositions see Ots Captequí (1940), pp. 70-75. 13 See section 2.1. Graph 1: Special Privileges Source: Own elaboration with data from Cedularios It seems that during the conquest most of the privileges were granted in the form of licences. The initial regulation of the territories was marked by the idea of nominative exceptions. Most of these licences refered to trade in general and to slave trade in particular. Slave trade was a tied regulated market. The crown dispatched personal permissions for a certain number of slaves. The discovery of gold mines in Santo Domingo and pearls in Terra Firma together with the development of sugar factories increased drastically the demand of labour force. The low population density in the Caribbean was a push factor for the demand of slaves. Castile merchants made use of the situation to claim for additional licences. The last decade however is slightly different. With the conquest stage nearly completed, the priority since the 40s was the guarantee of the settlement. The recruitment of civil servants and the attraction of colonist followed a policy of granting benefits. Land distribution and tax exemption were the most common rewards. The prerogatives however came with conditions. The concession of a land for instance implied the obligation of living there for a minimum period, generally four years, and the fiscal benefits were granted only for one occasion. This extraordinary tax exemption was legally justified with the necessary transport of supplies for the initial settlement and, therefore, it had to be reduced to one single time. Monopolies only appear in the central decades coinciding with the period of greater territorial expansion. In fact, after a capitulation contract the monarchy used to grant exclusive rights for the people taking part in the explorations as an alternative incentive. The next table shows the relationship between general prerogatives in the capitulations and personal privileges in form of royal decrees during the period analysed. Table 2: General and specific privileges Period General Specific Total General (%) Specific (%) 1500-1509 27 4 31 87,10 12,90 1510-1519 3 8 11 27,27 72,73 1520-1529 97 107 217 44,70 49,31 1530-1539 162 113 262 61,83 43,13 1540-1549 25 12 37 67,57 32,43 1550-1559 3 1 4 75,00 25,00 Source: Own elaboration with data from Cedularios The decades between 1520 and 1540 correspond with the greater expansion. This is the period of the exploration of Terra Firma with the capitulations for Santa Marta, Venezuela, Cartagena, Puerto Rico, Cubagua or Paria. After these decades, the number of expeditions drastically decreased, most of the territory in the Caribbean was already explored. During the last years of Charles V the Spanish Crown was more interested on the expansion in Peru and Mexico. Especially after the discoveries of Cerro Rico of Potosí (1545) and silver mines in Zacatecas (1546) respectively.14 The letters from the council of Santo Domingo already evidence this trend. Since 1550 and until 1557 the residents in Hispaniola accused the Emperor of abandoning them. They even affi that e a ot stop shouti g f o he e […] e ause is i the nature of sovereigns to hea ith suffe i g a d e ed the eeds of his essels .15 Most of the activity in major islands from the Caribbean was based on sugar plantation, they constantly complained about the lack of resources especially slaves to work in their factories. Moreover, when the king awarded the Almirant of Indies Luis de Colón -grandson of Christophorus Columbus- with local taxes the city council claimed that they have been transferred to other lord. Although from the legal point of view all capitulations were similar, a transfer of rights from the monarchy to an individual, records evidence a different treatment from one contract to other.16 Some contracts are very simple and only offer standard privileges while others are more generous adding exceptional prerogatives. The table below details different entitlements for the sample of contracts studied. 14 See Lacueva García (2010). 15 Rodríguez Morel (1999), p. 230. 16 Muro Orejón (1989), p. 147. Table 3: Capitulations in the Caribbean Year Grantee Province Political Priv. Economic Priv. Slave Trade Other Trading licence with Governor, Warden of the Tariff exemption, indians, free exports to 1501 Alonso de Ojeda Terra Firma Fortress land (6 leagues) No Hispaniola Tariff exemption, 1504 Alonso de Ojeda Cuquivacoa Governor land No Free trade with Hispaniola Governor, Warden of the Trading licence with Fortress, Designation of Tariff exemption, indians, Fiscal Revenues 1520 Bartolomé de las Casas Cumana Councilors land 350 (8%) Governor, Captain Free imports from General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, Hispaniola, trading 1525 Diego Caballero East Venezuela Warden of the Fortress land No licence with indians Governor, Captain Free trade with Terra General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, Firma, tax abatement 1525 Licenciado Marcelo Villalobos Margarita Warden of the Fortress land No (pearls) Governor, Captain General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, Trading licence with 1526 Juan de Ampiés Aruba, Curaçao y Bonaire Warden of the Fortress land No indians Fiscal revenues (4%), Gobernor, Captain Monopoly supply,tax General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, abatement (mining, Warden of the Fortress land (12 leagues), agriculture and trade), 1528 Heinrich Ehinger and Hieronymus Sayler Venezuela and Adelantado cattle 4000 free navigation Venezuela- Governor, Captain Trading licence with General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, indians, Fiscal Revenues 1530 Diego de Ordás Paria Warden of the Fortress land, 50 (5%), Subsidy Governor, Lord Bailiff, Warden of the Fortress Tariff exemption, Trading licence with 1532 Diego de Heredia Cartagena (Limited to 20 years) land 100 indians, Sugar Factory Governor, Warden of the Tariff exemption, Trading licence with 1533 Jerónimo Dortal Paria Fortress land, No indians Governor, Captain Trading licence with General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, indians, Participation in 1535 Alonso Luis de Lugo Santa Marta Warden of the Fortress land, 100 Fiscal Revenues, Subsidy Governor, Captain Fiscal Revenues (5%), General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, Trading licence with 1536 Juan Despés New Andalusia Warden of the Fortress land, cattle 100 indians, Subsidy Governor, Captain General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, Trading licence with 1540 Diego Gutiérrez y Toledo Costa Rica Warden of the Fortress land, 100 indians Governor, Captain Trading licence with General, Lord Bailiff, Tariff exemption, indians, Fiscal Revenues 1544 Francisco de Orellana New Andalusia Warden of the Fortress land, No (8%) Source: Own elaboration with information from Cedularios Among political prerogatives, the appointment of the conqueror as Governor was the most important. Governors represent the authority of the king in his territory. He was responsible for the application and fulfillment of royal decrees and legal dispositions signed by the king. Governors also had the right to dictate local ordinances, power that was limited in 1531 when the sovereign decrees that they must required the advice of Royal Officers and city councils at this regard. Governors were also judges for appeals in pecuniary sentences of less than 100 pesos. They had the power to banish, control the migration flow, and execute minor sentences. Military authority was represented by the Captain General and the Warden of the fortress. Those ranks were only awarded to protect the borders in conflict territories. The Captain General was responsible for the command and organization of the army and the defense of the territory. This rank normally was joined together with the Governor and for this reason there is not clear separation of duties. Wardens had fortresses under their command. They had to supply weapons, recruit soldiers, control the gates and, alert civilians. Inside the fortress, wardens represented the maximum authority, they could even judge, dictate and execute sentences.17 Regarding political power there are two exceptionalities. First, the power to appoint city councilors awarded to Bartolomé de las Casas. Originally, councilor designations corresponded to the king although in this case the legal authority was transfer to the friar for the special nature of colonization in the province of Cumaná.18 Second, the capitulation with the Ehinger and Sayler, agents of the Welser, constituted a unique case. In the Province of Venezuela all political and military authorities were designated by the company. Despite constant complain by the population the company was ruling the province between 1528 and 1546 and appointing agents even at the local level. Generally, capitulation contracts granted these political positions to the privilege holder for a life time. It is outstanding the case of Diego de Heredia. In the capitulation for Cartagena the conqueror received political powers for a period of twenty years and without possibility of inheritance. In contrast with this exceptional case, it was not unusual to extend the prerogatives also to the heirs, normally for one generation. When the grantee died in the line of duty the claim of heirs for their rights was not always easy and, in most cases, ended it up with a long trial.19 2.1. Economic Privileges and Conflicts The capitulation with Bartolomé de las Casas for Cumaná created a precedent in the participation of governors from fiscal revenues. The friar was awarded with 8% of the total amount of taxes collected in the province under his command. The same disposition although with a lower value was included in the contract with the Welser. This special treatment was also present in the cases of Diego de Ordás and Francisco de Orellana, both were granted with the singular privilege as a payment for their services in the conquest of Mexico and Peru respectively. Monopolies were also present in capitulations. Especially significant was the control of the territory by the Welser company. The Germans did not allow any trader from any nationality to introduce merchandise in their province. The supply of the population was exclusive prerogative of the company. The absolute monopoly fulfilled the expectation of the king and assured the supply however the sovereigns did not consider the prices. Population in Santa Ana de Coro and Maracaibo permanently complained to the Court about abusive prices even in basic commodities. The governors excused their behavior arguing that markets under their control were perfectly supplied and population had already access to credit. The final 17 For further explanations about rights and duties see Recopilación de Leyes de los Reinos de Indias (1841), vol. 3, pp. 42-47. 18 The Catholic Church run two colonization projects under the Regency of Cardinal Cisneros between 1515 and 1516. Both p oje ts had as a pu pose the o uest of the te ito a ou i g the Catholi do t i e ithout a ket of eapo s . “ee h o i le Go zalo Fe á dez de O iedo a d Valdés. 19 That was the case of Diego and Luis de Colón, son and grandson of Christophorus Columbus and Aldonza Villalobos daughter of Licenciado Marcelo Villalobos Governor of Margarita. consequence was that nearly all colonists were in debt with the German company. In 1531 Georg Hohermuth on behalf of the company demanded to the Crown a decree ordering to the colonists to be responsible for debts of deceased. The regalias were the privilege of free exploitation of natural resources during a certain period of time. By law, this power was exclusive of the monarchy and only the sovereign could transfer it to an individual. The kings however perceived in any case a fifth part of the total production in the form of taxes. To this aim, the Crown sent an officer to each province with the major purpose of account resources and discouraged fraud. Regarding economic privileges and resources the historiography had been focused on precious metals, especially gold. The Dorado and other myths had been used as a common explanation to justify exploration of territories in America. However, the conquerors themselves were aware of all sort of resources even more precious that gold. In a letter from the Court o ue o Diego de O dás e i ded his age t i Me i o that do ot look fo i es hi h is pe isha le ut fo la d a d I dia assals .20 Other natural resources commonly appreciated were salt, pearls, gems, Brazilwood and plants used to produce balsam and medicinal remedies. Pearls, gems and treasures were granted in the capitulation not only to the governor but to all soldiers in the expedition. The crown at this regard only requested a part of the spoils as taxes. In these cases the proportion demanded by the monarchy was one fifth, however if the regalias were established for a period of ten years taxes were variable. One tenth for the first year, a ninth for the second and so on until the compulsory fifth, the last five years taxes remained constant. The salt mines were granted to individuals for exclusive exploitation during two years. The Araya salt was rented to Genoese merchants Jacome di Castiglione and Jeronimo Grimaldi during 1515 to 1517 and to the treasurer of Hispaniola Esteban Pasamontes between 1526 and 1528. Salt mines in Cabo Rojo (Puerto Rico) were granted to the merchant Juan and Alonso Fernández de las Varas in 1519 and a few years later to the officer Andrés de Haro. 21 20 Diego de Ordás was alluding to the indians as taxpayers, Otte (1965), p. 106. 21 A out A a a’s salt see Quesada Go zález . For salt mines in Cabo Rojo (Puerto Rico) see Ramírez Padilla (2012). Map 3: The salt mine of Cabo Rojo Source: John White, watercolor, 1585, British Museum Plants also were reason of regulation. For their importance and potential use two plants were mentioned in the capitulation contracts: Brazilwood (Caesalpinia Echinata) and Cassia Fistula. Brazilwood is a compact dyewood whose extracts yield bright crimson and deep purple colours.22 The Brazilwood regulation was quite precise and licences were limited to a specific number of units. In a royal decree signed by queen Isabel of Portugal in April 4th 1531 Juan de Ampiés was granted with the privilege of cut 20 units of Brazilwood in Santa Marta. Licences for the Cassia Fistula (cañafístula in the original documents) were more general. As it happened with the salt mines the crown granted the exploitation in exclusive to an individual for a certain period of time. The concession of these licences for the case of Venezuela was a source of conflicts with the Welser Governors. The royal permission granted to Antonio de Villasante in 1528 only a few months before the capitulation for Venezuela triggered a war with the company. Once that the Welser agents arrived to their province they started to produce balsam and export it to central Europe, despite the royal prohibition. Villasante colluded with opponents to the German rulers and moved to the Court in Spain to denounce 22 In ancient and medieval times, the brazilwood imported to Europe from the Middle East was Caesalpinia braziliensis and other species of Caesalpinia. Caesalpinia echinata (called pau-brasil in Portuguese) is indigenous to the Brazilian coast and played a role in the naming of that country. the situation in front of the West Indies Council.23 The Crown dictated a royal decree favourable to Villasante however, when he died a few years after the exploitation of the balsam was granted to Anton and Bartholomeus Welser. 2.2. Obligations and the Cost of Expeditions In a cost-benefit scenario we should take into account that privileges comes also with obligations. The acceptance of privileges sometimes implied not only economic benefits or political power but also the commitment to fulfill duties. This is especially relevant for capitulation; as a contract, these original documents contain rights and obligations for both parties. For the Crown obligations were basically pay salaries and dictate all sort of disposition for Royal Officers, judges and city councilors to respect the political authority of the privilege holder. Obligations on the other side of the contract were more expensive. As the major purpose of the capitulation was the conquest and colonization of the territory the holders committed to send an armada, explore the territory, construct at least one fortress and supply it with arms, protect the indigenous population and guarantee the settlement. The next graph depicts the ratio privileges-obligations for the capitulations analyzed. Table 3: Ratio Privileges-Obligations24 Year Grantee Province Accomplished πi 1501 Alonso de Ojeda Terra Firma No -0,25 1504 Alonso de Ojeda Cuquivacoa Yes 0,17 1520 Bartolomé de las Casas Cumana Yes 2,33 1525 Diego Caballero East Venezuela No 1,00 1525 Licenciado Marcelo Villalobos Margarita Yes 2,00 1526 Juan de Ampiés Aruba, Curaçao y Bonaire Yes 0,50 1528 Heinrich Ehinger and Hieronymus Sayler Venezuela Yes 7,50 1530 Diego de Ordás Paria Yes 5,00 1532 Diego de Heredia Cartagena Yes 3,00 1533 Jerónimo Dortal Paria Yes 0,67 1535 Alonso Luis de Lugo Santa Marta No 4,00 1536 Juan Despés New Andalusia No 1,75 1540 Diego Gutiérrez y Toledo Costa Rica Yes 6,00 1544 Francisco de Orellana New Andalusia Yes 1,67 Source: Own elaboration with data from Cedularios Economic rationality suggests that the ratio privileges-obligations should have positive values. Indeed, no one would accept a contract with more duties than rights. However, that was not the case of Alonso de Ojeda, his first capitulation with the Spanish Crown for the large territory known as Terra Firma was pretty negative. The document was full of prohibitions and limitations to his political and economic power. According to the initial contract Ojeda had to 23 Once in the Court Villasante presented a report on the production of the balsam, the original document is in Archivo General de Indias, Indiferente 857. See also Barrera-Osorio (2006) and Mira Caballos (2000). 24 For every capitulation the ratio has been calculated as follows πi= Ii-Oi)/Oi where Ii denotes the u e of p i ileges a d Oi the o ligatio s o tai i i apitulatio o t a t ith i= , ,…, . arm 10 ships, explore a wide area with only 50 soldiers, build a fortress and mark the coast and protect it from pirates. The agreement was so harmful that only a few months later the grantee requested the annulment and started negotiating for a new territory. What aused the a ul e t of Diego Ca alle o’s o t a t ho e e as a uite diffe e t variable. Thank to the mediation of Governor of Santa Marta García de Lerma the king had the opportunity to offer Venezuela to the Welser company. As it was explained at the beginning of section two the Welsers were the best possible option to guarantee the settlement in Terra Firma. They could anticipate funding and supply to explore and colonize the territory granted by the Emperor. Historians traditionally have interpreted the substitution of Diego Caballero for the German company as a symptom of political weakness. They argue that Charles V owed the Welser brothers his coronation as emperor of the Holy Roman Empire. It is true that the Fugger and the Welser contributed with their wealth to convince the German princes that Charles was the right candidate and, from the European perspective, it seems that the sovereign was simply paying his debts. Nevertheless, connecting this historical event with the situation in America we can come up with a different explanation. The murder of Rodrigo de Bastidas opened a vacant in the government of Santa Marta. In the Court the banker from Burgos García de Lerma started negotiating on his behalf the exploration of this province adjacent to Venezuela. During the months of March and April of 1528 the king signed three different contracts one for Santa Marta with García de Lerma, other for Venezuela with the agents of the company and a third one called capitulation between García de Lerma and the Welser. In this last document the company committed to contribute to the armada departing for Santa Marta. “pe ifi all the Welse ill p o ide si thousa d ducats fo the a ada, fift soldie s a d o e si th of all e pe ditu e .25 Only by connecting the egotiatio fo Ve ezuela ith “a ta Ma ta’s apitulatio e a u de sta d that o t a ti g with the Welser was a rational and beneficial choice. Not only obligations but also the cost of the expedition can be considered as a negative variable in the calculation of net benefit from a capitulation contract. The estimation of the cost of an expedition it is indeed a harsh task, especially for the 16th century. Luckily, letters of conqueror Diego de Ordás revealed important pieces of information at this regard. He assessed the total cost of the armada for Paria in 10.000 ducats while his partner Alonso de Herrera increased the estimation to 12.000 ducats.26 From the same documents we can extract additional data to translate the value of the expedition in real terms. For example, Ordás explained how he had to buy two ships in Seville, one of 160 tons and other of 90, both to a price of 2.000 ducats. His annual salary as governor of Marañón for instance, was set by the king in 1.930 ducats. Allowances for the journey to America were acquired by his partner Alonso de Herrera in Canary Island. He spent 1200 ducats to feed 400 soldiers during a 25 Royal Decree April 22nd 1528, Archivo General de Indias, Panama, 238, p. 108. 26 See Otte (1959), p. XXVIII. month.27 Alongside this, in the letters the conqueror of Mexico complained about prices in Seville. A quintal of bread (100lbrs) were sold for 1,8 ducats which he found pretty excessive.28 Also time can be considered a cost. Diego de O dás’ e peditio was ready to depart from the port of Seville only four months. This was absolutely outstanding. Francisco de Orellana, for instance, had to wait fifteen months in Seville before leave to New Andalusia. The time gap is easy to explain, Ordás was indeed a rich man. As a reward for his contribution to the conquest of Tenochtitlán he had received important encomiendas. While Ordás was in the Court negotiating privileges, his agent in Mexico was selling some crucial properties. By the time he went to Seville to prepare his expedition for Marañón the silver had arrived to the city port. This situation was unusual, normally after receiving royal privileges for colonizing a territory, grantees used to search for funding at the credit market. In occasions, the endowments came with important concessions. For the expedition to New Andalusia, Orellana had to designate his capitalist partners for lord bailiff, captain general and maestre de campo, positions originally entrusted to the conqueror by the capitulation with the Crown. Jerónimo de Ortal however had to appeal to Genoese and Florentine bankers for credit. He even had to include some of his associates as part of the crew in his expedition to Paria. 3. Governing America: The Poly-centric State Model Confronting the classical distinction between British parliamentary and French absolutist model of state it is possible to understand that both accomplished the central control of economic resources. Nevertheless, for the Spanish monarchy this was only a theoretical option. The Iberian opted for a third way the so called poly-centric state.29 In this model, the sovereign had power to decide and legislate but the local authorities had the power to apply such decisions. The lack of resources to accomplish America and the great deal of privileges granted by the capitulation contracts forged the new model of state. The Crown was forced to export local institutions with strong prerogatives to constrain power of governors and viceroys. Scholars like Rodríguez Morel even states that this distribution of power lead to internal disputes which was exactly the original purpose of the Crown. When factions are consuming energy and resources fighting against them will not fight against a central power.30 This heterogeneous and flexible space facilitated the inclusion of population in the political and economic life of the colony. The dynamic and complex trade between Castile and America could not be possible with a central power controlling the process. There are evidences of how the concentration of power at the local level potentiated the development of resources to fuel commercial transactions and protect investments contributing to the dynamics of economic 27 In his chronicle Brother Bernardino of Sahagún estimates the duration of the journey between Canary Island and Santo Domingo in the year 1524 (only six years before the Armada of Diego de Ordás) in 32 days. See Vicente Castro and Rodríguez Molinero (1986), pp. 61-67. 28 The letter was written in Seville in July 26th 1530, see Otte (1964), pp. 124-127. 29 This concept have been coined and develop in the research Project Poly-centric States HAR2013- 45357-P fund by the Spanish Government and lead by Manuel Herrero Sánchez. 30 Rodríguez Morel (1999), pp. 22-24. exchange.31 This situation far from be a barrier may explain territorial, commercial and financial expansion in West Indies. 3.1. Constraining Power According to Ots Capdequi America had to be re-conquest just after its conquest.32 Indeed, the power given to the conquerors by the capitulations had to be constraint by the authority of civil servants. Judges from the different Audiences and Royal Officers were essentials in helping the sovereigns to maintain the balance of power in the colony. The intensive information flow together with the institutionalization of periodical audits limited the aspirations of privilege holders. 33 Audiences in America represented the supreme authority. Legal historians even consider the Audience as a superior power to the viceroy. Juan de Solorzano in his Politica Indiana affirms that neither governors nor viceroys could interfere ith the audie es’ esolutions.34 The Audiences acted as appeal courts, instruments for legal consult and sources of information. One of the duties of the audience was report to the king about all political institutions including viceroys. Judges in their letters included information about conflicts, trials and economic development of the different territories. The Audience of Hispaniola in the city of Santo Domingo was the first one. Established in 1511 by a Royal Decree of King Ferdinando of Aragon, was the Appeal Court for sentences given by colonial authorities.35 Until the creation of the Audience of Mexico in 1527, was the only Supreme Court in America. The next map depicts the different provinces under the surveillance of Santo Domingo. 31 For further information at this regard see Cachero Vinuesa (2017), Carvajal de la Vega (2013) and Bohorquez ( 32 Ots Capdequí (1952), p. 99. 33 The Court exported to the New World alternative control tools, the so-called visitas and residencias. These control procedures were coordinated by a judge of the Audience. The final purpose was to collect information about a political authority and to this regard the judge searched for witnesses and evidence, see Contreras (1975). Both, visitas and residencias, were periodicals although occasionally we can find extraordinary procedures as a consequence of important accusations. Royal Audiences, viceroys, governors, lord mayors and chief magistrates could be object of research but also royal officers, mints or even the House of Trade in Seville. 34 About the authority of the Audience see Serapio Mojarieta (1848), Ots Capdequí (1940) and Schäfer (2003). 35 See Schäfer (2003), Vol. II, pp. 65-67. Map 3: The territory of Santo Domingo Audience Source: Map of the Caribbean (1594), Harvard Map Collection, Pusey Library, Harvard University The Audience of Santo Domingo was in charge of the provinces of Santa Marta, Cumaná, Cubagua, Margarita, Hispaniola, Venezuela, Cartagena and New Andalusia (including Marañón and Paria). It is easy to deduct that an Audience with such a wide territory was most of the time collapsed. Indeed, city councils used to send court agents pretty often informing about disputes among the citizens and between local institutions and regional political powers. An additional prerogative of the Audience was to provide judges for the audits and institutional trials in its jurisdiction. As these control procedure were quite frequent sometimes the audiences faced the lack of judges. This condition was patent during the decade between 1520 and 1530 when the death of Governor Diego Colón provoked a lack of power and the Audience had to assume the government of Hispaniola Island. The situation was extreme the judges had to govern Hispaniola, acted as central court of justice and at the same time administrate institutional trials in adjacent territories. The city council of Santo Domingo itself had to write to the king begging for judges. Thanks to the analysis of the West Indies Council and its relation with the different audiences by Ernesto Schäfer it is possible to reconstruct the network of civil servants in Santo Domingo. The colors denote positions in the hierarchy of the Audience. Arrows represent the strength of the labour relationship weighted by their importance in the organization chart and the number of years on active duty. Map 4: The Hispaniola Audience Source; Own elaboration with data from Schäfer (2003) vols. 1 and 2 Members of the Audience were appointed by the king and fulfilled duties for all their working lives. The unlimited contract was seen by some local authorities as a negative issue. In 1531 the city of Santo Domingo argued that judges pretend to be in perpetuity to act in their own benefit with absolute impunity. Judges were graduates or doctors in law and their salary was ranged according to the importance of the Audience where they were destined. Councils recommended to the king to be wise in deciding about judges’ appointment. In a letter May 31st 1537 councilors stressed that it is i po ta t the espe t fo the la a d the e pe ie e i a Cou t of Justi e so fa f o its p i e .36 Together with the Audience, Royal Officers cooperated to constrain the power of governors and viceroys. It was with the se o d of Colu us’ o ages that the “pa ish Mo a h de ided to send its officers to the new land. The main purpose of these officers was to account all treasures discovered and to deduce the part correspondent to the kings. Officers were appointed by the Crown and served for all their working lives. They were civil servants and their salaries determined by royal decree. 36 Rodríguez Morel (1999), p. 134. After every capitulation contract the sovereign appointed the right candidates and dictated the correspondent dispositions. The civil servants had to travel with the new Governor and his armada. These officers were considered a crucial part in the exploitation of gold and natural resources. They were witnesses of the king and guard of the Royal Treasure. There was a number of two Royal Officers in each province, the treasurer and the accountant. The treasurer was responsible for collecting taxes, paying salaries and administrating custom house and mint. The accountant was in charge of registering payments in the books, custody money in the royal coffer and sending fiscal revenues to the court in Spain.37 America represented a great deal of wealth but also expenditures. Royal officers had to pay all salaries not only to their kind but also to judges from the different audiences, viceroys, governors, captain general, wardens of fortresses and even members of the Catholic Church when they went to expeditions. In 1509 all salaries, including viceroy Diego Colón, summed 5.560 ducats. Only fifty years later viceroys had an annual salary of 60.000 ducats each.38 Taking into consideration that the new territories had to be self-sufficient the amount of gold and silver arriving to Spain was considerably low. The sovereigns placed their officers in a central position. Instructions in different decrees alluded to the necessary communication between Governors and Royal officers. They had to work together compulsory in important acts of government such as writing ordinances. This fact shows how the king delegates in their local level the authority to audit Governors and Viceroys. Despite their power officers also had to face limitations. Indeed, they were not allowed to leave the province without royal consent and the practice of trade was forbidden. It is important to notice that those were legal limitations and not real limitations. Indeed after some years of service most of the officers received royal consent to participate in trade. The treasurer of Hispaniola Miguel Pasamontes for instance had a sugar factory in the island. Diego Caballero accountant of Santo Domingo was one of the most famous traders of his time; he took part in the slave trade, received permission to establish pearls factories in the coast of Venezuela and established a permanent network with Seville. 3.2. The Local Government The preponderance of the local power took roots in the corpus legislative since the Visigoths. With the invasion of the Iberia the Germanic Nation introduced also their law tradition. 39 With the Christian Re-conquest of the Iberian Peninsula mayors and councilors increased their power regulating most aspects of the city life. In Castile, the mayor duties of town council were the regulation of common goods, the establishment of standard weights and measurements, pricing and guarantee food supply. Mayor and lord mayors become judges and issued sentences while bailiff and lord bailiff executed them. At the end of the Middle Ages the 37 See instructions for treasurer Vázquez de Acuña in Otte (1963) pp. 190-193. 38 Schäfer (2003), Vol. II, p. 155. 39 See Ots Capdequí (1952), pp. 14-46. institution was decreasing in importance in favour of gilds and catholic brotherhoods, however, it was exported to America with its original dynamism. The city council were integrated by a variable number of councilors, in Seville for instance there were twenty four of them and, for this reason, they were name as knights twenty four (caballero veinticuatro). During the first half of the 16th century councilors for America were appointed by the king and they served for life. Even though the position was not inherited, when a councilor passed away, their colleagues used to suggested the king one of his heirs as the natural replacement. The reason was to concentrate the power in a few families. Despite that, the financial difficulties during the reign of Philip II forced to sell positions at the town council in public auction breaking with the previous tradition. By one or other mean, the town hall always had the right to reject a councilor. In 1532 for example the council of Santa Marta did not accept the designation of Diego de la Peña. Also the council of Santo Domingo in 1524 refused to admit Gaspar de Astudillo as councilor, despite he was been appointed by the king. 40 The city argued that he did not deserve such position because not being mild manner. The councilor was accused in front of the Audience opening a five years trial.41 The cities fought to maintain the prerogatives to elect mayors and court agents among their kind rather than accept the appointments from Spain. Both were elected by residents but while mayors only occupied their position for one year court agents were for life. Court agents used to travel regularly to Europe to claim for special privileges regarding taxes, land distribution or Indians. The town councils took advantage of these opportunities to complain when the king did not fulfill his commitments. In a letter of the city of Santo Domingo in 1531 the council e i ded the ki g that it has ee dela ed the p o isio a d e did ot hea a e s f o the Cou t .42 4. The Jungle: Interaction and Conflicts The poly-centric state model in America balanced the power but also was a source of constant conflicts. Although duties were detailed in royal dispositions named provisiones local authorities always found grey spaces, unclear boundaries and lack of power. Everyone wanted a bigger piece of the cake. Higher salaries, more political power, elevated social status or extra economic benefit were prizes coveted by authorities. The fight for the power was constant and all of them employed political arguments to justify their actions. The city council claimed its independence, its right to the self-government in local issues. Officers made other political actors aware of their role as guards of the Royal Treasury while judges defended the legitimacy of their determinations by the law. One could negotiate a favourable capitulation contract in the Court. One could go into debt dealing with bankers to set up an armada. One could defeat to the death in a dangerous 40 Rodríguez Morel (1999), pp. 77-79. 41 Ots Capdequí (1940), pp. 168-171. 42 Rodríguez Morel (1999), p. 55. journey, and even explore the jungle searching for hidden treasures. But at the end of the road they had to face the city council claiming for their rights, the intromissions of the officers and the constant audits and recommendations by the Audience. Only in the other side of the Atlantic one could realize about the limitations of the power granted by the Crown. Those limitations indeed reflected the deficiencies of the central power itself. It is this fight for the power at a local level what in a metaphorical way I have named the jungle. Only connecting the Court and the jungle we can understand the real nature of privileges. The multiple conflicts had different dimensions. The complex interaction can be understood at three levels: vertical, horizontal or internal. Vertical conflicts refer to hierarchy. In this case disputes were the consequence of either unclear boundaries among the attributions of political organizations or as weak punishment for opportunist behaviour. The horizontal dimension groups together conflicts with institutions at the same level. In horizontal conflicts we transcend political divisions of the territory capturing interaction among different geographical entities. Finally, internal struggles are the result of the interaction between factions inside a single institution. This dimension permits to identify alliances, map lobbies and estimate potential earnings of every group. 4.1. Vertical Dimension Information among institutions in different positions of the political hierarchy offers us the possibility to test the poly-centric state model. As an absolutist regime, we should expect a clear organizational chart with decisions going from the top of the pyramid to the basis. Royal decisions should not be questioned or disobeyed. The Emperor dictates the law the local authorities apply it. In America, governors and viceroys were granted by the Crown with apparently central powers. They represented the king authority in the colony and so far, we should presume them equal powers. Nevertheless, the reality was nothing like that. Political institutions at the local level enjoyed prerogatives similar and even superior to governors. At this regard, testimonies from colonial institutional trials are an excellent source. Indeed, the information from witnesses permits to know how population felt about political hierarchy. However, all information comes with a bias. In these trials, both parties used to present false witnesses. Only contrasting the testimonies with additional sources like the exchange of correspondence between the Court and the American institutions it is possible to depict the geographies of power. In July 30th 1530 a year after the arrival of the new governor Ambrosius Alfinger to Venezuela the Royal Officers sent a letter to the king reporting about the conditions of the province. They accused the governor of being nothing more than a merchant and use the territory, entrusted by the Crown, as a market.43 Only six years later, local authorities requested an institutional trial for governor and his deputy Francisco de Vanegas.44 Their petition was founded in a set of important accusations like obstruction to the law, nepotism, misappropriation or impunity. The deputy governor Francisco de Venegas had appointed his friends Hernando del Castillo 43 The letter has been transcript by Arellano Moreno (1961). 44 Arellano Moreno (1961), pp. 177-184. and Francisco de Contreras as mayor and bailiff respectively for Santa Ana de Coro city council. The Recopilación de leyes de Indias specifically prohibits to viceroys and governors to appoint family or friends to political positions (Ley 27, titulo 2, libro 3º). The rest of councilors affirmed that this p o i e is e t usted to the Welse a d the appoi ted thei age ts as deputies taking decisions on behalf of the o pa a d ithout o se t of the populatio .45 Accusations against superior institutions however not always were adjusted. In some occasions, actions against political powers were contradictories. Royal Officers prosecuted governors for illegalities while they were acting exactly the same. In a letter to the king, the treasurer of Venezuela accused the governor of selling assets of the deceased illegally. According to the law, when a person passed away in West Indies authorities had to interpellate a legal procedure. The procedure started with the confiscation of all assets by the competent judge, the inventory of the possessions and the public auction. The income resultant, once deduced public expenses, was sent to the family in Castile. According to the treasurer of Venezuela, the governor did not follow the legal procedure. However, in the same document, the officer confessed the sale of a slave whose owner was recently deceased. Also the Audience made similar mistakes. In 1529 judges from Santo Domingo complained about the privileges granted to the Welser for direct navigation between Venezuela and Flanders. The magistrate considered necessary the stop of all ships at Santo Domingo and at the port of Seville. Nevertheless, a year later the same court of justice suggested to the monarchy the possibility of sending sugar and cassia fistula from Santo Domingo to Flanders without stopping at Seville. A letter from 1532 shows the same petition but in this occasion they also claim for the possibility of using other ports and not only Flanders.46 Two Degrees of Separation: The City Council and the Governors The cities did not surrender to the authority of governors claiming their right to self- determination. When the Audience of Santo Domingo assumed the government of Hispaniola tried to break monopoly powers and impose free market in the island. The city council however was against the new economic policy. They considered that free market would lead to price increment in all commodities and thus supply problems. 47 The petition of the city was presented in Madrid and the king himself responded with a royal decree warning to the Audie e ot to i te fe e i it ou il’s usi esses. 48 One additional source of conflicts is the royal disposition regarding the participation of regional authorities in the local government. According to a Royal Decree given in Madrid by Charles V all high ranks had the right to assist to town council meetings. Governors constantly claim their right to be part of the city council however they used this prerogative to affect local decisions.49 Councils constantly sent court agents to Spain to inform about abuse of power and 45 Otte (1963), pp. 87-88. 46 Rodríguez Morel (2007), pp. 35 and 67. 47 See Rodríguez Morel (1999), pp. 68-77. 48 The letter is transcript in Rodríguez Morel (1999), p. 102. 49 Incháustegui (1958), vol. 1, pp. 269-270. illegalities prosecuted by governors. The Crown far from sentence in favour of the greater and closer authority used to protect municipality rights. The queen herself in a letter from 1536 warned political powers in America reminding them that cities had the right to accuse and prosecute upper government institutions such as the Captain General, the Audience and even the Governor.50 The case of Venezuela was especially controversial. The political differences among the German governors and the city council of Santa Ana de Coro ended up in an open war with terrible consequences. After the governor Ambrous Alfinger passed away the council of Coro colluded with the Royal Officers to de la e a oup d’etat. The ou ilo s took the po e of the province imprisoning Bartolomé de Santillana, deputy governor appointed by Alfinger. They also imprisoned soldiers in favour of the Germans and appointed treasurer Pedro de San Martín as new governor. That was the first time that the local council attempted to designate a deputy governor but will be not the last one. In their defense councilors claimed that once the governor is dead his power disappears. The dramatic situation forced the Emperor to proclaim a royal decree in 1535 endorsing to the Welsers the exclusivity for appointing governors in Venezuela.51 Despite this fact, the city would appoint deputy governors in 1544, 1547, 1557 and 1560. Nevertheless, not all news about the Germans were negatives. In a letter from the city of Santo Domingo councilors mention to the king the great benefit received by the license negotiated with the Welser for the introduction of slaves. Thank to the company they had enough labour force for sugar factories provided to fair prices. They accused to other merchants from Castile of monopolizing slave trade with the single purpose of increasing prices.52 4.2. Horizontal Interaction The horizontal dimension alludes to conflicts among institutions at the same level in the appa e t hie a h . Disputes about governors for a border territory, competition among city councils for royal prerogatives or battles for jurisdiction of the different audiences are examples of horizontality. During the first half of the 16th century however, conflicts between cities or audiences were unusual. When the colony was a work in progress what really mattered was stocked up territory guided by the hunger for resources. Cities were nothing more than population enclaves far away from the complex European urban system. With every new about wealth in adjacent territories settlement were abandoned. That was the case of Nueva Cádiz of Cubagua, Santa María del Darién in Panama or Maracaibo in Venezuela, even the prosperous Santo Domingo could not resist the migration flow towards destinations in New Spain or Peru. Provinces had luckily one important city that the Crown struggled for maintain. There was not a place for competition among town councils in this period. 50 Arellano Moreno (1961), p. 180. 51 See Arellano Moreno (1961), pp. 133-134. 52 The letter is transcript in Rodríguez Morel (1991), pp. 110-116. Nevertheless, this is a research in progress and sources so far did not bring any evidence on the contrary. Horizontality brings the geographical variable into the analysis. In a period of territorial expansion when borders were still not clear conflict about strategic pieces of land were frequent. The coast between contemporary Colombia, Venezuela, Guyana, Suriname and French Guiana was only defined at the end of Charles V reign. What was named as Tierra Firma comprised a coastline of more than 7.000 kilometers (4.300 miles). Initially, the territory was claimed for residents in Cubagua towards 1522 by building a fortress and pacifying the area. Nevertheless, the capitulation with the Welser in 1528 and the creation of the province of Paria decreased considerably the original territory. The decade of the 30s was especially controversial. Antonio Sedeño governor of San Juan Island, Alonso Luis de Lugo governor in Santa Marta and Diego de Ordás governor of Marañón undertook several attempts to control the territory initially granted to Cubagua. From Medina del Campo in January 13th 1532 queen Isabel accused Diego de Ordás of occupying the fortress of Paria and imprisoning Antonio Sedeño. With the death of Ordás a new contract between the Crown and Jerónimo Dortal in 1533 only added fuel to the flame. The disagreement about the territory and the increment in the number of capitulation contracts in the time interval between 1520 and 1540 divided Terra Firma into the provinces of Cumaná, Santa Marta, Venezuela, Cartagena, Paria and Marañón. As the territorial expansion was moving forward political boundaries were more accurate. The text of the different capitulation contracts reflects this tendency. The original contract with Alonso de Ojeda i t a sfe s to the o ue o the a ea that ou dis o e ed a d othe lands islands or solid ground already discovered or about to discover except those lands o uest Ch istopho us Colu us ou Al i a t of West I dies .53 A few years later, during the reign of Charles V, delimitations were clearer. In the contract with the Welser in 1528 the ki g a a ded the o uest a d olo izatio of the la ds i the oast of Te a Fi a f o Cabo de la Vela in the limits of Santa Marta to Maracapaná, east, west, north and south, from one sea to the other54 with all the islands in the coast except those granted to Juan de A piés .55 Even more precise is the description of the territory granted to Diego de Vargas in 9, he had to olo ize the p o i e et ee the estuary of Amazon river, 150 leagues long and 40 leagues wide, 20 leagues from one side of the river and 20 leagues from the other side .56 The description was followed by the warning of not occupied territory belonging to other provinces. Special interest had the Crown in respect de imaginary line separating the Spanish from the Portuguese Empire. In the capitulation contract with Francisco de Orellana in 1544 Prince Philip stated that et ee the e pe o a d the ki g of Po tugal the e a e e tai contracts about the distribution of West Indies we order do not enter in the domains of His “e e e High ess the ki g of Po tugal ou othe .57 53 Otte (1963), p. 39. 54 In this early stage of the colonization process they were still searching for the connection between the Atlantic and the Pacific. See Mena García (2011). 55 Otte (1959), vol. 1, p. 8. 56 Otte (1965), p. 361. 57 Otte (1965), p. 248. 4.3. Inside the Institutions The last dimension alludes to internal fragmentation of power. At this level, conflicts arise from disagreements among members of political institutions. These differences slowed down the decision making process increasing therefore the cost of governing a territory. Interaction inside institutions was pretty strong feeding a complex knit of alliances and rivalries where agents occasionally jumped from one faction to other. The letters from the city council of Santa Marta constitute an excellent source of information. In 1537 councilors wrote to the king explaining providing details about the benevolent government of García de Lerma. They even interceded for the governor when the sovereigns accused him of fiscal fraud.58 Prominent citizens sent public testimonies about investments for the city achieved with the personal patrimony of the Governor. Only a few days later the city council colluded with the Royal Officers in accusing the governor of irregularities in the administration of Justice and public perjury.59 A group of councilors then warned to the king about the credibility of other members. The affi that so e people ith o upted ill a ha e itte to the Cou t . The apparent contradiction between 60 those documents allows us to picture members of the institution in two different groups: one in favour of the governor and the other against him. The faction against Garcia de Lerma answered with an extensive report about the governor. Serious accusations were dropped in the document specially misappropriation, nepotism, impunity and high degree of individualism. It was compulsory for governors to consult with Royal Officers before taking important decisions and García de Lerma was clearly disobeying the law at this regard. The letter corroborates the fact by affirming that García de Lerma has o e i te est i t adi g tha i pa if i g the la d .61 The accusations finally were presented before the Audience of Santo Domingo.62 The partiality of the Audience and the internal disputes among their members was also well known. In 1542 royal officer Gaspar de Astudillo sent a letter to the King affirming that decrement on trade registered in the island was the consequence of randomness in the administration of the justice.63 At this same regard, five years later the city of Santo Domingo reported to the king about internal fights in the Audience. They affirmed that differences among judges and the president of the Audience lead to the reception and no application of royal decrees.64 58 See Vidal Ortega (2007), pp. 61-65. 59 See Vidal & Baquero (2007), pp. 70-71. 60 Vidal and Baquero (2007), p. 75. 61 Vidal and Baquero (2007), p. 82. 62 Rodríguez Morel (2007), p. 60. 63 See Incháustegui (1958), vol. 2, pp. 330-331. 64 Rodríguez Morel (1999), pp. 175-180 and Serapio Mojarieta (1848), pp. 18-19. Conclusions This paper analyses the institution of privileges granted by the Spanish Crown for the colonization of the New World. Departing from the negotiation process in the itinerant Court the paper depicts privileges from a wider perspective. Connecting both sides of the Atlantic, I describe the differences between the apparent power granted by the sovereign and the real power in America. Only transcending geographical boundaries and confronting both worlds it is possible to understand the real nature of privileges. Two lessons can be drawn from this paper. One, privilege was a necessary pre-requirement for the Spanish Crown to ensure the settlement process. Two, political power was exercised at a local level. The monarchy deliberately exported local institutions with new prerogatives and wider power to constrain central power granted by the capitulation contracts. Alongside this, the paper represents the whole network of privileges not only reconstructing nodes and edges but understanding why? Who? And what for? At this regard, it is important to understand the contribution of digital humanities to the historical analysis. In fact, the use of tools such as Gephi allows us to map privileges and discovering trends and tendencies that contribute to the explanation of the negotiation process. Nevertheless, this is a work in progress. At this first stage of research project I already have analysed information from Royal Decrees and letters. Also it has been provided initial results from the analysis of colonial institutional trials. In the next stage I attempt to code and map information from trials, calculate proxy of connectedness using letters and connect credit market in Seville as an intermediary stop between the Court and America. Bibliography Arellano Moreno, A. (1961): Documentos para la Historia Económica de Venezuela, Caracas: Instituto de Antropología e Historia, Universidad Central de Venezuela. Barrera-Osorio, A. (2006): Experiencing Nature. The Spanish American Empire and the Early Scientific Revolution, Austin: University of Texas Press. Ca he o Vi uesa, M. : U de sta di g Net o ki g: Theo eti al Framework and Evidence from Histo , i Herrero Sánchez, M. and Kaps, K. (eds) Merchants and Trade Networks in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, 1550-1800: Connectors of Commercial Maritime Systems, London: Pickering-Chatto, Forthcoming. Cachero Vinuesa, M. (2010): Should we trust? Explaining Trade Expansion in Early Modern Spain, 1500-1600, PhD Dissertation, Florence: European University Institute Carvajal de la Vega, D. (2013): Los negocios del hombre. Comercio y renta en Castilla en los siglos XV y XVI, Valladolid: Castilla Ediciones. Colección de Documentos Referentes a la Historia de América (1913): Cedulario de las Provincias de Santa Marta y Cartagena de Indias, Madrid: Librería de V. Suárez. Dougnac Rodríguez, A. (1994): Manual de Historia del Derecho Indiano, México DF: Universidad Autónoma de México. D eli h a , M. 9 : Li e se to till: The Privileges of the Spanish Mesta as a Case of Second-Best I stitutio , Explorations in Economic History, 46, 220-240. D eli h a , M. : All that glitte s: Precious metals, rent seeking and the decline of “pai , European Review of Economic History, 9, 313-336. Hel e , M. 9 : Cu agua, l'île des pe les , Annales, 17 (4), 751-760. Incháustegui, J. M. (1958): Reales Cédulas y Correspondencia de Gobernadores de Santo Domingo, Colección Histórico Documental Trujilloniana, Madrid: Gráficas Reunidas. Krueger, A. O. (1974): The Politi al E o omy of the Rent-“eeki g “o iet , American Economic Review 64, 291–303. Lacueva García, J. (2010): La plata del rey y sus vasallos. Minería y metalurgia en México (siglos XVI y XVII), Seville: Universidad de Sevilla. Meléndez, C. (1992): Reales Cédulas relativas a la provincia de Costa Rica (1550-1802), San José: Comisión Nacional de Conmemoraciones Histórica. Mena García, C. 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APPENDIX Image 1: Royal Decree to Francisco Aceituno with official appointment as Warden of the Fortress of San Cristobal de la Habana (12/03/1540) Source: Archivo General de Indias, Patronato, 278, N. 2, R. 42. Image 2: Letter of Diego de Ordás to Francisco de Verdugo, Seville July 16th 1530 Source: Archivo General de Indias, Justicia 712, 17 piezas

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