Vol. 4, Issue 1
The Global Taiwan Brief Volume 4, Issue 1
Fortnightly Review
By: Russell Hsiao
Former Senior US officials Warn of Losing a Future War with China over Taiwan
By: David An
Xi’s Address to ‘Taiwan Compatriots’ Backfires
By: J. Michael Cole
Updates on Taiwan’s Indigenous Submarine Program
By: Fu S. Mei
Fortnightly Review
Russell Hsiao is the executive director of the Global Taiwan Institute and editor-in-chief of the Global Taiwan Brief.
DPP Elects New Chairman, A New Cabinet, and the Race for 2020
The ruling-Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which suffered a crushing defeat in the November local elections, has elected a new chairperson. President Tsai Ing-wen, who served concurrently as head of the ruling party since 2014 and led the DPP in its political resurrection after it lost two successive presidential elections in 2008 and 2012, stepped down as party chief in December over the poor results of the recent nine-in-one elections. Additionally, William Lai (賴清德, b. 1959)—who was head of Tsai’s cabinet since September 2017 and a possible future presidential candidate—also stepped down in mid-January. Tsai tapped Su Tseng-Chang (蘇貞昌, b. 1947), a former premier and party chairman, to serve as the head of cabinet.
On January 9, with the general elections only 12 months away, party insider Cho Jung-tai (卓榮泰, b. 1959) became the new DPP chairman. In a race that pitted two very different candidates against one another, which the Taiwanese media billed as the “pro-Tsai” and “anti-Tsai” candidates, Cho was voted decidedly by DPP members to lead the Party into the 2020 general elections. According to the election results—which saw a very low turnout rate of 16.9 percent—Cho, who was widely considered the favorite to win the election, received 24,699 or 72.60 percent of the votes, easily defeating his opponent You Yinglong (游盈隆, b. 1956), chairman of the Taiwanese Public Opinion Foundation, who received only 9,323 or 27.40 percent of the votes.
When the last DPP chairman election was held in 2014—the turnout rate was unusually high at 65.13 percent. To put the low turnout in the recent chairperson election into perspective, when Ms. Tsai won the race for the party’s top post in 2014, she received 85,410 or 93.71 percent of the votes, which was more than twice the amount received by both candidates in the recent chairperson election. Eligible voters in the DPP was reportedly 140,000 in 2014 and increased to 202,568 in 2018. It is perhaps worth noting that the voter turnout for the DPP chairman races has never been very high. In 2005 during the 11th DPP chairman election, the turnout rate was 19.73 percent and the following year the turnout rate was also only around 19.96 percent. The new chairperson’s term is set to end on May 19, 2020—right before the winner of the presidential election is to begin the new term—which means that his primary responsibility will be to set up, manage, and run the party’s campaigns for the general elections in 2020. If past practice is the rule, the DPP will hold its presidential primary around April.
With her own party’s nomination as presidential candidate not assured, Tsai has also been facing mounting internal pressure from elements within her own party to not run as the party’s nominee for the 2020 elections. In addition to a lingering low popularity rating—which is consistent with the drop in approval rating of past presidents—the pressure on her administration began early on in her term as “dark green” elements—which advocates for a more assertive push for Taiwan independence—grew increasingly unsatisfied with what they perceive as the president’s weak responses to China’s threats and for not asserting Taiwan’s ”independence” strongly enough. This growing pressure materialized with the creation of the Formosa Alliance (喜樂島聯盟) in April 2018, a political coalition with the stated goal of amending the country’s Referendum Act (公民投票法) and thereby allow a public referendum on independence from China. The initiative has been endorsed by two former presidents and other political parties. More recently, three influential DPP stalwarts and former head of Academia Sinica also issued an open letter urging President Tsai to not seek the re-election as president and relinquish administrative powers to the premier.
Boosted by the local election results, excitement in the Nationalist Party—which was in disarray in the aftermath of the 2016 general elections—has been stirring as the party smelled the prospects of returning to power in the 2020 general elections. In uncharacteristic fashion, the party’s presidential primary may be larger than usual as a growing field of candidates are likely to vie for the chance to run in the 2020 presidential elections. The Nationalist Party’s former presidential candidate, Eric Chu (朱立倫, b. 1961), who served as mayor of New Taipei City since 2010, immediately announced his decision to seek the Party’s nomination for the presidency after the local elections. An aide to another former presidential candidate, Chang Ya-Chung (張亞中, b. 1954), served as an aide to the controversial Hung Shiu-Chu (洪秀柱, b. 1948), who was the Nationalist Party’s botched first pick to run in the 2016 presidential election and then served as party chief, also announced that he will be seeking the party’s nominations. A former deputy campaign manager for Mr. Ma, Lo Chih-chiang (羅智強) has also declared his intention to run. Former President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九, b. 1950), former speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Wang Jin-Pyng (王金平, b. 1941), and the current party chairman, Wu Den-yih (吳敦義, b. 1948), who could claim responsibility for party’s surprisingly quick resurrection, are also believed to be possible contenders in the 2020 elections. According to media reports, Chu is currently the favorite in terms of the popularity among the KMT base of supporters. There are several other wild card candidates. As of this writing, the Nationalist Party has not set the date for the primary.
The new premier, who ran as the DPP’s candidate in the race for mayor of New Taipei City in the “nine-in-one elections,” was sworn into office on January 14. Su is popularized in the media by his campaign moniker, “charge, charge, charge” (衝衝衝), which describes his highly-charged management style, has reshuffled the cabinet that saw several positions change. However, most of the national security agencies have remained the same—indicating more continuity in the national security, cross-Strait, and foreign policies of the Tsai administration. As of this writing, there have been no other reports about confirmed changes in Tsai’s national security team.
While the Nationalist Party may have reasons to be optimistic given the trend of previous local elections as a bellwether for general elections, party operatives and observers should take stock of a more fluid and dynamic voter behaviors. Indeed, according to a survey released by the Commonwealth Magazine titled 2019 State of the Nation Survey, despite the apparent decisive victory of the Nationalist Party in the local elections, only 14 percent of respondents identified themselves supporters of the KMT—and only seven percent self-identified as DPP supporters. Perhaps most notably, “66 percent of respondents identified themselves as not leaning toward any particular political party, a record high.”
The main point: After the local elections and 12 months before the general elections, the ruling party has elected a new chairperson and there is a new premier. With a growing field of presidential candidates from the KMT, a more fluid and dynamic voting population, and potential wild cards, the race for the 2020 general elections is far from certain.
Taiwan Invests in Biological Warfare Defense as African Swine Fever Outbreak Spreads
Amid reports of an African Swine Fever (ASF) outbreak spreading throughout the world and in particular China, Taiwan’s government is reportedly planning to upgrade the country’s biological warfare defenses. African Swine Fever is a highly contagious viral pig disease with no current treatments available. While the disease does not infect humans, some variants have a 100 percent mortality rate for pigs that could have a devastating effect on the swine industry. According to a report in The Guardian published in October 2018, there have been over 360,000 reported cases of ASF in 2018 with 19 countries having been affected. On January 15, China has reportedly culled 916,000 pigs after more than 100 outbreaks of African swine fever swept the country—with the disease continuing to spread throughout the country. The Liberty Times reported that Taiwan’s central government is planning to invest nearly US$16 million (NT$495.6 million) over the next five years in biological warfare defense.
Senior Taiwan military officials revealed that the country’s Ministry of National Defense has proposed spending US$1.8 million (NT$58 million) to enhance an existing biosafety laboratory located in New Taipei City’s Sanxia District, which is already a Level Four biochemical lab. The funds for the upgraded facility are only part of a much larger budget plan of US$16 million (NT$495.6 million), which the MND says will provide Taiwan with the defense capabilities it needs to counter biological weapons potentially being developed by China.
Taiwan, Japan, and China are currently the only countries in Asia with P4 laboratories for biological warfare research. There are less than 30 P-4 facilities in the world. The facility, which is located in New Taipei City, is operated by the Institute of Preventive Medicine Research and designed according to the World Health Organization-approved protocols for the isolation of biological agents, and under the oversight of National Defense University. Only labs rated P4, the highest standard in the WHO hierarchy, are qualified to handle highly contagious or unidentified pathogens.
As is often the case with any substantive policy issues in the island-democracy, the matter is not immune from political wrangling. When the ruling and opposition lawmakers reviewed the defense budgets for 2018 and 2019, there were differing opinions on the efficacy of the military’s biological defense research. Specifically, there were criticisms that while the military was spending huge sums of money on biological defense research, it was not easy to assess the progress of such research.
The research and development of anthrax vaccine was raised as a case in point. According to a Taiwanese official cited by the Liberty Times, the military has the capability for trial production of various vaccines including the anthrax vaccine (炭疽疫苗). Further, the cost per anthrax vaccine, which is currently around US$4.87 (NT$150) is significantly lower than the costs when it had previously purchased 3,000 doses of anthrax vaccine through a domestic private company from a US manufacturer for research, in which the unit price of each dose was US$134.94 (NT$4,160).
Taiwan’s central government’s announcement to invest biological warfare defense comes as tensions increase in the Taiwan Strait. As noted earlier, in the worst epidemic of the disease ever seen, China has confirmed about over 100 cases of African swine fever across 23 provinces with nearly 1 million pigs culled. A hog ostensibly from China washed up in Taiwan-controlled Kinmen, which tested positive for ASF. Yet in late December, Ma Xiaoguang (馬曉光), spokesman for PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, stated that the ASF epidemic in China has not yet reached a “massive scale” and reportedly stated that since “Taiwan does not import pork from China, so Beijing is not obliged to report ASF outbreaks to Taipei.” According to the Taiwan government, China has not responded to at least five calls for consultation on the outbreak.
Taiwan’s defense ministry said that staying ahead in biological research was a top priority to enhance epidemiology research and biological warfare defense research, adding that upgrading the lab would be a precautionary response to biological threats from China, terrorism or naturally occurring diseases. The Chinese government’s reticent behavior over the ASF outbreak is reminiscent of the SARS 2003 outbreak and highlights the health security concerns of Taiwan’s exclusion from international bodies such as the World Health Organizations. While current strands of ASF does not infect humans, it can have a devastating impact on the swine industry. Taiwan’s pig farming industry is valued at about US$2.6 billion. Taipei is especially sensitive to swine disease after the 1997 foot and mouth disease wiped out nearly 40 percent of the island’s pig population.
The main point: Amid reports of an African Swine Fever outbreak in China, Taiwan’s government is planning to invest more in the country’s biological warfare defenses.
Former Senior US officials Warn of Losing a Future War with China over Taiwan
David An is a senior research fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute and was previously a political-military officer at the US Department of State.
“If the United States had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat,” stated a US Institute of Peace (USIP) study Providing for the Common Defense published in November 2018. The 71-page report is authoritative and notable since it is an assessment made by the National Defense Strategy Commission, co-chaired by US Ambassador Eric Edelman and former Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Gary Roughead (retired) along with members of the commission, to include former Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Christine Fox, Center for Strategic and International Studies Senior Vice President Kathleen Hicks, and others. While the report’s declaration that “Americans can face a decisive military defeat” is stark, its purpose is to warn about the possibility of losing a war so the United States can refocus efforts now to prevent that outcome from happening in the future.
To say that the United States could lose a war against China is not a deterministic statement that it will necessarily happen. An analogy that comes to mind is a driver who does not realize the car in front of him or her has slowed down. If a passenger warns the driver that he or she could hit the car in front, then giving the warning will help prevent the accident from happening. The driver could then slow down, or swerve out of the way. If the driver continues his or her course because he or she is not paying attention and if there is no warning, then there would be an accident. In a similar way, the publication Providing for the Common Defense is a warning for the United States to adjust to dealing with near-peer competitors such as Russia and China to prevent the United States from having to face a decisive military defeat over the Baltic region or Taiwan.
“Losing Taiwan”
The USIP report offers its first vignette called “losing Taiwan” outlining a potential Chinese strike against Taiwan and subsequent US reactions. The prominent authors of the report offer a hypothetical scenario set in the future: “In 2024, China undertakes a surprise attack to prevent Taiwan from declaring independence. As Chinese forces launch air and missile attacks, cripple the Taiwanese Navy, and conduct amphibious landings, it becomes clear that decisive US intervention will be required.” The idea that China would first launch missile salvos at Taiwan to “soften the target” and then move toward amphibious landings is in line with the prediction from prominent studies such as the famous RAND Corporation study Air Defense Options for Taiwan and Project 2049 Institute researcher Ian Easton’s book The Chinese Invasion Threat.
At this point in the hypothetical scenario, the authors consider the limited number of US options to assist Taiwan. They note: “Unfortunately, America can no longer mount such an intervention at an acceptable cost. China’s missile, air, surface, and undersea capabilities have continued to grow as US defense spending has stagnated. Large parts of the Western Pacific have become “no-go” zones for US forces.” (Ibid) Their assessment is based on the recent phenomenon that China’s military capabilities have advanced significantly over the past two decades, culminating into what the US government calls China’s anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities. These are China’s collections of advanced radars, missiles, aircraft, naval vessels, and submarines positioned along its coast to try to deny the US military from operating within the first and second island chains in the West Pacific.
The USIP authors weigh the US decision to intervene to assist Taiwan’s defense. “The Pentagon informs the President that America could probably defeat China in a long war, if the full might of the nation was mobilized. Yet it would lose huge numbers of ships and aircraft, as well as thousands of lives, in the effort, in addition to suffering severe economic disruptions—all with no guarantee of having decisive impact before Taiwan was overrun,” according to the USIP report. (Ibid) Clearly, the decision for the United States to assist in Taiwan’s defense would have a great cost and consequence against such a capable and high-tech potential adversary such as China.
The US decision to not intervene to assist Taiwan would also have serious consequences, and result in “losing Taiwan.” The report explains, “Allowing Taiwan to be absorbed by the mainland would represent a crushing blow to America’s credibility and regional position. But avoiding that outcome would now require absorbing horrendous losses.” (Ibid) While Taiwan is not officially a US mutual defense treaty ally today, it was a treaty ally throughout the 1950s until 1979, so there is a history and sentiment of such a security guarantee between the United States and Taiwan. Even while Taiwan is not technically a mutual defense treaty ally, the US Congress mandates that “Taiwan shall be treated as though it were designated a major non-NATO ally.” This effectively gives Taiwan preference for the “transfer of defense articles and defense services” from the United States, but also reflects the heightened importance of Taiwan to the United States. Not to mention the negative signal that “abandoning” Taiwan would send to US allies in the region, particularly South Korea and Japan.
“Horizontal escalation”
The authors of the USIP report Providing for the Common Defense critique an important aspect of the current US government plan to counter China and Russia. The authors refer to the Pentagon’s National Defense Strategy (NDS), when the USIP report mentions, “The NDS asserts that DOD will ‘expand the competitive space’ but offers little evidence of how it will do so.” The USIP report elaborates:
The NDS also states that DOD will plan to employ the force “unpredictably” or “creatively” at the operational level. Horizontal escalation is one example of such an approach. Based on analysis reviewed by the Commission, the deterrent or coercive value of this approach appears limited. If China attacked Taiwan or Russia attacked the Baltic states, for instance, it seems unlikely that the United States could force its adversary to back down by applying pressure—military or otherwise—in secondary areas. Moreover, while the creativity implicit in seeking to “expand the competitive space” is laudable, force employment must be firmly grounded in foreign policy goals set by the civilian leadership, and it must deliberately integrate political-military considerations in order to avoid unintended or counterproductive strategic effects. (Ibid)
The USIP’s authors are pointing out that the United States will have trouble using the same tactic that China and Russia could use against the United States. While China and Russia can utilize “horizontal escalation” by attacking Taiwan or the Baltic region, the United States would have a harder time finding similar “secondary areas” of great value to China and Russia to pressure them to back down. While is laudable to think creatively in these ways, this line of reasoning provides limited policy options in reality.
From fighting low tech combatants to countering high tech potential adversaries
The USIP report highlights the growing security implications for the Indo-Pacific region caused by the rise of China and Russia, and offers recommendations for how the US can better compete against them in the region. The report states: “Of the five competitors and adversaries named in the NDS, four—China, North Korea, Russia, and terrorist groups—are active in the Indo-Pacific region. Deterring aggression in this region requires establishing a forward-deployed defense-in-depth posture.” (reference 4) The United States cannot rely on old tactics from past conflicts to prepare for this different set of new challenges in the region.
The United States is moving away from recent wars against relatively low-tech adversaries in Iraq and Afghanistan, toward the possibility of waging war against high-tech major powers such as China and Russia. The USIP report is a warning for the United States to shift its mix of military capabilities to address such high-tech adversaries.
Specifically, the USIP report recommends how the United States should prepare: “Protecting US interests from China and Russia will require additional investment in the submarine fleet; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) assets; air defense; long-range strike platforms; and long-range ground-based fires.” (Ibid) The report continues, “Given the distances involved in the Indo-Pacific region, the United States will also need to expand and modernize its logistics capacity, particularly its tanker, strategic airlift, and military sealift fleets. (Ibid) There is an important role for US allies as well: “Allies can be helpful in this context by investing in maritime domain awareness, undersea capabilities, missile defense, precision guided munitions, and cyber capabilities.” (Ibid) All of these efforts by the United States and US allies are high-tech and therefore high-cost endeavors, far from what the United States was previously dealing with in the Middle East.
The US Institute of Peace report Providing for the Common Defense opened with a controversial and startling statement: “If the United States had to fight Russia in a Baltic contingency or China in a war over Taiwan, Americans could face a decisive military defeat.” It did not end there, since it provided robust analysis and serious recommendations for how the United States and its allies can work toward preventing this outcome of defeat. We should carefully consider the content of the USIP report, as it was a result of the input of prominent experts such as former US ambassadors, admirals, an acting deputy secretary of defense, a senior vice president at CSIS, and other notable contributors.
The report yields many implications for Taiwan. The same recommendations for the United States to improve its military capabilities to counter a high-tech major power threat apply to Taiwan as well. Taiwan should focus on air defense, submarines, and ISR as mentioned in the report. Taiwan should also double up its approach toward the United States government to continue to shore up US commitment toward Taiwan for being a beacon of democracy in the region, setting a positive example for others, and being a helpful US partner.
Like a driver being warned of upcoming danger so he or she can stop or swerve around it, the USIP report warns of defeat to ensure victory and offer a way forward for the United States to assist in Taiwan’s defense against the face of China’s growing aggression.
The main point: In a recent US Institute of Peace report, prominent former senior US officials warned that “Americans could face a decisive military defeat” against “China in a war over Taiwan.” Yet, their purpose is to provide serious analysis and recommendations for how the United States can prevent the outcome of defeat and instead ensure victory against such as capable and high-tech potential adversary.
Xi’s Address to ‘Taiwan Compatriots’ Backfires
J. Michael Cole is a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
On January 2, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) General Secretary Xi Jinping delivered his first official address of 2019 with a 4,254-character speech marking the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan.” Besides its refusal to abandon the threat to use force against Taiwan to accomplish unification, Xi’s speech was important for two reasons—it clarified Beijing’s position on “one China” and the so-called “1992 Consensus” (九二共識), and its tone-deafness inadvertently underscored the baseline for almost all the people in Taiwan, blue or green.
Since at least 2013, China analysts had observed that a hitherto in-built, if not explicitly stated, flexibility in the “1992 Consensus,” whereby both sides of the Taiwan Strait agreed that there is only “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “one China” means, had been obviated. Whereas Xi’s predecessors had shown leniency whenever Taipei, then governed by the Kuomintang (KMT), insisted on the different interpretations appendix to the “1992 Consensus,” the new Chinese leader was making it clear that there is only one China—the People’s Republic of China (PRC)—and that the ‘other China,’ the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, had ceased to exist after 1949. Thus, while the KMT in Taiwan was previously able to argue that adherence to the “1992 Consensus” did not imply the end of the ROC or place it within a subservient relationship with the PRC, Xi’s emphasis on a single China undercut the KMT’s argument and undermined its appeal with the Taiwanese public.
The complete negation of “different interpretations,” which is now integral to Xi’s take on cross-Strait policy, now means that whatever consensus may have existed between the KMT and the CCP no longer exists. In other words, the Beijing side no longer agrees to disagree, which places the KMT in an awkward position and forces party members who continue to insist on the “1992 Consensus” to imply that they agree with Beijing’s strict formulation.
Even more controversial was Xi’s equating in his speech of the “1992 Consensus” with the “one country, two systems” (一國兩制) formula, an act of revisionism which once again put the KMT in a difficult position. In the days that followed Xi’s address, various KMT politicians were forced to echo President Tsai Ing-wen’s condemnation of that statement by emphasizing that with the exception of ultra-marginal pro-unification groups, “one country, two systems” has very little appeal among the Taiwanese. The erosion of liberties and autonomy in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region since 1997, which has intensified markedly under Xi, has exacerbated the view among the Taiwanese that such terms are unacceptable to them, and at variance with the liberal democratic principles that have become the name of the game in Taiwan.
Although KMT politicians criticized President Tsai’s firm response to Xi, what was striking was the commonality of interest and the red lines that the two main political parties in democratic Taiwan, along with the public, will not allow Beijing to cross. Thus, Xi’s address, rather than deepening divisions within Taiwan or cow the Taiwanese into subservience, succeeded in showcasing the unity that is possible and yet so often elusive, in Taiwan. Among other things, it showed that “Taiwan separatists”—the main targets of Xi’s threat—along with ardent “blue” supporters of the ROC and the majority of those who support the maintenance of the “status quo” (i.e., de facto independence) are all on the same page when it comes to what they do not want—“one country, two systems”—and what they do want—the preservation of their way of life, which the increasingly repressive CCP cannot be counted on to deliver. That, according to President Tsai, is the “Taiwan consensus.” KMT presidential hopeful Eric Chu may have lambasted President Tsai for refusing to acknowledge the “1992 Consensus” altogether, and criticized her for calling on other parties to drop the “1992 Consensus,” but in the end, what mattered was that he, too, had to state the fact that the ROC is free, democratic, and independent. KMT Legislator Chiang Wan-an, a grandson of former president Chiang Ching-kuo, also supported President Tsai’s response to Xi and said that “one country, two systems” was unacceptable. Soon enough, his Weibo account was the target of angry attacks by Chinese netizens.
Hopefully the many discussions in Taiwan that followed Xi’s address will have helped drive home the fact that, notwithstanding the many differences that exist on the official name of the country or the extent to which Taiwan should open its doors to China, members of both camps have overlapping interests that transcend everything else.
This development, along with President Tsai’s eloquent response emphasizing democracy, provided a welcomed rallying point for the embattled president, who had come under attack by members of her own camp following the Democratic Progressive Party’s disastrous showing in the November 24, 2018, nine-in-one elections. Three opposition parties, the People First Party (PFP), the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), and the New Power Party (NPP) have stated their support for President Tsai’s opposition to “one country, two systems.” Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, an independent who also has been accused by the green camp of espousing some of Beijing’s views, also stated that Xi’s version of the “1992 Consensus” would likely fail to resonate among the Taiwanese. Several countries, among them the United States and France, shocked by the overt reference to the possible use of force by China to resolve the Taiwan “question,” also expressed support for Taiwan following Xi’s speech. If the aim was to further marginalize President Tsai, Xi’s speech backfired.
Overtly pro-unification groups, such as the Grand Alliance for China’s Reunification Under the Three Principles of the People, then followed with their own proposals for unification. Ironically, while criticizing both the KMT and DPP for their “passive responses” to Xi’s address, the Alliance nevertheless—and again inadvertently—highlighted the contradictions inherent to any attempt to integrate Taiwan and China. The Alliance, which said it would collaborate with two other pro-unification organizations in Taiwan and hold a series of events before August 2019, suggested that “one country, two systems” could be interpreted creatively, as an association (perhaps federalist) of equals rather than one of subservience. Lost on the Alliance is the fact that by moving beyond Xi’s rigid offer, their proposal shows that a consensus does not even exist among those who support unification, let alone among political parties that, due to the fact that they operate in a democracy, must answer to the wishes of Taiwanese voters. The Alliance’s proposal that the PRC and the ROC would be given “appellations of equal status” directly contradicts Xi’s insistence on the impermissibility of “two Chinas” (兩個中國).
Despite all this, the KMT is unlikely to abandon its adherence to the “1992 Consensus” and its use as an instrument to gainsay its opponents in elections. Already, the party and its likely candidate in the January 2020 elections, Eric Chu, have emphasized the utility of the “1992 Consensus” as a foundation for dialogue with Beijing, which insists that recognition thereof is a prerequisite for talks. However, by clarifying how Beijing views the “1992 Consensus” and directly tying it with the unpalatable “one country, two systems” formula, Beijing has done a disservice to the KMT, which will now have to try harder to convince its supporters, along with the Taiwanese public, that it can safely and responsibly adopt the “1992 Consensus” and ensure that Taiwan’s freedoms, democracy, and way of life are not compromised. (The principal reason why the KMT threw out its initial candidate for the 2016 elections, Hung Hsiu-chu, at the 11th hour was that she was seen to be moving beyond the party’s longstanding interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” and was mooting the possibility of signing a “peace accord” with Beijing.) It could also result in a split within the KMT among the party’s more pro-Beijing elements (a minority) and those who are better attuned to public opinion and democratic principles.
For many years, in-built flexibility and ambiguity of language allowed the KMT to get away with proposing the “1992 Consensus” as a viable conduit for cross-Strait talks, and even then the two sides were unable to agree on most, if not all, of the fundamentals. A more rigid interpretation of the “1992 Consensus” will likely undermine the KMT’s ability to portray the so-called consensus as a safe mechanism, one over which the two sides have equal say.
The main point: By tapping into Chinese nationalist sentiment and moving the goal posts on the “1992 consensus,” CCP secretary-general Xi Jinping has given President Tsai Ing-wen a much-needed boost as Taiwan enters the one-year period before the 2020 general elections.
Updates on Taiwan’s Indigenous Submarine Program
Fu S. Mei is the director at the Taiwan Security Analysis Center in Manhasset, New York.
After being frustrated in its persistent efforts to acquire additional modern submarines from abroad over the past three decades, Taiwan embarked on an ambitious plan to design, develop, and build its own diesel-electric submarines several years ago. There is now a broad consensus in Taiwan that submarines, by virtue of their greater survivability and significant deterrent potential, are essential for the island’s defense. Given Taiwan’s geography, submarines play a critical role in defending sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) for the country’s economy and energy security, as well as the threat of maritime blockade and amphibious invasion. Known as the Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS), the program is being implemented as a top national priority and at a nearly breakneck pace. The last point is especially noteworthy, given Taiwan’s lack of prior experience in submarine design and existing submarine industrial base. Especially as the program is afforded very substantial resources as well as policy latitude.
Program Requirement, Cost, and Schedule
The IDS is being developed to meet a Taiwan Navy requirement for an ocean-going submarine of 1,500-2,000 (standard) displacement. The boat would be capable of anti-surface (ASuW), anti-submarine (ASW), mine warfare, intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance (ISR), and special operations missions.
The contract for the 4-year design phase was awarded in December 2016 to the quasi-state-owned (42.5 percent) CSBC Corporation, at a contract value of US$86 million (NT$2.59 billion). Work began in early-2017, with the Preliminary Design completed in March 2018, and the Contract Design to be delivered by March 2019. The detail design is slated for completion by the end of 2020.
This is a remarkably aggressive schedule at a relatively low cost, not least because it is the first time Taiwan has tried to develop an ocean-going submarine (1,500-2,000-ton nominal displacement) and lacks direct technical assistance from an experienced foreign submarine builder/design house.
The budget for the construction of the lead submarine amounts to US$1.64 billion (NT$49.36 billion) over the 7-year period spanning from 2019 through 2025. The unit cost is inflated due to inclusion of the capital investment needed for construction of the new submarine construction yard inside CSBC’s main complex at Siaogang, in southern Kaohsiung. The total cost for the program, as originally envisioned, could amount to US$13.3 billion (NT$400 billion), with up to eight submarines to be built indigenously over a 25-year period.
Although awarded as a “design-build” contract to CSBC, design work for the IDS program is actually subcontracted out to the Ship and Ocean Industries R&D Center (SOIC) and overseen by Taiwan Navy’s Naval Shipbuilding Development Center (NDSC). All together, there are currently several hundred naval architects and marine engineers working on the indigenous submarine design.
Secrecy and Scandal
The program is highly classified, and little reliable information has been officially released, particularly with regards to the design, choice of primary equipment and sources of foreign technical assistance. In fact, the IDS program is so tightly held that the project manager reports directly to the Navy Commander-in-Chief and then to the Presidential Palace, effectively bypassing the Ministry of National Defense. This has raised questions with regards to the chain of command and proper oversight.
The only accidental disclosure that has emerged in the form of an alleged scandal over the selection of the design consultant for the prime contractor, the quasi-state owned CSBC International Shipbuilding Corp. Gavron Limited, which is a small, newly established company headed by former British submarine officers and domiciles in Gibraltar, was chosen over much larger, far more established European and North American firms in 2017. Even though one of the former partners of the agent who supposedly brokered the (US$20 million/NT$600 million) consulting deal publicly claimed that the brother of Taiwan Navy’s Commander-in-Chief was involved in the transaction—the Navy and MND have both denied any illegality.
IPR Issues Complicate US Program Support
To this date, the platform development and engineering efforts have not received any technical assistance that is officially sanctioned by the United States government. This is ostensibly due to Washington’s uncertainty over intellectual property rights of the IDS concept design. Taiwan is reportedly basing its indigenous submarine hull design and general layout on the Dutch Zwaardvis Mk 2, two of which were built by Wilton-Fijenoord shipyard in the 1980s (these submarines are known as the “Jian Lung/Sword Dragon” class in Taiwan service). As a part of that deal, Taiwan was provided with a (supposedly only partial) technical data package, to facilitate in-country maintenance support for the boats.
The Dutch Zwaardvis class design was developed from the US Barbel class, which was built in the mid-1950s, incorporating the then newly successful streamlined “teardrop” or “body of revolution” hull form and the single-shaft design of USS Albacore. Such a design concept ensured high underwater speed, as well as significant usable internal volume. Both of these features made the basic Zwaardvis design a desirable starting reference for Taiwan in developing its own submarine design.
Design and Construction
The IDS reportedly borrows heavily from the Zwaardvis Mk 2/Sword Dragon design concept, albeit with a number of visible modifications. These include a sloping bow design featuring top-bottom asymmetry and an X-form rudder system (instead of the original cross-shaped rudder on the Zwaardvis Mk 2). The modified bow and forward casing design, similar to that found on the Japanese Oyashio class and Soryu class, is typically associated with the use of conformal arrays instead of a cylindrical bow sonar. However, it is unclear if this is also the case on the new IDS design. The use of X-form rudders aims to improve underwater maneuverability, reduce collision risk when landing, and lower noise from propeller flow interactions.
According to Rear Admiral Shao Wei-Yang (邵維揚), Director of NSDC and the de facto IDS chief designer, the new submarine has different operational requirements than the Zwarrdvis Mk 2/Sword Dragon and would feature different patrol range/endurance and acoustic silencing performance. The IDS should have greater maximum designed diving depths, in view of the planned use of locally-produced HSLA-80 high-strength low-alloy steel in pressure hull construction. The HSLA-80 has substantially higher yield strength than the Fe-510 steel with which Taiwan’s Zwaardvis Mk 2 boats were built (550 MPa vs. 355 MPa).
Furthermore, since Taiwan Navy is introducing a photonics mast (or optronic periscope) upgrade as part of the Life Extension Program (LEP) for its two Sword Dragon class (Zwaardvis Mk 2) submarines, it is reasonable to expect that photonics mast technology would also be employed on the IDS.
CSBC, together with SOIC and NSDC, have scoured the world market for critical systems and technology, especially HM&E (hull, mechanical, and electrical) equipment, components and engineering support, for which the United States has not offered active support. Even though the CSBC/SOIC/NSDC team appears confident that they will be able to obtain all the equipment and components necessary for building the design they are developing, export licensing for certain major equipment items remains less than absolutely certain as of this writing. As a possible fallback, Taiwan may fund the trial manufacturing of a number of critical systems by local industry. Moreover, Taiwan is also exploring domestic sources for such applications as fuel cells and lithium-based battery technology for submarine propulsion. However, it is not certain if equipment produced by local sources could be ready and sufficiently mature in time for the fit out on the first submarine, which is scheduled to begin construction in 2020/2021.
In April 2018, the United States approved marketing license and technical assistance agreement for Lockheed Martin and Raytheon to work with Taiwan on providing combat system solutions for the IDS program. It is understood that Raytheon will be providing the sensor systems (sonars, etc.), while Lockheed Martin will be responsible for the combat management system integration.
Details of the IDS sensor suite are yet unknown, although it is expected to consist of a bow sonar, flank arrays, and an intercept array group. Adoption of a sloping bow shape, as supported by circumstantial image evidence, suggests the possible use of a different bow sonar than the original cylindrical-type array on the Zwaardvis Mk 2, but this remains to be confirmed.
Towed array will not be included in the baseline configuration, even though the United States has issued export license for a thin-line towed array to Taiwan in support of the IDS project. The advanced towed array is capable of long-range detection and tracking of surface and underwater targets, with significant potential for intelligence collection as well as war fighting applications. Its exclusion on the prototype is driven by the desire to mitigate design risks, especially in the context of the tight development schedule.
There will also be a search radar, an electronic support measure (ESM) system, datalink, and various communication systems (including satellite communications), all of which already exist on Taiwan’s Sword Dragon class (Zwaardvis Mk 2) submarines.
The indigenous submarine is expected to be armed with heavyweight torpedoes, submarine-launched anti-ship missiles, and, if required, sea mines. The United States had previously approved the sale of Mark 48 Mod. 6AT torpedoes as well as Sub-Harpoon missiles to Taiwan.
Challenges Looming
The IDS hull design has been undergoing hydrodynamic tank tests at an eminent model basin establishment in Europe. The Taiwan Navy is in the process of selecting an international firm to serve as its consultant to help evaluate the contract design in the upcoming Critical Design Review (CDR), which is scheduled for March 2019.
With IDS both a top priority military requirement and the centerpiece of President Tsai Ing-Wen’s defense industry policy, there is tremendous pressure for the program to succeed and remain on (its very tight) schedule. As such, there are concerns that political pressure could undermine the rigor normally associated with CDR. Moreover, continued uncertainties with respect to the ability to secure export licenses for critical equipment and components could greatly complicate efforts to actually build the submarine, even if the design is deemed satisfactory by an honest CDR process.
Even though Rear Admiral Shao has testified to the Legislative Yuan that export permits for all essential equipment are already at hand, there remains uneasiness among insider experts (who wish to remain anonymous) about the design team’s ability to secure all necessary interface control documentation (ICD) for all major system components in the immediate future.
The Taiwan Navy is in the process of selecting consultants to help evaluate the IDS contract design developed by the CSBC/SOIC/NSDC team. Consulting services specifically pertain to technical analysis of the submarine’s electrical system, rudder system, safety assurance system, vibration mitigation reduction/shock protection measures, hull/hydrodynamic noise analysis, composite material sail, and construction planning.
Five companies from Europe, North America, and India are competing for the contract, worth US$7.6 million in total. A British firm and a North American entity appear to be in final contention. However, again, local experts quietly voice concerns about potential conflict of interest whereby the design consultant and the prospective Navy consultant may both ultimately be represented through the same ownership.
Given its lack of prior experience in the design, construction, and testing of modern submarines of this complexity, Taiwan sorely requires assistance in program management to help guide the builder through the construction and testing processes. Indeed, the need for suitable underwater testing facilities could present a whole other challenge for the IDS project. There are very few oceanographically and acoustically suitable as well as sufficiently secure sites near Taiwan that could be used as an underwater range to test the new submarine(s).
Finally, Taiwan would require robust technical assistance if serious platform or system problems should emerge during construction or sea trials. As such, Taiwan should begin discussions with the United States with respect to a possible framework for undersea warfare (submarine) cooperation/assistance, not dissimilar to what Australia was able to develop with the United States in the wake of the Collins class experience.
The main point: Indigenous Defense Submarine (IDS) is a top-priority program in which Taiwan has been willing to resort to extraordinary measures and commit enormous resources, even though critical challenges remain, and Taiwan would ultimately benefit from US assistance.
