Nuclear Testing-Related Statements and Developments
 
 

This chronology includes statements and developments on issues related to China's nuclear testing, including negotiations on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), reactions to Chinese testing, Chinese and other countries' statements on nuclear testing, and peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs).

2002

3/07/02: Both China and Iran have stopped providing real time or complete information to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treat (CTBT) monitoring group in Vienna.  There are four (4) monitoring stations in China, but they have "yet to install the communication facilities to transmit the data" to Vienna.  Instead, China is sending information by diplomatic pouch in the form of a computer diskette.  Furthermore, a U.S. diplomatic source stated, the monitoring station in Iran, which became operational last year, stopped sending data a few months ago. "This may suggest Iran may be joining China in an effort to get back at Washington for withholding partial funding from the CTBT organization and also Bush's recent description of Iran as an 'axis of evil' with Iraq and North Korea." [Carol Giacomo, "China, Iran said Balking at Test Ban Pact Cooperation," Reuters, 07 March 2002; Julian Borger and John Gittings, "US Test Ban Threat Provokes China and Iran," The Guardian, 26 March 2002.]

2001

2000

6/6/00: Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Wang Guangya stated that the Chinese government is ready to contribute to the objectives of the CTBT and wishes the treaty to enter into force as soon as possible.  Wang also stated that "I believe that the NPC will complete its early review and ratification in accordance with the legal procedure."  Wang spoke at the Regional Workshop for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) International Cooperation and National Implementation/Ratification Procedures, which for the first time was sponsored by the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Prepatory Commission for the CTBTO and the Chinese government.  ["China Supports CTBT Early Entry into Force," China Daily, 6 June 2000.]

4/25/00: In reponse to the Russian Duma ratifying the CTBT, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman stated, "We welcome the approval of the CTBT by the Russian Duma. . .  I believe the National People's Congress will speed the process of approving the treaty." [China to Speed Approval of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Reuters, 26 April 2000.]

3/1/00: China announced that it submitted the CTBT to the National People's Congress (NPC) for ratification.  The NPC will be in session for two weeks starting on March 5.  Foreign Ministry spokesman Zhu Bangzao said about the ratification, "Our attitude is positive but as for when it is actually to be approved, that is for the NPC to decide." ["China Submits N-Test Ban Treaty to Parliament," Reuters, 1 March 2000.]

1999

10/14/99: After the US Senate rejected the CTBT, China's Foreign Ministry stated:

"The USA is a big nuclear country that has made the most nuclear tests.  America's ratification of the agreement will have a great influence on the future of the agreement.  (China) hopes the US will respond to the call of the last declaration set by the conference of the first group of countries who ratified this agreement and finish the ratification procedures as soon as possible." ["AFP: PRC FM Statement Urges US To Ratify CTBT," AFP, 14 October 1999 in FBIS FTS199910130002063, 14 October 1999.]

7/3/97: China called for complete adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and said that its was closely watching a US series of underground tests which are designed to test weapons materials without a nuclear explosion. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Tang Guoqiang stated: "All countries ought to closely observe the rules of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and not engage in activities that do not accord with the treaty". ["China Calls On U.S. To Stop Nuclear Tests," Inside China Today, 3 July 1997; Associated Press, 3 July 1997.]

1996

12/8/96: In the Beijing Review, Zhang Yunyu, one of the original founders of China's nuclear testing program, wrote:

9/25/96: In a speech to the UN General Assembly, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen stated:

9/24/96: China, along with the other four nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and France) and 11 additional countries, signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Along with its signature, China submitted a declaration which endorsed the verification measures consistent with the CTBT, but opposed "the abuse of verification rights by any country, including the use of espionage or human intelligence to infringe upon the sovereignty of China and impair its legitimate security interests..." [PPNN Newsbrief, Fourth Quarter 1996, p. 5; Michael Littlejohns, Laura Silber, and Patti Waldmeir, "Top Powers Sign N-Test Ban Treaty," Financial Times, 25 September 1996, p. 6; Statement made by the Chinese government upon signature of the CTBT, 24 September 1996.]

China's statement upon signature is as follows: [Statement made by the Chinese government upon signature of the CTBT, 24 September 1996.]

9/11/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang, speaking about the passage of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the UN General Assembly, stated:

9/10/96: At the UN General Assembly, China supported the adoption of the Australian resolution (A/50/L.58), endorsing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as negotiated in Geneva. The resolution was passed by a vote of 158 for and 3 against, with 5 abstentions.

8/27/96: The official Chinese newspaper People's Daily stated that "Although the final draft of the treaty probably didn't totally satisfy any country, it was in general balanced." It further stated that "The completion of the test ban treaty would be an important and practical step in the gradual process of achieving total nuclear disarmament." ["Nuclear Pact Will Be A Step To Disarmament--China," Reuters, 27 August 1996.]

8/8/96: Western diplomats stated that China agreed to support the present Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) being negotiated at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva as part of a deal with the United States concerning the conduct of on-site inspections (OSI). A US diplomatic source said that the United States and China agreed that if OSI were more difficult to launch, China would use its influence to ensure Pakistan's participation in a CTBT, and that if India vetoed the CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament, China would help the United States present the CTBT for signature at the UN General Assembly. ["China To Support Nuclear Test Ban," Washington Times, 9 August 1996, p. A15; "US And China Make Deal On Side At Nuclear Talks," Reuters, 9 August 1996.]

8/1/96: Sha Zukang, Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, stated that China was making a concession on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) verification, but that his delegation "cannot agree to allowing easy inspections in its country by inspectors coming and going like international tourists," regarding on-site inspections (OSI). On national technical means (NTM), Sha stated: "China is firmly opposed to using human intelligence or espionage information in triggering an OSI in the name of 'national technical means.' China will never allow legitimizing espionage, as it infringes upon national sovereignty, in the CTBT or other future international arms control and disarmament treaties." [Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang to the Conference on Disarmament, 1 August 1996.]

Another Chinese official familiar with the CTBT talks stated that China has "no intention to engage others in a race whether in quantitative or qualitative terms." He added that "We will, under the premise of not engaging in nuclear test explosions, use appropriate and all necessary ways to preserve or safeguard the safety of nuclear weapons." The official declined to say whether these ways included computer simulations. [Benjamin Kang Lim, "Beijing Says No Intention Of Nuclear Arms Race," Reuters, 1 August 1996.]

8/96: According to an Iranian military source, Iran made a formal request to China to send an observation team to the next Chinese nuclear test. Iran also asked to send a 10-person team of armed forces personnel to China to undergo training at China's nuclear weapons test sites. The Iranian negotiating team consisted of Iranian Defense Minister Dr. Hassan Firouzandeh, Chief of the Armed Forces Joint Staff major General Hassan Firouzabadi, heads of the Revolutionary Guards ground forces, Brig. Mohammad Ali Jaafari, IRGC Air Force commander Brig. Gen. Mohammad Hossein Jalali, and the head of the IRGC Central Staff headquarters, Brig. Gen. Mohammad Baqr Zolqadr. [Iran Brief, 1 October 1996, pp. 4-5.]

8/1/96: A Chinese Foreign Ministry official stated that the purpose of China's 29 July 1996 test was to ensure the safety of China's nuclear weapons. [Wen Wei Po (Hong Kong), 2 August 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96, 2 August 1996.]

7/30/96: China’s self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing went into effect. [Benjamin Kang Lim, "Beijing Says No Intention Of Nuclear Arms Race," Reuters, 1 August 1996; Guo Nei, "China Ceases Nuclear Tests," China Daily (Beijing), 30 July 1996, in FBIS, 30 July 1996.]

7/29/96: After its 45th nuclear test, China announced that effective 30 July 1996, it would begin a self-imposed moratorium on nuclear testing. China stated:

"China successfully conducted a nuclear test today. The Chinese government hereby solemnly declares that it will start a moratorium from 30 July, 1996. Such an important decision by China is not only a response to the appeal of the vast number of non-nuclear-weapon states, but also a concrete action to promote nuclear disarmament."

China also appealed to the other nuclear-weapon states to: abandon their policies of nuclear deterrence; drastically reduce their stockpiles; undertake unconditional no-first-use (NFU) and negative security assurances (NSAs) against NNWS and nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs), concluding international agreements to that effect; withdraw all nuclear weapons from outside their territories; support the establishment of NWFZs; refrain from developing space weapon systems or missile defense systems; conclude an international agreement on the prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. ["Statement of the Government of the People's Republic of China, 29 July 1996.]

Sha Zukang, Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, stated that China's test was timed to coincide with the resumption of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) talks "just to show that China is very positive about the treaty negotiations and that we want a treaty, as I said, before September [1996]." Sha also surprised other delegations by stating that China would push for changes in the current draft CTBT. [Kyodo (Tokyo), 29 July 1996, in FBIS, 29 July 1996; Seth Faison, "China Sets Off Nuclear Test, Then Announces Moratorium," New York Times, 30 July 1996; Benjamin Kang Lim, "Beijing Says No Intention Of Nuclear Arms Race," Reuters, 1 August 1996; Guo Nei, "China Ceases Nuclear Tests," China Daily (Beijing), 30 July 1996, in FBIS, 30 July 1996.]

7/13/96: A Chinese diplomat negotiating on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), who asked not to be identified, said that China would never sign an "unequal treaty" which gave "one very advanced country" (possibly meaning the United States) the exclusive power to conduct on-site inspections. The diplomat said, "We cannot allow a few countries to be self-proclaimed international police and we can never accept this...It is so obvious that these national technical means could be misused and the implication is clear that the future treaty could be unequal," and also noted that "China is the nation that has conducted the least number of tests and our plan (on nuclear development) has been shortened and cut as a result of [the CTBT]." [AFP (Hong Kong), 13 July 1996, in FBIS.]

7/5/96: Chinese President Jiang Zemin, during a visit to Kazakstan, stated:

"China always stands for complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and endorses a comprehensive test ban...China is ready to join other countries in working for the conclusion within this year of a fair, reasonable and verifiable treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration."

Jiang also stated that "China fully understands the concerns of Central Asian states over the possible negative impact of atomic testing on the environment," but added that there was no evidence that there were negative effects. [Douglas Busvine, "China's Jiang Calls For Nuclear Test Ban Treaty," Reuters, 5 July 1996.]

7/2/96: In a news briefing, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai stated:

"China favors a comprehensive test ban treaty while working toward complete nuclear disarmament. China has showed flexibility on a series of major issues and hopes to sign a treaty within the year. All the parties concerned must show flexibility and continue to work earnestly and responsibly. Only in this way can a fair and lasting treaty with universal observance be reached within the year." ["News Briefing by Chinese Foreign Ministry," Beijing Review, 22-28 July 1996, p. 11.]

6/18/96: During closed negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, China proposed that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should be re-examined in 10 years to discuss whether peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) should be allowed under the treaty. [Philippe Naughton, Reuters, 19 June 1996.]

6/13/96: Sha Zukang, Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, stated to the Conference:

"As is known to everyone, PNEs are not a Chinese invention. PNEs are legitimized by the NPT Treaty, and the NPT was not drafted by the Chinese. As is also known to all, China became a party to that treaty more than 20 years ago. If some delegations want to use the CTBT to perpetually ban PNEs, then why did they not call for amendment of the NPT at the Review Conference held in May last year, or at many an NPT review conference held before? The Chinese delegation has its own national position on PNEs." [Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang to the Conference on Disarmament, 13 June 1996.]

6/12/96: The Nihon Keizai Shimbun reported that China detonated two nuclear devices during its 8 June 1996 test. The paper also stated that China has purchased "computer simulation technology on nuclear warheads" from Russia to develop a multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability. ["China Exploded More Than Two Warheads--Paper," Reuters, 12 June 1996, in Executive News Service, 12 June 1996.]

6/8/96: After conducting its 44th nuclear test on this date, China stated that: "before September this year, China will conduct another nuclear test to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons. After that, China will exercise a moratorium on nuclear testing." China also stated that: "In the world today, there still exist huge nuclear arsenals and the threat of a nuclear war caused by the first use of nuclear weapons. Against such a background, for the purpose of safeguarding the supreme interests of the State and the nation, China cannot but conduct the necessary and minimum number of nuclear tests. We have all along exercised utmost restraint in conducting nuclear tests, and the number of tests we have conducted is extremely limited."

An unnamed Chinese Foreign Ministry official told Xinhua: "For the purpose of the supreme interests of the state and the nation, China cannot but conduct the necessary and minimum number of nuclear tests," and needs to conduct one more test before September "to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons".

This announcement came two days after China's agreeing to drop its insistence on allowing peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) under a CTBT. [Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang to the Conference on Disarmament, 13 June 1996; "China To Sign Pact After One More Nuclear Test," Jane's Defence Weekly, 19 June 1996, p. 25; Steven Mufson, "China Conducts Nuclear Test While Negotiating Ban," Washington Post, 9 June 1996, p. A22; "Nuclear Blast Heralds A Chinese Moratorium," Jane's Defence Weekly, 7 August 1996, p. 11.]

China also stated that it "will continue to work with other countries for the conclusion, within this year, of a fair, reasonable and verifiable [test ban] treaty with universal adherence and unlimited duration." ["China Stages Nuclear Test And Vows To Join Ban After One More," New York Times, 9 June 1996.]

6/6/96: China officially stated that, although its position on PNEs had not changed, it was temporarily dropping its demand that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) be allowed under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Sha Zukang said that the CTBT's ban on PNEs should be "temporary" and that the issue should be revisited at a treaty review conference in ten years. Sha stated, "to facilitate the conclusion of a treaty within the time frame as planned, the Chinese delegation is now ready to go along with a temporary ban on peaceful nuclear explosions."

On entry into force, Sha added that "It is essential to condition the entry into force of the treaty on the joining by all those states that are technically capable of conducting nuclear explosions."

On verification, Sha stated that China was opposed to the use of human intelligence to trigger an on-site inspection. [Steven Mufson, "China To Drop Its Demand On Nuclear Testing," Washington Post, 7 June 1996, pp. A25, A29; Steven Mufson, "China Conducts Nuclear Test While Negotiating Ban," Washington Post, 9 June 1996, p. A22; Xinhua (Beijing), 6 June 1996; in "PRC: Fuller Version Of Temporary Ban On Peaceful Nuclear Tests," FBIS.]

Sha’s full statement to the Conference was the following:

[Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang to the Conference on Disarmament, 6 June 1996.]

6/1/96: Western negotiation sources stated that China had unofficially dropped its insistence that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) be allowed under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), with the condition that the issue be revisited at a review conference ten years after the treaty's entry into force. [Kyodo (Tokyo), 1 June 1996, in FBIS-TAC-96-007, 1 June 1996.]

5/21/96: US Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe stated that China is preparing for a new underground nuclear test at its Lop Nur test site. ["China Set For New Nuke Test," Washington Times, 22 May 1996, p. A7; "China Preparing For Nuclear Test, US Says," Reuters, 21 May 1996.]

5/20/96: During meetings with the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, Chinese Disarmament Ambassador Sha Zukang said that China can legally conduct nuclear tests until the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) enters into force, but that Beijing wants to avoid further tests. [CND-Global, 22 May 1996.]

5/18/96: The Japan Daily reported that China completed a tunnel for nuclear testing at Lop Nur. China also started constructing another tunnel, suggesting it may be planning to speed up its nuclear testing. ["China Builds Tunnel For Nuclear Test - Japan Daily," Reuters, 18 May1996.]

Mid-5/96: At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, China stated that it was ready to show "flexibility" on its insistence that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) be allowed under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). ["China Preparing For Nuclear Test, US Says," Reuters, 21 May 1996.]

5/16/96: Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Cui Tiankai stated that "The basic standpoint of China's proposal for peaceful nuclear blasts is that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) should not be used to hinder the exploration of peaceful utilization of nuclear energy." Cui further stated that "Nor should it be used to close the door on mankind's peaceful utilization of nuclear blasts." [AFP (Hong Kong), 16 May 1996, in FBIS-TAC-96-007, 16 May 1996.]

4/25/96: Despite Russian President Boris Yeltsin's claim that he "had carried out [his] promise to President Clinton" in getting China to support a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman again stated that China still wants peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) allowed under a CTBT. [Western, Russia, and Chinese agencies, 25 April 1996.]

4/23/96: In response to the Moscow nuclear safety summit, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Shen Guofang stated that China still supports an exemption for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Shen stated, "We believe nuclear explosions are one of the ways mankind makes peaceful use of nuclear energy...In fact, experts on nuclear matters still have differing views on this matter. Therefore we believe that the door to nuclear explosions should not be closed, at least for now." ["China Says Still Wants Peaceful Nuclear Tests," Reuters, 23 April 1996.]

3/28/96: China called for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) to be concluded by the end of 1996 and stated its position that peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs) should be allowed under a CTBT for scientific research purposes. China agreed to treaty language on scope prohibiting "any nuclear weapon test explosion."

Chinese Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament Sha Zukang stated that "The Chinese delegation hopes to conclude, no later than 1996, a good CTBT, which will genuinely prohibit all nuclear weapon test explosions." Sha further stated that "China is willing to make compromises on some issues, but that cannot be done on a unilateral basis. No country can impose its will on China under any circumstances."

On PNEs, Sha stated:

"as an important principle, any disarmament or arms control treaty should not hinder the development and application of science and technology for peaceful purposes. Therefore, it would be incorrect if CTBT should ban PNEs. It may be due to the same reason that both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT contain clear-cut provisions of principle permitting PNEs. As a populous developing country with insufficient per capita energy and mineral resources, China cannot abandon forever any promising and potentially useful technology that may be suited to its economic needs. China fully shares the concern over the possible misuse of PNEs. However, we think that this issue can be solved by establishing a strict application and approval procedure and an effective international on-site monitoring mechanism for the whole process of PNEs."

Sha also stated:

"The Chinese delegation understands and sympathizes with the demand of a large number of non-nuclear-weapon States for nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework. China has always stood for the early and complete elimination of nuclear weapons and has put forward a package of proposals for this purpose at the United Nations General Assembly. We have always regarded the CTBT as an important step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, because a treaty like this, for the first time banning all nuclear-weapon test explosions in the world in the form of an international legal instrument, will certainly promote the process of nuclear disarmament and lay the groundwork for the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons. In the meantime, we should note that the advent and development of nuclear weapons has been a lengthy historical process. So likewise the complete elimination of such weapons will also take some time." [Stephanie Nebehay, "China Insists Treaty Allow 'Peaceful' N-Tests," Reuters, 28 March 1996; Xinhua (Beijing), 28 March 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-062, 28 March 1996; Frances Williams, "China Backs Total N-Test Ban," Financial Times, 29 March 1996, p. 4; Statement by Ambassador Sha Zukang to the Conference on Disarmament, 28 March 1996.]

3/96: It was reported that China may not conduct its next nuclear test until after the visit of Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to Japan in early April 1996. ["Nuclear Testing," PPNN Newsbrief, First Quarter 1996, p. 3.]

2/8/96: Sha Zukang, Chinese ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament, stated in response to a statement by the US ambassador:

2/6/96: Kyrgyz government officials, scientists from the Kyrgyz Academy of Sciences, and representatives from environmental movements claimed that China's tests at Lop Nur had no real effect on the radiation levels in Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyz officials stated that anti-nuclear hysteria could damage the country's tourist industry. [Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network (Bishkek), 7 February 1996, in FBIS-SOV-96-027, 7 February 1996.]

2/3/96: During a meeting with Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda in Thailand, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen said that China would continue nuclear tests, saying it was for self-defense. Qian stated that China would sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) within 1996.

1/30/96: It was reported that Western military sources estimate that China will conduct three more tests before the end of 1996. China is reportedly planning to conduct its next test sometime in the next few weeks. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Chen Jian stated that "The position of the Chinese government on nuclear testing is a clear-cut one and remains unchanged." Chen said that China will continue to conduct "a very limited number" of tests, and that "The purpose of China's nuclear testing and development of nuclear weapons is solely for self-defence." Regarding China's adherence to a future Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), Chen stated, "As far as international law is concerned, legal obligations can only be binding after the international convention in question enters into force." [AFP (Hong Kong), 30 January 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-020, 30 January 1996; "French Decision Leaves China As Lone Nuke Tester," USA Today World, 30 January 1996.]

1/9/96: Wu Xueqian, a vice-chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, stated that China will not sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) unconditionally, and said that the US demand for a CTBT banning all nuclear explosions was "unreasonable." ["China Still Balks At Total Test Ban," Washington Times, 12 January 1996, p. A13.]

1/5/96: The South Korean government will begin autonomously operating the Wonju observation post, its first nuclear observation facility for monitoring Chinese nuclear tests and regional nuclear testing, according to ROK Foreign Ministry officials. The Wonju observation post was established in the 1960s for monitoring Chinese nuclear tests. According to a ROK Foreign Ministry official, South Korea has previously relied on observations made by US forces stationed in Wonju. The decision to autonomously operate the Wonju post was based on the ROK government's conclusion that the procedure to monitor regional nuclear activity has become "dysfunctional due to the government's denuclearization declaration," and that South Korea's "nuclear sovereignty" has been compromised, according to the official. [Chosun Ilbo (Seoul), 5 January 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-004, 5 January 1996.]

1995

11/95: In an academic paper, Liu Huaqiu, a Chinese arms control researcher, stated that:

11/12/95: It was reported that China's Commission on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) made a "military pledge" guaranteeing a successful nuclear test in 1996. [Lien Ho Pao (Hong Kong), 12 November 1995, in FBIS-CHI-95-218, 12 November 1995.]

9/15/95: According to a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, China and Kazakstan will set up a commission to work jointly to monitor the effects of Chinese nuclear tests on the environment in Kazakstan. [Bhavna Dave, "China And Kazakstan To Jointly Monitor Effects Of Nuclear Tests," Omri Daily Digest, No. 179, Vol. 1, 14 September 1995.]

The establishment of the commission is apparently in response to Kazakstani appeals for China to regulate its nuclear testing. The joint Chinese-Kazakstani commission would monitor future Chinese tests. No plans have been made yet to define the commission's jurisdiction or powers. Furthermore, Chinese officials refuse to admit that there is any danger of radioactive emissions from the underground tests, despite evidence to the contrary presented by German researchers after a visit to China's Gobi Desert. ["Beijing Promises To Conduct Nuclear Explosions With Consideration For Kazakstan," Current Digest, Vol. 47, No. 27, 1995, pp. 25-26.]

9/12/95: China and Kazakstan issued a joint call, containing no specific provisions, for an end to nuclear testing. [Bhavna Dave, "...Differences Over Nuclear Issue...," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 179, Vol. 1, 14 September 1995.]

8/95: The Kazakstani Foreign Ministry issued statements expressing serious concern over Chinese underground nuclear tests at the Lop Nur test site on 15 May 1995 and 17 August 1995. [Bhavna Dave, "...Differences Over Nuclear Issue...," OMRI Daily Digest, No. 179, Vol. 1, 14 September 1995.]

8/17/95: At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, China stated:

China stated further that:

China's Foreign Ministry stated that China "has taken an active part in the negotiation on Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty hoping to see this treaty concluded no later than 1996. Once the treaty enters into force, China will stop nuclear tests." ["Statement Of The Spokesman Of The Foreign Ministry Of The People's Republic Of China," 17 August 1995; Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives On Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Winter 1995/96, p. 47.]

7/19/95: It was reported that Kyrgyzstan's government commission for radiation monitoring has refuted reports by the Lop Nur anti-nuclear movement that the underground nuclear tests in China have had a negative impact on Kyrgyzstan. Measurements taken from 1992 to 1995 before and after tests showed that an increase in the content of beta-active elements did not exceed natural radiation levels. [FBIS-TEN-95-011, 19 July 1995.]

6/8/95: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, China that:

5/17/95: China's underground nuclear test on 15 May 1995 apparently confirmed that the Chinese nuclear weapons program is focusing on the miniaturization of nuclear warheads for use on tactical missiles. [Le Monde, 17 May 1995; Liberation, 16 May 1995.]

4/18/95: In a statement at the NPT Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC), China said that it "has exercised restraint in nuclear testing from the very beginning and has conducted fewer nuclear tests than any other nuclear-weapon State" and that "a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty should be concluded through negotiations as soon as possible, not later than 1996." ["Statement By H.E. Qian Qichen, Vice Premier And Foreign Minister And Head Of Delegation Of The People's Republic Of China At The 1995 Review And Extension Conference Of The Parties To The Treaty On The Non-Proliferation Of Nuclear Weapons," 18 April 1995.]

4/8/95: It was reported that China plans to conduct five additional nuclear tests before a CTBT is concluded: Two in 1995 and three in 1996. ["China Increases Test Total Before Treaty," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 April 1995, p. 3.]

4/6/95: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, China said that "the Conference on Disarmament should intensify its negotiations and strive to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty no later than 1996." [Chinese plenary statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 6 April 1995.]

2/2/95: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, China said that it "has all along attached great importance to and participated actively in the negotiations...China stands for the conclusion of a comprehensive, effective and universal treaty banning nuclear weapon test explosions no later than 1996." [Chinese plenary statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 2/ February 1995.]

2/95: Asian intelligence sources indicated China was scheduling five additional nuclear tests before the close of 1996, the projected date for the conclusion of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Two tests were scheduled for 1995, and three others were planned in 1996. China claimed the goal of the tests was to guarantee the safety of its nuclear weapons, though outside analysts argue that China's purpose is "modernization" and "miniaturization" of the weapons. [Robert Karniol, Jane's Defense Weekly, 8 April 1995, p. 3.]

1/31/95: At the reopening of negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament, US Officials charged China and France with seeking to postpone the signing of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) for one year. [Joseph Fitchett, International Herald Tribune, 1 February 1995, p. 2.]

1994

11/14/94: Japanese Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama asked Chinese President Jiang Zemin for his "understanding in efforts to ban all nuclear testing." Jiang responded that China's nuclear testing is "limited," and that Chinese policy is to work toward a complete ban on nuclear weapons. [Teruaki Ueno, Reuters, 16 November 1994.]

1994: According to Dingli Shen, the goals of China's recent testing included one or more of the following objectives:

11/94: Chinese officials have stated that recent and future testing is aimed at designing warheads with safety features, such as insensitive high explosives (IHE). [Dunbar Lockwood, "The Status Of US, Russian and Chinese Nuclear Forces In Northeast Asia," Arms Control Today, November 1994, p. 24.]

10/26/94: China has indicated it will sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by 1996, but a Chinese expert has suggested that Beijing may conduct four more tests of the reliability and miniaturization of its second generation warhead designs. [Patrick E. Tyler, New York Times, 26 October 1994, pp. A1, A3.]

10/21/94: According to a Kyrgyzstani Foreign Ministry statement, Chinese nuclear tests at Lop Nur have had an adverse effect on the Kyrgyz ecology and public health. The statement emphasized the need to establish an international commission to analyze the effects of tests at Semipalatinsk, Kazakstan, and at Lop Nur. According to scientists, background radiation doubled on the Kyrgyz-Chinese border and increased by half around Lake Issyk-Kul following China's underground test on 7 October 1994. [Interfax, 21 October 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-205, 21 October 1994.]

10/20/94: A Chinese Foreign Ministry official stated that China would continue to conduct underground nuclear tests. The official said that the 1996 date projected for the conclusion of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was "artificial" and politically motivated. [Steven Mufson, Washington Post Service, in International Herald Tribune, 21 October 1994.]

10/18/94: US Secretary of Defense William Perry stated that the United States offered to send computer technology which simulates nuclear explosions to China. According to Perry, the offer was intended to allow China to maintain a dependable nuclear arsenal while refraining from nuclear tests; it was not intended to help the China develop nuclear weapons. [Charles Aldinger, Reuters, 19 October 1994, in Washington Times, 19 October 1994, p. A13; Arms Control Today, December 1994, p. 28.]

10/7/94: China exploded a nuclear device at the Lop Nur nuclear test site in Xinjiang province. The Australian Seismological Center detected the 40-150 kT explosion at 0325 GMT. The London-based Verification Technology Information Center (VERTIC) placed the explosion at 41.7 degrees North, 88.8 degrees East. This test on this date was reportedly part of a warhead miniaturization program. The warheads were designed in the 1980s for 12,000 km range surface-to-surface missiles or 8,000 km-range SLBMs. The warheads in question may include MRVs. [Patrick E. Tyler, New York Times, 8 October 1994, p. A3; Nicholas Doughty, Reuters, 12 October 1994; Patrick E. Tyler, New York Times, 8 October 1994, p. A3; Trust and Verify, October 1994, p. 1.]

10/7/94: Kazakstan's Foreign Ministry released a statement, denouncing China's 7 October 1994 underground nuclear explosion at the Lop Nur nuclear test site. In the statement, Kazakstan called on China to stop its nuclear explosions and participate in the establishment of a universal nuclear test ban. [Vladimir Akimov, Itar-Tass (Moscow), 7 October 1994, in JPRS-TND-94-020, 17 November 1994; Reuters (Almaty), 7 October 1994.]

9/4/94: At a press conference in Moscow, Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen neither denied nor confirmed rumors of Chinese plans to conduct a nuclear test in October 1994. [Itar-Tass, 4 September 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-172, 6 September 1994.]

Fall 1994: At the 49th Session of the UN General Assembly, China issued a nuclear disarmament proposal, including unconditional no-first-use declarations and negotiations toward such a convention; negative security assurances toward non-nuclear-weapon states and nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs); a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) no later than 1996; implementation of current nuclear disarmament treaties; further reductions; a fissile material cut-off treaty; and a convention prohibiting nuclear weapons. ["China: Arms Control And Disarmament," Information Office of the State Council of the Peoples Republic of China, November 1995.]

7/7/94: A group of geophysical experts from Russia, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan reported that China's 10 June 1994 underground nuclear test resulted in a discharge of nuclear particles in regions west of China. Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM), however, stated that the test was an "ideally clean explosion." [Boris Mainayev, Itar-Tass, 7 July 1994, in JPRS-TEN-94-019, 5 August 1994; Beronika Romanenkova, Itar-Tass, 7 July 1994, in JPRS-TEN-94-019, 5 August 1994.]

7/94: Following China's 10 June 1994 nuclear test at Lop Nor--the third such test in less than two years--Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister A. Aytmatov delivered a message of concern to China's ambassador to Bishkek, Pan Ranglin. Kyrgyzstan opposes nuclear testing on the grounds that it threatens the health of the region's inhabitants and undermines negotiations on a comprehensive test ban treaty. China expressed its willingness to ban all nuclear testing if a corresponding international treaty is signed prior to 1997. [Vladimir Berezovkiy, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Moscow), 21 July 1994, in FBIS-SOV-94-94-142, 25 July 1994.]

6/10/94: China's Foreign Ministry announced that China conducted an underground nuclear test hours earlier. China did not divulge the site of the test nor the size of the explosion, but the London-based Verification Technology Information Center (VERTIC) identified the location as Lop Nor test site in Xinjiang province and estimated the force at between 10-60 kT. The United States and Japan released statements expressing disapproval of the test.

VERTIC stated that China will try to conduct five or six more nuclear tests before it halts its testing program. The tests are allegedly designed to develop MIRVed missiles and improve mobile ICBM s and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. China said that the United States has conducted 25 times as many nuclear tests as China and claims its efforts to improve its nuclear technology are not for offensive military purposes. [John Leicester, Washington Times, 11 June 1994, pp. A1, A9; PPNN Newsbrief, 2nd Quarter 1994, p. 10.]

6/8/94: US government officials announced that China will conduct an underground nuclear test within days at the Lop Nur site in Xinjiang Province. One official stated that the Chinese are currently sealing a nuclear device in a test shaft using concrete and can carry out the test as soon as the sealing is complete. [Washington Times, 9 June 1994, p. A15.]

Late 5/94: Western diplomats reported that China has entered the last stages of preparations for an underground test explosion of a hydrogen bomb at its Lop Nor testing site. China appeared to be delaying the test until after US President Bill Clinton's announcement on whether to extend China's most favored nation (MFN) trading status. China's continued testing is viewed as complicating the process of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT). China has signaled its wish to enter discussions in 1995 for a CTBT and a nuclear materials trade convention, as well as the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. [Patrick E. Tyler, New York Times, 26 May 1994, p. A5; Theresa Hitchens, Defense News, 16 May 1994, p. 22.]

5/3/94: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman, emphasizing the limited number of China's nuclear tests and China's "attitude of utmost restraint" regarding such tests, said, "I am not aware of any nuclear test in the near future." However, on 5 February 1994, Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Kunihiko Saito said that China was preparing for a nuclear test and urged China to call it off. Chinese officials indicated privately that China will conduct five or six more nuclear tests before 1996, when it says it will be willing to sign a comprehensive test ban treaty. [AFP, 3 May 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-011, 16 May 1994, p. 1; Arms ControlToday, June 1994, p. 31.]

4/27/94: Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, addressing reporters in Kazakstan, reiterated China's position supporting a nuclear test ban in the context of a complete ban on, and thorough destruction of, nuclear weapons, and agreements on the non-first-use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. [Xinhua (Beijing), 27 April 1994; in JPRS-TND-94-011, 16 May 1994, p. 1.]

3/31/94: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman denied knowledge of reported Chinese preparations for a nuclear test. [Reuters, 31 March 1994; in Executive News Service, 31 March 1994.]

3/30/94: According to the chairman of the Conference on Disarmament's special committee for a comprehensive test ban, Miguel Marin-Bosch, China appeared to be preparing to carry out another underground nuclear test. [Reuters, 31 March 1994; in Executive News Service, 31 March 1994.]

3/18/94: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman said China "has noted" US President Bill Clinton's 15 March 1994 announcement that the United States would push the expiration date of its moratorium on nuclear testing from 30 September 1994 to 30 September 1995, but gave no indication that China will stop its nuclear testing program. [Frank J. Murray, Washington Times, 16 March 1994, p. A4; Reuters, 18 March 1994; in Executive News Service, 17 March 1994.]

3/10/94: While addressing the Chinese National Assembly, Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng said that China supports a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT), but added that Chinese accession would be conditional upon the nuclear weapon states agreeing to a no first-use agreement. [Mainichi Shimbun, 11 March 1994.]

1993

12/93: China, along with the other four nuclear weapon states (United States, Russia, United Kingdom, and France), voted for a UN General Assembly consensus resolution calling for a CTBT. [J. Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control In The Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy, August 1995, p. 27.]

11/93: Russia issued a statement condemning China's underground test of a nuclear weapon on 5 October 1993, and reiterated its support and observance of a moratorium on nuclear testing. [Itar-Tass (Moscow), 21 October 1993; in JPRS-TND-93-035, 10 November 1993, p. 46.]

10/5/93: China conducted an underground nuclear test designed to improve its nuclear missile warheads. One of the possible objectives of the test is the downsizing of warheads. After the test, the Chinese government issued a statement saying that

8/30/93: Kazak President Nursultan Nazarbayev said that there was "a vast field for cooperation" between his country and China in cleaning up the effects of nuclear explosions at China's Lop Nur test site. China dismissed the need for clean-up, asserting that the test site is downwind of Kazakstan, and therefore poses no threat to the country. [Reuters, 30 August 1993; in Executive News Service, 1 September 1993; Reuters, 2 September 1993.]

3/4/93: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, China stated that, "From the very beginning China has adopted a highly prudent and restrained attitude towards nuclear testing. We long ago ceased nuclear testing in the atmosphere. We have conducted only a very limited number of tests, the smallest number among the nuclear-weapon States." China also stated that it "fully understands the strong aspiration of the numerous non-nuclear-weapon States for a ban on nuclear testing and believes that a nuclear test ban, as a specific step in the cause of nuclear disarmament, will have some effect in containing the development of nuclear weapons and must be achieved in the framework of complete nuclear disarmament...China has always been in favour of putting the issue of a nuclear test ban on to the agenda of the Conference [on Disarmament] for intensive and extensive deliberations." [Chinese plenary statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 4 March 1993.]

1992

5/22/92: US officials said that the Chinese nuclear test conducted on 21 May 1992 was the test of a warhead for a new intercontinental ballistic missile. The United States protested the size of the test, saying the yield violated the Threshold Test-Ban Treaty (TTBT) (to which China is not a signatory). The yield was estimated at between 700 kT and 1.8 MT. An ICBM carrying a 1 MT warhead would be comparable to the 900 kT Russian SS-18 Mod 5. Officials also said they expect China to conduct a second explosion in the near future. Huang Qitao, vice president of the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), said the test was for military purposes. Shen Dingli, of the Arms Control and Regional Security program at Fudan University, Shanghai, said at an informal press briefing on 16 June 1992 that "The test related to China's preparation for a test ban. It may be the last on a big scale." ["Nuclear Blast Was Test For New Chinese ICBM," Washington Times, 23 May 1992, p. A3; Executive News Service, 17 June 1992.]

5/21/92: China conducted its largest underground nuclear test (660 kT). ["Nuclear Notebook," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1993, p. 49.]

1990

12/90: China abstained on a UN General Assembly resolution calling for the conclusion of a CTBT. 140 countries supported the resolution. [J. Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control In The Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy, August 1995, p. 25.]

7/17/90: In a statement to the Conference on Disarmament, China said that

2/27/90: Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, while addressing the Conference on Disarmament, stated that China "has always exercised the utmost restraint and prudence towards nuclear tests, and has conducted only a very limited number of such tests. We will continue to do so in the future," and added that "It is our position that the objective of a comprehensive nuclear test ban should be reached in the context of an effective nuclear disarmament process. The United States and the Soviet Union have conducted the most nuclear tests, amounting to about 1,600 to date. Therefore, they have the obligation to take the lead in halting all nuclear tests and carrying out nuclear disarmament so as to create conditions for a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests. The Chinese delegation is ready to join in the work of the ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban as soon as it is established by the CD." [Chinese plenary statement to the Conference on Disarmament, 27 February 1990.]

1986

1986: China stated that if an ad hoc committee on a CTBT were created, "the Chinese delegation will participate in its work." [J. Mohan Malik, "China's Policy Towards Nuclear Arms Control In The Post-Cold War Era," Contemporary Security Policy, August 1995, p. 25.]

3/21/86: China unilaterally pledged to abide by the PTBT, ending above-ground testing, but did not promise to dismantle the technical capability to conduct such tests. [Vipin Gupta, "The Status Of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Testing," Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1994, p. 34; Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 5, p. 335; Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives On Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Winter 1995/96, p.47.]

1980

10/19/85: A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman denied that Pakistan will conduct a nuclear test in China, as alleged by the chief of the Indian army staff:

10/16/80: China conducts its last atmospheric nuclear explosion. [Vipin Gupta, "The Status Of Chinese Nuclear Weapons Testing,"Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1994, p. 34; Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume 5, p. 335; Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives On Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Winter 1995/96, p. 47.]

1970s

11/17/76: China conducts its largest atmospheric test (4 Megatons) ["Nuclear Notebook," The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May 1993, p. 49.]

1960s

9/23/69: China conducted its first underground nuclear test.

Mid-1960s: China began research and design of underground nuclear testing facilities. [Tang Hua, "Background To China's Suspension Of Nuclear Testing," Beijing Review, 2-8 December 1996, p. 16.]

10/16/64: China conducted its first nuclear test. In a statement after its first nuclear weapon explosion, China stated that

7/31/63: China proposed a world summit conference to discuss nuclear disarmament. China proposed four steps toward disarmament:

[CHINA'S NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM]

This material is produced independently for NTI by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, agents. Copyright © 2003 by MIIS.

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