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The Kim Jong Il Succession Problem in the Context of the North
Korean Political Structure*
Titus North
CHAPTER 1: Introduction
CHAPTER 2: The State of Affairs in North Korea
1. Introduction
2. Mythology
3. Social Conditions
4. The Economy
5. The Use of Terrorism
6. Smuggling
7. North Korea According to Witnesses
8. The Police State
9. The Attitude of South Korea
10. Reunification
CHAPTER 3: Source of Opposition to Kim Jong Il
1. Introduction
2. Ideological Problems
3. Opposition to Kim Jong Il's Succession: the Military
4. Opposition to Kim Jong Il's Succession: Relatives
5. Opposition to Kim Jong Il's Succession: the Party
6. Kim Jong Il the Man
7. Conclusion
CHAPTER 4: Final Conclusion
*Translated from the original Japanese text "Kita Choosen no
Seiji Taisei ni okeru Kin Nissei Kookei Mondai ni tsuite" by the
author himself.
CHAPTER 1: Introduction
North Korea is a country of riddles. As a result of its
isolationist policies, North Koreans are virtually cut off from
news about the outside world. Similarly, information concerning
North Korea is extremely hard to come by in the rest of the
world. Ever since the establishment of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea in 1948, the country has known the rule of but
one man, Kim Il Sung.
Using 20th century technology, Kim Il Sung over the past forty
some-odd years established a total police state in his densely
populated country. To the north were the carefully controlled
frontiers of the communist giants China and the old Soviet Union.
To the south, the most highly militarized strip of land in the
world divides the North Korean people from there brethren in
South Korea. Inside these tightly sealed borders lies a bizarre
society built on mythology, the mythology surrounding "the Great
Leader, Comrade Kim Il Sung".
France's Louis XIV is famous for having said "I am the state".
However, given the state of technology in the seventeenth
century, the extent to which the country and its people could be
controlled was limited. Present day technology allows for
surveillance and management of a large population. On the other
hand, the same technology makes it difficult to stop the flow of
ideas and information in and out of the country. There is no
way, for example, that radio waves can be prevented from crossing
a border. Once ideas enter the country, they can spread like a
virus to threaten the entire state.
Even if like Louis XIV he is the state, as a mortal human
being, Kim Il Sung has a limited life span. What will happen
after he dies to the system which is based on his personality
cult? Kim Il Sung is attempting to pass on his cult to his son,
Kim Jong Il. While Louis XIV successfully passed power on to his
great-grandson Louis XV, examples of dynastic succession are rare
in modern-day dictatorships, and unheard of in the communist
world.
As researchers, we can not prophesize the future, we can only
examine the trends in society and guess where they might lead
given what we assume to be the rules governing human conduct. In
this thesis, I will attempt to compare and contrast the situation
in North Korea with the factors that led to the anti-government
movements in Eastern Europe to decide whether such a phenomenon
is also inevitable in North Korea, as well as try to examine
possible sources of opposition to Kim Jong Il's succession while
inquiring into his personal history in order to learn what kind
of ruler he may be.
CHAPTER 3: The Problems with Kim Jong Il's Succession
1. Introduction
On February 25, 1977, Japan's Toitsu Shimbun newspaper reported
that Kim Jong Il had been made Kim Il Sung's successor by a
decision of the Central Committee of the Korean Worker's Party1.
As has been mentioned already, there has never been this kind of
dynastic succession in a communist regime before, but Kim Il
Sung's Juche philosophy, which has been enshrined in the
constitution as the "guiding principle" of the state, was being
adapted so as to legitimize this2. The ability of the regime
itself to survive presents another problem. There are no
Stalinist regimes anywhere on Earth to rival North Korea's. If
Kim Il Sung, the core of this regime, were to suddenly vanish
from the scene, there are those who say that the Juche regime
would soon perish.
Juche is used to legitimize both the present cult of
personality and Kim Jong Il's succession. If any of Kim Jong
Il's rivals were to oppose his succession, they would also have
to oppose Juche. Thus, if one of Kim Jong Il's rivals were to
grab power, the legitimacy of the regime itself would be lost.
It is becoming increasingly clear that Kim Jong Il is running
the day to day affairs of the country, and it is only a question
of time before he formally becomes head of state. At a plenary
session of the North Korean Worker's Party congress on December
24, 1991, Kim Il Sung announced that Kim Jong Il would replace
him as supreme commander of the North Korean People's Army3. Of
course, it is the senior Kim who has the ultimate power and at
this point is merely delegating it to his son. Whether the junior
Kim will be able to wield that power without his father behind
him is another matter altogether.
Because any opposition to Kim Jong Il while his father is still
healthy would be quickly purged, it is not possible to draw up a
list of some anti-Kim Jong Il faction within the ruling party or
the military. Such factions can only come to the surface after
Kim Il Sung dies.
On November 17, 1986, South Korea reported that Kim Il Sung's
assassination and the seizure of power by defense minister O Jin
U had been announced over loudspeakers on the North Korean side
of the DMZ at Panmunjon. However, the next day, Kim Il Sung
appeared at the welcoming ceremonies for the president of
Mongolia. North Korea claims that the whole story had been
fabricated by the South, but it is hard to imagine what Seoul
would have to gain from such a lie. Diplomatic sources in
Pyongyang speculated that the broadcasts were designed to trap
those who would oppose Kim Jong Il's succession. Only high
ranking officials have access to the short-wave radio that could
inform them of the broadcasts, so the population at large would
be aware of any crisis, while the actions of the members of the
ruling class could be observed4.
This chapter will examine the possible sources of opposition to
Kim Jong Il's succession.
2. Ideological Problems
Kim Jong Il's succession looks difficult from whatever angle it
is examined. Kim Jong Il was not even born in Korea, but in the
Siberian city of Khabarovsk5. However, the North has recently
put forward the myth that he was born in a secret anti-Japanese
guerrilla camp on top of Mount Paekdu6. The reason it is
important for Kim Jong Il to have been born in Korea is that
Koreans are traditionally xenophobic, and if it were thought that
"the Dear Leader" had been born in a foreign country, it would
not help his succession chances.
Many aspects of his father's personality cult have been
extended to Kim Jong Il, including assertions of super human
powers. For instance, it is said that just as Kim Il Sung has
the ability to manipulate space, Kim Jong Il has the ability to
manipulate time7! Furthermore, it is written by official sources
that when he went to his "birthplace" on Mount Paektu, "the rain
clouds disappeared and a rainbow came out. This is because the
weather of Mount Paektu recognized him as its master"8.
Naturally, the legends of Kim Il Sung's heroic ancestors also
form a part of Kim Jong Il's cult. According to this mythology,
Kim Jong Il comes from a long line of great patriots. From the
time his great great grandfather, Kim Ung Woo, supposedly led the
burning of the American warship "the Sherman", the Kim family
history is one revolutionary act after another. In particular,
his great great grandfather, two great grandfathers,
grandparents, various uncles, and especially his father were
distinguished anti-imperialist revolutionaries, and Kim Jong Il's
late mother is being built into a cult figure of her own right9.
As this legendary lineage helped to promote Kim Il Sung's
legitimacy, it plays a central role in justifying that Kim Jong
Il, who shares the same lineage, should be the legitimate
successor to his father.
The most important ideological development in the preparation
for Kim Jong Il's succession is the "Theory of Kim Il Sung's
Incarnation", which goes as follows:
The successor to the Great Leader Kim Il-sung should be
chosen from among those who have inherited all the revolu-
tionary thoughts and virtues of the Leader, and have thus
become his incarnation. Kim Jong-il, the Leader's son, is the
only one who deserves to win this title of the "Incarnation of
the Great Leader" because he and he alone has gone through a
historic preparatory stage to emulate the Great Leader10.
Apparently, it is thought that this will allow the legitimacy to
be inherited by the son. However, Kim Il Sung fused the state to
himself through a personality cult which glorifies him as having
single-handedly liberated the country and by quickly suppressing
any potential challenges to his authority. It will take more
than the "Incarnation Theory" for Kim Jong Il to establish the
legitimacy of his rule and hence the legitimacy of the state.
3. Opposition to Kim Jong Il's Succession: the Military
There are many possible sources of opposition to Kim Jong Il's
succession. According to the "Rules of the Korean Worker's
Party", the People's Army is subordinate to the Party, and the
superiority of the Party is clearly stated11. However, in a
crisis, the 800,000 strong Korean People's army would be the most
powerful organization. Part of the Army, particularly the pro-
Chinese faction, is reported not to favor Kim Jong Il12. Kim
Jong Il lacks respect from the armed forces because he has no
military record himself and because he is deemed not to have the
appropriate experience and leadership capabilities to become a
head of state of his father's caliber. He is also thought to
lack the political prestige to put down internal strife13. He is
criticized as being a over-drinking, skirt-chasing playboy. Some
military analysts in the South believe that the old "partisans"
represented by O Jin U act as if they favor Kim Jong Il, but upon
the death of his father would work against him14.
During the late 1970's, after General O Guk Ryol was installed
as Chief of Staff, any direct talk against Kim Jong Il was
snuffed, and Kim Jong Il's classmates gradually took over the
most important posts in the military15. O Guk Ryol was thought
to be the center of the pro-Kim Jong Il elements in the military,
but he was replaced as Chief of Staff, and in 1988 was removed
from the Politburo. In the 1990 elections for Supreme People's
Assembly, he reappeared, but with considerably lower status than
before16. O Guk Ryol is thought to be a relative of O Jin U, but
it is not clear whether the two support each other politically17.
Immediately after Kim Jong Il's promotion to supreme commander
of the army in December 1991, Kim Il Sung met with O Jin U and
the current chief of staff, General Choe Gwang, in order to
insure that they would be loyal to his son.18 The fact that Kim
Il Sung thought such a meeting was necessary may indicate that he
is not confident that this most important group is fully behind
his son's take over.
4. Opposition to Kim Jong Il's Succession: Relatives
Many of Kim Il Sung's relatives occupy important posts in the
Party and the government. In the 12-member politburo, aside from
himself and his son, there are brothers-in-law Park Sung Chol and
until recently the late Foreign Minister Ho Dam, as well as
cousin Kang Sung San19. In such a dynastic regime, the opinion
of relatives really does matter. While it seems that there are
family members who are not pleased with Kim Jong Il's succession,
like Kim Jong Il, the other members of the family depend on their
relationship to Kim Il Sung for their position. Some feel that
if there were an anti-Kim Jong Il movement in the wake of his
father's death, the rest of the family would have no other choice
than to line up behind Kim Jong Il20.
During the 1960's, Kim Il Sung's younger brother Kim Yong Ju
was a member of the politburo, but after maneuvers to make Kim
Jong Il the successor started, Kim Yong Ju's status gradually
dropped, and currently he has no position in either the Party or
the government. However, after Kim Il Sung's death, a power
struggle between Kim Jong Il and Kim Yong Ju has been predicted
by some observers21.
Relations between Kim Jong Il and his father's second wife, Kim
Sung Ae, are known to be strained. Furthermore, Kim Sung Ae's
eldest son, Kim Pyong Il, is thought to be ambitious,
intelligent, and all in all of superior character than Kim Jong
Il. With difficult relations between Kim Jong Il and Kim Pyong
Il, it is possible that the later could be used as a front man
for anti-Kim Jong Il forces after the death of Kim Il Sung22.
During the late 1980's, Kim Pyong Il was the ambassador to
Bulgaria and later Hungary, but he was recalled to Pyongyang
after Hungary opened diplomatic relations with Seoul in February,
198923.
5. Opposition to Kim Jong Il's Succession: The Party
Eastern European diplomatic sources report that part of the
ruling party vehemently opposes Kim Jong Il's succession. These
people favor a kind of group leadership rather than a
continuation of personal dictatorship24. There are also
complaints that bribery in particular has thrived since Kim Jong
Il became a Party secretary25. There are other sources of
frustration towards Kim Jong Il's succession. Many bureaucrats
and technicians oppose Kim Jong Il because his radicalism in the
international arena makes technology transfers impossible and
impedes economic development.
The old "revolutionaries" who fought against the Japanese
Empire are being driven slowly out of the center of the party26.
However, this group, as of the end of 1989, still made up almost
a quarter of the 25-man Politburo and half of the 16-man Central
Military Committee27, and when Kim Il Sung is out of the way, it
is possible that there could be a backlash from this sector.
6. Kim Jong Il the Man
Kim Jong Il was born on February 16, 1941 in Khabarovsk, USSR,
as the eldest son of Kim Il Sung and his first wife, Kim Jong
Suk. The year of his birth has subsequently been changed to 1942
to make a more convenient 30-year age difference between himself
and his father. In 1963, he graduated from Kim Il Sung
University28. In the early 60's he studied in East Germany, but
there are rumors that he was sent back to North Korea due to his
bad behavior29. He entered the Worker's Party in 196430, was
appoint to the secretariat of the Central Committee in 1973, and
by the following year was a member of the party political
committee. At the Sixth Congress of the Korean Workers Party in
1980, he was selected as a member of the Central Committee, a
full member of the politburo, and a member of the military
committee. It was at this congress that Kim Jong Il became the
formal successor to his father31.
Kim Jong Il is a movie fanatic, and has a collection of over
20,000 films32. In 1978, in order to advance the North Korean
film industry, he ordered North Korean agents to abduct the
famous South Korean movie director Shin Sang Ok and his ex-wife,
actress Che Eun Hui, and kept them for eight years while making
them produce propaganda films. As mentioned above, during that
time, the two became very well acquainted with Kim Jong Il, and
after escaping in 1986, they wrote a book exposing his decadent
lifestyle.
According to Che Eun Hui, Kim Jong Il hosted a party almost
every week, which were frequented by various high ranking party
officials. They drank imported liquor and sang and danced until
morning (Kim Jong Il is particularly fond of Hennesy cognac33).
In his book Shin Kita Chosen no Higeki, Takayuki Kiba describes
Kim Jong Il as a "illiterate murderer who thinks of nothing but
sex", but offers no evidence to support this bombast34. However,
Kim Hyon Hui has said that her "teacher" had been part of a game
with Kim Jong Il in which the loser in Jan Ken* matches takes off
a garment. The famous North Korean soprano, Park Hen Jo lost all
her close on that particular occasion35. (*Jan Ken is a
children's game played by making the hand into the shapes of
rocks, scissors, or sheets of paper.)
While it now is evident that Kim Jong Il is yielding his
father's authority and running the government, for many years now
he seems to have been in control over terrorist policy and the
promotion of the personality cult. After being designated as Kim
Il Sung's successor in 1980, many colossal monuments to his
father sprouted up in the Pyongyang skyline36. In 1982, the 150
meter-tall Juche Tower was built, and in the same year, an arch
of triumph was built that is even larger than the one in Paris.
Earlier, in 1972, a giant gold plated statue of Kim Il Sung was
erected, but suddenly in 1979 the 37 kilograms of gold plating
disappeared and the statue was painted red. This could be a
result of the chronic foreign exchange shortage37.
At a theatrical performance that director Shin Sang Ok
attended, the entire cast jumped up and down joyously and shouted
"long live comrade the Dear Leader" upon Kim Jong Il's entrance
into the theatre. Much later, referring to the incident, Kim
Jong Il told him "Mr. Shin, that was all an act, you see, just an
act!" It was at that moment that Shin Sang Ok realized that Kim
Jong Il was not crazy. Shin Sang Ok wrote "although he promoted
the deification of his family including his great-grandfather,
his grandfather, his father, and even himself, it is clear that
he still hasn't lost sight of reality38.
Kim Jong Il is supposed to be a big fan of James Bond movies39.
Just as the villain in 007 movies always explains his plot to
James Bond, Kim Jong Il explained to Shin Sang Ok and Che Eun Hui
how their abduction had been planned. At that time, Madam Che
had hidden a small Japanese tape recorder in her purse and
recorded the conversation. The couple brought this tape with
them when they escaped, and Kim Jong Il was recorded as saying
the following:
You see, we simply needed the two of you, so I said by all
means to bring you here, and so these comrades "executed" it
(by this meaning the kidnaping)...the two of you, an actress
and a director, as actors you could lead our actors and
actresses, and even spank the bottoms of the young ones, and
for that we need dignified actors, not some greenhorns....I
also spoke of this to the Great Leader once40.*
*The parentheses are Shin Sang Ok's
This is proof of Kim Jong Il's direct involvement in the planning
of terrorist activities.
7. Conclusion
In the USSR, Stalin's crimes are now publicly debated, and in
China, the official line on Mao Zedong is that he was 60% good
and 40% bad. If after his death, Kim Il Sung's dictatorship is
criticized in this way, Kim Jong Il and the ruling class will
fall into a critical situation. Even if a slight amount of
criticism of Kim Il Sung is tolerated, the Juche philosophy,
which is rooted in the Great Leader myth, will fall apart, and
Kim Jong Il will have nothing to legitimize himself or prevent
opposition from being voiced.
Although some try to portray Kim Jong Il as some kind of
madman, an objective look at all the evidence leads to a somewhat
different conclusion. The concentration and maintenance of
political power in the hands of one man over a period of decades
perverted the political system in North Korea, as it does in any
country. Kim Jong Il was practically born into this system and
is in a sense a prisoner of it himself. He can't reform the
system without undermining Juche and thus his own legitimacy,
therefore, assuming that his wants to rule, the only rational
option for him has been to uphold the system, even by means of
terrorism.
However, there can come a time where one must face the
inevitable and recognizes that the game has been lost. This
paper argues that due to severe conditions at home, as well as
changes in the international situation beyond their control,
North Korean leaders must realize that they have little hope of
avoiding the processes that brought down the Soviet block
governments. The main question concerning Kim Jong Il's
character is whether he will accept this fate gracefully or
whether he will fight it to the bitter end; whether he will
abdicate as did Erik Honneker or go down in flames amid the
destruction of his country like Hitler.
CHAPTER 4: Final Conclusion
Diagram 1.
ZDDDDDDDDDDDD? ZDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD?
3Closed 3 3Isolated 3
3Police State3 3Planned Economy3 Policies
@DDDDDBDDDDDDY @DDDDDDDBDDDDDDDY
ZDDDDDDDDDDD? ZDDDDDDADDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDADDDDDDDDD?
3Kim Jong Il3 3Legitimacy --- System's superiority3
3Succession 3 @DDDDDDDDDDDDBDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDY Objectives
@DDDDDDDBDDDY 3
ZDDDDADDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDADDDDDD?
3 Juche --- Kim cult 3
3(inseparable, all-encompassing)3 Philosophical Interface
@DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDBDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDY
ZDDDDDDDDDDDDDADDDDDDDDDDDDDD?
3 Liberation by Kim Il Sung 3
3 Kim's infallible leadership3 Basis of the System
@DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDY
Kim Il Sung became the leader of North Korea in the early days
of Soviet occupation in the autumn of 1945. During the ensuing
decades, he has become the center of the North Korean universe.
His negligible role in the expulsion of the Japanese from the
Korean Peninsula and his stewardship, for better or for worse, of
the northern half of the peninsula since the Japanese departure
have been blown out of all proportion into the mythology of "The
Great Leader."
This mythology forms the basis of his cult of personality,
which is interwoven with and inseparable from the Juche
philosophy. This philosophy has been elevated over the years to
a status of "guiding principle for all activities", and even lies
at the foundation of the North Korean Constitution.
Although Juche is laden with contradictions, it spells out very
clearly the socialist-style command economy, as well as the role
of a dominating and authoritarian party, with "the Leader" at its
center. Kim Il Sung's claim to the post of leader is legitimized
by the mythology of his personality cult.
However, their is a question of legitimacy other than that of
who fills the post of leader. Both North and South Korea declare
that there is only one legitimate state on the peninsula, and
both regimes claim to be the one. Seeing as both states were
created by occupying armies, the question ultimately comes down
to whose system is superior. Pyongyang has always used the
argument that the superiority of their system (as well as Kim Il
Sung's defeat of the Japanese) makes them the legitimate
government for all of Korea.
Kim Jong Il's succession is also legitimized by the Juche
philosophy, although it is not directly linked to the legitimacy
of the state as such. At any rate, two decades of work have gone
into remolding Juche so as to call for Kim Jong Il's succession,
and twelve years of indoctrinating the population so as to expect
it. At this point, were someone other than Kim Jong Il to
succeed his father, he would have trouble using Juche to explain
his ascension.
The grave problem facing the Pyongyang regime today is that
they are illegitimate, and it is becoming impossible to hide.
The Kim Il Sung cult is based on lies, and the Juche inspired
system has failed. The regime has two options open to it. It
can either continue as it is, or it can try to reform. Either
way, they lose.
If they stick to their guns and continue with the present
system, the increasingly heavy burden of maintaining the fiction
of infallible leadership and a workers' paradise will eventually
overwhelm their ability to deceive their population. The
limitations of a planned economy are no better that they have
ever been, but on top of that there is the new problem of having
lost the source of most of its aid and trade, i.e. the Soviet
Union. China is incapable of filling the void, and there is no
real prospect of aid coming from the West.
As recent events have proven, the West is none too generous
with reforming communist countries, let alone non-reforming ones.
The situation is far worse in North Korea than in any of the
other communist states, and it will only get worse. In this
weakened state, the shock of Kim Il Sung's death would likely
trigger confusion in the masses that could open up a Pandora's
Box of frustrations and easily snowball out of control.
Furthermore, in a power struggle upon Kim's death or any time
afterwards, elements outside the immediate ruling circle, such as
middle ranking army officers, would probably be called in to
support one side or another. The more people involved in the
struggle, the harder it will be to keep it secret from the
population at large.
If reforms are attempted either before or after succession,
they will cause different but equally dangerous problems. As is
obvious from the Soviet experience, political reforms would not
only let loose a tidal wave of resentment against the police
state, but would aggravate rather than improve the economic
situation. This is out of the question.
Chinese-style economic reforms are also impossible. In
pursuing their reforms, China has sent off an army of students to
western countries in order for them to bring back knowledge and
technology necessary to help their economy advance. Foreign
investment is also encouraged, and foreign businessmen and
technicians live in the countries in great numbers. Furthermore,
foreign tourists crisscross the countryside providing both hard
currency and foreign exposure to typical Chinese workers and
peasants. As a result, the Chinese must admit to themselves that
they are a poor, developing country.
The Juche regime could not dare this, even on a small scale.
The "paradise on Earth" myth is central to the regime's claim of
legitimacy and superiority over the South. This revelation,
coupled with other information, such as word of the insignificant
role in liberation that Kim Il Sung actually played, would
totally discredit Juche as a pack of lies and destroy the
regime's legitimacy.
Kim Il Sung's 80 birthday is just around the corner on April
15th, and there are some who have been looking to this occasion
as an opportunity to formally hand over power to Kim Jong Il.
After all, his new post as supreme commander of the army
constitutionally must belong to the state's president1.
Furthermore, such subtle signs as the reference to Kim Jong Il as
"father" and Kim Il Sung as "grandfather"2 in recent children's
songs indicate a generational changing of the guard.
Other observers point out that the cost associated with
ceremonial transfer of power make it prohibitive at this time,
and also that would still like to meet with the South Korean
leader to discuss a basic framework for reunification.
However, more important than the timing of the formal transfer
of power is the timing of Kim Il Sung's death. Even if Kim Il
Sung were to "retire" on his 80th birthday, he would certainly
continue to be the decisive factor in North Korean politics as
long as he remains healthy, just as Deng Xiao Ping and Lee Kuan
Yew have in China and Singapore after their "retirements".
Because North Korea's situation is becoming more precarious day
by day as there economy deteriorates and their erstwhile allies
turn away from them, the odds are stacked against a smooth
succession of power to Kim Jong Il. While there will probably be
no one able to prevent him from moving into his father's post at
the time it is vacated, he will have even less means at his
disposal for extricating the regime from its quagmire than his
father had, and is destined to be no more than a transitional
figure.
FOOTNOTES
Chapter 2
1. Shiromine, Kin Nissei Den, Dainibu (Yusangaku Shuppan
Kabushiki Kaisha, 1970) p.87
2. Shiromine, p.83
3. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, Yami kara no Kodama, part 2 (Pen
Enterprise, 1988) p.43
4. ibid., p.97
5. ibid., p.177
6. Munhwa Kongbobu, op. cit., p.19
7. Bunge, Frederica M., North Korea: A Country Study
(Washington, Foreign Area Studies, The American University,
1981) p.75
8. ibid., p.79
9. National Unification Board, A Comparative Study of South And
North Korea (Seoul, National Unification Board, 1988) p.148
10. Bunge, op. cit., p.85
11. Munhwa Kongbobu, op. cit., p.144
12. Bunge, op. cit., p.98-9
13. ibid., p.100-1
14. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, op. cit., part 2, Part 2, p.96
15. Ku Ch'ung Seo, "Minzoku Bungakushi Fukugen no Kadai", Minju,
(Zainichi Bungei Minjusha, September 1989), p.278-9
16. Lee Pu Yoeng, Hangukin Seonggak ui Shillihakchoek Kosal
p.323
17. Lee, Chang-ha, A peek into North Korea, (Seoul, Naewoe
Press, 1988), p.14
18. ibid., p.15
19. ibid., p.40-1
20. Chang Mi Yong (pseudonym), October 20, 1990 Interview
21. Lee, Chang-ha, op. cit., p.84
22. ibid., p.85
23. ibid., p.86
24. ibid., p.87
25. ibid., p.90
26. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, op. cit., part 2, p.238
27. ibid., p.240
28. ibid., p.24
29. Hagiwara Ryo, Souru to Pyonyan (Daigetu Shoten, 1989)
p.73-6
30. Kil Seung Heum, Pukhan eun Pyoen hago isseumnikka? (Seoul
Taehakkyo Hanguk Choungchi Yeonguseo, Eomungak 1990) p.16
31. ibid., p.49
32. "The Korean Mating Season", Economist, (Oct. 20, 1990), p.25
33. "Kita Chosen mo Shokuryo Kiki", Sankei Shimbun, (December 6,
1990), p.5
34. Mikheev, Vasily V., "New Soviet Approaches to North Korea: A
Problem of Morality in Foreign Policy", Korea and World
Affairs, Vol.15,No.3, (Fall 1991), p.448
35. Hagiwara Ryo, p.77
36. Lee, Chang-ha, op. cit., p.113-4
37. ibid., p.116
38. ibid., p.116
also Gotoh, Takao, Shinjitsu: Kim Hyon Hui Dokusen Intabyuu
Zenkiroku (Tokyo, Aipec Press, 1991), p.137
39. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, op. cit., part 2, p.41
40. Lee, Chang-ha, op. cit., p.128
41. ibid., p.129
42. ibid., p.130-3
43. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, op. cit., part 2, p.20
44. ibid., p.20
45. ibid., p.27
46. Bae Yoen Dal, Bukhan: Kwoellyok Tusongnon (Hakmunsa, 1990)
p.255
47. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, Yami kara no Kodama, part 1
(Bungei Shunju, 1989) p.175-6
48. Lee, Chang-ha, op. cit., p.50
49. ibid., p.70-1
50. ibid., p.71
51. ibid., p.58-9
52. ibid., p.74
53. ibid., p.72
54. ibid., p.50
55. ibid., p.50
56. ibid., p.60
57. ibid., p.118
58. Yu Suk-Ryul, "Political Succession and Policy Change in North
Korea", Korea and World Affairs, Vol.10,No.1 (Spring 1986),
p.39
59. Chang Myeong Su, "Sogoku wa Zainichi Doho wo Uragitta (part
2)", Shukan Asahi, (June 15, 1990), p.134
60. Yu, op. cit., p.39
61. Bae Yoen Dal, op. cit., p.253-5
62. "Ex-Pyongyang sympathizer claims 100,000 repatriates held
hostage", Japan Times, (June 17, 1990), p2
63. Kwak, Tae-Hwan: "North Korean Isolation and the Prospects for
National Unification", The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis (Seoul, the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses,
1990) Vol.2,No.2 (Winter 1990), p.155
64. Kwak, Tae-Hwan: "The Reduction of US Forces in Korea in the
Inter-Korean Peace Process", The Korean Journal of Defense
Analysis (Seoul, the Korea Institute of Defense Analyses,
1990) Vol.2,No.2 (Winter 1990), p.172
also Kim, Euikon, "East European Reform and Its Impact on
East Asian Socialism", The Korean Journal of International
Studies (Seoul, the Korean Institute of International
Studies, 1991) Vol.22,No.1, (Spring 1991)
65. ibid., p.173
66. ibid., p.178
67. ibid., p.178
68. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, op. cit., part 2, p.297
69. Lee Kil-ung, "Inter-Korean P.M. talks open today", The Korean
Herald, (October 22, 1991), p1
Chapter 3
1. Park Yu Seo, Park Jae Kyu, Baek Chong Cheon, Lee Ki Tak, Lee
Chong Hak, Buk Chosoen Kunsa Chongchaek (Kyeongnam
Taehakkyo Kuktong Munjae Yeonguseo, 1983) p.33
2. National Unification Board, op. cit., p.33, also:
Suh, Dae-sook, Korean Nationalism--Communism and Democracy,
Korea and World Affairs, Vol.11,No.3, Fall 1987, p409
3. Joh Se-hyon, "Kim Jong-il may take over leadership soon", The
Korean Herald, January 24, 1992, p.2
4. Munhwa Kongbobu, op. cit., p.60
5. Lee, Chang-ha, op. cit., p.8
6. ibid., p.9
7. Munhwa Kongbobu, Dateline Pyongyang (Seoul, Haewoe
Kongbobugwan, 1986) p.16
8. Wakabayashi Ki, Karakasa Fumio, Shiryo: Chosen Minshushugi
Jinmin Kyowakoku (Nitcho Bunka Koryu Kyokai, 1990) p.115
9. Lee, Chang-ha, op. cit., p.2-3
10. ibid., p.8
11. Park Yu Seo, op. cit., p.14
12. Munhwa Kongbobu, op. cit., p.8
13. Yu, op. cit., p.34-5
14. Park Yu Seo, op. cit., p.36, also Bae Yoen Dal, op. cit.,
p.288-9
15. Yu, op. cit., p.37
16. "General Election for 9th-term Supreme People's Assembly
Held", Vantage Point, Vol.13,No.4 (April 1990), p.21
also Radiopress, Kita Chosen Minshushugi Kyowakoku
Soshiki Betsu Jinmeibo, 1989 edition, (Radiopress, 1989) p.28
17. Yu Suk-Ryul, "Political Succession in North Korea", Korea and
World Affairs, Vol.6,No.4 (Winter 1982), p.572
18. Joh, op. cit., p.2
19. Yu (1982), op. cit., p.570, also "General Election for 9th-
term Supreme People's Assembly Held", op. cit., p.21
20. Ha Su Do, January 16, 1991 Interview
21. Bae Yoen Dalop. cit., p.289op. cit.,
22. Yu, op. cit., p.38
23. Byun, Dae-Ho, North Korea's Foreign Policy: The Juche
Ideology and the Challenge of Gorbachev's New Thinking
(Seoul, Research Center for Peace and Unification of Korea,
1991), p.194. also Radiopress, op. cit., p.65
24. Munhwa Kongbobu, op. cit., p.9
25. ibid., p.10
26. ibid., p.11
27. Cha, Young Koo and Taeho Kim: "Prospects for Political Change
and Leadership Succession in North Korea", The Korean Journal
of Defense Analysis (Seoul, the Korea Institute of Defense
Analyses, 1990) Vol.3,No.2, (Winter 1991), p.228
28, Radiopress, op. cit., p.176
29. Munhwa Kongbobu, op. cit., p.12
30. Yu, op. cit., Winter, 1982, p.574-5
31. ibid., p.575
32. Lee, Chang-ha, op. cit., p.113
33. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, op. cit., part 2, p.82-8
34. Kiya Takayasu, Shin - Kita Chosen no Higeki (Tairyusha,
1988) p.11
35. Gotoh, op. cit., p.138
36. Munhwa Kongbobu, op. cit., p.104-6
37. ibid., p.20-22
38. Che Eun Hi, Shin Sang Ok, op. cit., part 2, p.82
39. ibid., p.137
40. ibid., p.146-7
Chapter 4
1. "Kim Jong-il"s future as N.K. leader questioned", The Korean
Herald, p.5, February 14, 1992
2. Wakabayashi, op. cit., p.198
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