Daniel D. Hutto
Born and raised in New York, I finished my undergraduate degree as a study abroad student in St Andrews, Scotland where my maternal roots lie. I returned to New York to teach fourth grade in the Bronx for a year in order to fund my MPhil in Logic and Metaphysics. I then carried on my doctoral work in York, England. We, my wife and three boys, lived in England for over 20 years. Australia is our new home since I took up the position of Senior Professor of Philosophical Psychology at the University of Wollongong, Australia in 2014. Previously I worked at the University of Hertfordshire since 1993, where I served as Professor of Philosophical Psychology from 2002 and led the Philosophy unit from 1999 to 2005.
My research is a sustained attempt to understand human nature in a way which respects natural science but which nevertheless rejects the impersonal metaphysics of contemporary naturalism. My recent research focuses primarily on issues in philosophy of mind, psychology and cognitive science. I am best known for promoting thoroughly non-representational accounts of enactive and embodied cognition, and for having developed a hypothesis which claims that engaging with narratives, understood as public artefacts, plays a critical role in underpinning distinctively human forms of cognition.
Reaching beyond philosophy, I have often been invited to speak at conferences and expert meetings aimed at anthropologists, clinical psychiatrists/therapists, educationalists, narratologists, neuroscientists and psychologists.
I am called upon regularly to provide assessments for major research bodies worldwide. For example, I have done so for the European Research Council (ERC); Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC, UK); the National Science Foundation (NSF)/National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH, USA). Since migrating to Australia I have served for various terms on the Australian Research Council (ARC) College of Experts, and once Chaired its Humanities and Creative Arts Panel.
Phone: +61 (0)2 4221 3987
Address: School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts University of Wollongong,
NSW 2522, Australia
My research is a sustained attempt to understand human nature in a way which respects natural science but which nevertheless rejects the impersonal metaphysics of contemporary naturalism. My recent research focuses primarily on issues in philosophy of mind, psychology and cognitive science. I am best known for promoting thoroughly non-representational accounts of enactive and embodied cognition, and for having developed a hypothesis which claims that engaging with narratives, understood as public artefacts, plays a critical role in underpinning distinctively human forms of cognition.
Reaching beyond philosophy, I have often been invited to speak at conferences and expert meetings aimed at anthropologists, clinical psychiatrists/therapists, educationalists, narratologists, neuroscientists and psychologists.
I am called upon regularly to provide assessments for major research bodies worldwide. For example, I have done so for the European Research Council (ERC); Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC, UK); the National Science Foundation (NSF)/National Endowment for the Humanities (NEH, USA). Since migrating to Australia I have served for various terms on the Australian Research Council (ARC) College of Experts, and once Chaired its Humanities and Creative Arts Panel.
Phone: +61 (0)2 4221 3987
Address: School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, Faculty of Law, Humanities and the Arts University of Wollongong,
NSW 2522, Australia
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Books by Daniel D. Hutto
Hutto calls this developmental proposal the narrative practice hypothesis (NPH). Its core claim is that direct encounters with stories about persons who act for reasons (that is, folk psychological narratives) supply children with both the basic structure of folk psychology and the norm-governed possibilities for wielding it in practice. In making a strong case for the as yet underexamined idea that our understanding of reasons may be socioculturally grounded, Hutto not only advances and explicates the claims of the NPH, but he also challenges certain widely held assumptions. For example, he targets the idea that the primary function of folk psychology is to enable us to predict the behaviors of others. In this way, Folk Psychological Narratives both clears conceptual space around the dominant approaches for an alternative and offers a groundbreaking proposal.
This book also appears as a triple issue of the Journal Consciousness Studies, Vol. 16, no. 6-8, June/August 2009
Ron Chrisley, University of Sussex, UK
Contributors include: Donald Davidson, Tom Sorrell, T. L. S. Sprigge, Phillip Ferreira, Paul Coates, Daniel Hutto.
Papers by Daniel D. Hutto
fundamentally different ways. It is a hallmark of cognitivism to seek to
identify some independent component that puts the memory – the
what’s remembered – into acts of remembering. Such a component is
variably characterized as: a stored memory, a stored content, or stored
information. Accordingly, and on this basis, cognitivists seek to distinguish
memories from acts of remembering. This paper raises doubts about the
very idea that we can make sense of the real, independent existence of
stored memory contents or stored memory information and, in its place,
motivates adoption of a radically enactivist approach to understanding
various acts of remembering.
thousand ships and changed the contours of the larger sea of theorizing about cognition. Over the past twenty-six years, it has led to intense philosophical debates about of the constitutive bounds of mind and cognition and generated multiple waves of work taking the form of various attempts to clarify and defend its core thesis. The extended mind thesis states that under certain (specialized and particular) conditions cognitive processes may be constituted by resources distributed across the brain, the body, and the environment. The extended mind thesis is part of a larger family of theoretical frameworks such as embodied cognition, distributed cognition, and various versions of enactivism (Gallagher 2018; Hutchins 1995; Varela et al. 1991; Di Paolo 2009; Hutto & Myin 2013, 2017). In this paper we revive and clarify the commitments of Radical Enactivism’s Extensive Enactivism, compare it to alternatives, and provide new
arguments and analyses for preferring it over what is on offer from other members of the extended-distributed-enactive family of positions.
been adequately done; and, finally, offers some correctives and clarifications to get us started on developing a satisfactory philosophy of persons.