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Amanpour
Interview with Former Trump Appointee to U.S. State Department Matthew Bartlett; Interview with Former U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell; Interview with Israeli Historian and Writer Fania Oz-Salzberger; Interview with "First Among Equals" Author Emma Ashford. Aired 1-2p ET
Aired September 03, 2025 - 13:00 ET
THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT. THIS COPY MAY NOT BE IN ITS FINAL FORM AND MAY BE UPDATED.
[13:00:00]
CHRISTIANE AMANPOUR, CNN CHIEF INTERNATIONAL ANCHOR: Hello, everyone, and welcome to "Amanpour." Here's what's coming up.
A show of force in Beijing and a challenge to American supremacy. Trump accuses these leaders of conspiring against the United States, but is he
ceding control?
Then the battle for the soul of Israel. Historian and writer Fania Oz- Salzberger on the moral questions facing her country about the war on Gaza.
Plus --
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
EMMA ASHFORD, AUTHOR, "FIRST AMONG EQUALS": Alienating India, threatening sanctions related to the war on Ukraine, that is an example of putting
ideals and values above what are actually U.S. interests.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: -- the case for realist foreign policy. Walter Isaacson speaks with Emma Ashford about her boOK. "First Among Equals."
Welcome to the program, everyone. I'm Christiane Amanpour in London.
Peace or war? A warning from Xi Jinping as he put China's full military might on display in Beijing, joined by the leaders of Russia and North
Korea. He also claimed that China's rise is unstoppable. Take a listen.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
XI JINPING, CHINESE LEADER (through translator): Today, humanity once again faces the choice between peace or war, dialogue or confrontation,
win-win cooperation over a zero-sum game. The Chinese people firmly stand on the right side of history and the progress of human civilization. We
adhere to the path of peaceful development and work hand in hand with people of all countries to build a community with a shared future for
mankind.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: And those striking images of Xi, Putin, and Kim standing side by side certainly caught the attention of the U.S. president. Donald Trump
says they're conspiring against the United States. But after months of alienating allies, many accused the president of undermining America's
influence and upending a world order that has ensured western peace and prosperity for the past 80 years, an order led by the United States.
So, here to discuss what's ahead, Kurt Campbell, who served as deputy secretary of state and architect of the Biden administration's China and
Indo-Pacific policy, and Matthew Bartlett, who served as a senior State Department official during President Trump's first term. Welcome both of
you to the program.
I think I want to get a gut reaction or a considered geopolitical reaction from both of you on the display that we just saw and that I just described
in Beijing. It was very powerful. Matthew Bartlett, as a former Trump administration official in his first term, what do you make of it? What is
the message to the United States?
MATTHEW BARTLETT, FORMER TRUMP APPOINTEE TO U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT: I mean, the optics of this are striking. This has been called the new axis of
upheaval. A playoff of Michael Gerson's old term from the Bush years, but it certainly illustrates to the world, you know, this potential new divide
where these fault lines are and how America and the west, you know, must confront this in a myriad of different ways, from a security, to a trade
economic energy, and that this is becoming much more apparent I think as we drive deeper into the 21st century.
AMANPOUR: OK. I'm going to come back to you on how to confront it. And I'm going to ask you, Kurt Campbell. You know, it -- you -- it seems that Trump
is ceding control. Is that a fair thing to say? He had a summit with Putin in Alaska, which went pretty much nowhere except in Putin's favor. He's got
all these issues, as I described, of alienating some key allies who he needs, if he's going to somehow confront or deal with the China challenge.
But is he doing what he needs to do to keep that security for America?
KURT CAMPBELL, FORMER U.S. DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE: Well, first, Christiane, it's great to be with you and I appreciate joining the stage
with Matthew as well. I would say the key to American strength on the international stage is not just the capacity that the United States brings
militarily, technologically, our soft power, et cetera.
[13:05:00]
It is our ability over decades to work with friends and partners to correct -- to create a kind of operating system. And those key partners in Europe,
in Japan, South Korea, Australia. Over the last several years, we've sought, Christiane, to add to that group. One of the key swing states has
been India. I would argue that the U.S.-India relationship might be the most important bilateral relationship for the United States in the 21st
century.
In recent months, however, it appears that the president actually is more focused on trying to build bridges and curry favor with Putin and Xi,
rather than with these partners that we've been discussing. All those capitals in the west are deeply worried about the trajectory of the U.S.
relationship with allies and partners and are wondering about the way ahead, probably the biggest display and the most concerning one, despite
the incredible military capabilities, which we'll probably get to, but at a political level, Christiane, it is seeing Prime Minister Modi, who has
worked so closely with the United States in so many ways, hugging it up in Beijing with both Putin and Xi. That concerns me.
AMANPOUR: Well, I will get to that because it's been described as having, you know, essentially abandoned decades of American bipartisan policy to
bring India into the fold in terms of a bulwark against China.
But, Matthew Bartlett, I want to ask you, because President Trump has, now we all know, posted overnight regarding this summit in China. May President
Xi and the wonderful people of China have a great and lasting day of celebration. Please give my warmest regards to Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong
Un as you conspire against the United States of America.
So, that's a bit of sarcasm with a sting in its tail. And then, he said something else in the Oval Office, just in the last few hours. What do you
make of the way he's describing and reacting to this show of force in Beijing?
BARTLETT: I mean, clearly, he believes that this is a summit, a meeting where the optics are mainly meant for him to convey a message, and he is
dismissive of that. But I think we should really recognize that this summit, you know, as Kurt said, as the deputy secretary, who, you know, has
done so much work on behalf for our country and advancing our strategic interest in a nonpartisan way, but this is the business-as-usual crowd.
This is the, we want to buy cheap Russian energy and gas.
And yes, India is, you know, a critical relationship, arguably a critical ally. Yet, we should remember that, you know, their growth is fueled by
cheap Russian oil. And that growth is funding, you know, a war in Ukraine. So, you would have to recognize that, you know, in some ways, you know,
when you try to squeeze Putin, which arguably the president is doing right now with these sanctions -- additional sanctions and tariffs on India, that
there's going to be some ramifications, some which may be unavoidable.
AMANPOUR: OK. So, this is then the interesting point, is it really by slapping India with a 50 percent tariff that's going to get Putin to change
his action in Ukraine? I don't know. I mean, do you think so, Matthew Bartlett? And then I'll get Kurt's take.
BARTLETT: You're asking the right question. Sometimes in -- oftentimes in foreign policy there is not a right decision, there's only an effective
decision. And right now, post-summit, it seems as if where the ball was in Putin's corner, Putin is walking away. There are reports, open source, that
now with the support of President Trump, Ukrainians have struck Russia where it hurts, in their oil pipelines. And now, again, secondary sanctions
on India, arguably, you know, China could -- which just announced a pipeline deal this week with Russia, these are critical.
This war, under the guise of a land grab, again, looks to be a war around energy and how energy security is national security in the future.
AMANPOUR: Kurt Campbell, do you agree with that? And describe for us a little bit how your administration, certainly, and they announced it was
trying to draw in India and Modi despite his, you know, some would say authoritarian tendencies, draw him in as a bulwark against China. What did
the United States try to do and has Trump put it at risk?
[13:10:00]
CAMPBELL: Look, I think it's been a bipartisan project, Christiane, over decades recognizing that India is a great power, the largest country on
earth, the largest democracy on earth. We've worked with them constructively in a variety of different ways.
I would take a slightly different view than Matthew. I think over time India has positioned itself subtly away from Russia for a variety of
reasons. Most prominently, the weapons that India had depended on from Russia have performed very badly on the battlefield in Ukraine, and I think
that's caused the Indians to sort of pivot away. It is true that India purchases natural gas and petroleum from Russia, but they're not the
largest percentage of those imports by far, it's China and also the E.U. And so, by picking on India, I think it misses the larger problem here.
The question is going to be whether the Trump administration goes after the real supporter of Russia, which is China. I think what animates the Trump
strategy is the idea that you can drive a wedge between China and Russia. I do not believe that is possible. And I also believe that what we are
seeing, the peak and the really deeply unfortunate rhetoric between the two sides, I'm not sure really is animated by Ukraine. I think it really has
more to do with the reluctance of India for a variety of domestic reasons to accord what President Trump wants, which is some kind of credit for the
role he played in conversations and engagements between India and Pakistan.
I will say, one of the things that's interesting about President Trump, he is actually much more astute about American politics than his critics give
him credit for. He really does understand how to maneuver here, what the implications are. What we've seen increasingly, however, is that he doesn't
care and doesn't understand the domestic politics of our allies and partners. He's put Prime Minister Modi in a really tough place. And I'm
concerned about the trajectory of the relationship.
My hope is we'll be able to overcome some of the challenges of recent weeks and resume a positive trajectory and technology and military. Indian
students are the largest group in the United States, I think that's generally quite positive.
AMANPOUR: Well, except that's changing.
CAMPBELL: This is critical. It changing.
AMANPOUR: It is changing.
CAMPBELL: Yes, it is.
AMANPOUR: And yes, just to add, you know, Modi is responding to U.S. tariffs with a call for Indian self-reliance. Now, you would say, yes, he
would, wouldn't he, encouraging shops to post made in India, you know, all of that stuff. And Indian students, which make up such a big -- an
important sector of, you know, all sorts of professional activity, are -- a lot of them avoiding America right now and seeking universities elsewhere.
So, I think -- you know, I want to ask Matt, because he worked for -- Matthew Bartlett, for Trump. You know, Kurt says that Trump is incredibly
astute about U.S. politics. All right. So, let's take that as a given. But is he astute about policy? How these politics actually affect policy and
how, you know, it affects allies when you alienate them or when, you know, mistakenly think that you can divide the world into spheres of influence?
What do you think is going on policy wise?
BARTLETT: I mean, yes and no. If you look back to the first administration, we built allies around defeating ISIS and terrorism. You
look at Europe, you look at some of those earlier conversations around and gosh, you know, I could not concur with Kurt more. You know, the E.U., even
last year, bought a record amount of Russian LNG gas. Just an unfathomable fact that you -- if you look back from that -- you know, the earlier NATO
meetings. And now, this reality that we are, flash forward, the better part of a decade.
So, there is critical policy that the president does articulate yet, yes, there's also -- you have to acknowledge, that there is a notion of
carelessness, of attitude, of swagger that he carries with him sometimes on a personal level, on a personality level that crosses over into the policy.
Lavrov himself applauded India and Modi for buying that Russian oil. That is a critical component of this relationship, of this inflection point
right now. But as Kurt said, it goes deeper than that. It goes back to taking credit over who ended the war. It goes to the tariffs. It goes to
the personality.
So, it is a sometimes-confusing complex mix of all of this. Some where he is right, and oftentimes, you know, where he may fall short.
[13:15:00]
AMANPOUR: So, what I don't understand is what Trump is getting out of, let's say, cozying up to Putin. And as you know, he says one thing one day
and one thing another day. Sometimes more, you know, targeted against Putin, sometimes more amenable to Putin.
At the Alaska Summit there was a lot of outrage at the red-carpet treatment, at the refusal to take any questions in any press conference at
the final decision by Trump to go against his allies, go against Zelenskyy and sort of dismiss the idea of a ceasefire first. And also, just
symbolically, Sergey Lavrov arrived, I'm told, wearing a sweatshirt with the Cyrillic letters of the Soviet Union in the United States.
I mean, that's a major middle finger, I think. And then they go to China and they -- you know, and they, you know, flaunt their axis of anti-
Americanism and anti-westernism. So, Matthew, what more does Trump need to do to, I don't know, be the superpower, have America be the superpower, not
just as sort of an isolationist America only power?
BARTLETT: Yes, let's just be clear. You know, Putin is the devil. He is a murderous, invading dictator. That is a fact. But sometimes you have to
deal with the devil. You have to compromise with the devil and know that the devil is not trustworthy. You have to see the American president try to
push him and pressure him to peace talks. Directionally speaking, we had a meeting with Putin, then we had an amazing meeting with so many leaders in
the west. Directionally, this may have been better than the war had gone in many, years, yet we should not measure this on direction but rather
outcomes. And since then, Putin has grown even more aggressive.
Treasury Secretary Bessent called it despicable, his actions. The president, the first lady have spoken out on this. You've seen the
secondary tariffs on India. You've seen a massive weapon sale to NATO. You know, talk about security agreements to prevent the war. No. We're talking
about potential security agreements to end this war.
How do you have leverage over Putin to bring him to the table, to negotiate some sort of a diplomatic end to this? It's a very difficult thing. You
don't want to enhance, expand this war, you want to extinguish it.
AMANPOUR: Let me ask you, Kurt Campbell. I spoke to Elbridge Colby shortly after Trump's election this second time. He's now a Senior Defense
Department official.
CAMPBELL: Yes.
AMANPOUR: And this is what he spoke -- told me about what he expected a Trump administration policy, foreign policy to be in contrast with Biden
and the Democratic foreign policy agendas. Here's what he told me.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
ELBRIDGE COLBY, FORMER PENTAGON OFFICIAL: What I see from the Biden Harris administration is a wild disconnect between rhetoric and reality. I mean,
endless highfaluting discussion of the rules based international order and no limits to American's commitments. And then, you know, a defense budget
that isn't even rising and -- on a trajectory to a potentially multi-front war. So, we're heading towards the iceberg, and I think if we continue on
the current trajectory, we're going to ram right into it. I think the Trump-Vance agenda offers us a very good way of avoiding World War II in a
way that protects our interests.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: OK. So, to be fair, that was, you know, just before -- just after the election. Do you concur with what Eldridge Colby said? Elbridge
Colby, I keep getting it wrong.
CAMPBELL: Well, it's hard to make a judgment from just a quick little splice there on the video. I know Bridge Colby well, and I think I
understand some of the things that he's trying to accomplish in the Pentagon. I will say, just back quickly on the earlier point. I very much
hope what Matthew suggests is actually happening with the president with respect to Russia.
The hope is that he is finally starting to understand that the challenge to finding peace is not with Zelenskyy and Ukraine. Fundamentally, it is with
Putin. And that the only thing that he will understand is more pressure. And so, I think we're hopeful that the president will actually take some
steps and sanctions, asking for some of that Russian money in European banks, continuing to provide arms to Ukraine. There has been discussion of
that, but if you look, there is a clear disconnect between the rhetoric of disappointment in Russia. And also suggesting that you're going to support
Ukraine more. There hasn't been as much follow through as we'd like to see.
I think the indicators are that the defense budget, in many respects, has not increased in the way that Bridge Colby had suggested. I think the key
to the Biden approach, Christiane, was to try to ensure that the United States was working closely with key allies and partners in Europe and in
Asia.
[13:20:00]
And I give Matthew credit. That was really the byline and the approach in the first Trump administration. This time around, there is a clear
inclination, I think, to approach problems by ourselves. There is a degree of alienation with our allies and partners, and we are now confronted by a
remarkable and dangerous combination of states that were on display in China over the last day and a half with clear overshadows of 1939,
unmistakable. Christiane, you with your experience, sort of 1939 flavor with an over context of 21st century laser and hypersonic weapons, deeply
dangerous and concerning.
I do not think this is a day that we should be comforted by. I think it's deeply concerning to American purpose, and I hope it will lead quietly to a
degree of reexamination about the fundamentals of what the United States is about, working with allies and partners along the quarters of power in the
Trump administration.
AMANPOUR: Well, finally then to you, Matthew Bartlett, because in the first term Trump did try to reign in North Korea's nuclear ambitions. And
here was he on stage, Kim Jong Un. He never travels abroad basically. There he was with all the world leaders. And he's now basically a nuclear power
and being accepted as such. That must be really scary given what Kurt has just said.
BARTLETT: I mean, again, I could not agree more with Kurt. He is dead on, very unfortunately. On the -- looking at the horizon here. You now have a
meeting of unaligned countries of theocracies, dictators, authoritarian leaders. This is a threat to the U.S, this is a threat to the west, a
threat to the global order. And what is this? This is -- they are not pressuring Putin to end the war, they are pressuring Putin to continue to
pump gas at the expense of Ukraine. Ukraine is on the menu at that summit. And what's next could potentially be Taiwan and other hotspots around the
world. So, yes, the optics are horrific but the foreboding could be even worse.
AMANPOUR: Well, we'll continue the discussions. Thank you very much for being with us, Matthew Bartlett and Kurt Campbell. Thank you so much.
And later in the program, Israel calls up thousands of reservists to take over Gaza City, despite protests from hostage families at home. The Israeli
writer Fania Oz-Salzberger on the battle for the soul of Israel. That's next.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: In Israel, reservists are being called up for a massive operation to conquer Gaza City despite widespread internal and
international opposition. Meanwhile, the UAE is warning Israel that any move to annex the occupied West Bank will constitute a red line in their
Abraham Accords. And in Gaza, dozens more have been killed by Israel, and every day, men, women, and children continue to die of starvation.
[13:25:00]
Amid these harrowing reports from Gaza and Israel's increasing isolation on the world stage and the hostages who still remain in captivity, in
Jerusalem, protestors have kicked off a plan four days of demonstrations calling on the government to end the war.
Historian Fania Oz-Salzberger is reflecting on Israel's actions and reputation in what she calls the battle for the soul of Israel. And she's
joining me from Tel Aviv. Welcome back to our program. And I was struck by your article in this weekend's Financial Times titled, as I just said. And
as we speak, there have been, you know, hundreds if not thousands, I don't know the full number, of demonstrators near your prime minister's home.
Where do you think the politics of your country regarding this war stand right now?
FANIA OZ-SALZBERGER, ISRAELI HISTORIAN AND WRITER: Well, the politics of my country regarding the war is -- good evening. It's nice to be here,
Christiane. The politics of my government is running parallel to the personal interests of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who will continue
the war as long as he thinks it is in his political favor. And unfortunately, hundreds of thousands of us now know that this is not the
case.
So, the noise people are making on the street tonight in Jerusalem, normally all over the country, is getting louder and louder. We cannot
democratically undo this government, but we can say out loud that it is no longer representing us, that it's not in our name.
AMANPOUR: So, tell me what you mean then by the battle for the soul of Israel. And as I mentioned, even the soldiers and the reservists are now
beginning to question and some are wanting to refuse heading to their bases, to take part in this war as it continues. Tell me about how you see
the battle for the soul of Israel, given what's unfolding against the civilians in Gaza and also in the West Bank.
OZ-SALZBERGER: Yes. In Gaza, in the West Bank and what is also unfolding in a different sort of way against the citizens of Israel itself, who are
seeing democracy slip away under the unkind fingers of the current government. So, we are here to say, and there is a growing number of us,
that we can no longer support either the war in Gaza, which is continuing against the interest of returning the hostages, which is continuing against
humanitarian international law, and people are beginning to say -- well, have begun to say we are no longer going to stand for it.
I personally know several reserve soldiers who are now refusing to reenter Gaza, to continue serving as reservist in the Israeli army. And I
personally encourage them to refuse because this is an unprecedentedly, illegitimate and non-agreed war from the perspective of Israel's own
citizens.
AMANPOUR: Can I just play --
OZ-SALZBERGER: And for soldiers and also citizens and are part of this country, yes.
AMANPOUR: Indeed. Given what you just said, I want to play a short soundbite from one of the reservists, combat medic, Sergeant Kresh. He,
here's what he said recently.
(BEGIN VIDEO CLIP)
MAX KRESH, ISRAELI ARMY RESERVIST: We're over 365 and counting, soldiers who served during the war and have declared that we will not report for
duty when called again. We refuse to take part in Netanyahu's illegal war and we see it as a patriotic duty to refuse and to demand accountability
from our leaders.
We are the same refuse -- we are the same reservists and soldiers who dropped everything on October 7th and rushed to the fronts to report for
duty to protect our people. It is precisely from that same sense of duty, which we are driven to refuse and to use our voices loudly to resist
Netanyahu's attempts to sacrifice everything for his own political survival.
(END VIDEO CLIP)
AMANPOUR: Fania Oz-Salzberger, do you think, given that a group of rabbis have come out in the last couple of weeks to also, you know, say that this
has to end and not in our name, et cetera, do you think these important sectors of Israelis society, like the soldiers, like the rabbis, like
others, even artists who may not be taken this seriously by the current government, but you've signed a petition along with many others, do you
think there will come a time when this government hears them and listens or not?
[13:30:00]
OZ-SALZBERGER: Well, let's put things in order, to some degree, Christiane. There is a huge number of Israelis today, a clear majority who
want a hostage deal and to return the living hostages, the dead hostages, all 48 of the remaining people in Gaza. There is also a huge majority for
ending the war.
It is clear now to many Israelis who are not part of the original protest core or the original left center viewpoint, it is absolutely clear to them
now that this war is not serving any purpose except for twin purposes of this government, which is to save Netanyahu's skin and find a way to stop
his trial, his indictment on three cases of charges of corruption and the ultra-messianic right, the far-right interest of reconquering and
resettling Gaza with Jews, not only at the expense of the Arab Palestinian civilian population there, but also at the expense of the lives of Israeli
soldiers and civilians in the future. They don't mind it anymore.
So, what has been a consensus among Israelis? Ever since the foundation of the state is no longer a consensus. We cannot agree to fight a war using
our citizens' army, our own children and their friends. We cannot agree to fight a war which is so horrific, so devoid of humanity, both towards the
Gazans and towards the most citizen of Israel. And we can no longer support a war which is intended to keep the prime minister alive and kicking and
out of court.
AMANPOUR: Fania, I hear you and I hear all those people who say this is a political and personal project by Netanyahu and a project by those who seem
to be holding the strings to his power, and those are the -- as you call them, the ultra-orthodox messianic members of his cabinet and his
government.
But I want to ask you this, because you point out throughout your essay, you call -- you talk about a moderate majority. You talk about, you know,
now so many people coming out against this war for the reasons you've just laid out, but you've probably also seen people like Michael Sfard, who's
the leading Israeli human rights lawyer, saying that actually all Israelis are implicated in what's happening in Gaza. He called it an all-Israeli
project. As uncomfortable as that probably does sound to you and others.
He says this, it's easiest to look at Be-Gvir or Smortich and feel it has nothing to do with us, but the criminal, felonious, unforgivable project of
Gaza's Destruction is an all-Israeli project. It could not have happened without the cooperation, whether through active contribution or silence of
all parts of Jewish Israeli society. The government secured loyalty to this crime in the war's very first days when the nature of Israel's attack on
Gaza was formed, a total assault on everything Gazan, with no pretense of focusing on only military targets. Back then, when voices warning of war
crimes were drowned out by war drums, all segments of society were chained into complicity in the crime.
That is so harsh, and I wonder what your take is on it, because many people believe that to be true.
OZ-SALZBERGER: Christiane, I have great respect for Michael Sfard. He's a wonderful human rights lawyer and fighter. But I have to say that there was
a segment from the very start of the Gaza war who saw and foresaw what's coming, which is a totally unwise, and may I say violent, cruel war, taking
civilians along with the Hamas militants and victimizing so many innocent people.
So, I respect Michael Sfard, but he himself and some of his friends were courageous enough to say that in the immediate aftermath of the 7th of
October, at the beginning of the Israeli invasion of Gaza. Others, including myself, were a little later, but we're there already. Early in
2024, we had a chat then, you and I. And now, a growing number, an increasing number.
Now, these are not the huge majorities that I mentioned before for a hostage deal and an end to the war. The smaller groups among the Israelis
protesting in the streets and the city square, and these smaller groups are still significant that are saying, enough already, it should have stopped a
while ago. What we're doing now is completely out of order, immoral and possibly even -- or quite evidently, even criminal. So, this is a growing
group.
[13:35:00]
Now, people can argue with me and say, on this you are only a minority. I also belong to a minority who wants a two-state solution, who wants a free
and sovereign Palestine next door to a safe and Democratic Israel. The two- state solution, which is classic, it got a hit on the 7th of October, but it's here to stay because it's among the only nonviolent endings for these
terrible stories.
So, of course, we're still a minority, but we are a growing minority. This is my life mission now to talk to fellow Israelis about a political
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. And friends of Israel should reach out to us, to these people because otherwise, what will you do? If
the whole of Israel is totally and equally guilty, as people like Michael Sfard seem to be implying, then OK, what's next? What will you do with 7.1
million Jews, many of whom call themselves Zionists, I do too, in a moderate way, who are not going anywhere?
So, this --
AMANPOUR: As you said --
OZ-SALZBERGER: -- a nonstarter for me to say, all Israelis are equally vile or equally racist, or equally want Gaza demolished. Maybe the polls
give big numbers. People are still in a very, very militant mood about Hamas. But having said that, we need to encourage the moderate and not
start counting how many moderates there are. Because the good news, as I said before, it's a growing number.
AMANPOUR: And it is coming more and more to the fore as you're saying. But the good -- as you said, you've said there's -- you know, neither Israeli
Jews are going anywhere nor Palestinians. They have to share this space. You also said it's very likely what we know that what's happening to the
hostages is criminal. They're still wherever they are underground, probably under fed, tortured, and awful.
And we know also that Palestinians and many, many hundreds of children have died of starvation, including women and others, and there's still a siege
on there. You've talked about it as potentially being criminal. So, I wonder whether you think that that is criminal, and whether -- you have to
struggle to tell people inside Israel and your allies outside what you've written, people accusing Israel of war crimes against innocent Gazans are
not anti-Semites, they are simply human. That's what you wrote.
And yet, so many allies in the United States, allies in Europe, all -- you know, many Jews, many allies believe it's antisemitic. But you're saying
it's not.
OZ-SALZBERGER: It's certainly not antisemitic to say that Israeli is very evidently conducting war crimes. Not all of its military actions are war
crimes, but some of it evidently are, and we need to acknowledge that and we need to start thinking about the future, not only in terms of rebuilding
Gaza physically and politically finding a day after scenario for Gaza. Israelis will also need to rebuild ourselves morally, constitutionally,
make democracy stronger against such assaults as we are getting now, and recreating the humanist strain that went through the early historical
Zionism and is still there among hundreds and thousands of us.
Humanist meaning believing that human lives are equal, whether you're a Jew or a non-Jew. Humanist meaning that we don't own the whole of the land, but
it has to be shared somehow. Call it a two-state solution, call it a confederation. And humanist in the sense of recognizing the humanity of
every innocent Palestinian in Gaza and in West Bank and elsewhere.
AMANPOUR: Wow.
OZ-SALZBERGER: And this is my Judaism. This is my Israeli -- these are my Israeli values and Zionist values. And we are fighting for that, both
within our own traumatized militarized society and when talking to Israel's friends abroad.
AMANPOUR: Yes.
OZ-SALZBERGER: So, there are probably two or three different Israels, and one I'm speaking for is not Netanyahu's Israel, it is certainly not the
Ben-Gvir and Smotrich Israel. It is an Israel that wants to continue the old dream of becoming a legitimate member of the -- what used to be called
the family of nations, of the global community.
AMANPOUR: Well, we thank you. Thank you very much.
OZ-SALZBERGER: And create a compromise with the Palestinians as long as the Palestinians will have leaders leading them to a moderate solution the
way we are trying to push for here in a Israel.
[13:40:00]
AMANPOUR: OK. Thank you for that, Fania Oz-Salzberger. Thanks for being with us. And we'll be right back after this short break.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
AMANPOUR: As we discussed earlier, president Trump seems to have walked India into the arms of China and Russian. So, how can the U.S. navigate
this shift? In her new book, "First Among Equals," Emma Ashford offers some suggestions as she explains now to Walter Isaacson.
(BEGIN VIDEOTAPE)
WALTER ISAACSON, CO-HOST, AMANPOUR AND CO.: Thank you, Christiane. And, Emma Ashford, welcome to the show.
EMMA ASHFORD, AUTHOR, "FIRST AMONG EQUALS": It's great to be here. ISAACSON: Your new book, "First Among Equals," it is a cry for a realist foreign policy. Explain to me what you mean by realistic foreign policy and
how that's different from what we've been doing.
ASHFORD: Yes. So, I mean, look, I think of realism is one of the two poles around which U.S. foreign policy tends to cluster, right? Sometimes we're
very idealistic, Woodrow Wilson, for example, and sometimes we are more realist and I think Eisenhower or Nixon are great examples of that.
The argument that I make in the book is that during the post-Cold War period, we have tended far too much towards that idealistic pole, that we
have effectively engaged in a series of very transformative crusading foreign policy goals, like the freedom agenda under Bush, and that we've
forgotten that we actually have to operate in this world of great power competition, of diplomatic politics, and we need to get back to thinking a
little more about interests and what we do to try and achieve those.
ISAACSON: Well, you talk about great power competition and the balances of power that come with that. There were pictures this week that would just
send shutters down the spine of a realist, a Metternich or a Bismarck would be appalled, and that was Prime Minister Modi meeting with President Xi of
China and President Putin of Russia.
And I think Bismarck and Metternich, Kissinger, for that matter, would say you never, when you have a realistic foreign policy, allow more than one of
your potential adversaries to get close to each other. In this case, we've been able to do it to all three. Is this a really bad fumble in a realist
foreign policy?
ASHFORD: I think so. And again, this is not something that is unique to the Trump administration. If anything, in many ways, they've been slightly
more realist than say, the Biden administration or some of the others in the recent past.
But yes, alienating India, threatening sanctions related to the war in Ukraine, that is an example of putting ideals and values above what are
actually U.S. interests. And in this case, you know, we risk losing India as a partner in competition with China if we spend so much time on Europe
and Ukraine and we elevate that over India and its role in the Indo- Pacific. And so, those are the kind of hard choices that politicians, that realist politicians have to make.
But what I see from U.S. policymakers all too often is this willingness to talk, very wonderful talk about values, but to ignore those sort of very
concrete interests we might be leaving behind.
ISAACSON: Well, have we ever had a time when we were suddenly able to take what was an ally, India, in many ways, an ally India was very much opposed
to China, and likewise, Kissinger and Nixon take China's relationship with Russia and pull them apart? That was part of their realism. Have we ever
seen a time when you have three potential adversaries thrown together like we see this week?
[13:45:00]
ASHFORD: I mean, I don't think I would necessarily describe India as an adversary, but I do think that this is a reflection of the fact the world
is becoming more multipolar. There are more important players, again, than there were for the last 30 years. And in some ways, what I think the United
States needs to do is become a little more like those countries and how they pursue foreign policy.
The Indians, they know they have an interest in cooperating with the United States on China. At the same time, they have other options and they are
going to exercise those. They're going to try rapprochement with China, they're going to continue to buy Russian oil. They have these options. The
United States, if we continue to just lock ourselves into, you know, we have a western alliance and we don't talk to other states, right, that's
very restrictive and we are losing out when we could be doing something like the Indians or others are doing.
ISAACSON: When you look at the other great powers, are there any of them that we should be building better relationships with, and I mean, say India
or perhaps China, that we shouldn't try to fight both China and Russia at the same time?
ASHFORD: You know, I tend to think -- and again this is sort of somewhat a mainstream realist view, I tend to think the biggest challenge, the biggest
threat to the United States at the moment is China and its growing influence in Asia. So, for me, I would prioritize that. And that does mean
improving relations with India.
A little more controversially, it probably means improving relations with Russia. And I think -- I don't agree with the Trump administration in many
things, but I think this is one area where they are correct, reducing the U.S.-Russia relationship just to Ukraine and ignoring all the other areas,
China, the Arctic, where we might need to talk to the Russians or potentially not have them just a junior partner to China, that would
actually be in the U.S. interest.
ISAACSON: You keep using the phrase in the book coercive economic state craft. And I guess one of the great examples of it was when Russia did its
latest grand assault on Ukraine. We put what we call crippling sanctions, and even Trump decided to do more. And the result of that is the Russian
economy hasn't collapsed, and Russia has now created economic relationships with China and with India. Was that a mistake to try to deal with it with
through crippling sanctions, or do we not do enough?
ASHFORD: Look, I mean, I think that one thing that we have learned from the last 30 years is that no matter how powerful the United States, you
know, we are financially center of the world. We have this huge military, there are still things that are unachievable even for that power, whether
that is transforming states into democracies in the Middle East, or whether that is forcing Russia, a country that provides, you know, 10 to 12 percent
of world oil supply to stop a war that it really wants to fight.
And so, we have seen the limits of our ability to force other countries to do what we want to do, and that was during this period of extreme U.S.
dominance. So, again, you know, one of the arguments that I make in the book is that we need to think going forward as that preponderance of power
declines is going to get even harder. To use coercion, to force other countries, we need to think about other ways.
And again, I think in the case of Ukraine, I understand why the Biden administration went the sanctions route. It was sort of a middle road
between doing nothing and starting a war with a nuclear power. But we shouldn't pretend that it was ever going to actually force another great
power to come to -- you know, to stop entirely what it was doing.
ISAACSON: Well, you've talked in the book about we need to have flexible partnerships, and I think you contrast in that book to what we used to
think of our alliances as sacred obligations. I mean, it was almost invoked as it were moral, not just realistic. And you said, no, we -- I think
you're saying in the book that we have to get away from sacred obligation types of alliances and move towards what -- I think you even used the word
mundane, just sort of mundane and flexible partnerships. Let me ask you about that. How would've that have helped in Ukraine?
ASHFORD: I mean, look, alliances are tools, and I think that is something that has been forgotten in many ways during the unipolar moment. Alliances
like NATO have always had this values component to them, right? We work with other democracies. It was focused on the communist Soviet Union. But
at the same time, interests mattered a lot during that period. We had autocracies like Turkey that were welcomed into NATO because they were
strategically important.
[13:50:00]
When Joe Biden talked about alliance as sacred obligations and he started to talk about Ukraine, we saw things like in the run up to the war in
Ukraine, the Biden administration refusing to negotiate or even consider the notion that maybe Ukraine wouldn't join NATO even if it could prevent a
war. And so, for me, that is the difference, right? Does Ukraine have an absolute right to join a western alliance of democracies? Well, that's a
value judgment, right?
ISAACSON: Well, so give me your solution there on Ukraine, what should we offer in this war?
ASHFORD: I think earlier on, before the conflict, I think potentially there were negotiations that could have created some form of neutrality for
Ukraine, the way Finland had during the Cold War, for example. We've all --
ISAACSON: Well, Finland doesn't have it now. This thing is not Finland back in (INAUDIBLE).
ASHFORD: Yes. Well, exactly. And they chose to join sort of the western coalition here. I mean, look, that ship has sailed at this point. I think
for Ukraine, the best available option -- I mean, it is a form of neutrality, but it's a form of neutrality where they've lost a lot of
territory. But I think what we saw in this war is the U.S., Western European countries, they're not willing to fight a war against Russia for
Ukraine. And again, for me, that highlights the difference between these values driven statements.
You know. Ursula von der Leyen of the European Commission saying, we'll do anything for Ukraine. And the reality of -- no, the European states are not
going to fight for Ukraine. So, we need to actually have politics, diplomacy that reflects the reality of what we are actually willing to do,
not just this sort of free-floating value statements.
ISAACSON: So, you want to change a lot of what we would call sacred obligations and say, no, they should be more mundane, or I guess I'd just
use the word flexible and practical partnerships, that include Israel?
ASHFORD: Israel is a really interesting case. It has a distinct sort of -- we don't commit to it the way we commit to NATO states, but we have a lot
of different treaties that obligate us to certain things. I mean, look, I think the alliance with Israel should be open to question the same way that
any other alliance would be. And in the current moment, I would say that our alliance with Israel is hurting our ability to work with, negotiate
with basically every state in the Arab world, and frankly, some in Asia. Our relationship with Indonesia, a very important state in Asia, has got
worse because of the war in Gaza.
So, we need to be able to think again about interests rather than saying, the alliance with Israel is a sacred obligation and we must keep supporting
them no matter what it means for us.
ISAACSON: You say, in a multipolar world we really have to build up the capabilities of our friends. I'm wondering now in the past 4, 5, 6, 7
years, who are these friends you're talking about? If we've decided we're not going to build up NATO, we're not going to build up Europe, we're
having disputes with many of our European allies and we push Russia, China, and India all together into being adversaries, who are the friends that we
now have? Do we have more friends than we used to?
ASHFORD: Look, I talk about enabling U.S. allies to carry more of the weight. And I think, you know, there is a -- not a tradeoff, right, but if
you are going to get allies in NATO, for example, to do more for their own security, to spend more on defense, to build up those military capabilities
so that the U.S. can do less, you are going to need a little tough love.
Now, again, I think this administration has gone perhaps a little too far in that direction. But when I talk about enabling our friends to do more,
what I mean is finding these alliances where the U.S. has carried most or all of the weight for a couple of decades now, right? European states just
don't spend enough on defense. They're not capable of defending themselves. They rely on the United States. We should be doing less. They should be
doing more.
ISAACSON: Does that mean we should be pulling all our troops out of Europe within the next 10 years?
ASHFORD: I think over the next 10 to 15 years, yes, the U.S. should engage in a phased withdrawal from Europe. I think that is the only way in which
you successfully transfer the burden of defense to European states. Now, that's --
ISAACSON: Why?
ASHFORD: Because if we don't pull back, they won't do it. And I think we've seen this from history. Basically, the only times where European
states have --
ISAACSON: Wait, wait. You don't see them doing it in Ukraine now?
ASHFORD: I do see them starting to step up. And I think, in many ways, that's because the Trump administration has pulled back. We have seen
European states start to do more. We saw that spending pledge at the summit in the Hague, which, again, may or may not be reflected in capabilities,
but again, that is perhaps the most forward-thinking version of burden shifting that we have seen. We have the most obvious example where we've
seen European states actually start to step up.
And so, I think that a properly communicated, properly phased U.S. withdrawal from Europe over time that lets European states build the
capabilities and step up, I think that would be good for both sites. I think it would result in a much more balanced alliance where countries that
are, you know, populous, economically advanced just like us, they can do more for themselves and then, we have to do less and can focus our scarce
resources elsewhere.
[13:55:00]
ISAACSON: Near the end of this book, you talk about President Xi and President Putin having a meeting a while back. And they said, we're going
into the multipolar world, and they said that that would inevitably be a harbinger of the decline of the United States. Are they right?
ASHFORD: I don't think that's true. I used the phrase relative decline earlier and that is to say that the U.S. is seeing other countries rise to
meet it, right. Our predominance of power, the amount that we are out ahead of everybody else, that's shrinking. That doesn't mean that we are in
decline. And I think the United States is very capable of pivoting its, you know, scarce resources to meet the challenges of this multipolar world.
My concern is that we don't shift in time, we continue to pursue, you know, an extremely ambitious global strategy that overstretched us, that adds to
the debt, that means that we can't really accomplish anything anywhere. We're so stretched thin. If we don't adapt, I think then we might be in
much more trouble. But I think the opportunity is there for us to adapt to this emerging world and to build a very good place in it.
ISAACSON: Emma Ashford, thank you so much for joining us.
ASHFORD: Thanks for having me.
(END VIDEOTAPE)
AMANPOUR: And that's it for now. Goodbye from London.
(COMMERCIAL BREAK)
[14:00:00]
END
