Albert Newen

Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Institut für Philosophie II, Faculty Member

Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Graduiertenkolleg "Situated Cognition", Faculty Member

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Since 2007: Full Professor of Philosophy of Mind at the Ruhr-University of Bochum
2012-2022 Director of the Master-Program “Cognitive Science”, Bochum
Since 2011: Director of the “Center for Mind Brain and Cognitive Evolution”, Bochum
2003-2007 Associate Professor of Philosophy of Mind and Language and at University of Tübingen
1995-2002 Assistant Professor at the department of Philosophy, University of Bonn
1990-1994 PhD (Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter) at the department of Philosophy at the University of Bielefeld: "The meaning of singular terms"

Fellowships since 2002 include being a fellow (or visiting felllow) at:
- Oxford University
- Stanford University
- University of Urbana-Champaign
- UC Berkeley
- ZIF (Center for Interdisciplinary Research, Bielefeld)
- Institute for Advanced Studies ("Hanse-Wissenschaftskolleg")

https://www.ruhr-uni-bochum.de/philosophy/staff/newen/index.html

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165 Papers
2 Publications
1 Papers (Other)

Papers by Albert Newen

Beyond the comparator model: A multifactorial two-step account of agency

Consciousness and Cognition, Mar 1, 2008

There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the regis... more There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the ''comparator model''. In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.

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With great(er) power comes great(er) responsibility: an intercultural investigation of the effect of social roles on moral responsibility attribution

Philosophical Psychology, May 30, 2023

Beyond the Courtroom

Bloomsbury Academic eBooks, 2023

A Representational Account of Self-knowledge

Erkenntnis, Aug 23, 2007

... 2006; ). Finally, some cultures still do not have any representational system remotely akin ... more ... 2006; ). Finally, some cultures still do not have any representational system remotely akin to the count list (Gordon 2004; Pica et al. ... We are not questioning the characterization in the way that was initiated by Gettier (1963) but rather ignore this debate. ...

Why cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience is still the most plausible account

Consciousness and Cognition, 2017

To what extent is our perceptual experience influenced by higher cognitive phenomena like beliefs... more To what extent is our perceptual experience influenced by higher cognitive phenomena like beliefs, desires, concepts, templates? Given recent arguments against the possibility of cognitive penetration, we present striking evidence against the impenetrability claims. The weak impenetrability claim cannot account for (1) extensive structural feedback organization of the brain, (2) temporally very early feedback loops and (3) functional top-down processes modulating early visual processes by category-specific information. The strong impenetrability claim could incorporate these data by widening the ''perceptual module" such that it includes rich but still internal processing in a very large perceptual module. We argue that this latter view leads to an implausible version of a module. Therefore, we have to accept cognitive penetration of our perceptual experience as the best theoretical account so far given the available empirical evidence. We outline that this does not have any problematic consequences for the relation between perception and cognition.

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Thoughts, Motor Actions, and the Self

Mind & Language, Feb 1, 2007

The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to ... more The comparator-model, originally developed to explain motor action, has recently been invoked to explain several aspects of the self. However, in the fi rst place it may not be used to explain a basic self-world distinction because it presupposes one. Our alternative account is based on specifi c systematic covariation between action and perception. Secondly, the comparator model cannot explain the feeling of ownership of thoughts. We argue -contra Frith and Campbell -that thoughts are not motor processes and therefore cannot be described by the comparator-model. Rather, thoughts can be the triggering cause (intention) for actions. An alternative framework for the explanation of thought insertion in schizophrenics is presented.

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Situated Mental Representations

Oxford University Press eBooks, Dec 3, 2020

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Varieties of cognitive penetration in visual perception

Consciousness and Cognition, Jul 1, 2014

Is our perceptual experience a veridical representation of the world or is it a product of our be... more Is our perceptual experience a veridical representation of the world or is it a product of our beliefs and past experiences? Cognitive penetration describes the influence of higher level cognitive factors on perceptual experience and has been a debated topic in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Here, we focus on visual perception, particularly early vision, and how it is affected by contextual expectations and memorized cognitive contents. We argue for cognitive penetration based on recent empirical evidence demonstrating contextual and top-down influences on early visual processes. On the basis of a perceptual model, we propose different types of cognitive penetration depending on the processing level on which the penetration happens and depending on where the penetrating influence comes from. Our proposal has two consequences: (1) the traditional controversy on whether cognitive penetration occurs or not is ill posed, and (2) a clear-cut perceptioncognition boundary cannot be maintained.

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Building on Frege: New Essays about Sense, Content and Concepts

Philosopher-logican, Gottlob Frege's (1848-1924) work has recieved much attention. In his goa... more Philosopher-logican, Gottlob Frege's (1848-1924) work has recieved much attention. In his goal to solidify the foundations of mathematics and scientific work, Frege concieved a comprehensive philosophy of language and developed the main thesis of logicism, that mathematics is reducible to logic. This volume contains essays covering a range of issues related to Frege and his work. It discusses topics either in a Fregean spirit or in a dialogue with Frege's original views. Key papers concern the ontological status of propositions and concepts, attempts to improve on the semantics of singular terms, the question of how to construe the content of concept-expressions and other themes within the common ground in which ontology and philosophical semantics intersect.

I move, therefore I am: A new theoretical framework to investigate agency and ownership

Consciousness and Cognition, Jun 1, 2008

The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still pe... more The neurocognitive structure of the acting self has recently been widely studied, yet is still perplexing and remains an often confounded issue in cognitive neuroscience, psychopathology and philosophy. We provide a new systematic account of two of its main features, the sense of agency and the sense of ownership, demonstrating that although both features appear as phenomenally uniform, they each in fact are complex crossmodal phenomena of largely heterogeneous functional and (self-)representational levels. These levels can be arranged within a gradually evolving, onto-and phylogenetically plausible framework which proceeds from basic non-conceptual sensorimotor processes to more complex conceptual and meta-representational processes of agency and ownership, respectively. In particular, three fundamental levels of agency and ownership processing have to be distinguished: The level of feeling, thinking and social interaction. This naturalistic account will not only allow to ''ground the self in action", but also provide an empirically testable taxonomy for cognitive neuroscience and a new tool for disentangling agency and ownership disturbances in psychopathology (e.g. alien hand, anarchic hand, anosognosia for one's own hemiparesis).

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Irren ist … sinnvoll!

Rätsel Mensch - Expeditionen im Grenzbereich von Philosophie und Hirnforschung, 2016

Gegenuber Fakten, die die eigene Person betreffen, sind wir oft taub und blind. Ist das vernunfti... more Gegenuber Fakten, die die eigene Person betreffen, sind wir oft taub und blind. Ist das vernunftig? Ja, sagen die Philosophen Albert Newen und Gottfried Vosgerau. Denn diese Form der Tauschung schutzt und stabilisiert unser Selbstbild.

Animal thought exceeds language-of-thought

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, Dec 31, 2022

Quilty-Dunn et al. claim that all complex infant and animal reasoning implicate language-of-thoug... more Quilty-Dunn et al. claim that all complex infant and animal reasoning implicate language-of-thought hypothesis (LOTH)-like structures. We agree with the authors that the mental life of animals can be explained in representationalist terms, but we disagree with their idea that the complexity of mental representations is best explained by appealing to abstract concepts, and instead, we explain that it doesn&#39;t need to.

Modeling interactions between the embodied and the narrative self: Dynamics of the self-pattern within LIDA

Cognitive Systems Research

Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonl... more Despite lacking a generally accepted definition, Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) is commonly understood to refer to artificial agents possessing the capacity to build up a context-independent understanding of itself and the world and to generalize this knowledge across a multitude of contexts. In our paper, we model the reciprocal interaction of narrative and embodied aspects of the self-pattern within an individual cognitive agent. We do so by extending an approach by Ryan, Agrawal, &amp; Franklin (2020), who laid the groundwork for the implementation of the pattern theory of self in the LIDA (Learning Intelligent Decision Agent) model.

Selfless Memories

Erkenntnis, 2022

Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or consciou... more Many authors claim that being conscious constitutively involves being self-conscious, or conscious of oneself. This claim appears to be threatened by reports of 'selfless' episodes, or conscious episodes lacking self-consciousness, recently described in a number of pathological and nonpathological conditions. However, the credibility of these reports has in turn been challenged on the following grounds: remembering and reporting a past conscious episode as an episode that one went through is only possible if one was conscious of oneself while undergoing it. Call this the Memory Challenge. This paper argues that the Memory Challenge fails to undermine the credibility to reports of selfless episodes, because it rests on problematic assumptions about episodic memory. The paper further argues that we should distinguish between several kinds of self-representation that may be involved in the process of episodic remembering, and that once we do so, it is no longer mysterious how one could accurately remember and report a selfless episode as an episode that one went through. Thus, we should take reports of this kind seriously, and view them as credible counterexamples to the claim that consciousness constitutively involves self-consciousness.

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Metarepresentation, trust, and “unleashed expression”

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2023

Heintz &amp; Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issu... more Heintz &amp; Scott-Phillips's account of human expression leaves a number of central issues unclear – not least, whether the lack of expression in nonhuman species is attributable to their lack of the relevant metarepresentational abilities, an absence of trust, or a consequence of other factors. In place of their view, we propose a gradualistic account of the origins of human expression.

Knowledge and abilities: The need for a new understanding of knowing-how

Phenomenology and The Cognitive Sciences, May 12, 2009

Situated authenticity in episodic memory

Synthese

A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the origi... more A recalled memory is deemed authentic when it accurately represents how one experienced the original event. However, given the convincing research in cognitive science on the constructive nature of memory, this inevitably leads to the question of the ‘bounds of authenticity’. That is, how similar does a memory have to be to the original experience to still count as authentic? In this paper we propose a novel account of ‘Situated Authenticity’ which highlights that the norms of authenticity are context-dependent. In particular, we show that each of the three core functions of episodic memory (self, social and directive) is correlated with patterned changes in levels of conceptualization (e.g., concrete construal versus abstract construal of the event). We support this theoretical account with existing empirical data. We conclude the paper by showing how our account of Situated Authenticity supplements ongoing discussions on memory contextualism, and providing an outline of how our ac...

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Try to See it My Way: Humans Take the Level-1 Visual Perspective of Humanoid Robot Avatars

International Journal of Social Robotics

Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a fundamental process of social cognition. To date, however, o... more Visual perspective taking (VPT) is a fundamental process of social cognition. To date, however, only a handful of studies have investigated whether humans also take the perspective of humanoid robots. Recent findings on this topic are conflicting as one study found no evidence for level 1 VPT (i.e., which object is seen by the agent) and a different study has found evidence for level 2 VPT (i.e., how is the object seen by the agent). The latter study proposed that the human-like appearance of robots triggers VPT and that a mental capacity to perceive the environment is not required (mere-appearance hypothesis). In the present study, we tested whether the mere-appearance hypothesis is also applicable to level 1 VPT. We manipulated the appearance of a humanoid robot by either showing it with a human-like or artificial head, and its mental capacity for perception by presenting it as switched on or off. We found that all manipulations triggered VPT, showing, in contrast to earlier findi...

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4E Cognition. Historical Roots, Key Concepts, and Central Issues

Oxford University Press eBooks, 2018

The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the featur... more The Introduction starts with offering definitions of the central 4E features, that is, the features of embodied, embedded, enacted, and extended cognition. To set the stage, we sketch the conceptual distinction that characterizes the role of these features: are they only causally influencing a mental phenomenon or are some of them constituting it? We suggest that we can no longer presuppose a common understanding of X being constitutive for P as X being necessary in all possible worlds for P. This metaphysical understanding is increasingly challenged. We also clarify that the question about the role of mental representations needs an independent answer from the question about the role of the 4E features. After a short outline of the central concepts, we present an overview of the nine sections and outline their importance for the debate concerning the role of 4E features in thinking about the mind.

A Role for the Prefrontal Cortex in Supporting Singular Demonstrative Reference

One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what make... more One of the most pressing questions concerning singular demonstrative mental contents is what makes their content singular: that is to say, what makes it the case that individual objects are the representata of these mental states. Many philosophers have required sophisticated intellectual capacities for singular content to be possible, such as the possession of an elaborate scheme of space and time. A more recent reaction to this strategy proposes to account for singular content solely on the basis of empirical models of visual processing. We believe both sides make good points, and offer an intermediate way of looking into singular content. Our suggestion is that singular content may be traced to psychological capacities to form flexible, abstract representations in the prefrontal cortex. This allows them to be sustained for increasingly longer periods of time and extrapolated beyond the context of perception, thus going beyond low-level sensory representations while also falling s...

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