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Description
Current ownership after the SDK migration
StackQL owns provider archive acquisition, verification before extraction/activation, and installation preservation. Publication/provenance is tracked in stackql/stackql-provider-registry#493. Document signature verification already exists in omnisdk; do not refile the completed any-sdk #153 / omnisdk #17 work. The original any-sdk source links below remain historical evidence.
Upstream dependencies
- [SECURITY] Publish verifiable provider archives and release provenance stackql-provider-registry#493
Keep this issue open until the relevant upstream changes are available, any required StackQL integration is complete, and the acceptance checks here pass. Upstream issue closure alone is not sufficient.
Constituent of #769. Reviewed current main at 1de4135 on 2026-10-08; this issue proposes work, no implementation is included.
CWEs: CWE-345, CWE-494.
Finding and evidence
The inferred registry configuration sets verifyConfig.nopVerify=true (internal/stackql/cmd/root.go). Independently, any-sdk pullArchive always calls getUnVerifiedArchive (internal/anysdk/registry.go), so enabling document verification is not equivalent to authenticating an archive before extraction.
Provider documents can select local_templated execution. The executor templates a command name and argv before exec.Command (pkg/local_template_executor/local_template_executor.go). This is a provider-document trust boundary even though argv execution is not, by itself, shell injection.
These paths were source-verified. No tampering with the official registry or practical signature bypass of an otherwise verified document was demonstrated. Signature coverage of all published providers must be established before changing distribution defaults.
Required outcome
- Specify a content provenance/integrity policy and verify bytes before extraction/activation, with a supported operator trust-root mechanism.
- Inventory signature availability across releases and provide an explicit, documented opt-out/migration for local unsigned providers instead of silently disabling verification.
- Document provider documents as executable/trusted configuration, including local_templated and unstable document-driven providers.
- Preserve a working installation on signature/missing-signature failures.
Validation and acceptance
Test valid signatures, tampered archive/document, missing/unknown signatures, mismatched versions and explicit unsigned local development. Add a black-box provider pull against a controlled signed fixture. Verification must precede any archive write or executable provider activation.
Scope and related work
Separate from archive path containment and transport TLS. Work spans StackQL registry installation, registry publication and StackQL packaging/configuration. Add SDK work only for a demonstrated gap in the agreed contract. CLI jsonnet imports and provider-authored executable templates are not newly claimed remote code-injection bugs.
Activity