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[SECURITY] Classify SQL by its effects before applying MCP safety modes #818
Constituent of #769. Reviewed current main at 1de4135 on 2026-10-08; this issue proposes work, no implementation is included.
CWEs: CWE-862, CWE-863.
Finding and evidence
pkg/mcp_server/policy/policy.go treats every SELECT as read-only and scans for mutation keywords only in WITH statements. The parser and planner support EXEC as a table subquery.
Current-code parser and in-memory MCP tests confirmed that select status from (exec stackql_native_test.casing.activate.activate @id = 'x') parses as SELECT, is allowed in read_only, and reaches the query backend. The existing robot EXEC scenario establishes that this form invokes the operation.
Also inspect stackql_preview.iac.run: internal/stackql/intrinsic/iac.go executes a converge plan from SELECT. It requires --preview with unstable:true; it is not enabled by default. An AST-only 'SELECT is safe' rule would still miss this effect. Its mutation path was source-traced, not exercised against cloud resources.
Required outcome
Use one semantic effect classification shared with the parser/planner, including nested EXEC, subqueries, views/indirection and effectful intrinsic relations.
Refuse cloud mutations/lifecycle effects in read_only and request the appropriate approval in safe/delete_safe; do so before any effect occurs.
Keep metadata/select-only queries usable. Avoid regex matching inside literal strings as the definitive classifier.
Validation and acceptance
Add robot cases with a mock operation counter proving zero writes for nested EXEC in read_only, correct approval behavior in safe/delete_safe, and allowed execution in full_access. Add an opt-in preview IaC mock case. Preserve PR #804 multi-statement protections and test indirection through views as applicable.
Scope and related work
pull_provider and reload_credentials are expressly documented as allowed in all modes because the contract concerns cloud effects. Their cache/source safety is covered separately; their mere availability is not this bypass.
Activity