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[SECURITY] Restrict client-selected credential sources and prevent failed AUTH from changing shared credentials #816

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Description

@jeffreyaven

Constituent of #769. Reviewed current main at 1de4135 on 2026-10-08; this issue proposes work, no implementation is included.

CWEs: CWE-73, CWE-200, CWE-488.

Source: GitHub Security Lab finding 21537, originally tested at adc0956, plus current-code review and the validation below. Credit: GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent, GitHub Secure Open Source Fund, reported by @JarLob.

Finding and evidence

internal/stackql/planbuilder/plan_builder.go writes KeyFilePath/KeyEnvVar before prov.Auth returns. internal/stackql/handler/handler.go returns the shared pointer, and Clone shares the auth map (internal/stackql/handler/handler.go, internal/stackql/handler/handler.go). SET SESSION "$.auth.<provider>..." is another credential mutation route.

Reproduced on the current build using the local k8s fixture and a loopback HTTP collector with fake tokens only:

  1. A SELECT sent Bearer FAKE-OPERATOR-TOKEN.
  2. AUTH LOGIN k8s SA '<temporary-other-token-file>' '' returned unsupported service-account authentication.
  3. A new connection's SELECT sent Bearer FAKE-OTHER-TOKEN.
  4. AUTH LOGIN k8s SA '' 'SECURITY_PROBE_TOKEN' also errored; a third connection sent that fake environment token.

The lab independently reproduced this with mTLS. Authenticating the connection does not prevent credential-source redirection. Environment credentials take precedence over files; this AUTH path cannot clear fields. Header validation blocks newline-containing values, so do not claim wholesale PEM or arbitrary multiline-file exfiltration.

Required outcome

  • Make credential-source mutation a deliberate operator capability on server surfaces, covering AUTH and SET, with restricted named sources if overrides are supported.
  • Define session versus process scope and ensure a rejected change leaves existing credentials intact. If session changes are supported, isolate auth contexts and cached provider/auth state coherently, including concurrent access.
  • Keep operator-controlled credential reload working. Scrub client-facing OS paths and credential parse details from rejected source reads while retaining useful server diagnostics.

Validation and acceptance

Add black-box tests using two simultaneous clients and fake files/env vars: denied overrides, failed AUTH atomicity, source precedence, SET aliases/scopes, disconnect/reconnect, and unchanged credentials in the other session. Include an mTLS server and race-focused tests for supported mutation paths.

Scope and related work

Credential-source control is distinct from destination/egress control, which can expose an already configured token without AUTH. Full RBAC belongs to #312. PR #804 deferred this design; a shallow pointer copy alone is not a complete fix.

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