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Description
Related upstream work
The TLS negotiation ticket is related work, not a prerequisite for safe bind defaults or explicit unauthenticated exposure. No blocked-by relationship is added for this link.
Constituent of #769. Reviewed current main at 1de4135 on 2026-10-08; this issue proposes work, no implementation is included.
CWEs: CWE-306, CWE-1188.
Source: GitHub Security Lab finding 21530, originally tested at adc0956, plus current-code review and the validation below. Credit: GitHub Security Lab Taskflow Agent, GitHub Secure Open Source Fund, reported by @JarLob.
Finding and evidence
stackql srv defaults to 0.0.0.0 and accepts arbitrary startup usernames without a password exchange. Server TLS alone does not authenticate clients; mTLS is enforced only when clientCAs is configured.
- internal/stackql/cmd/root.go: all-interface default.
- internal/stackql/psqlwire/server.go: neither construction path supplies a wire authentication strategy; client CAs enable
tls.RequireAndVerifyClientCert. - auth.go: a nil
Authstrategy sends AuthenticationOk.
Current-build loopback probe sent a PostgreSQL startup packet with user=made-up-user, received AuthenticationOk without a challenge, and successfully executed SELECT 1. The listener was deliberately bound to loopback for this test; the all-interface default was verified in source. Reachable clients run provider calls under the operator's credentials.
Required outcome
- Default to loopback and require configured client authentication, or explicit unauthenticated opt-in, for wider exposure. Define handling of wildcard, hostname, IPv4 and IPv6 binds without a string-only loopback test.
- Keep existing mTLS deployments working. If password authentication is added, require protected transport and avoid passwords in arguments/logs; a new authentication mechanism is not required merely to fix defaults.
- Update the Docker default command and server/audit examples consistently. A compose service bound only to loopback cannot serve sibling containers; use authentication or a clearly documented explicit opt-in on that network.
Validation and acceptance
Add black-box pgwire tests for default bind, anonymous/wrong-credential refusal when authentication is required, mTLS success/failure, explicit insecure opt-in, and IPv4/IPv6/hostname configuration. Verify container startup and document migration for existing deployments.
Scope and related work
This is connection authentication and exposure, not per-user authorization (#312). #366 addresses additional TLS behaviors. The image's non-root user is a separate hardening item. PR #804 improved README guidance but left this behavior unchanged.
Activity