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HTTPS.js
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357 lines (301 loc) · 11 KB
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INCLUDE('Cookie');
// XXX: Disable STS for now.
var STS = {
isSTSURI : function(uri) {
return false;
}
};
// Hack. We only need the part of the policystate that tracks content
// policy loading.
const PolicyState = {
attach: function(channel) {
IOUtil.attachToChannel(channel, "httpseverywhere.policyLoaded", true);
},
extract: function(channel) {
var res = IOUtil.extractFromChannel(channel,
"httpseverywhere.policyLoaded", true);
return res;
},
};
const HTTPS = {
secureCookies: true,
secureCookiesExceptions: null,
secureCookiesForced: null,
httpsForced: null,
httpsForcedExceptions: null,
httpsRewrite: null,
replaceChannel: function(channel) {
var uri = HTTPSRules.rewrittenURI(channel.URI);
if (!uri) {
HTTPS.log(INFO,
"Got replace channel with no applicable rules for URI "
+ channel.URI.spec);
return false;
}
var c2=channel.QueryInterface(CI.nsIHttpChannel);
this.log(DBUG,"Redirection limit is " + c2.redirectionLimit);
// XXX This used to be (c2.redirectionLimit == 1), but that's very
// inefficient in a case (eg amazon) where this may happen A LOT.
// Rather than number like 10, we should use the starting value
// in network.http.redirection-limit minus some counter
if (c2.redirectionLimit < 10) {
this.log(WARN, "Redirection loop trying to set HTTPS on:\n " +
channel.URI.spec +"\n(falling back to HTTP)");
https_everywhere_blacklist[channel.URI.spec] = true;
return false;
}
if (ChannelReplacement.supported) {
HTTPS.log(INFO,"Scheduling channel replacement for "+channel.URI.spec);
IOUtil.runWhenPending(channel, function() {
new ChannelReplacement(channel, uri).replace(true).open();
HTTPS.log(INFO,"Ran channel replacement for "+channel.URI.spec);
});
return true;
}
this.log(WARN,"Aborting redirection " + channel.name + ", should be HTTPS!");
IOUtil.abort(channel);
return false;
},
rewriteInPlace: function(old_uri, new_uri) {
// Strategy 1: replace the parts of the old_uri piecewise. Often this
// works. In some cases it doesn't.
this.log(NOTE,"Rewriting " + old_uri.spec + " -> " + new_uri.spec + "\n");
HTTPSEverywhere.instance.notifyObservers(old_uri, new_uri.spec);
old_uri.scheme = new_uri.scheme;
old_uri.userPass = new_uri.userPass;
old_uri.username = new_uri.username;
if (new_uri.password)
old_uri.password = new_uri.password;
old_uri.host = new_uri.host;
old_uri.port = new_uri.port;
old_uri.path = new_uri.path;
return true;
},
forceURI: function(uri, fallback, ctx) {
// Switch some uris to https; ctx is either nsIDOMNode or nsIDOMWindow as
// per the ContentPolicy API.
// Returns true if everything worked out (either correct replacement or no
// replacement needed). Retun False if all attempts to rewrite failed.
var newuri = HTTPSRules.rewrittenURI(uri);
if (!newuri) return true; // no applicable rule
try {
if (this.rewriteInPlace(uri, newuri))
this.log(INFO,"Forced URI " + uri.spec);
return true;
} catch(e) {
if (ctx &&
(ctx instanceof CI.nsIDOMHTMLImageElement
|| ctx instanceof CI.nsIDOMHTMLInputElement
|| ctx instanceof CI.nsIObjectLoadingContent)) {
var type, attr;
if (ctx instanceof CI.nsIObjectLoadingContent) {
type = "Object";
attr = "data";
} else {
type = "Image";
attr = "src";
}
// XXX Isn't this a security flaw? Have to bug Georgio about
// this... the content policy docs claim to require it, but
// it looks like a race condition nightmare.
Thread.asap(function() { ctx.setAttribute(attr, newuri.spec); });
var msg = type + " HTTP->HTTPS redirection to " + newuri.spec;
this.log(INFO,msg);
throw msg;
}
if (fallback && fallback()) {
this.log(INFO, "Channel redirection fallback on " + uri.spec);
return true;
}
this.log(WARN,"Firefox wouldn't set https on " + uri.spec);
this.log(INFO,"(error was " + e + ")");
}
return false;
},
onCrossSiteRequest: function(channel, origin, browser, rw) {
try {
this.handleCrossSiteCookies(channel, origin, browser);
} catch(e) {
this.log(WARN, e + " --- " + e.stack);
}
},
registered: false,
handleSecureCookies: function(req) {
try {
req = req.QueryInterface(CI.nsIHttpChannel);
} catch(e) {
this.log(WARN, "Request is not an nsIHttpChannel: " + req);
return;
}
if (!this.secureCookies) return;
var uri = req.URI;
if (!uri) {
this.log(WARN,"No URI inside request " +req);
return;
}
this.log(VERB, "Cookie hunting in " + uri.spec);
if (uri.schemeIs("https")) {
var host = uri.host;
try {
var cookies = req.getResponseHeader("Set-Cookie");
} catch(mayHappen) {
this.log(VERB,"Exception hunting Set-Cookie in headers: " + mayHappen);
return;
}
if (!cookies) return;
var c;
for each (var cs in cookies.split("\n")) {
this.log(DBUG, "Examining cookie: ");
c = new Cookie(cs, host);
if (!c.secure && HTTPSRules.shouldSecureCookie(c)) {
this.log(INFO, "Securing cookie: " + c.domain + " " + c.name);
c.secure = true;
req.setResponseHeader("Set-Cookie", c.source + ";Secure", true);
}
}
}
},
handleCrossSiteCookies: function(req, origin, browser) {
var unsafeCookies = this.getUnsafeCookies(browser);
if (!unsafeCookies) return;
var uri = req.URI;
var dscheme = uri.scheme;
var oparts = origin && origin.match(/^(https?):\/\/([^\/:]+).*?(\/.*)/);
if (!(oparts && /https?/.test(dscheme))) return;
var oscheme = oparts[1];
if (oscheme == dscheme) return; // we want to check only cross-scheme requests
var dsecure = dscheme == "https";
if (dsecure && !ns.getPref("secureCookies.recycle", false)) return;
var dhost = uri.host;
var dpath = uri.path;
var ohost = oparts[2];
var opath = oparts[3];
var ocookieCount = 0, totCount = 0;
var dcookies = [];
var c;
for (var k in unsafeCookies) {
c = unsafeCookies[k];
if (!c.exists()) {
delete unsafeCookies[k];
} else {
totCount++;
if (c.belongsTo(dhost, dpath) && c.secure != dsecure) { // either secure on http or not secure on https
dcookies.push(c);
}
if (c.belongsTo(ohost, opath)) {
ocookieCount++;
}
}
}
if (!totCount) {
this.setUnsafeCookies(browser, null);
return;
}
// We want to "desecurify" cookies only if cross-navigation to unsafe
// destination originates from a site sharing some secured cookies
if (ocookieCount == 0 && !dsecure || !dcookies.length) return;
if (dsecure) {
this.log(WARN,"Detected cross-site navigation with secured cookies: " + origin + " -> " + uri.spec);
} else {
this.log(WARN,"Detected unsafe navigation with NoScript-secured cookies: " + origin + " -> " + uri.spec);
this.log(WARN,uri.prePath + " cannot support secure cookies because it does not use HTTPS. Consider forcing HTTPS for " + uri.host + " in NoScript's Advanced HTTPS options panel.")
}
var cs = CC['@mozilla.org/cookieService;1'].getService(CI.nsICookieService).getCookieString(uri, req);
for each (c in dcookies) {
c.secure = dsecure;
c.save();
this.log(WARN,"Toggled secure flag on " + c);
}
if (cs) {
Array.prototype.push.apply(
dcookies, cs.split(/\s*;\s*/).map(function(cs) { var nv = cs.split("="); return { name: nv.shift(), value: nv.join("=") } })
.filter(function(c) { return dcookies.every(function(x) { return x.name != c.name }) })
);
}
cs = dcookies.map(function(c) { return c.name + "=" + c.value }).join("; ");
this.log(WARN,"Sending Cookie for " + dhost + ": " + cs);
req.setRequestHeader("Cookie", cs, false); // "false" because merge syntax breaks Cookie header
},
cookiesCleanup: function(refCookie) {
var downgraded = [];
var ignored = this.secureCookiesExceptions;
var disabled = !this.secureCookies;
var bi = DOM.createBrowserIterator();
var unsafe, k, c, total, deleted;
for (var browser; browser = bi.next();) {
unsafe = this.getUnsafeCookies(browser);
if (!unsafe) continue;
total = deleted = 0;
for (k in unsafe) {
c = unsafe[k];
total++;
if (disabled || (refCookie ? c.belongsTo(refCookie.host) : ignored && ignored.test(c.rawHost))) {
if (c.exists()) {
this.log(WARN,"Cleaning Secure flag from " + c);
c.secure = false;
c.save();
}
delete unsafe[k];
deleted++;
}
}
if (total == deleted) this.setUnsafeCookies(browser, null);
if (!this.cookiesPerTab) break;
}
},
get cookiesPerTab() {
return ns.getPref("secureCookies.perTab", false);
},
_globalUnsafeCookies: {},
getUnsafeCookies: function(browser) {
return this.cookiesPerTab
? browser && ns.getExpando(browser, "unsafeCookies")
: this._globalUnsafeCookies;
},
setUnsafeCookies: function(browser, value) {
return this.cookiesPerTab
? browser && ns.setExpando(browser, "unsafeCookies", value)
: this._globalUnsafeCookies = value;
},
shouldForbid: function(site) {
switch(this.allowHttpsOnly) {
case 0:
return false;
case 1:
return /^(?:ht|f)tp:\/\//.test(site) && this.isProxied(site);
case 2:
return /^(?:ht|f)tp:\/\//.test(site);
}
return false;
},
isProxied: function(u) {
var ps = CC["@mozilla.org/network/protocol-proxy-service;1"].getService(CI.nsIProtocolProxyService);
this.isProxied = function(u) {
try {
if (!(u instanceof CI.nsIURI)) {
u = IOS.newURI(u, null, null);
}
return ps.resolve(u, 0).type != "direct";
} catch(e) {
return false;
}
}
},
_getParent: function(req, w) {
return w && w.frameElement || DOM.findBrowserForNode(w || IOUtil.findWindow(req));
}
};
(function () {
["secureCookies", "secureCookiesExceptions", "secureCookiesForced"].forEach(function(p) {
var v = HTTPS[p];
delete HTTPS[p];
HTTPS.__defineGetter__(p, function() {
return v;
});
HTTPS.__defineSetter__(p, function(n) {
v = n;
HTTPS.cookiesCleanup();
return v;
});
});
})();