[3.8] gh-118486: Support mkdir(mode=0o700) on Windows (GH-118488) (GH-118742)

zooba · ambv · web-flow · commit 91e3669e0124 · 2024-05-24T19:27:13.000+02:00
Co-authored-by: Łukasz Langa &lt;lukasz@langa.pl&gt;
diff --git a/Doc/library/os.rst b/Doc/library/os.rst
@@ -1909,6 +1909,10 @@ features:
    platform-dependent.  On some platforms, they are ignored and you should call
    :func:`chmod` explicitly to set them.
 
+   On Windows, a *mode* of ``0o700`` is specifically handled to apply access
+   control to the new directory such that only the current user and
+   administrators have access. Other values of *mode* are ignored.
+
    This function can also support :ref:`paths relative to directory descriptors
    <dir_fd>`.
 
@@ -1923,6 +1927,9 @@ features:
    .. versionchanged:: 3.6
       Accepts a :term:`path-like object`.
 
+   .. versionchanged:: 3.8.20
+      Windows now handles a *mode* of ``0o700``.
+
 
 .. function:: makedirs(name, mode=0o777, exist_ok=False)
 
diff --git a/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst b/Doc/whatsnew/3.8.rst
@@ -1046,6 +1046,13 @@ treat junctions as links.
 
 (Contributed by Steve Dower in :issue:`37834`.)
 
+As of 3.8.20, :func:`os.mkdir` and :func:`os.makedirs` on Windows now support
+passing a *mode* value of ``0o700`` to apply access control to the new
+directory. This implicitly affects :func:`tempfile.mkdtemp` and is a
+mitigation for CVE-2024-4030. Other values for *mode* continue to be
+ignored.
+(Contributed by Steve Dower in :gh:`118486`.)
+
 
 os.path
 -------
@@ -1252,6 +1259,15 @@ in a standardized and extensible format, and offers several other benefits.
 (Contributed by C.A.M. Gerlach in :issue:`36268`.)
 
 
+tempfile
+--------
+
+As of 3.8.20 on Windows, the default mode ``0o700`` used by
+:func:`tempfile.mkdtemp` now limits access to the new directory due to
+changes to :func:`os.mkdir`. This is a mitigation for CVE-2024-4030.
+(Contributed by Steve Dower in :gh:`118486`.)
+
+
 threading
 ---------
 
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_os.py b/Lib/test/test_os.py
@@ -1380,6 +1380,18 @@ def test_exist_ok_existing_regular_file(self):
         self.assertRaises(OSError, os.makedirs, path, exist_ok=True)
         os.remove(path)
 
+    @unittest.skipUnless(os.name == 'nt', "requires Windows")
+    def test_win32_mkdir_700(self):
+        base = support.TESTFN
+        path = os.path.abspath(os.path.join(support.TESTFN, 'dir'))
+        os.mkdir(path, mode=0o700)
+        out = subprocess.check_output(["cacls.exe", path, "/s"], encoding="oem")
+        os.rmdir(path)
+        self.assertEqual(
+            out.strip(),
+            f'{path} "D:P(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)(A;OICI;FA;;;BA)(A;OICI;FA;;;OW)"',
+        )
+
     def tearDown(self):
         path = os.path.join(support.TESTFN, 'dir1', 'dir2', 'dir3',
                             'dir4', 'dir5', 'dir6')
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py b/Lib/test/test_tempfile.py
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 import contextlib
 import stat
 import weakref
+import subprocess
 from unittest import mock
 
 import unittest
@@ -760,6 +761,33 @@ def test_mode(self):
         finally:
             os.rmdir(dir)
 
+    @unittest.skipUnless(os.name == "nt", "Only on Windows.")
+    def test_mode_win32(self):
+        # Use icacls.exe to extract the users with some level of access
+        # Main thing we are testing is that the BUILTIN\Users group has
+        # no access. The exact ACL is going to vary based on which user
+        # is running the test.
+        dir = self.do_create()
+        try:
+            out = subprocess.check_output(["icacls.exe", dir], encoding="oem").casefold()
+        finally:
+            os.rmdir(dir)
+
+        dir = dir.casefold()
+        users = set()
+        found_user = False
+        for line in out.strip().splitlines():
+            acl = None
+            # First line of result includes our directory
+            if line.startswith(dir):
+                acl = line[len(dir):].strip()
+            elif line and line[:1].isspace():
+                acl = line.strip()
+            if acl:
+                users.add(acl.partition(":")[0])
+
+        self.assertNotIn(r"BUILTIN\Users".casefold(), users)
+
     def test_collision_with_existing_file(self):
         # mkdtemp tries another name when a file with
         # the chosen name already exists
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-01-20-57-09.gh-issue-118486.K44KJG.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2024-05-01-20-57-09.gh-issue-118486.K44KJG.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,4 @@
+:func:`os.mkdir` on Windows now accepts *mode* of ``0o700`` to restrict
+the new directory to the current user. This fixes CVE-2024-4030
+affecting :func:`tempfile.mkdtemp` in scenarios where the base temporary
+directory is more permissive than the default.
diff --git a/Modules/posixmodule.c b/Modules/posixmodule.c
@@ -40,6 +40,12 @@
 #include "pycore_pystate.h"   /* _PyRuntime */
 #include "pythread.h"
 #include "structmember.h"
+
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+#  include <aclapi.h>             // SetEntriesInAcl
+#  include <sddl.h>               // SDDL_REVISION_1
+#endif
+
 #ifndef MS_WINDOWS
 #  include "posixmodule.h"
 #else
@@ -4122,7 +4128,6 @@ os__path_splitroot_impl(PyObject *module, path_t *path)
 
 #endif /* MS_WINDOWS */
 
-
 /*[clinic input]
 os.mkdir
 
@@ -4151,6 +4156,12 @@ os_mkdir_impl(PyObject *module, path_t *path, int mode, int dir_fd)
 /*[clinic end generated code: output=a70446903abe821f input=e965f68377e9b1ce]*/
 {
     int result;
+#ifdef MS_WINDOWS
+    int error = 0;
+    int pathError = 0;
+    SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES secAttr = { sizeof(secAttr) };
+    SECURITY_ATTRIBUTES *pSecAttr = NULL;
+#endif
 
     if (PySys_Audit("os.mkdir", "Oii", path->object, mode,
                     dir_fd == DEFAULT_DIR_FD ? -1 : dir_fd) < 0) {
@@ -4159,11 +4170,38 @@ os_mkdir_impl(PyObject *module, path_t *path, int mode, int dir_fd)
 
 #ifdef MS_WINDOWS
     Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
-    result = CreateDirectoryW(path->wide, NULL);
+    if (mode == 0700 /* 0o700 */) {
+        ULONG sdSize;
+        pSecAttr = &secAttr;
+        // Set a discretionary ACL (D) that is protected (P) and includes
+        // inheritable (OICI) entries that allow (A) full control (FA) to
+        // SYSTEM (SY), Administrators (BA), and the owner (OW).
+        if (!ConvertStringSecurityDescriptorToSecurityDescriptorW(
+            L"D:P(A;OICI;FA;;;SY)(A;OICI;FA;;;BA)(A;OICI;FA;;;OW)",
+            SDDL_REVISION_1,
+            &secAttr.lpSecurityDescriptor,
+            &sdSize
+        )) {
+            error = GetLastError();
+        }
+    }
+    if (!error) {
+        result = CreateDirectoryW(path->wide, pSecAttr);
+        if (secAttr.lpSecurityDescriptor &&
+            // uncommonly, LocalFree returns non-zero on error, but still uses
+            // GetLastError() to see what the error code is
+            LocalFree(secAttr.lpSecurityDescriptor)) {
+            error = GetLastError();
+        }
+    }
     Py_END_ALLOW_THREADS
 
-    if (!result)
+    if (error) {
+        return PyErr_SetFromWindowsErr(error);
+    }
+    if (!result) {
         return path_error(path);
+    }
 #else
     Py_BEGIN_ALLOW_THREADS
 #if HAVE_MKDIRAT
