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fix: clarify that servers should not advertise tasks.list without context-binding #2123

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fix: clarify that servers should not advertise tasks.list without context-binding #2123

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fix: clarify that servers should not advertise tasks.list without con…
LucaButBoring Jan 20, 2026
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Merge branch 'main' into fix/list-tasks-auth
LucaButBoring Feb 6, 2026
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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions docs/specification/2025-11-25/basic/utilities/tasks.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -875,6 +875,7 @@ When an authorization context is provided, receivers **MUST** bind tasks to said
Context-binding is not practical for all applications. Some MCP servers operate in environments without authorization, such as single-user tools, or use transports that don't support authorization.
In these scenarios, receivers **SHOULD** document this limitation clearly, as task results may be accessible to any requestor that can guess the task ID.
If context-binding is unavailable, receivers **MUST** generate cryptographically secure task IDs with enough entropy to prevent guessing and should consider using shorter TTL durations to reduce the exposure window.
Furthermore, receivers that cannot identify requestors **SHOULD NOT** declare the `tasks.list` capability, as listing tasks would expose task metadata to any requestor regardless of task ID entropy.

If context-binding is available, receivers **MUST** reject `tasks/get`, `tasks/result`, and `tasks/cancel` requests for tasks that do not belong to the same authorization context as the requestor. For `tasks/list` requests, receivers **MUST** ensure the returned task list includes only tasks associated with the requestor's authorization context.

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1 change: 1 addition & 0 deletions docs/specification/draft/basic/utilities/tasks.mdx
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Expand Up @@ -875,6 +875,7 @@ When an authorization context is provided, receivers **MUST** bind tasks to said
Context-binding is not practical for all applications. Some MCP servers operate in environments without authorization, such as single-user tools, or use transports that don't support authorization.
In these scenarios, receivers **SHOULD** document this limitation clearly, as task results may be accessible to any requestor that can guess the task ID.
If context-binding is unavailable, receivers **MUST** generate cryptographically secure task IDs with enough entropy to prevent guessing and should consider using shorter TTL durations to reduce the exposure window.
Furthermore, receivers that cannot identify requestors **SHOULD NOT** declare the `tasks.list` capability, as listing tasks would expose task metadata to any requestor regardless of task ID entropy.

If context-binding is available, receivers **MUST** reject `tasks/get`, `tasks/result`, and `tasks/cancel` requests for tasks that do not belong to the same authorization context as the requestor. For `tasks/list` requests, receivers **MUST** ensure the returned task list includes only tasks associated with the requestor's authorization context.

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