transfer.fsckObjects::

When `fetch.fsckObjects` or `receive.fsckObjects` are

not set, the value of this variable is used instead.

Defaults to false.

+

When set, the fetch or receive will abort in the case of a malformed

object or a link to a nonexistent object. In addition, various other

issues are checked for, including legacy issues (see `fsck.<msg-id>`),

and potential security issues like the existence of a `.GIT` directory

or a malicious `.gitmodules` file (see the release notes for v2.2.1

and v2.17.1 for details). Other sanity and security checks may be

added in future releases.

+

On the receiving side, failing fsckObjects will make those objects

unreachable, see "QUARANTINE ENVIRONMENT" in

linkgit:git-receive-pack[1]. On the fetch side, malformed objects will

instead be left unreferenced in the repository.

+

Due to the non-quarantine nature of the `fetch.fsckObjects`

implementation it can not be relied upon to leave the object store

clean like `receive.fsckObjects` can.

+

As objects are unpacked they're written to the object store, so there

can be cases where malicious objects get introduced even though the

"fetch" failed, only to have a subsequent "fetch" succeed because only

new incoming objects are checked, not those that have already been

written to the object store. That difference in behavior should not be

relied upon. In the future, such objects may be quarantined for

"fetch" as well.

+

For now, the paranoid need to find some way to emulate the quarantine

environment if they'd like the same protection as "push". E.g. in the

case of an internal mirror do the mirroring in two steps, one to fetch

the untrusted objects, and then do a second "push" (which will use the

quarantine) to another internal repo, and have internal clients

consume this pushed-to repository, or embargo internal fetches and

only allow them once a full "fsck" has run (and no new fetches have

happened in the meantime).

transfer.hideRefs::

String(s) `receive-pack` and `upload-pack` use to decide which

refs to omit from their initial advertisements. Use more than

one definition to specify multiple prefix strings. A ref that is

under the hierarchies listed in the value of this variable is

excluded, and is hidden when responding to `git push` or `git

fetch`. See `receive.hideRefs` and `uploadpack.hideRefs` for

program-specific versions of this config.

+

You may also include a `!` in front of the ref name to negate the entry,

explicitly exposing it, even if an earlier entry marked it as hidden.

If you have multiple hideRefs values, later entries override earlier ones

(and entries in more-specific config files override less-specific ones).

+

If a namespace is in use, the namespace prefix is stripped from each

reference before it is matched against `transfer.hiderefs` patterns.

For example, if `refs/heads/master` is specified in `transfer.hideRefs` and

the current namespace is `foo`, then `refs/namespaces/foo/refs/heads/master`

is omitted from the advertisements but `refs/heads/master` and

`refs/namespaces/bar/refs/heads/master` are still advertised as so-called

"have" lines. In order to match refs before stripping, add a `^` in front of

the ref name. If you combine `!` and `^`, `!` must be specified first.

+

Even if you hide refs, a client may still be able to steal the target

objects via the techniques described in the "SECURITY" section of the

linkgit:gitnamespaces[7] man page; it's best to keep private data in a

separate repository.

transfer.unpackLimit::

When `fetch.unpackLimit` or `receive.unpackLimit` are

not set, the value of this variable is used instead.

The default value is 100.