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package ra
import (
"context"
"crypto/x509"
"encoding/json"
"errors"
"fmt"
"math/big"
"net"
"net/url"
"reflect"
"sort"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
"github.com/honeycombio/beeline-go"
"github.com/jmhodges/clock"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/akamai"
akamaipb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/akamai/proto"
capb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ca/proto"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core"
corepb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/core/proto"
csrlib "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/csr"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ctpolicy"
berrors "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/errors"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/features"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/goodkey"
bgrpc "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/grpc"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/identifier"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/issuance"
blog "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/log"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/metrics"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/policy"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/probs"
pubpb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/publisher/proto"
rapb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ra/proto"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/ratelimit"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/reloader"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/revocation"
sapb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/sa/proto"
vapb "github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/va/proto"
"github.com/letsencrypt/boulder/web"
"github.com/prometheus/client_golang/prometheus"
"github.com/weppos/publicsuffix-go/publicsuffix"
"golang.org/x/crypto/ocsp"
grpc "google.golang.org/grpc"
"google.golang.org/protobuf/types/known/emptypb"
"gopkg.in/square/go-jose.v2"
)
var (
errIncompleteGRPCRequest = errors.New("incomplete gRPC request message")
errIncompleteGRPCResponse = errors.New("incomplete gRPC response message")
)
type caaChecker interface {
IsCAAValid(
ctx context.Context,
in *vapb.IsCAAValidRequest,
opts ...grpc.CallOption,
) (*vapb.IsCAAValidResponse, error)
}
// RegistrationAuthorityImpl defines an RA.
//
// NOTE: All of the fields in RegistrationAuthorityImpl need to be
// populated, or there is a risk of panic.
type RegistrationAuthorityImpl struct {
rapb.UnimplementedRegistrationAuthorityServer
CA capb.CertificateAuthorityClient
VA vapb.VAClient
SA sapb.StorageAuthorityClient
PA core.PolicyAuthority
publisher pubpb.PublisherClient
caa caaChecker
clk clock.Clock
log blog.Logger
keyPolicy goodkey.KeyPolicy
// How long before a newly created authorization expires.
authorizationLifetime time.Duration
pendingAuthorizationLifetime time.Duration
rlPolicies ratelimit.Limits
maxContactsPerReg int
maxNames int
reuseValidAuthz bool
orderLifetime time.Duration
issuersByNameID map[issuance.IssuerNameID]*issuance.Certificate
issuersByID map[issuance.IssuerID]*issuance.Certificate
purger akamaipb.AkamaiPurgerClient
ctpolicy *ctpolicy.CTPolicy
ctpolicyResults *prometheus.HistogramVec
rateLimitCounter *prometheus.CounterVec
revocationReasonCounter *prometheus.CounterVec
namesPerCert *prometheus.HistogramVec
newRegCounter prometheus.Counter
reusedValidAuthzCounter prometheus.Counter
recheckCAACounter prometheus.Counter
newCertCounter prometheus.Counter
recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime prometheus.Counter
}
// NewRegistrationAuthorityImpl constructs a new RA object.
func NewRegistrationAuthorityImpl(
clk clock.Clock,
logger blog.Logger,
stats prometheus.Registerer,
maxContactsPerReg int,
keyPolicy goodkey.KeyPolicy,
maxNames int,
reuseValidAuthz bool,
authorizationLifetime time.Duration,
pendingAuthorizationLifetime time.Duration,
pubc pubpb.PublisherClient,
caaClient caaChecker,
orderLifetime time.Duration,
ctp *ctpolicy.CTPolicy,
purger akamaipb.AkamaiPurgerClient,
issuers []*issuance.Certificate,
) *RegistrationAuthorityImpl {
ctpolicyResults := prometheus.NewHistogramVec(
prometheus.HistogramOpts{
Name: "ctpolicy_results",
Help: "Histogram of latencies of ctpolicy.GetSCTs calls with success/failure/deadlineExceeded labels",
Buckets: metrics.InternetFacingBuckets,
},
[]string{"result"},
)
stats.MustRegister(ctpolicyResults)
namesPerCert := prometheus.NewHistogramVec(
prometheus.HistogramOpts{
Name: "names_per_cert",
Help: "Histogram of the number of SANs in requested and issued certificates",
// The namesPerCert buckets are chosen based on the current Let's Encrypt
// limit of 100 SANs per certificate.
Buckets: []float64{1, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70, 80, 90, 100},
},
// Type label value is either "requested" or "issued".
[]string{"type"},
)
stats.MustRegister(namesPerCert)
rateLimitCounter := prometheus.NewCounterVec(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "ra_ratelimits",
Help: "A counter of RA ratelimit checks labelled by type and pass/exceed",
}, []string{"limit", "result"})
stats.MustRegister(rateLimitCounter)
newRegCounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "new_registrations",
Help: "A counter of new registrations",
})
stats.MustRegister(newRegCounter)
reusedValidAuthzCounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "reused_valid_authz",
Help: "A counter of reused valid authorizations",
})
stats.MustRegister(reusedValidAuthzCounter)
recheckCAACounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "recheck_caa",
Help: "A counter of CAA rechecks",
})
stats.MustRegister(recheckCAACounter)
recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "recheck_caa_used_authz_lifetime",
Help: "A counter times the old codepath was used for CAA recheck time",
})
stats.MustRegister(recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime)
newCertCounter := prometheus.NewCounter(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "new_certificates",
Help: "A counter of new certificates",
})
stats.MustRegister(newCertCounter)
revocationReasonCounter := prometheus.NewCounterVec(prometheus.CounterOpts{
Name: "revocation_reason",
Help: "A counter of certificate revocation reasons",
}, []string{"reason"})
stats.MustRegister(revocationReasonCounter)
issuersByNameID := make(map[issuance.IssuerNameID]*issuance.Certificate)
issuersByID := make(map[issuance.IssuerID]*issuance.Certificate)
for _, issuer := range issuers {
issuersByNameID[issuer.NameID()] = issuer
issuersByID[issuer.ID()] = issuer
}
ra := &RegistrationAuthorityImpl{
clk: clk,
log: logger,
authorizationLifetime: authorizationLifetime,
pendingAuthorizationLifetime: pendingAuthorizationLifetime,
rlPolicies: ratelimit.New(),
maxContactsPerReg: maxContactsPerReg,
keyPolicy: keyPolicy,
maxNames: maxNames,
reuseValidAuthz: reuseValidAuthz,
publisher: pubc,
caa: caaClient,
orderLifetime: orderLifetime,
ctpolicy: ctp,
ctpolicyResults: ctpolicyResults,
purger: purger,
issuersByNameID: issuersByNameID,
issuersByID: issuersByID,
namesPerCert: namesPerCert,
rateLimitCounter: rateLimitCounter,
newRegCounter: newRegCounter,
reusedValidAuthzCounter: reusedValidAuthzCounter,
recheckCAACounter: recheckCAACounter,
newCertCounter: newCertCounter,
revocationReasonCounter: revocationReasonCounter,
recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime: recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime,
}
return ra
}
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) SetRateLimitPoliciesFile(filename string) error {
_, err := reloader.New(filename, ra.rlPolicies.LoadPolicies, ra.rateLimitPoliciesLoadError)
if err != nil {
return err
}
return nil
}
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) rateLimitPoliciesLoadError(err error) {
ra.log.Errf("error reloading rate limit policy: %s", err)
}
// certificateRequestAuthz is a struct for holding information about a valid
// authz referenced during a certificateRequestEvent. It holds both the
// authorization ID and the challenge type that made the authorization valid. We
// specifically include the challenge type that solved the authorization to make
// some common analysis easier.
type certificateRequestAuthz struct {
ID string
ChallengeType core.AcmeChallenge
}
// certificateRequestEvent is a struct for holding information that is logged as
// JSON to the audit log as the result of an issuance event.
type certificateRequestEvent struct {
ID string `json:",omitempty"`
// Requester is the associated account ID
Requester int64 `json:",omitempty"`
// OrderID is the associated order ID (may be empty for an ACME v1 issuance)
OrderID int64 `json:",omitempty"`
// SerialNumber is the string representation of the issued certificate's
// serial number
SerialNumber string `json:",omitempty"`
// VerifiedFields are required by the baseline requirements and are always
// a static value for Boulder.
VerifiedFields []string `json:",omitempty"`
// CommonName is the subject common name from the issued cert
CommonName string `json:",omitempty"`
// Names are the DNS SAN entries from the issued cert
Names []string `json:",omitempty"`
// NotBefore is the starting timestamp of the issued cert's validity period
NotBefore time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
// NotAfter is the ending timestamp of the issued cert's validity period
NotAfter time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
// RequestTime and ResponseTime are for tracking elapsed time during issuance
RequestTime time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
ResponseTime time.Time `json:",omitempty"`
// Error contains any encountered errors
Error string `json:",omitempty"`
// Authorizations is a map of identifier names to certificateRequestAuthz
// objects. It can be used to understand how the names in a certificate
// request were authorized.
Authorizations map[string]certificateRequestAuthz
}
// certificateRevocationEvent is a struct for holding information that is logged
// as JSON to the audit log as the result of a revocation event.
type certificateRevocationEvent struct {
ID string `json:",omitempty"`
// SerialNumber is the string representation of the revoked certificate's
// serial number.
SerialNumber string `json:",omitempty"`
// Reason is the integer representing the revocation reason used.
Reason int64 `json:",omitempty"`
// Method is the way in which revocation was requested.
// It will be one of the strings: "applicant", "subscriber", "control", "key", or "admin".
Method string `json:",omitempty"`
// RequesterID is the account ID of the requester.
// Will be zero for admin revocations.
RequesterID int64 `json:",omitempty"`
// AdminName is the name of the admin requester.
// Will be zero for subscriber revocations.
AdminName string `json:",omitempty"`
// Error contains any error encountered during revocation.
Error string `json:",omitempty"`
}
// noRegistrationID is used for the regID parameter to GetThreshold when no
// registration-based overrides are necessary.
const noRegistrationID = -1
// registrationCounter is a type to abstract the use of `CountRegistrationsByIP`
// or `CountRegistrationsByIPRange` SA methods.
type registrationCounter func(context.Context, *sapb.CountRegistrationsByIPRequest, ...grpc.CallOption) (*sapb.Count, error)
// checkRegistrationIPLimit checks a specific registraton limit by using the
// provided registrationCounter function to determine if the limit has been
// exceeded for a given IP or IP range
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkRegistrationIPLimit(ctx context.Context, limit ratelimit.RateLimitPolicy, ip net.IP, counter registrationCounter) error {
if !limit.Enabled() {
return nil
}
now := ra.clk.Now()
count, err := counter(ctx, &sapb.CountRegistrationsByIPRequest{
Ip: ip,
Range: &sapb.Range{
Earliest: limit.WindowBegin(now).UnixNano(),
Latest: now.UnixNano(),
},
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
if count.Count >= limit.GetThreshold(ip.String(), noRegistrationID) {
return berrors.RateLimitError("too many registrations for this IP")
}
return nil
}
// checkRegistrationLimits enforces the RegistrationsPerIP and
// RegistrationsPerIPRange limits
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkRegistrationLimits(ctx context.Context, ip net.IP) error {
// Check the registrations per IP limit using the CountRegistrationsByIP SA
// function that matches IP addresses exactly
exactRegLimit := ra.rlPolicies.RegistrationsPerIP()
err := ra.checkRegistrationIPLimit(ctx, exactRegLimit, ip, ra.SA.CountRegistrationsByIP)
if err != nil {
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip", "exceeded").Inc()
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, RegistrationsByIP, IP: %s", ip)
return err
}
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip", "pass").Inc()
// We only apply the fuzzy reg limit to IPv6 addresses.
// Per https://golang.org/pkg/net/#IP.To4 "If ip is not an IPv4 address, To4
// returns nil"
if ip.To4() != nil {
return nil
}
// Check the registrations per IP range limit using the
// CountRegistrationsByIPRange SA function that fuzzy-matches IPv6 addresses
// within a larger address range
fuzzyRegLimit := ra.rlPolicies.RegistrationsPerIPRange()
err = ra.checkRegistrationIPLimit(ctx, fuzzyRegLimit, ip, ra.SA.CountRegistrationsByIPRange)
if err != nil {
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip_range", "exceeded").Inc()
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, RegistrationsByIPRange, IP: %s", ip)
// For the fuzzyRegLimit we use a new error message that specifically
// mentions that the limit being exceeded is applied to a *range* of IPs
return berrors.RateLimitError("too many registrations for this IP range")
}
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("registrations_by_ip_range", "pass").Inc()
return nil
}
// NewRegistration constructs a new Registration from a request.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) NewRegistration(ctx context.Context, request *corepb.Registration) (*corepb.Registration, error) {
// Error if the request is nil, there is no account key or IP address
if request == nil || len(request.Key) == 0 || len(request.InitialIP) == 0 {
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
}
// Check if account key is acceptable for use.
var key jose.JSONWebKey
err := key.UnmarshalJSON(request.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("failed to unmarshal account key: %s", err.Error())
}
err = ra.keyPolicy.GoodKey(ctx, key.Key)
if err != nil {
return nil, berrors.MalformedError("invalid public key: %s", err.Error())
}
// Check IP address rate limits.
var ipAddr net.IP
err = ipAddr.UnmarshalText(request.InitialIP)
if err != nil {
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("failed to unmarshal ip address: %s", err.Error())
}
err = ra.checkRegistrationLimits(ctx, ipAddr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Check that contacts conform to our expectations.
err = validateContactsPresent(request.Contact, request.ContactsPresent)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
err = ra.validateContacts(ctx, request.Contact)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Don't populate ID or CreatedAt because those will be set by the SA.
req := &corepb.Registration{
Key: request.Key,
Contact: request.Contact,
ContactsPresent: request.ContactsPresent,
Agreement: request.Agreement,
InitialIP: request.InitialIP,
Status: string(core.StatusValid),
}
// Store the registration object, then return the version that got stored.
res, err := ra.SA.NewRegistration(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
ra.newRegCounter.Inc()
return res, nil
}
// validateContacts checks the provided list of contacts, returning an error if
// any are not acceptable. Unacceptable contacts lists include:
// * An empty list
// * A list has more than maxContactsPerReg contacts
// * A list containing an empty contact
// * A list containing a contact that does not parse as a URL
// * A list containing a contact that has a URL scheme other than mailto
// * A list containing a mailto contact that contains hfields
// * A list containing a contact that has non-ascii characters
// * A list containing a contact that doesn't pass `policy.ValidEmail`
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) validateContacts(ctx context.Context, contacts []string) error {
if len(contacts) == 0 {
return nil // Nothing to validate
}
if ra.maxContactsPerReg > 0 && len(contacts) > ra.maxContactsPerReg {
return berrors.MalformedError(
"too many contacts provided: %d > %d",
len(contacts),
ra.maxContactsPerReg,
)
}
for _, contact := range contacts {
if contact == "" {
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("empty contact")
}
parsed, err := url.Parse(contact)
if err != nil {
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("invalid contact")
}
if parsed.Scheme != "mailto" {
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("contact method %q is not supported", parsed.Scheme)
}
if parsed.RawQuery != "" {
return berrors.InvalidEmailError("contact email [%q] contains hfields", contact)
}
if !core.IsASCII(contact) {
return berrors.InvalidEmailError(
"contact email [%q] contains non-ASCII characters",
contact,
)
}
err = policy.ValidEmail(parsed.Opaque)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
// NOTE(@cpu): For historical reasons (</3) we store ACME account contact
// information de-normalized in a fixed size `contact` field on the
// `registrations` table. At the time of writing this field is VARCHAR(191)
// That means the largest marshalled JSON value we can store is 191 bytes.
const maxContactBytes = 191
if jsonBytes, err := json.Marshal(contacts); err != nil {
// This shouldn't happen with a simple []string but if it does we want the
// error to be logged internally but served as a 500 to the user so we
// return a bare error and not a berror here.
return fmt.Errorf("failed to marshal reg.Contact to JSON: %#v", contacts)
} else if len(jsonBytes) >= maxContactBytes {
return berrors.InvalidEmailError(
"too many/too long contact(s). Please use shorter or fewer email addresses")
}
return nil
}
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkPendingAuthorizationLimit(ctx context.Context, regID int64) error {
limit := ra.rlPolicies.PendingAuthorizationsPerAccount()
if limit.Enabled() {
countPB, err := ra.SA.CountPendingAuthorizations2(ctx, &sapb.RegistrationID{
Id: regID,
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Most rate limits have a key for overrides, but there is no meaningful key
// here.
noKey := ""
if countPB.Count >= limit.GetThreshold(noKey, regID) {
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("pending_authorizations_by_registration_id", "exceeded").Inc()
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, PendingAuthorizationsByRegID, regID: %d", regID)
return berrors.RateLimitError("too many currently pending authorizations")
}
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("pending_authorizations_by_registration_id", "pass").Inc()
}
return nil
}
// checkInvalidAuthorizationLimits checks the failed validation limit for each
// of the provided hostnames. It returns the first error.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkInvalidAuthorizationLimits(ctx context.Context, regID int64, hostnames []string) error {
results := make(chan error, len(hostnames))
for _, hostname := range hostnames {
go func(hostname string) {
results <- ra.checkInvalidAuthorizationLimit(ctx, regID, hostname)
}(hostname)
}
// We don't have to wait for all of the goroutines to finish because there's
// enough capacity in the chan for them all to write their result even if
// nothing is reading off the chan anymore.
for i := 0; i < len(hostnames); i++ {
err := <-results
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
return nil
}
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkInvalidAuthorizationLimit(ctx context.Context, regID int64, hostname string) error {
limit := ra.rlPolicies.InvalidAuthorizationsPerAccount()
if !limit.Enabled() {
return nil
}
latest := ra.clk.Now().Add(ra.pendingAuthorizationLifetime)
earliest := latest.Add(-limit.Window.Duration)
req := &sapb.CountInvalidAuthorizationsRequest{
RegistrationID: regID,
Hostname: hostname,
Range: &sapb.Range{
Earliest: earliest.UnixNano(),
Latest: latest.UnixNano(),
},
}
count, err := ra.SA.CountInvalidAuthorizations2(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return err
}
// Most rate limits have a key for overrides, but there is no meaningful key
// here.
noKey := ""
if count.Count >= int64(limit.GetThreshold(noKey, regID)) {
ra.log.Infof("Rate limit exceeded, InvalidAuthorizationsByRegID, regID: %d", regID)
return berrors.RateLimitError("too many failed authorizations recently")
}
return nil
}
// checkNewOrdersPerAccountLimit enforces the rlPolicies `NewOrdersPerAccount`
// rate limit. This rate limit ensures a client can not create more than the
// specified threshold of new orders within the specified time window.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkNewOrdersPerAccountLimit(ctx context.Context, acctID int64) error {
limit := ra.rlPolicies.NewOrdersPerAccount()
if !limit.Enabled() {
return nil
}
now := ra.clk.Now()
count, err := ra.SA.CountOrders(ctx, &sapb.CountOrdersRequest{
AccountID: acctID,
Range: &sapb.Range{
Earliest: now.Add(-limit.Window.Duration).UnixNano(),
Latest: now.UnixNano(),
},
})
if err != nil {
return err
}
// There is no meaningful override key to use for this rate limit
noKey := ""
if count.Count >= limit.GetThreshold(noKey, acctID) {
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("new_order_by_registration_id", "exceeded").Inc()
return berrors.RateLimitError("too many new orders recently")
}
ra.rateLimitCounter.WithLabelValues("new_order_by_registration_id", "pass").Inc()
return nil
}
// MatchesCSR tests the contents of a generated certificate to make sure
// that the PublicKey, CommonName, and DNSNames match those provided in
// the CSR that was used to generate the certificate. It also checks the
// following fields for:
// * notBefore is not more than 24 hours ago
// * BasicConstraintsValid is true
// * IsCA is false
// * ExtKeyUsage only contains ExtKeyUsageServerAuth & ExtKeyUsageClientAuth
// * Subject only contains CommonName & Names
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) MatchesCSR(parsedCertificate *x509.Certificate, csr *x509.CertificateRequest) error {
// Check issued certificate matches what was expected from the CSR
hostNames := make([]string, len(csr.DNSNames))
copy(hostNames, csr.DNSNames)
if len(csr.Subject.CommonName) > 0 {
hostNames = append(hostNames, csr.Subject.CommonName)
}
hostNames = core.UniqueLowerNames(hostNames)
if !core.KeyDigestEquals(parsedCertificate.PublicKey, csr.PublicKey) {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate public key doesn't match CSR public key")
}
if parsedCertificate.Subject.CommonName != strings.ToLower(csr.Subject.CommonName) {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate CommonName doesn't match CSR CommonName")
}
// Sort both slices of names before comparison.
parsedNames := parsedCertificate.DNSNames
sort.Strings(parsedNames)
sort.Strings(hostNames)
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedNames, hostNames) {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate DNSNames don't match CSR DNSNames")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedCertificate.IPAddresses, csr.IPAddresses) {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate IPAddresses don't match CSR IPAddresses")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedCertificate.EmailAddresses, csr.EmailAddresses) {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate EmailAddresses don't match CSR EmailAddresses")
}
if len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Country) > 0 || len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Organization) > 0 ||
len(parsedCertificate.Subject.OrganizationalUnit) > 0 || len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Locality) > 0 ||
len(parsedCertificate.Subject.Province) > 0 || len(parsedCertificate.Subject.StreetAddress) > 0 ||
len(parsedCertificate.Subject.PostalCode) > 0 {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate Subject contains fields other than CommonName, or SerialNumber")
}
now := ra.clk.Now()
if now.Sub(parsedCertificate.NotBefore) > time.Hour*24 {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate is back dated %s", now.Sub(parsedCertificate.NotBefore))
}
if !parsedCertificate.BasicConstraintsValid {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate doesn't have basic constraints set")
}
if parsedCertificate.IsCA {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate can sign other certificates")
}
if !reflect.DeepEqual(parsedCertificate.ExtKeyUsage, []x509.ExtKeyUsage{x509.ExtKeyUsageServerAuth, x509.ExtKeyUsageClientAuth}) {
return berrors.InternalServerError("generated certificate doesn't have correct key usage extensions")
}
return nil
}
// checkOrderAuthorizations verifies that a provided set of names associated
// with a specific order and account has all of the required valid, unexpired
// authorizations to proceed with issuance. It returns the authorizations that
// satisfied the set of names or it returns an error. If it returns an error, it
// will be of type BoulderError.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkOrderAuthorizations(
ctx context.Context,
names []string,
acctID accountID,
orderID orderID) (map[string]*core.Authorization, error) {
// Get all of the valid authorizations for this account/order
req := &sapb.GetValidOrderAuthorizationsRequest{
Id: int64(orderID),
AcctID: int64(acctID),
}
authzMapPB, err := ra.SA.GetValidOrderAuthorizations2(ctx, req)
if err != nil {
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("error in GetValidOrderAuthorizations: %s", err)
}
authzs, err := bgrpc.PBToAuthzMap(authzMapPB)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
// Ensure the names from the CSR are free of duplicates & lowercased.
names = core.UniqueLowerNames(names)
// Check the authorizations to ensure validity for the names required.
if err = ra.checkAuthorizationsCAA(ctx, names, authzs, int64(acctID), ra.clk.Now()); err != nil {
return nil, err
}
return authzs, nil
}
// validatedBefore checks if a given authorization's challenge was
// validated before a given time. Returns a bool.
func validatedBefore(authz *core.Authorization, caaRecheckTime time.Time) (bool, error) {
numChallenges := len(authz.Challenges)
if numChallenges != 1 {
return false, fmt.Errorf("authorization has incorrect number of challenges. 1 expected, %d found for: id %s", numChallenges, authz.ID)
}
if authz.Challenges[0].Validated == nil {
return false, fmt.Errorf("authorization's challenge has no validated timestamp for: id %s", authz.ID)
}
return authz.Challenges[0].Validated.Before(caaRecheckTime), nil
}
// checkAuthorizationsCAA implements the common logic of validating a set of
// authorizations against a set of names that is used by both
// `checkAuthorizations` and `checkOrderAuthorizations`. If required CAA will be
// rechecked for authorizations that are too old.
// If it returns an error, it will be of type BoulderError.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) checkAuthorizationsCAA(
ctx context.Context,
names []string,
authzs map[string]*core.Authorization,
regID int64,
now time.Time) error {
// badNames contains the names that were unauthorized
var badNames []string
// recheckAuthzs is a list of authorizations that must have their CAA records rechecked
var recheckAuthzs []*core.Authorization
// Per Baseline Requirements, CAA must be checked within 8 hours of
// issuance. CAA is checked when an authorization is validated, so as
// long as that was less than 8 hours ago, we're fine. We recheck if
// that was more than 7 hours ago, to be on the safe side. We can
// check to see if the authorized challenge `AttemptedAt`
// (`Validated`) value from the database is before our caaRecheckTime.
// Set the recheck time to 7 hours ago.
caaRecheckAfter := now.Add(-7 * time.Hour)
// Set a CAA recheck time based on the assumption of a 30 day authz
// lifetime. This has been deprecated in favor of a new check based
// off the Validated time stored in the database, but we want to check
// both for a time and increment a stat if this code path is hit for
// compliance safety.
caaRecheckTime := now.Add(ra.authorizationLifetime).Add(-7 * time.Hour)
for _, name := range names {
authz := authzs[name]
if authz == nil {
badNames = append(badNames, name)
} else if authz.Expires == nil {
return berrors.InternalServerError("found an authorization with a nil Expires field: id %s", authz.ID)
} else if authz.Expires.Before(now) {
badNames = append(badNames, name)
} else if staleCAA, err := validatedBefore(authz, caaRecheckAfter); err != nil {
return berrors.InternalServerError(err.Error())
} else if staleCAA {
// Ensure that CAA is rechecked for this name
recheckAuthzs = append(recheckAuthzs, authz)
} else if authz.Expires.Before(caaRecheckTime) {
// Ensure that CAA is rechecked for this name
recheckAuthzs = append(recheckAuthzs, authz)
// This codepath should not be used, but is here as a safety
// net until the new codepath is proven. Increment metric if
// it is used.
ra.recheckCAAUsedAuthzLifetime.Add(1)
}
}
if len(recheckAuthzs) > 0 {
err := ra.recheckCAA(ctx, recheckAuthzs)
if err != nil {
return err
}
}
if len(badNames) > 0 {
return berrors.UnauthorizedError(
"authorizations for these names not found or expired: %s",
strings.Join(badNames, ", "),
)
}
return nil
}
// recheckCAA accepts a list of of names that need to have their CAA records
// rechecked because their associated authorizations are sufficiently old and
// performs the CAA checks required for each. If any of the rechecks fail an
// error is returned.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) recheckCAA(ctx context.Context, authzs []*core.Authorization) error {
ra.recheckCAACounter.Add(float64(len(authzs)))
type authzCAAResult struct {
authz *core.Authorization
err error
}
ch := make(chan authzCAAResult, len(authzs))
for _, authz := range authzs {
go func(authz *core.Authorization) {
name := authz.Identifier.Value
// If an authorization has multiple valid challenges,
// the type of the first valid challenge is used for
// the purposes of CAA rechecking.
var method string
for _, challenge := range authz.Challenges {
if challenge.Status == core.StatusValid {
method = string(challenge.Type)
break
}
}
if method == "" {
ch <- authzCAAResult{
authz: authz,
err: berrors.InternalServerError(
"Internal error determining validation method for authorization ID %v (%v)",
authz.ID, name),
}
return
}
resp, err := ra.caa.IsCAAValid(ctx, &vapb.IsCAAValidRequest{
Domain: name,
ValidationMethod: method,
AccountURIID: authz.RegistrationID,
})
if err != nil {
ra.log.AuditErrf("Rechecking CAA: %s", err)
err = berrors.InternalServerError(
"Internal error rechecking CAA for authorization ID %v (%v)",
authz.ID, name,
)
} else if resp.Problem != nil {
err = berrors.CAAError(resp.Problem.Detail)
}
ch <- authzCAAResult{
authz: authz,
err: err,
}
}(authz)
}
var subErrors []berrors.SubBoulderError
// Read a recheckResult for each authz from the results channel
for i := 0; i < len(authzs); i++ {
recheckResult := <-ch
// If the result had a CAA boulder error, construct a suberror with the
// identifier from the authorization that was checked.
err := recheckResult.err
if err != nil {
var bErr *berrors.BoulderError
if errors.As(err, &bErr) && bErr.Type == berrors.CAA {
subErrors = append(subErrors, berrors.SubBoulderError{
Identifier: recheckResult.authz.Identifier,
BoulderError: bErr})
} else {
return err
}
}
}
if len(subErrors) > 0 {
var detail string
// If there was only one error, then use it as the top level error that is
// returned.
if len(subErrors) == 1 {
return subErrors[0].BoulderError
}
detail = fmt.Sprintf(
"Rechecking CAA for %q and %d more identifiers failed. "+
"Refer to sub-problems for more information",
subErrors[0].Identifier.Value,
len(subErrors)-1)
return (&berrors.BoulderError{
Type: berrors.CAA,
Detail: detail,
}).WithSubErrors(subErrors)
}
return nil
}
// failOrder marks an order as failed by setting the problem details field of
// the order & persisting it through the SA. If an error occurs doing this we
// log it and return the order as-is. There aren't any alternatives if we can't
// add the error to the order.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) failOrder(
ctx context.Context,
order *corepb.Order,
prob *probs.ProblemDetails) *corepb.Order {
// Convert the problem to a protobuf problem for the *corepb.Order field
pbProb, err := bgrpc.ProblemDetailsToPB(prob)
if err != nil {
ra.log.AuditErrf("Could not convert order error problem to PB: %q", err)
return order
}
// Assign the protobuf problem to the field and save it via the SA
order.Error = pbProb
_, err = ra.SA.SetOrderError(ctx, &sapb.SetOrderErrorRequest{
Id: order.Id,
Error: order.Error,
})
if err != nil {
ra.log.AuditErrf("Could not persist order error: %q", err)
}
return order
}
// FinalizeOrder accepts a request to finalize an order object and, if possible,
// issues a certificate to satisfy the order. If an order does not have valid,
// unexpired authorizations for all of its associated names an error is
// returned. Similarly we vet that all of the names in the order are acceptable
// based on current policy and return an error if the order can't be fulfilled.
// If successful the order will be returned in processing status for the client
// to poll while awaiting finalization to occur.
func (ra *RegistrationAuthorityImpl) FinalizeOrder(ctx context.Context, req *rapb.FinalizeOrderRequest) (*corepb.Order, error) {
if req == nil || req.Order == nil {
return nil, errIncompleteGRPCRequest
}
order := req.Order
if order.Status != string(core.StatusReady) {
return nil, berrors.OrderNotReadyError(
"Order's status (%q) is not acceptable for finalization",
order.Status)
}
// There should never be an order with 0 names at the stage the RA is
// processing the order but we check to be on the safe side, throwing an
// internal server error if this assumption is ever violated.
if len(order.Names) == 0 {
return nil, berrors.InternalServerError("Order has no associated names")
}
// Parse the CSR from the request
csrOb, err := x509.ParseCertificateRequest(req.Csr)
if err != nil {
return nil, err
}
err = csrlib.VerifyCSR(ctx, csrOb, ra.maxNames, &ra.keyPolicy, ra.PA)
if err != nil {
// VerifyCSR returns berror instances that can be passed through as-is
// without wrapping.
return nil, err
}
// Dedupe, lowercase and sort both the names from the CSR and the names in the
// order.
csrNames := core.UniqueLowerNames(csrOb.DNSNames)
orderNames := core.UniqueLowerNames(order.Names)
// Immediately reject the request if the number of names differ
if len(orderNames) != len(csrNames) {
return nil, berrors.UnauthorizedError("Order includes different number of names than CSR specifies")
}
// Check that the order names and the CSR names are an exact match
for i, name := range orderNames {
if name != csrNames[i] {
return nil, berrors.UnauthorizedError("CSR is missing Order domain %q", name)
}
}
// Update the order to be status processing - we issue synchronously at the
// present time so this is somewhat artificial/unnecessary but allows planning
// for the future.
//
// NOTE(@cpu): After this point any errors that are encountered must update
// the state of the order to invalid by setting the order's error field.
// Otherwise the order will be "stuck" in processing state. It can not be
// finalized because it isn't pending, but we aren't going to process it
// further because we already did and encountered an error.
_, err = ra.SA.SetOrderProcessing(ctx, &sapb.OrderRequest{Id: order.Id})
if err != nil {
// Fail the order with a server internal error - we weren't able to set the
// status to processing and that's unexpected & weird.
ra.failOrder(ctx, order, probs.ServerInternal("Error setting order processing"))
return nil, err
}
// Attempt issuance for the order. If the order isn't fully authorized this
// will return an error.
issueReq := core.CertificateRequest{
Bytes: req.Csr,
CSR: csrOb,
}
// We use IssuerNameID 0 here because (as of now) only the v1 flow sets this
// field. This v2 flow allows the CA to select the issuer based on the CSR's
// PublicKeyAlgorithm.
cert, err := ra.issueCertificate(ctx, issueReq, accountID(order.RegistrationID), orderID(order.Id), issuance.IssuerNameID(0))
if err != nil {
// Fail the order. The problem is computed using
// `web.ProblemDetailsForError`, the same function the WFE uses to convert
// between `berrors` and problems. This will turn normal expected berrors like
// berrors.UnauthorizedError into the correct
// `urn:ietf:params:acme:error:unauthorized` problem while not letting
// anything like a server internal error through with sensitive info.
ra.failOrder(ctx, order, web.ProblemDetailsForError(err, "Error finalizing order"))
return nil, err
}
// Parse the issued certificate to get the serial