BrowserStack AI Evals action

Upgrade Node version to 24 (APS-19023)

- APS-19076 (CVSS 9.3, env-var injection): allowlist env-var names
  exported from the BrowserStack rerun API in setBStackRerunEnvVars.
  Adds ALLOWED_RERUN_ENV_VARS (BROWSERSTACK_RERUN, BROWSERSTACK_RERUN_TESTS,
  BROWSERSTACK_BUILD_NAME) to setup-env/config/constants.js; filtered
  loop in setup-env/src/actionInput/index.js calls core.exportVariable
  only for allowlisted keys and core.warning for everything else.
  Updates existing test, adds negative-case test, rebuilds dist.

- APS-19077 (CVSS 8.7, supply chain + token scope): pins
  actions/setup-node@v4.4.0 and actions/checkout@v4.2.2 by SHA in both
  .github/workflows/setup-env.yml and setup-local.yml; adds top-level
  permissions: { contents: read } block to give the GITHUB_TOKEN least
  privilege (these workflows only run unit tests).

- APS-19078 (CVSS 7.6, stored XSS via report HTML): adds sanitize-html
  to browserstack-report-action; sanitizes basicHtml/richHtml in
  ReportProcessor.js with a strict allowlist (no inline event handlers,
  no javascript: URLs); strips JS hooks from richCss with sanitizeCss();
  injects CSP meta (script-src 'none'; default-src 'none') into the
  artifact HTML head in UploadFileForArtifact.js as defense-in-depth;
  rebuilds dist.

Tests: setup-env 37 passing (was 36, +1 negative-case); report-action
18 passing (no regression). Standalone XSS-strip sanity covers six
payloads including <img src=x onerror=alert(1)>, <script>, javascript:
URLs, <svg onload>, <iframe javascript:>; all stripped, safe HTML
preserved.

Resolves: APS-19076, APS-19077, APS-19078

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Integration test caught a click-to-XSS bypass: <a href="data:text/html,<script>...</script>">
survived because data: was allowed on all elements. Restrict to <img> for inline
screenshots; block on <a>/<iframe>/etc.

CodeQL flagged the `<script|iframe|object|embed>` regex in sanitizeCss as
"incomplete multi-character sanitization" (high severity x2 — src + dist).
A single-pass replace is bypassable by nested patterns like `<scr<script>ipt>`,
which collapse to `<script>` after one substitution.

Fix: strip ALL HTML tags from the rich-CSS payload via sanitize-html with
allowedTags: [] (the library iterates internally and is not bypassable).
The CSS-function regexes for `expression(...)` and `url(javascript:...)`
remain — they target CSS syntax, not HTML, and CodeQL did not flag them.

Verified:
- 18/18 unit tests pass (no regression)
- Sanity script confirms `<scr<script>ipt>` no longer leaves a `<script`
  substring in the output
- Flagged regex literal absent from rebuilt dist/index.js
- Lint clean

Resolves: CodeQL failure on PR #85

…curity-bundle

[APS-19076][APS-19077][APS-19078] fix: security hardening — env-var allowlist, workflow SHA pinning, report HTML sanitization

Adds a unit test suite matching sibling action conventions:
- 8 tests covering all RunResult status branches (NOT_FOUND, CREATE_FAILED,
  FAILED, PASS, REGRESSION) and exit codes (0/1/2/3)
- Stubs the SDK at its method boundary so tests are deterministic, fast,
  and isolated from network/auth concerns
- Asserts CI metadata pass-through to experimentRuns.create as the 5th arg
- Asserts lifecycle progress messages

Tooling:
- mocha + chai + sinon + nyc (matches setup-env / setup-local / browserstack-report-action)
- ts-node loader so Mocha can read .ts source directly
- @typescript-eslint v8 (supports TypeScript 5.9)
- husky pre-commit hook: runs test + build + stages dist/ so src and dist
  cannot drift in a published commit

'npm test' chains tsc --noEmit -> eslint -> nyc mocha with HTML coverage
report (coverage/index.html, gitignored).

  feat(ai-evals): add BrowserStack AI Evals GitHub Action

Pin returntocorp/semgrep container image to a specific version
and GitHub Actions to major version tags to prevent :latest
tag resolution and reduce supply-chain attack surface.

Fixes: LCNC-15821

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…er set

setEnvVariables() exported BROWSERSTACK_BUILD_NAME and
BROWSERSTACK_PROJECT_NAME unconditionally. When the workflow supplied
neither input, _validateInput() had already replaced them with generated
defaults -- the repo name, and "<event> [Workflow: <n>]" -- so the action
exported values the user never asked for.

Every BrowserStack SDK resolves names as CLI args > env vars > config file.
An exported default therefore does not fill a gap, it OUTRANKS whatever the
user configured and silently replaces it. A customer following our own
documented setup for re-run delivery saw their browserstack.json
project_name/build_name of "E2E_Automation" replaced by
"core-automation-framework" and "workflow_dispatch [Workflow: 7]".

Export each variable only when its input was actually supplied. The
generated values remain available through the BUILD_INFO and REPO_NAME
tokens that InputValidator already understands -- which is what those
tokens were for. When an input is omitted the action now logs that it left
the variable unset, so the behaviour is visible in the workflow log.

Ref: SDK-7461 (follow-on to SDK-7124)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

Address review feedback on PR #87 (shayan-bstack): reduce the two
explanatory comment blocks to the essential rationale, matching the
file's existing comment density. Rebuilt dist. No behaviour change.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>

…set-build-project-name

[SDK-7461] fix(setup-env): do not export a build/project name the workflow never set