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fix(core): block dangerous data: URL MIME types in URL sanitizer to prevent XSS #69816

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fix(core): block dangerous data: URL MIME types in URL sanitizer to prevent XSS #69816

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6641f90
fix(core): sanitize dangerous data: URL MIME types in URL sanitizer
CYANO-01 Jul 16, 2026
fda0a9b
test(core): add tests for dangerous data: URL MIME type sanitization
CYANO-01 Jul 16, 2026
5c75efe
fix(core): switch to blocklist approach for dangerous data: URL MIME …
CYANO-01 Jul 16, 2026
1371325
test(core): update tests for blocklist-based data: URL sanitization
CYANO-01 Jul 16, 2026
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27 changes: 24 additions & 3 deletions packages/core/src/sanitization/url_sanitizer.ts
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Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -36,13 +36,34 @@ import {XSS_SECURITY_URL} from '../error_details_base_url';
* This regular expression was taken from the Closure sanitization library.
*/
const SAFE_URL_PATTERN = /^(?!javascript:)(?:[a-z0-9+.-]+:|[^&:\/?#]*(?:[\/?#]|$))/i;

/**
* A pattern that matches `data:` URLs with MIME types that can execute scripts
* when navigated to or embedded. These are explicitly blocked to prevent XSS.
*
* Blocked MIME types:
* - `text/html`, `application/xhtml+xml` — rendered as HTML documents with full script execution
* - `text/javascript`, `application/javascript` — executed as JavaScript directly
* - `image/svg+xml` — SVG documents can embed and execute scripts when opened as a document
*
* All other `data:` URLs (e.g. `data:text/csv`, `data:application/pdf`,
* `data:application/json`) remain allowed, preserving common patterns such as
* client-side file generation for download via `<a [href]="..." download>`.
*/

@JeanMeche JeanMeche Jul 16, 2026

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AGENT: While the intent to block malicious data URLs is good, using a strict allowlist here breaks perfectly safe and common data URLs. For example, data:text/csv or data:application/pdf used in <a download> will now be blocked. A blocklist targeting specific dangerous types (e.g. text/html, application/javascript, image/svg+xml) would prevent the XSS vectors without breaking legitimate client-side file generation.

@SkyZeroZx SkyZeroZx Jul 16, 2026 •
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In fact, modern browsers already block some of these by default.

If I'm not mistaken, the only possibly valid one would be blob, since it can be used for downloads, but it would be difficult (or impossible) to determine if it's safe or intentional on the part of the developer.

image image image

I also found this:
parallax/jsPDF#2286
https://ourcodeworld.com/articles/read/682/what-does-the-not-allowed-to-navigate-top-frame-to-data-url-javascript-exception-means-in-google-chrome

const UNSAFE_DATA_URL_PATTERN =
/^data:(?:text\/html|application\/xhtml\+xml|text\/javascript|application\/javascript|image\/svg\+xml)[,;]/i;

export function _sanitizeUrl(url: string): string {
url = String(url);
if (url.match(SAFE_URL_PATTERN)) return url;

if (UNSAFE_DATA_URL_PATTERN.test(url)) {
if (typeof ngDevMode === 'undefined' || ngDevMode) {
console.warn(`WARNING: sanitizing unsafe URL value ${url} (see ${XSS_SECURITY_URL})`);
}
return 'unsafe:' + url;
}
if (SAFE_URL_PATTERN.test(url)) return url;
if (typeof ngDevMode === 'undefined' || ngDevMode) {
console.warn(`WARNING: sanitizing unsafe URL value ${url} (see ${XSS_SECURITY_URL})`);
}

return 'unsafe:' + url;
}
51 changes: 51 additions & 0 deletions packages/core/test/sanitization/url_sanitizer_spec.ts
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Expand Up @@ -46,6 +46,11 @@ describe('URL sanitizer', () => {
'', // Truncated.
'data:video/webm;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAYAAAAf8/',
'data:audio/opus;base64,iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAABAAAAAQCAYAAAAf8/',
// Common download use cases must remain valid
'data:text/csv,a,b,c',
'data:text/csv;charset=utf-8,hello%2Cworld',
'data:application/pdf;base64,JVBERi0xLjQ=',
'data:application/json,{"key":"value"}',
'unknown-scheme:abc',
];
for (const url of validUrls) {
Expand All @@ -71,4 +76,50 @@ describe('URL sanitizer', () => {
it(`valid ${url}`, () => expect(_sanitizeUrl(url)).toMatch(/^unsafe:/));
}
});

describe('dangerous data: URLs are sanitized', () => {
const dangerousDataUrls = [
// HTML content executes scripts when navigated to (Firefox allows data: navigation)
'data:text/html,<h1>Hello</h1>',
'data:text/html;base64,PHNjcmlwdD5hbGVydCgxKTwvc2NyaXB0Pg==',
'data:text/html;charset=utf-8,<script>alert(1)</script>',
'DATA:TEXT/HTML,xss',
// JavaScript MIME types execute scripts directly
'data:application/javascript,alert(1)',
'data:text/javascript,alert(1)',
// XHTML can embed and execute scripts
'data:application/xhtml+xml,<html><script>alert(1)</script></html>',
// SVG executes scripts when opened as a document via link navigation
'',
];
for (const url of dangerousDataUrls) {
it(`blocks "${url}"`, () => {
expect(_sanitizeUrl(url)).toMatch(/^unsafe:/);
expect(logMsgs.join('\n')).toMatch(/sanitizing unsafe URL value/);
});
}
});

describe('non-executable data: URLs remain valid', () => {
const safeDataUrls = [
'',
'',
'',
'',
'data:video/mp4;base64,AAAAIGZ0eXBpc29t',
'data:audio/ogg;base64,T2dnUwACAA==',
// Client-side file download patterns must remain unblocked
'data:text/csv,name,age\nAlice,30',
'data:text/csv;charset=utf-8,hello%2Cworld',
'data:application/pdf;base64,JVBERi0xLjQ=',
'data:application/json,{"key":"value"}',
'data:application/octet-stream;base64,AAAA',
];
for (const url of safeDataUrls) {
it(`allows "${url.substring(0, 50)}..."`, () => {
expect(_sanitizeUrl(url)).toEqual(url);
});
}
});
});
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