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/**
* Podkey - Background Service Worker
* Coordinates key management, signing, and Solid auto-auth
*/
import { generateKeypair, signEvent, getPublicKey } from './crypto.js';
import {
getConversationKey,
encrypt as nip44Encrypt,
decrypt as nip44Decrypt,
bytesToHex as nip44BytesToHex
} from './nip44.js';
import {
storeKeypair,
getKeypair,
hasKeypair,
getStoredPublicKey,
clearSessionKey,
isTrustedOrigin,
addTrustedOrigin,
getAutoSign
} from './storage.js';
import { createVault, unlockVault, hasVault } from './vault.js';
import { normalizeSecretKeyToHex } from './keyformat.js';
import { sha256 } from '@noble/hashes/sha256';
import { bytesToHex } from '@noble/hashes/utils';
// Set DEBUG=true to emit verbose diagnostics. Off by default so the extension
// never logs public keys, DIDs, NIP-98 events, or Authorization headers.
const DEBUG = false;
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Background service worker started');
// Initialize extension
chrome.runtime.onInstalled.addListener(async () => {
console.log('[Podkey] Extension installed');
const keyExists = await hasKeypair();
if (!keyExists) {
console.log('[Podkey] No keypair found - user will need to generate or import one');
} else {
console.log('[Podkey] Keypair already exists');
}
});
// Pending signing approval promises: requestId -> resolve function
const pendingApprovals = new Map();
// Handle messages from content scripts and popup
chrome.runtime.onMessage.addListener((message, sender, sendResponse) => {
// Handle signing approval responses from the approve popup
if (message.type === 'APPROVE_SIGNING') {
const resolve = pendingApprovals.get(message.requestId);
if (resolve) {
pendingApprovals.delete(message.requestId);
resolve(message.approved === true);
}
return; // synchronous, no sendResponse needed
}
handleMessage(message, sender)
.then(result => {
// Never log `result`: it may be a public key, signed event, or
// Authorization header (token). Log only the message type under DEBUG.
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Message handled:', message.type);
sendResponse(result);
})
.catch(error => {
console.error('[Podkey] Error handling message:', message.type, error);
sendResponse({ error: error.message });
});
return true; // Async response
});
/**
* Handle incoming messages
*/
// Key-material operations are only ever initiated by extension UI (the action
// popup, or the dedicated ceremony window opened via chrome.windows.create),
// never on behalf of a page. The content-script whitelist in injected.js
// already keeps pages away from these, but that guarantee lives in one Set in
// another file — so reject them here too unless the sender is one of our own
// extension pages.
//
// The discriminator is the sender's extension origin, NOT sender.tab: the
// ceremony window is a real browser tab, so a sender.tab check would wrongly
// reject the very passkey flow these types exist for. A content script instead
// reports the web page's URL/origin, so an chrome-extension://<own-id> prefix
// cleanly separates trusted extension UI from page-injected content.
const EXTENSION_UI_ONLY_TYPES = new Set([
'GENERATE_KEYPAIR',
'IMPORT_KEYPAIR',
'UNLOCK_VAULT',
'LOCK_VAULT',
'SET_SESSION_KEY',
'GET_KEYPAIR_STATUS'
]);
function isExtensionUiSender (sender) {
if (!sender || sender.id !== chrome.runtime.id) return false;
const ownOrigin = `chrome-extension://${chrome.runtime.id}`;
// Extension pages report a chrome-extension URL/origin for our own id; a
// content script reports the host page's URL even though sender.id matches.
const from = sender.url || sender.origin || '';
return from.startsWith(ownOrigin);
}
async function handleMessage (message, sender) {
const { type, origin } = message;
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Message received:', type, 'from', origin || 'popup');
if (EXTENSION_UI_ONLY_TYPES.has(type) && !isExtensionUiSender(sender)) {
throw new Error(`${type} is not allowed from web content`);
}
switch (type) {
case 'GET_PUBLIC_KEY':
return await handleGetPublicKey(origin, sender);
case 'SIGN_EVENT':
return await handleSignEvent(message.event, origin, sender);
case 'GENERATE_KEYPAIR':
return await handleGenerateKeypair(message.passphrase);
case 'IMPORT_KEYPAIR':
return await handleImportKeypair(message.privateKey, message.passphrase);
case 'UNLOCK_VAULT':
return await handleUnlockVault(message.passphrase);
case 'LOCK_VAULT':
return await handleLockVault();
case 'GET_KEYPAIR_STATUS':
return await handleGetKeypairStatus();
case 'SET_SESSION_KEY':
return await handleSetSessionKey(message.privateKey);
case 'NIP44_ENCRYPT':
return await handleNip44Encrypt(message.pubkey, message.plaintext, origin);
case 'NIP44_DECRYPT':
return await handleNip44Decrypt(message.pubkey, message.ciphertext, origin);
case 'NIP44_GET_CONVERSATION_KEY':
return await handleNip44GetConversationKey(message.pubkey, origin);
case 'CREATE_NIP98_AUTH_HEADER':
return await createNip98AuthHeader(
message.url,
message.method,
message.body,
message.bodyHash
);
default:
throw new Error(`Unknown message type: ${type}`);
}
}
/**
* Coalesce concurrent unlock requests behind a SINGLE passphrase prompt.
*
* A page that logs in fires several key-using requests back to back —
* `GET_PUBLIC_KEY` (identity), `SIGN_EVENT` (the NIP-42 relay AUTH), and
* `nip44.decrypt` (gift-wrapped DMs). Each one used to hit `ensureUnlocked`
* while the vault was still locked, open its OWN popup, and reject immediately.
* The user therefore faced three passphrase prompts, and the rejected
* `nip44.decrypt` made encrypted DMs silently un-readable (the relying app saw a
* "locked" error, not a decryptable message). Here the first locked caller opens
* ONE popup and every concurrent caller awaits the same unlock; a single
* passphrase entry — which writes the key into `chrome.storage.session` — resolves
* them all. `chrome.storage.onChanged` reliably wakes the MV3 service worker, so
* the wait survives an idle eviction of the background. Returns `true` if the
* vault became unlocked, `false` on timeout.
*/
let pendingUnlock = null;
function awaitUnlock () {
if (pendingUnlock) return pendingUnlock;
pendingUnlock = new Promise((resolve) => {
let settled = false;
let timer;
const finish = (ok) => {
if (settled) return;
settled = true;
chrome.storage.onChanged.removeListener(onChange);
clearTimeout(timer);
pendingUnlock = null;
resolve(ok);
};
// Any write to session storage may be the unlocked key landing — confirm
// with hasKeypair() rather than assuming.
const onChange = async (_changes, area) => {
if (area === 'session' && (await hasKeypair())) finish(true);
};
chrome.storage.onChanged.addListener(onChange);
// Two minutes for the user to find the popup and type their passphrase.
timer = setTimeout(() => finish(false), 120000);
// Only prompt if the key didn't already land in the race window between the
// caller's hasKeypair() check and this listener being registered.
hasKeypair().then((already) => (already ? finish(true) : openUnlockPopup()));
});
return pendingUnlock;
}
/**
* Ensure the private key is unlocked in the session before a signing or
* key-reading operation. Distinguishes three states so the error is actionable:
* - unlocked (session key present) -> returns
* - locked (encrypted vault on disk, no session key) -> opens ONE unlock UI,
* waits for the user's single passphrase entry (shared across concurrent
* callers), then returns; only throws if the unlock times out
* - empty (no vault at all) -> throws a "generate or import" error
*/
async function ensureUnlocked () {
if (await hasKeypair()) return;
const { podkey_passkey: passkey } = await chrome.storage.local.get(['podkey_passkey']);
if ((await hasVault()) || passkey) {
const unlocked = await awaitUnlock();
if (unlocked && (await hasKeypair())) return;
throw new Error('Podkey is locked. Open Podkey, unlock it, and try again.');
}
throw new Error('No key in Podkey. Open the extension to generate or import a key first.');
}
/**
* Best-effort: surface the popup so the user can unlock. Never throws — the
* caller still rejects with the "locked" message if the window cannot open.
*/
function openUnlockPopup () {
try {
chrome.windows.create({
url: 'popup/popup.html',
type: 'popup',
width: 400,
height: 560,
focused: true
});
} catch (e) {
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Could not open unlock popup:', e.message);
}
}
/**
* Get public key with user permission
*/
async function handleGetPublicKey (origin, _sender) {
// Require an unlocked key (locked vault -> opens unlock UI; no key -> setup).
await ensureUnlocked();
// Check if origin is trusted
const trusted = await isTrustedOrigin(origin);
if (!trusted) {
// Show permission prompt
const allowed = await showPermissionPrompt(origin, 'read your public key');
if (!allowed) {
throw new Error('User denied permission');
}
// Trust this origin
await addTrustedOrigin(origin);
}
// Get and return public key (ensure it's a string)
const keypair = await getKeypair();
if (!keypair || !keypair.publicKey || typeof keypair.publicKey !== 'string') {
throw new Error('Invalid keypair format');
}
return String(keypair.publicKey);
}
/**
* Sign event with user permission
*/
async function handleSignEvent (event, origin, _sender) {
// Require an unlocked key (locked vault -> opens unlock UI; no key -> setup).
await ensureUnlocked();
const keypair = await getKeypair();
// A trusted origin signs without a prompt — the same trust model already used
// by GET_PUBLIC_KEY and nip44.{encrypt,decrypt} (decrypting DMs is strictly
// more sensitive than signing, and is silent for trusted origins). An
// untrusted origin always prompts, and approving it establishes revocable
// trust. The previous `&& autoSign && isSolidAuth` gate special-cased Solid
// kind-27235 and made Podkey unusable as a general NIP-07 signer — a normal
// client (kind 0/1/10002/22242…) re-prompted on every page load. isSolidAuth
// now only tunes the wording of the first-contact prompt.
const isSolidAuth = event.kind === 27235;
const trusted = await isTrustedOrigin(origin);
let shouldSign = trusted;
if (!shouldSign) {
// Show signing prompt with event preview
const actionLabel = isSolidAuth ? 'sign a Solid authentication event' : `sign an event (kind ${event.kind})`;
const previewData = JSON.stringify({
kind: event.kind,
content: (event.content || '').substring(0, 200),
tags: (event.tags || []).length
});
const allowed = await showPermissionPrompt(origin, actionLabel, previewData);
if (!allowed) {
throw new Error('User denied signing');
}
// Trust this origin if not already trusted
if (!trusted) {
await addTrustedOrigin(origin);
}
}
// Sign the event
const signedEvent = await signEvent(event, keypair.privateKey);
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Event signed:', signedEvent.id.substring(0, 16) + '...');
// Ensure event structure is correct (tags should be array, content should be string)
// Preserve original event structure but ensure required fields are correct types
return {
...signedEvent,
kind: Number(signedEvent.kind),
created_at: Number(signedEvent.created_at),
tags: Array.isArray(signedEvent.tags) ? signedEvent.tags : [],
content: String(signedEvent.content || '')
};
}
/**
* Resolve the user's keypair for an encryption request, gating on origin
* trust exactly the way GET_PUBLIC_KEY / SIGN_EVENT do. The raw private key
* never leaves the background service worker — only ciphertext/plaintext or a
* conversation key is returned to the page.
*
* @param {string} origin - requesting page origin
* @param {string} action - human-readable action for the permission prompt
* @returns {Promise<{privateKey: string, publicKey: string}>}
*/
async function resolveKeypairForEncryption (origin, action) {
// Require an unlocked key (locked vault -> opens unlock UI; no key -> setup).
await ensureUnlocked();
const trusted = await isTrustedOrigin(origin);
if (!trusted) {
const allowed = await showPermissionPrompt(origin, action);
if (!allowed) {
throw new Error('User denied permission');
}
await addTrustedOrigin(origin);
}
const keypair = await getKeypair();
if (!keypair || typeof keypair.privateKey !== 'string') {
throw new Error('Invalid keypair format');
}
return keypair;
}
/**
* NIP-44 (v2) encrypt: encrypt plaintext for a peer pubkey.
* @param {string} peerPubkey - 64-char hex peer public key
* @param {string} plaintext - message to encrypt
* @param {string} origin - requesting page origin
* @returns {Promise<string>} base64 NIP-44 payload
*/
async function handleNip44Encrypt (peerPubkey, plaintext, origin) {
if (typeof peerPubkey !== 'string' || typeof plaintext !== 'string') {
throw new Error('nip44.encrypt requires (pubkey, plaintext) strings');
}
const keypair = await resolveKeypairForEncryption(origin, 'encrypt a message (NIP-44)');
const conversationKey = getConversationKey(keypair.privateKey, peerPubkey);
return nip44Encrypt(plaintext, conversationKey);
}
/**
* NIP-44 (v2) decrypt: decrypt a base64 payload from a peer pubkey.
* @param {string} peerPubkey - 64-char hex peer public key
* @param {string} ciphertext - base64 NIP-44 payload
* @param {string} origin - requesting page origin
* @returns {Promise<string>} decrypted plaintext
*/
async function handleNip44Decrypt (peerPubkey, ciphertext, origin) {
if (typeof peerPubkey !== 'string' || typeof ciphertext !== 'string') {
throw new Error('nip44.decrypt requires (pubkey, ciphertext) strings');
}
const keypair = await resolveKeypairForEncryption(origin, 'decrypt a message (NIP-44)');
const conversationKey = getConversationKey(keypair.privateKey, peerPubkey);
return nip44Decrypt(ciphertext, conversationKey);
}
/**
* NIP-44 (v2) conversation key derivation (hex). Some apps call this sub-API to
* cache the key client-side; we still derive it in the background so the raw
* private key stays here.
* @param {string} peerPubkey - 64-char hex peer public key
* @param {string} origin - requesting page origin
* @returns {Promise<string>} 64-char hex conversation key
*/
async function handleNip44GetConversationKey (peerPubkey, origin) {
if (typeof peerPubkey !== 'string') {
throw new Error('nip44.getConversationKey requires a pubkey string');
}
const keypair = await resolveKeypairForEncryption(origin, 'derive a NIP-44 conversation key');
const conversationKey = getConversationKey(keypair.privateKey, peerPubkey);
return nip44BytesToHex(conversationKey);
}
/**
* Generate a new keypair, seal it under the passphrase, and unlock the session.
*/
async function handleGenerateKeypair (passphrase) {
try {
const keypair = await generateKeypair();
await createVault(keypair.privateKey, passphrase); // encrypted at rest
await storeKeypair(keypair.privateKey, keypair.publicKey); // unlocked session
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Keypair generated, sealed, and unlocked');
return {
publicKey: keypair.publicKey,
did: `did:nostr:${keypair.publicKey}`
};
} catch (error) {
console.error('[Podkey] Error generating keypair:', error);
throw error;
}
}
/**
* Import an existing private key, seal it under the passphrase, and unlock.
*/
async function handleImportKeypair (privateKey, passphrase) {
// Accept either raw 64-char hex or an `nsec1…` (NIP-19) key. Most Nostr apps
// display keys in nsec form, so an existing-key import must handle it inline —
// convert to Podkey's canonical hex without treating the format as an error.
// `normalizeSecretKeyToHex` throws a neutral "Invalid key" on anything else.
const hexKey = normalizeSecretKeyToHex(privateKey);
// Derive public key (also validates the scalar is a usable secp256k1 key).
const publicKey = getPublicKey(hexKey);
await createVault(hexKey, passphrase); // encrypted at rest (validates passphrase)
await storeKeypair(hexKey, publicKey); // unlocked session
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Keypair imported and sealed');
return {
publicKey,
did: `did:nostr:${publicKey}`
};
}
/**
* Unlock the vault: decrypt the private key into the session with the
* passphrase. Throws 'Incorrect passphrase' on a bad passphrase.
*/
async function handleUnlockVault (passphrase) {
const privateKey = await unlockVault(passphrase); // throws on wrong passphrase
const publicKey = getPublicKey(privateKey);
await storeKeypair(privateKey, publicKey); // populate session cache
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Vault unlocked');
return {
publicKey,
did: `did:nostr:${publicKey}`
};
}
async function handleSetSessionKey (privateKey) {
const hexKey = normalizeSecretKeyToHex(privateKey);
const publicKey = getPublicKey(hexKey);
const storedPublicKey = await getStoredPublicKey();
if (storedPublicKey && storedPublicKey !== publicKey) {
throw new Error('Passkey produced a different identity');
}
await storeKeypair(hexKey, publicKey);
return { state: 'unlocked', exists: true, publicKey, did: `did:nostr:${publicKey}` };
}
/**
* Lock the vault: drop the in-memory key but keep the encrypted vault on disk.
*/
async function handleLockVault () {
await clearSessionKey();
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Vault locked');
return { ok: true };
}
/**
* Get keypair status as one of three states the popup routes on:
* - 'unlocked' — session key present (returns publicKey/did)
* - 'locked' — encrypted vault on disk, session cleared (returns the stored
* publicKey so the unlock screen can show the identity)
* - 'none' — no vault at all (show setup)
*/
async function handleGetKeypairStatus () {
if (await hasKeypair()) {
const keypair = await getKeypair();
return {
state: 'unlocked',
exists: true,
publicKey: keypair.publicKey,
did: `did:nostr:${keypair.publicKey}`
};
}
const { podkey_passkey: passkey } = await chrome.storage.local.get(['podkey_passkey']);
if ((await hasVault()) || passkey) {
const publicKey = await getStoredPublicKey();
return {
state: 'locked',
exists: true,
publicKey: publicKey || null,
did: publicKey ? `did:nostr:${publicKey}` : null
};
}
// No session key, vault, or passkey config: a stored public key here is an
// orphan from an interrupted setup. Clear it so it cannot later trip the
// SET_SESSION_KEY different-identity guard against a fresh derivation.
if (await getStoredPublicKey()) {
await chrome.storage.local.remove(['podkey_public_key']);
}
return { state: 'none', exists: false };
}
/**
* Show permission prompt to user via a popup window.
* Opens popup/approve.html and waits for the user to approve or deny.
* Auto-denies after 60 seconds if no response.
* @param {string} origin - The requesting origin
* @param {string} action - Human-readable description of the action
* @param {string} [eventPreview] - Optional preview of the event data
* @returns {Promise<boolean>} True if user approved
*/
async function showPermissionPrompt (origin, action, eventPreview) {
const requestId = crypto.randomUUID();
return new Promise((resolve) => {
pendingApprovals.set(requestId, resolve);
// Auto-deny after 60 seconds if no response
const timeout = setTimeout(() => {
if (pendingApprovals.has(requestId)) {
pendingApprovals.delete(requestId);
console.log(`[Podkey] Signing request ${requestId} timed out, auto-denying`);
resolve(false);
}
}, 60000);
// Clean up timeout when resolved normally
const originalResolve = resolve;
pendingApprovals.set(requestId, (approved) => {
clearTimeout(timeout);
originalResolve(approved);
});
const params = new URLSearchParams({
id: requestId,
origin: origin || 'Unknown',
action: action || 'sign',
preview: eventPreview || ''
});
chrome.windows.create({
url: `popup/approve.html?${params.toString()}`,
type: 'popup',
width: 420,
height: 380,
focused: true
});
});
}
/**
* Encode signed event to Authorization header value
* @param {object} signedEvent - Signed Nostr event
* @returns {string} Base64-encoded event for Authorization header
*/
function encodeNip98Header (signedEvent) {
const eventJson = JSON.stringify(signedEvent);
// Use btoa for base64 encoding (available in service workers)
return btoa(eventJson);
}
/**
* Create NIP-98 auth header for a request (called from content script)
* @param {string} url - Request URL
* @param {string} method - HTTP method
* @param {string|ArrayBuffer|Blob|null} body - Request body
* @returns {Promise<string>} Authorization header value
*/
/**
* Check if an origin is likely a Solid server
* @param {string} origin - Origin to check
* @returns {boolean}
*/
function isLikelySolidServer (origin) {
let hostname;
try {
hostname = new URL(origin).hostname;
} catch {
return false;
}
const trustedHosts = [
'solid.social',
'solidcommunity.net',
'inrupt.net',
'solidweb.org'
];
return trustedHosts.some(trusted =>
hostname === trusted || hostname.endsWith('.' + trusted)
);
}
async function createNip98AuthHeader (url, method, body = null, bodyHash = null) {
try {
// Check if we should add auth
const origin = new URL(url).origin;
const trusted = await isTrustedOrigin(origin);
const autoSign = await getAutoSign();
const keyExists = await hasKeypair();
const isSolid = isLikelySolidServer(origin);
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] NIP-98 auth check:', { url, origin, keyExists, trusted, autoSign, isSolid });
if (!keyExists) {
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] No keypair found, skipping NIP-98 auth');
return null;
}
// For Solid servers, auto-trust on first use if auto-sign is enabled
if (!trusted && isSolid && autoSign) {
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Auto-trusting Solid server:', origin);
await addTrustedOrigin(origin);
} else if (!trusted) {
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Origin not trusted, skipping NIP-98 auth');
return null;
}
if (!autoSign) {
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] Auto-sign disabled, skipping NIP-98 auth');
return null;
}
// Prefer a body hash computed in the page context (the only place where
// FormData / URLSearchParams / streamed bodies survive intact). Fall back
// to hashing here for body types that cross the message channel losslessly.
let resolvedBodyHash = typeof bodyHash === 'string' ? bodyHash : '';
if (!resolvedBodyHash && body) {
if (typeof body === 'string') {
resolvedBodyHash = bytesToHex(sha256(new TextEncoder().encode(body)));
} else if (body instanceof ArrayBuffer) {
resolvedBodyHash = bytesToHex(sha256(new Uint8Array(body)));
} else if (body instanceof Blob) {
resolvedBodyHash = bytesToHex(sha256(new Uint8Array(await body.arrayBuffer())));
}
}
// Always create a fresh signed event (no caching -- reusing signed events
// causes replay issues and servers with replay protection reject them).
// created_at has 1-second resolution, so a random nonce tag guarantees a
// distinct event id for repeated identical requests within the same second.
const event = {
kind: 27235,
content: '',
created_at: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),
tags: [
['u', url],
['method', method],
['nonce', bytesToHex(crypto.getRandomValues(new Uint8Array(16)))]
]
};
if (resolvedBodyHash) {
event.tags.push(['payload', resolvedBodyHash]);
}
const keypair = await getKeypair();
const signedEvent = await signEvent(event, keypair.privateKey);
if (DEBUG) {
console.log('[Podkey] NIP-98 event:', JSON.stringify(signedEvent));
console.log('[Podkey] Public key (did:nostr):', `did:nostr:${keypair.publicKey}`);
}
return `Nostr ${encodeNip98Header(signedEvent)}`;
} catch (error) {
console.error('[Podkey] Error creating NIP-98 auth header:', error);
return null;
}
}
// Note: Blocking webRequest listeners require webRequestBlocking permission,
// which is deprecated in Manifest V3 and only available for enterprise extensions.
// Instead, we use JavaScript-level interception via content scripts.
// See src/injected.js for fetch/XMLHttpRequest interception.
if (DEBUG) console.log('[Podkey] NIP-98 auto-auth: Using JavaScript-level interception (see injected.js)');