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Keep connection-authenticated sockets off the HTTP/2 registry - #2342
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## Summary - Fixes #2358. This is the [`fix/proxy-hop-alpn`](main...fix/proxy-hop-alpn) branch rebased onto `main`, with its two commits and their authorship kept, plus six commits of mine, three of them after review. - The TLS connection to an HTTPS proxy no longer offers `h2` in ALPN, and h2c prior knowledge is no longer sent to an HTTP proxy. Both connections only ever carry HTTP/1.1. ## Problem 1. **HTTPS proxy:** the TLS connection to an `HTTPS` proxy derived `http2Allowed` from the proxy's URI, so with HTTP/2 enabled it offered `h2`. A proxy that accepts `h2` then receives the HTTP/1.1 `CONNECT`, or the absolute-URI request, and drops the connection (`RemotelyClosedException`). Proxies that don't accept `h2` are not affected. 2. **HTTP proxy with h2c:** with `http2CleartextEnabled`, an `http://` target behind an HTTP proxy got the HTTP/2 connection preface (`PRI * HTTP/2.0`) sent to the proxy, which never agreed to HTTP/2. SOCKS is not affected, since there the peer is the origin. Both are reproduced by the tests below on `main`, against test proxies (an h2-capable TLS `CONNECT` proxy and a stub HTTP proxy) rather than a real proxy product. ## Change - **[`04f167c`](04f167c), rebased:** the HTTPS proxy connection passes `http2Allowed = false`, so `DefaultSslEngineFactory` uses its http/1.1-only context. If the connection still negotiates `h2`, which a user-supplied context can, this commit logged a warning; the request now fails with the reason instead (see below). `main` already has the 5-argument `addSslHandler` (#2342), so of the `ChannelManager` change only the Javadoc is left. - **[`0b4f999`](0b4f999), rebased:** h2c is only used when the socket's peer is the origin, that is without a proxy or through SOCKS. The check joins `main`'s handling of connections a login authenticates (#2342), so its "instead of h2c" warning is only logged when h2c would otherwise be used. The test imports `Http2Headers`, since `main` rejects fully qualified names (#2338). - **Don't wait for h2c behind an HTTP proxy (mine):** #2334 fails a request refused a connection permit at once when no HTTP/2 connection could ever be registered for it. A cleartext origin behind an HTTP or HTTPS proxy is now such a case too. On `main`, the check only looked at `http2CleartextEnabled`, so with it enabled such a request waited out `connectTimeout` behind either proxy type. - **Let the h2c proxy test check the response (mine):** the stub HTTP proxy now answers, and the test checks that the request completes over HTTP/1.1. It no longer waits out its 10-second timeout. - **Correct the proxy tests' comments (mine):** the TLS test proxy's Javadoc no longer claims that it checks the HTTP/2 preface, and both tests use ASCII only. After review: - **Fail the connect when the proxy selects h2:** if the TLS connection to an HTTPS proxy still negotiates h2, as an engine from a user-supplied `SslContext` can, the connect now fails at once, before anything is written to the proxy, with an exception that names the cause. Before, this was only logged, and the request repeated the handshake once per retry and then failed with a bare `Remotely closed`. The failure is not retried in any state, also not after an earlier retry or a closed pooled connection, since a new connection would select h2 again. - **Test the h2c waiter through SOCKS and HTTPS:** an over-cap h2c request through SOCKS must wait for the first connection and complete on it, and an `http` target behind an HTTPS proxy must be refused at once. - **Document every connection kept on HTTP/1.1:** `SslEngineFactory` and `DefaultSslEngineFactory` now list all three cases of `http2Allowed = false`: WebSocket, the connection to an HTTPS proxy, and a connection that a login authenticates (NTLM, Kerberos or SPNEGO, or any proxy login on a `CONNECT` tunnel or through SOCKS). The h2c comments say that prior knowledge in RFC 9113 is about the immediate peer, and that it is `http2CleartextEnabled` that limits it to origins. Test comments corrected. Unchanged: - the connection to the origin through a `CONNECT` tunnel still negotiates `h2`, also behind an HTTPS proxy; - h2c without a proxy and through SOCKS; - WebSocket staying on HTTP/1.1; - connections a login authenticates staying off the HTTP/2 registry. ## Not in scope A user-supplied `SslContext` is used as-is for every connection, so if it offers `h2`, the proxy connection can still negotiate it, as a `wss://` connection already can. The request then fails with the reason (see above). To keep h2 to origins, a custom `SslEngineFactory` can offer only http/1.1 when it receives `http2Allowed = false`, which it does for the proxy connection. ## Release note With `http2CleartextEnabled`, requests through an HTTP forward proxy now use HTTP/1.1 rather than h2c, including when that proxy supports h2c. ## AI disclosure Claude Code on behalf of Matthias Kurz. The two rebased commits keep their original authorship; Claude Code did the rebase and the conflict resolution, which their messages describe. All eight commits include `Co-Authored-By` per `AGENTS.md`. ## Test plan - [x] Fail on `main`, pass with this PR: - `ProxyTunnelHttp2Test.httpsProxyHopMustNotNegotiateHttp2`: on `main` the proxy negotiates `h2`, then `Remotely closed`. With the PR, it also checks that the origin behind the HTTPS proxy still gets HTTP/2. - `ProxyH2cTest.h2cIsNotSpokenToAnHttpProxy`: on `main` the proxy receives `PRI * HTTP/2.0`. - `Http2ConnectionWaiterGateTest.permitExhaustedOnCleartextOriginBehindAnHttpProxyFailsWithoutWaitingOutConnectTimeout` and `...BehindAnHttpsProxy...`: fail without my first commit, with the refused request still pending. - `ProxyTunnelHttp2Test.httpsProxyHopThatSelectsHttp2FailsTheConnect`: before the fail-fast commit, the request failed with `RemotelyClosedException`. Checks the exception, that the proxy receives no bytes after selecting h2, one handshake per request, and that the connection permit is returned. - `ProxyHopAlpnConnectListenerTest`: drives the connect listener with a proxy connection that selected h2, in the `NEW`, `RECONNECTED` and `POOLED` states. With the failure going through `onFailure()`, the latter two were retried. Checks that nothing is retried, the exception, that the channel is closed, and that the permit is returned once. - [x] The new waiter tests catch the changes described in review: without the `isSocks()` exemption, `ProxyH2cTest.overCapH2cRequestThroughASocksProxyWaitsForTheFirstConnection` fails; with HTTPS proxies let through, the HTTPS-proxy waiter test fails. - [x] Pass on both: the other five `ProxyTunnelHttp2Test` tests (HTTP/2 to the origin through a `CONNECT` proxy, tunnel reuse, concurrent requests, SOCKS, `maxConnectionsPerHost`) and `ProxyH2cTest.h2cIsSpokenThroughASocksProxy`. - [x] `./mvnw -B -ntp -Dgpg.skip=true clean verify` on JDK 11, merged with `main` `3e95ec8c2`: 1,919 tests, 0 failures, 0 errors, 11 skipped; Revapi passed. No test-skipping flags were used. - [x] `ProxyTunnelHttp2Test`, `ProxyH2cTest`, `Http2ConnectionWaiterGateTest`, `ConnectionOrientedAuthConnectListenerTest` and `ProxyHopAlpnConnectListenerTest` compiled on JDK 11 and run on JDK 17, 21 and 25 (Maven Surefire's `-Djvm`): 21 tests each, 0 failures. --------- Co-authored-by: Aayush Atharva <aayush@shieldblaze.com> Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Motivation:
NTLM, Kerberos and Negotiate authenticate the socket rather than the request. The HTTP/2 registry is keyed by host alone, and every stream of a connection shares that socket, so a connection one principal completed a handshake on can be polled and multiplexed for another. The preemptive header is attached only when a connection is new, so nothing on the wire shows it. The CONNECT tunnel registers the same way, and there the origin realm may be absent entirely: a request with no credentials of its own draws a tunnel the proxy authenticated.
Modification:
Refuse HTTP/2 for such a realm rather than scope the registry key, which cannot be scoped without breaking the sibling lookup, the connection waiters and maxConnectionsPerHost. ALPN advertises only http/1.1, the h2c upgrade is skipped, the CONNECT tunnel does both, the registry poll is skipped on every branch, and a connection that reaches h2 anyway through a caller-supplied SslEngineFactory is marked redundant rather than left unregistered. Either hop counts, since a tunnel is one socket. h2c is prior knowledge and has no negotiation to carry the refusal, so it warns instead of silently writing HTTP/1.1.
Result:
A connection an identity authenticated is used only for that identity. HTTP/1.1 carries these exchanges, keeping the socket that issued a 401 or 407 challenge. The HTTP/1.1 key is scoped by principal for the origin hop only, so for a proxy realm this bounds the sharing rather than ending it. With maxConnectionsPerHost set, such a request now fails fast on the permit instead of multiplexing onto a sibling connection.