ࡱ>   bjbjEE o'':&  %F%4%%%$#&#&#&Ps&o'T#&7x''"''')))6666666,C;=*6%)))))6)%%''47))))L%'%'6))6))Vv0@0pV De)j067070 #>)#>0)0>%1)))66))))7))))#>))))))))) + K$:   Schopenhauer on the Aimlessness of the Will Christopher Janaway I: Introduction In The World as Will and Representation Arthur Schopenhauer makes various claims about the relation of suffering and satisfaction of the will, including: (1) that satisfaction is never present without suffering, because satisfaction cannot occur without willing or desiring, which is itself a form of suffering; (2) that no satisfaction is permanent; (3) that suffering is positively felt, while satisfaction is not; (4) that the occurrence of satisfaction never compensates for the occurrence of suffering. While these claims can all be the subject of philosophical contention and interpretive debate, here I want to concentrate on another claim that Schopenhauer offers as ostensibly more fundamental: Everything that these remarks should clarify, the unattainable nature of lasting satisfaction and the negativity of all happiness, is explained by what we showed at the end of the Second Book: namely that the will, which is objectified in human life as it is in every appearance, is a striving without aim and without end [ein Streben ohne Ziel und ohne Ende] (Werke 2: 378/WWR 1, 347). Here we see that, for Schopenhauer, it is not just that the ends we aim at cannot all be attained at once, nor that the having-attained-an-aim state is impermanent, nor that there exists no positive feeling of having attained ones aim. Rather, in some sense, an aim of willing is lacking altogether. The will is in principle unfulfillable because it lacks any final aim. It is this idea, that the will is a striving without aim and without end, that I wish to explore in what follows. I argue first against a reading of the claim the will is a striving without aim and without end suggested by Jordi Fernndez. Fernndez argues that Schopenhauer means that each of our specific desires lacks an aim, and that he requires this premise in order to support a pessimistic conclusion that suffering is inescapable as long as we have desires. However, I show that this reading is inconsistent with Schopenhauers expressed view that every act of will has an object at which it is aimed. When Schopenhauer states that the will is a striving without aim and without end, he does so in order to argue for the conclusion, not that happiness is unattainable, but rather that happiness, once attained, is never final, in that sense that it never brings an end to the natural, egoistic willing that he associates with the will to life that constitutes the human essence. He makes this point in order to contrast happiness, the attainment of willed aims centred on individual well-being, with will-lessness, a state which is truly final, in that such desires no longer arise. Will-lessness is for him a state explicitly superior to happiness. II: Desire as aimless In a recent article Jordi Fernndez has given a determinate interpretation of Schopenhauers claim that the will is a striving without aim and without end. He interprets the claim as the proposition (AD) Desire is aimless. As Fernndez construes it, if AD is true, then there is no object whose possession will come to stop our willing because, quite simply, there is no object of our willing (Fernndez 2006: 6545). Fernndez argues that Schopenhauer holds a position which he calls Conditional Pessimism (CP) As long as desires arise in us, suffering is inescapable, and on his analysis Schopenhauer must rely on AD as at least an implicit premise in order to support CP. I shall argue that, in the sense in which Fernndez construes it, Schopenhauer does not hold AD at all. But first let us look at the role Fernndez assigns to it. In CP suffering is held to be conditional upon the occurrence of desires, or upon episodes of willing, and upon those episodes of willing not being fulfilled. This is not absolute pessimism because it allows that, were it not for desires arising, we might escape suffering. However, even the conditional inescapability of suffering remains a grave matter for Schopenhauer, since for him willing belongs to the essence of all living things. Desires arise naturally and continually for all of us almost all of the time. So if CP is true, then suffering is inescapable for most of us, most of the time, given our natural condition. This might be a questionable claim if under suffering we thought solely of unremitting pain and inconsolable misery. So there is a further caveat, as Fernndez reminds us: CP must be read as saying that the presence of some suffering, no matter how brief or mild, is guaranteed (Fernndez 2006: 651). Schopenhauer can, then, allow that in some human lives the satisfaction of desires may be frequent and the dissatisfaction relatively minor. But in that case why is true happiness impossible? Because, as Fernndez says, Schopenhauer raised the bar for happiness very high, such that the constant presence of some unsatisfied desires is enough to guarantee its absence (651). CP, therefore, might not seem especially controversial: it says just that all human lives naturally and persistently contain the occurrence of desires, and that consequently some suffering, lasting or brief, severe or mild, will inescapably be present in all human lives. But the question is: How is CP itself supported? Fernndez locates two arguments, the argument from the lack of satisfaction and the argument from boredom (646), and according to his analysis AD plays an essential role in both arguments. We can summarize the argument from the lack of satisfaction by using Fernndezs own schematic representation (2006, 650, 656): (D ! N) Any desire is generated by a need (N ! P) Any experience of need is painful From which it follows that: (D ! P) Having desires is painful. New premise: (LS) Satisfying all of our desires is impossible Therefore, (CP) As long as desires arise in us, suffering is inescapable. This argument appears valid, provided that we interpret Having desires as experiencing unsatisfied desires. Experiencing unsatisfied desires will always be painful, according to this argument, and of desires that we experience some will always be unsatisfied. There are many potential queries to be raised about this argument and the individual steps that compose it, not least whether D ! P is really credible. However, Fernndez focuses attention on one central question concerning the premise LS. Why is it impossible to satisfy all of our desires? He argues that Schopenhauer relies on AD as a suppressed premise: (AD) Desire is aimless The import of this is allegedly that [T]here is no object whose possession will come to stop our willing because, quite simply, there is no object of our willing. No wonder, then, that our desires cannot be satisfied once and for all (2006, 6545). Fernndez makes it clear that the point in LS [is] meant to be that one cannot permanently satisfy ones specific desires (659). Hence AD is supposed to be the view that specific desires are aimless: each desire is such that it lacks any aim. On this picture it is not just that the objects of our willing are hard to attain, or that there are too many of them, or that we are inept at identifying them or inept at identifying the means to attaining them rather, there is no such thing as attaining the objects of our desires, because there are no such things as the objects of our desires. Desire tantalizingly masquerades as a state that aims at an object, but really it has none. As Fernndez says, The goals of our desires are not meant to be only apparent in that we systematically misidentify them. They are meant to be only apparent in the sense that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as the goals of our desires (656). AD is also required, according to Fernndez, as a premise in Schopenhauers argument from boredom (2006, 656), which has the premises: (D ! P) Having desires is painful. (SB) Satisfying any of our desires produces boredom in us. How do we get from this to (CP) As long as desires arise in us, suffering is inescapable? We need to add the assumption that boredom is a form of suffering. But still, why accept SB? Fernndezs answer is that SB is also grounded on AD. He explains as follows: if we get bored once we achieve what we apparently want, it is simply because we did not really want it in the first place . If we never really wanted a certain object that we pursued and finally secured, then it is not surprising that we are not able to enjoy its possession (655). We need to make a distinction here. If people become bored once they have attained the car, the house, the holiday, and so on, that they were ostensibly yearning for before, then it can be because they discover that they never really wanted those specific things. But Fernndez has Schopenhauer making a different point: that people become bored whatever they attain, because prior to attaining it they were wanting and yearning, and so experiencing a sense of lack (and hence suffering) yet, strictly speaking, there was nothing they wanted or yearned for. Their desires were aimed at no object. Similarly, reverting to the earlier lack of satisfaction argument, if I am ostensibly yearning for a car, a house, and a holiday, it is guaranteed that this yearning can never be satisfied, because, again, I am just yearning, but not genuinely for anything. So anything I happen to get could not be the object of my yearning, which would explain why there can be no felt satisfaction relative to any desire. Now Fernndez is critical of AD, and rightly so, since it is a singular oddity. Although human beings are prone to be wrong or self-deceived about what they desire, and to fall prey to ill-focussed longings and senses of dissatisfaction with their condition in general that may not encompass any identifiable aim, it seems misguided to take something like AD as a starting assumption about desires as such. At least an intuitive starting-point for thinking about states of desiring, wanting, willing, yearning, and so on, is that they take an intentional object, that desire is desire for or desire that . Closer to home for present purposes is the charge Fernndez makes, that the assumption of AD renders Schopenhauer s own overall position inconsistent, because it conflicts with (D ! N)  Any desire is generated by a need . Schopenhauer s version of this premise is  All willing springs from need, and thus from lack, and thus from suffering, or the basis of all willing is need, lack, and thus pain, which is its primordial destiny by virtue of its essence. Fernndez argues that, if it is to be intelligible, this premise must be construed as saying that desires are aimed at the elimination of those needs that generate them (657). But, thus construed, (D ! N) says that desires have aims, contradicting AD. Fernndez s advice is that Schopenhauer  would be better off dropping the view that desire is aimless (654). However, I shall argue that Schopenhauer cannot drop the view that desire is aimless (as so far construed) because he does not hold it in the first place. III: Acts of will have aims In this section I shall argue that the evidence Fernndez offers for the claim that Schopenhauer holds AD does not support that claim. Fernndez (2006, 655) cites the following passages: (i) In fact, absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will in itself, which is an endless striving. Therefore, the striving of matter can always be impeded only, never fulfilled or satisfied. But this is precisely the case with the striving of all the wills phenomena. (Werke 2: 195/WWR 1 (Payne), 164). (ii) We clearly saw how, at all grades of its phenomenon from the lowest to the highest, the will dispenses entirely with an ultimate object aim and object. It always strives, because striving is its sole nature, to which no attained goal can put an end. Such striving is therefore incapable of final satisfaction. (Werke 2: 364/WWR 1 (Payne), 308). (iii) All that these remarks are intended to make clear, namely the impossibility of attaining lasting satisfaction and the negative nature of all happiness, finds its explanation in what is shown at the end of the second book, namely that the will, whose objectification is human life like every other phenomenon, is a striving without aim or end. (Werke 2: 378/WWR 1 (Payne), 321). My claim is that none of these passages gives evidence of Schopenhauers supporting AD, the claim that particular desires lack any aim. In (i) Fernndez omits some sentences from the text, one of which states that the gravitation of matter is a constant striving although a final goal for it is obviously impossible. The emphasis is on the lack of a final goal (letztes Ziel). Then immediately following the passage Schopenhauer adds the sentence (again not quoted by Fernndez), Every attained end (jedes erreichte Ziel) is at the same time the beginning of a new course, and so on ad infinitum. Hence the point of the passage is to make a contrast: particular cases of striving have ends, goals, or aims, which are capable of attainment, but there is no final end of striving as such. Schopenhauer makes the contrast explicit towards the end of the same paragraph, in a sentence that Fernndez cites later (2006: 658): Every individual act has a purpose or end; willing as a whole has no end in view (jeder einzelne Akt hat einen Zweck; das gesamte Wollen keinen). Fernndez suggests that this sentence is in conflict with the longer extract just examined. But there is no conflict here: the longer extract belongs to a passage in which the same contrast between the aims or goals of particular acts and the aimlessness of willing as such (willing as a whole, the will) is manifest. Passage (ii) places the same emphasis on the wills dispensing entirely with an ultimate aim and object (eines letzten Zieles und Zweckes), but in the same breath says that no attained goal can put an end (kein erreichtes Ziel ein Ende macht) to the striving which is the wills nature. This implies that there are goals to be attained. The passage ends with a re-statement of the impossibility of the wills final satisfaction (endliche Befriedigung). So once again there are goals at which episodes of willing aim, and which can indeed be attained, but there is no possibility of a final goal of willing as a whole. Passage (iii) repeats the claim that no lasting satisfaction is possible because the will is a striving without aim (Ziel) or end (Ende). But from this it cannot be inferred that no particular desire has an aim, nor that Schopenhauer has inexplicably abandoned the contrast he consistently presents elsewhere. So I submit that these passages provide no genuine evidence that Schopenhauer supports AD, Desire is aimless, at least in the sense Fernndez requires for his interpretation. There is more positive evidence against Fernndezs reading too. That particular desires or episodes of willing have objects is a cornerstone of Schopenhauers positive theory of willing and action. In his essay on freedom he says: If a human being wills, then he wills something: his act of will is in every case directed towards an object [Gegenstand] and can be conceived only in relation to one. So what does it mean to will? It means: the act of will, which itself is at first only an object of self-consciousness, arises on the occasion of something that belongs to consciousness of other things, thus something that is an object [Objekt] for the cognitive faculty, an object that, in this relation, is called a motive and at the same time is the material of the act of will, in the sense that the act of will is directed towards it, i.e. aims at some alteration in it, or reacts to it. The whole being of the act of will consists in this reaction. Already from this it is clear that without the object the act of will could not occur; for it would lack both occasion and material. (Werke 4: 14/FW, 40.) So having an aim is constitutive of acts of will: there could not be an act of will, or episode of willing, that was aimless. Each episode of willing must have material or content: what it means to will is to act with an aim relative to some object of ones experience, where the occurrence of the experience of the object functions also as the cause of the action. Thus AD, if taken to mean each of our particular desires is aimless, is not only false, but unintelligible for Schopenhauer. His the will is a striving without aim and without end requires interpreting in some other way. IV: The Will as aimless As we have seen, while particular desires must have aims for Schopenhauer, the will or willing as a whole is said to be characterized by aimlessness. One way of rendering these claims consistent is in terms of a distinction between will understood empirically and will understood transcendentally. Such a reading is given clear expression by Mark Migotti, who suggests that in order to avoid contradiction, a metaphysical split between will and Will is essential: Schopenhauers theory of willing requires a distinction between empirical willing, engaged in by spatio-temporally located subjects of will, and transcendental willing, engaged in by the metaphysically ultimate and non-spatio-temporal subject of will, the Will itself, which is the essence of all things in Schopenhauers system. The need for a distinction of this sort can be seen by juxtaposing the following two claims : Every will[e] is directed to something; it has an object, an aim of its willing [WWR 1, 29, 163] In fact absence of all aim, of all limits, belongs to the essential nature of the will[t] in itself, which is endless striving [ibid., 164] Unless we distinguish between two orders or levels of willing, these statements flatly contradict one another (Migotti 1995: 647). From Fernndezs point of view, however, this interpretive move of denying any aim merely to this metaphysically ultimate will, as opposed to particular desires, is unhelpful to Schopenhauers case for pessimism. Whatever may be true at the transcendental level, as long as particular desires have aims (i.e. as long as AD is removed), conditional pessimism (CP) will remain unsupported. Thus Fernndez says: The claim that The Will is aimless seems irrelevant . The point in LS was meant to be that one cannot permanently satisfy ones specific desires. If we grant that those desires have goals, then it is difficult to see why the fact that The Will is aimless should prevent us from being able to achieve all of those goals (2006, 659). An additional concern is whether Schopenhauers utterances to the effect that the will is aimless always make reference exclusively to what is here called the Will. By this capitalized usage the Will, English-language commentators generally mean to refer to the Schopenhauerian thing in itself, the undivided metaphysical essence that Schopenhauer equates with the world as such. It is a questionable usage, however. Schopenhauer himself, writing in German where every substantive must have a capital letter, never makes an orthographical distinction between will and Will, so to introduce capitalization in English is already to push interpretation of the mere phrase the will (der Wille) in a definite direction which it may not merit in all contexts. There certainly are contexts in which der Wille can only be read as referring to the metaphysical thing in itself, for instance the passage at the end of the Second Book of The World as Will and Representation where Schopenhauer writes The will that is presented to us as the essence in itself of the world: what does it ultimately will, or what does it strive for? In fact the absence of all goals belongs to the essence of the will in itself, which is an endless striving (Werke 2: 195/WWR 1, 188, emphasis added). However, the same reading may not apply across the board whenever Schopenhauer writes der Wille. Context alone will determine whether he refers to the thing in itself, the will of an individual empirical being, a particular desire of an empirical being, all the particular desires of all empirical beings, or indeed more than one of these alternatives at once. It is important to understand that, for Schopenhauer, there is a sense in which the aimlessness of the will as thing in itself is also transferred to its empirical manifestations. Human agents are empirical manifestations of the will. So indeed is every other natural phenomenon, but since our topic is the unattainability of human satisfaction and the negativity of human happiness, other natural manifestations of will need not be considered here. Every individual that is an empirical manifestation of the metaphysical will shares (at least qualitatively) the same essence: what he recognizes as his own essence is the same thing that constitutes the essence of the world in its entirety (Werke 2: WWR 1, 187). In the case of an animal or human being willing and striving constitute their entire essence [sein ganzes Wesen] (Werke 2: 367/WWR 1, 338). And the crucial point is that whatever shares this essence shares the same absence of aim. In other words, the essence of every individual empirical being that manifests will is endless striving that has no final aim. All three passages adduced by Fernndez above state exactly this (with my emphases): [not just in itself, but] at all grades of its phenomenon [or appearance, Erscheinung] from the lowest to the highest, the will dispenses entirely with an ultimate aim and object; this is precisely the case with the striving of all the wills phenomena; the will, whose objectification is human life like every other phenomenon, is a striving without aim (emphasis added). So we cannot shunt the claim of aimlessness off into the transcendental realm, because it applies equally to every empirical being that manifests will, and in particular to human life. To put the issue in proper context, we must acknowledge Schopenhauers central conception of will to life (Wille zum Leben). He says that it amounts to the same thing if, instead of simply saying the will, we say the will to life (Werke 2:324/WWR 1, 301). So when he states that willing and striving constitute my entire essence, what he intends more narrowly is that, as a spatio-temporal, individuated, living part of nature that manifests will, I am naturally disposed to pursue ends that centre on this one individual. Put in other words, The chief and fundamental incentive in a human being, as in an animal, is egoism, i.e. the urge to existence and well-being. This egoism, both in an animal and in a human being, is linked in the most precise way with his innermost core and essence, and indeed is properly identical with it; the human being unconditionally wills to preserve his existence, wills it unconditionally free from pains, wills every pleasure of which he is capable (Werke 4: 1967/BM, 190). If this is my individual essence, and if the will as objectified in a human individual dispenses entirely with an ultimate aim and object, then Schopenhauer should hold that this absence of aim and object holds of my natural striving after egoistic ends. One issue this might be thought to raise is what we might term the existential question: Why do we will at all? Is there an overall aim or purpose served by the fact of our willing existence, pleasure and well-being in the first place? Human beings generally have no answer to this question, in Schopenhauers view: every human being when asked why he wills in general [berhaupt], or why in general he wills to exist would not have an answer and in fact the question would make no sense to him (Werke 2: 1945/WWR 1, 188). The explanation is that we will in the first place, not in order to fulfil some aim, but because we are, as it were, thrown into willing, because it is our essence so to do. However, this existential point is orthogonal to the question whether all our particular desires can be fulfilled. Even supposing that each of my desires and actions has an aim, and that those aims might all be achieved if in the course of my life I had, again and again, satisfied my particular desires for food, sex, enjoyment, money, recognition, and so on there may still be no answer to the existential question. And by the same token, the unanswerability of that question does not in itself give us reason to think that our individual desires could not in principle be fulfilled. So Fernandezs point re-asserts itself. If the premise AD is not held, and we thereby concede aims to particular desires, there seems no reason to conclude that (CP) As long as desires arise in us, suffering is inescapable. At this point we need to take a different tack, and question whether CP is indeed the conclusion that Schopenhauer wishes to support with his claim that the will is aimless. Recall that in the passages examined above Schopenhauer was committed not only to individual desires having aims, but also to there being no final aim of willing as such. Similarly, when Schopenhauer says the will is a striving without aim and without end, end here translates Ende, and is not merely a paraphrase of aim (Ziel). To say that the will has no Ende is to say that its activity does not come to a stop. In one sense this is obviously false: in the case of each human individual, their willing of course comes to an end in temporal terms. We all have what is in fact our last wish, and Schopenhauer cannot mean to deny this inescapable truth when he says that the will is a striving without end. However, the notions of no aim and no end need not be understood as making separate claims here. Rather, I shall argue, Schopenhauer means that in relation to the will to life there is no aim we can strive for whose attainment has the power to end willing. The point here is not that desires fail to have their aims fulfilled, or that temporary happiness is not sometimes attained. It is rather that no matter how much we fulfil the aims of our desires, there is no final aim, meaning no aim that has the power to bring about a state of will-lessness, a state in which the individual ceases to be disposed towards further striving. The negativity of happiness to which Schopenhauer refers is not its unattainability, but its comparative worthlessness. Happiness itself is deficient because it does not bring willing to a stop. V: An end to willing Will-lessness is, for Schopenhauer, a possible state that is positively transformative of the human condition. Will-lessness is the sole state of true salvation [Heil], redemption [Erlsung] from life and from suffering (Werke 2: 470/WWR 1, 424). Schopenhauer also frequently describes this will-less state as the final goal of existence, or as the one and only condition that has final value. Will-lessness, for Schopenhauer, arises from what he calls the wills denial (or negation, Verneinung) of itself. Will-lessness thus stands in fundamental opposition to happiness. Happiness is the attainment of what the will strives for: When an obstacle is placed between [the will] and its temporary goal, we call this inhibition suffering; on the other hand, the achievement of its goal is satisfaction, well-being, happiness [Glck] (Werke 2: 365/WWR 1, 336). The redemptive state, by contrast, results from the wills self-abolition, its absence of striving. Crucial though this opposition is, it can easily be missed, as in this summary by Bernard Reginster: Schopenhauer ostensibly defines happiness in terms of desire satisfaction: happiness is a final satisfaction of the will, after which no fresh willing would occur, [] an imperishable satisfaction of the will [eine finale Befriedigung des Willens, nach welcher kein neues Wollen eintrte, [] ein unzerstrbares Gengen des Willens], or a contentment that cannot be disturbed [Zufriedenheit [], die nicht wieder zerstrt werden kann] (Reginster 2006: 108). The excerpt quoted here from Volume 1 of The World as Will and Representation may initially read as though the satisfaction and the contentment that Schopenhauer mentions are the same thing, especially since the latter translates Zufriedenheit and the former, in its first occurrence, translates the cognate Befriedigung. But, when read fully, the passage makes a stark contrast: the Zufriedenheit (contentment) it mentions is a possible and highly valuable state; but the finale Befriedigung (final satisfaction) is an impossible one: Absolute good is thus a contradiction: highest good or summum bonum mean the same thing, denoting properly a final satisfaction for the will, following which there will be no new willing. But such a thing is unthinkable. The will can have no lasting fulfilment that gives perfect and permanent satisfaction to its strivings. But we might by way of a trope and figuratively call the complete self-abolition and negation of the will, the true absence of the will, the only thing that can give that contentment that can never again be disturbed, the only thing that can redeem the world we might call this the absolute good, the summum bonum (Werke 2: 428/WWR 1, 389, translation modified). Contentment [Zufriedenheit] that can never again be disturbed applies to a state that can redeem the world, but final satisfaction [Befriedigung] applies to something that is impossible, a contradiction. So at the very least these expressions cannot be co-referential. Schopenhauer makes this contrast explicit and salient, saying of the complete self-abolition and negation of the will: we can look upon it as the one radical cure for the disease against which all other goods such as fulfilled wishes and achieved happiness are only palliatives, only anodynes (Werke 2: 428/WWR 1, 389). Note that there is achieved happiness in life (we attain the aims of some of our desires) but it is not the cure that life requires because that cure can be provided only by the absence of will. Happiness (Glck, Glcksligkeit) is equated with Befriedigung, satisfaction, and sometimes with Wohlseyn (well-being). Negation of the will is a state not of the satisfaction of desires, but of renunciation (Entsagung) or resignation (Resignation) from desires (Werke 2: 448/WWR 1, 406), and it is to this that Schopenhauer applies the term Zufriedenheit, along with other terms that are translated as blissfulness, peace, rest, cheerfulness, elevation, and composure. Thus the central contrast in Schopenhauers philosophy of value is between happiness and will-lessness. Happiness is not a route to salvation, because no effort of striving to satisfy the will is sufficient to bring about will-lessness. So, even if Fernndezs CP were false, and we could achieve all our desires, we would not have reached the state of final value, that of not willing at all. In many obvious cases where an object of desire is attained, desire for the same object re-surfaces. Eating food satisfies my occurrent desire for food now, but satisfying that desire does not bring it about that I desire no more food, because, whether or not my desire for food now is satisfied, I still retain the disposition to desire food. In other cases a desire for some specific object may abate once attained: my satisfying a desire to ride on the back of an elephant or go sky-diving might completely obliterate any desire ever to repeat such an activities. But satisfying such a desire obviously does not remove my proneness to desire other particular objects in general. Schopenhauers really rather simple point is that nothing ever attained as the object of any particular desire would have the power to do that. We might put it this way: (A) When any desire of an individual human being S attains its object at time t, then S is naturally disposed to have some desire, for some object, that is unsatisfied either at t or soon after t. An obvious objection to (A) is that ones desire might be to terminate ones very existence, or at least ones capacity for conscious experience. On that desires attaining its object, one would have terminated ones disposition to form new, unfulfilled desires. So (A) applies only to cases in which the individual continues to exist beyond t as a subject of consciousness. To make this explicit we can amend (A) to: (A*) When any desire of an individual human being S attains its object at time t, and S is a subject of consciousness after t, S is naturally disposed to have some desire, for some object, that is unsatisfied either at t or soon after t. (A*) is arguably true, or at least is not obviously false. Assuming that I continue to exist as a subject of consciousness, however many specific aims of my specific desires I manage to attain, none is a final aim, in the sense that none terminates my willing as a whole, none turns me into a non-willing being. It is this that Schopenhauer offers in explanation of the impossibility of lasting satisfaction and the negative nature of all happiness. VI. Some difficulties It is not clear whether Schopenhauers position is coherent. First, it may be objected that Schopenhauer has after all provided the will with a final aim: namely will-lessness itself. This is the state that has final value, and as such is at least something desirable, something we should desire. It is not only the ultimate goal of existence, but also, as he explicitly says elsewhere, a state for which we cannot help feeling the greatest longing, since we acknowledge that this alone is infinitely superior to everything else (Werke 2:461/WWR 1, 417). If we long for will-lessness, it is surely the aim of one of our desires. And if we reached that aim, our doing so would provide a counter-example to (A*). Schopenhauer says that will-lessness is the ultimate state that puts an end to willing. If we desire this end, it is hard not to conceive it as the final aim of the will, in the sense canvassed above. Running somewhat counter to this suggestion is Schopenhauers idea that the redemptive state of will-lessness is not arrived at by an act of the individuals will: negation of the will cannot be forced by any intention or resolution, but arrives suddenly, as if flying in from outside (Werke 2: 478/WWR 1, 432). He compares it even to the arrival of divine grace, as theorized by Luther in particular. Although there is, for Schopenhauer, literally nothing divine to serve as the source from which grace can emanate, the point he makes via this analogy is that our own individual human efforts of will are not sufficient to bring us salvation. We do not attain salvation simply by striving after it, but must await a kind of conversion experience. In other passage, however, Schopenhauer makes it clear that will-lessness is something that does have to be striven for: the peace and blissfulness we have described in the lives of saintly people is only a flower that emerges from the constant overcoming of the will, and we see the constant struggle with the will to life as the soil from which it arises; Thus we also see people who have succeeded at some point in negating the will bend all their might to hold to this path by wresting renunciations of every sort from themselves, by adopting a difficult, penitent way of life and seeking out everything they find unpleasant: anything in order to subdue the will that will always strive anew. I have often used the expression asceticism, and I understand by it, in the narrow sense, this deliberate [vorstzliche] breaking of the will. (Werke 2: 463/WWR 1, 41819) Here it seems plain that the peace of not willing is something that is willed. This passage also shows that attaining the state of peace and blissfulness does not after all leave the subject empty of all desires. In that case, Schopenhauers invocation of true or complete will-lessness must be treated as hyperbole. Schopenhauers theory therefore seems beset by two problems: (1) that there is a final aim of the will, despite his assertions to the contrary, and (2) that the alleged final aim of the will is not really final, that is to say, it is a not state in which all willing has come to a stop. One way in which these problems can perhaps be mitigated is to introduce a distinction between two kinds of will or desire. Schopenhauer never clearly makes this distinction. He appears to have only one conception of will, equating will with will to life. Nevertheless, when he says of people who have achieved the blissfulness of not willing that they desire to stay in that state, and must struggle to preserve it, he attributes to them a desire that clearly stands in opposition to the will to life (Werke 2: 463/WWR 1, 41819). So it looks as though he should acknowledge a kind of desire or will that is not a manifestation of the will to life. Supposing there are such desires, then if by absence of will Schopenhauer all along means absence of will to life, but not absence of all desire, his position gains in coherence, at least to the extent of removing our problem (2). Desires have not come to a stop in the state that is the final purpose, but the will to life has. As for the first problem, the same kind of disambiguation may be suggested. If Schopenhauers claim that the will lacks a final aim and end is restricted to the will to life, then it need not stand in conflict with the claim that we desire a state of will-less bliss as our highest goal. While the will to life aims at the well-being or pleasure of the individual human being and is essentially egoistic, the self-negation of the will is precisely its turning away from life, disdaining the satisfaction and well-being of the individual. The resulting state of will-lessness puts a stop to this kind of natural, egoistic willing. But will-lessness is not an aim of natural, egoistic willing, not an aim that satisfies our individual, essentially egoistic desires. A fortiori, will-lessness is not the final aim of the will to life. This interpretation is consonant with the distinction between happiness and salvation discussed above. If the happiness that occurs in life is always conceived as being the satisfaction of desires centred on an individuals well-being, then there is no final happiness. This is because no individually-centred desire is such that satisfying it ends individually-centred desiring altogether. What is final, however, is a state of salvation in which one is free of this kind of desiring altogether. VII: Conclusion Thus, to summarize, I have argued that when Schopenhauer states that the will dispenses with a final aim, he does not merely mean that the metaphysical thing in itself has no aim, nor does he mean that a human beings specific desires have no aim. He means that no fulfilled aim of our natural, egoistic desire is final, in the sense of putting an end to that kind of willing as such. So the aimlessness of the will is meant to explain not the unattainability of happiness, but the unsatisfactoriness of the only kind of happiness we can and do attain. Its unsatisfactoriness is its lack of finality. Admittedly, Schopenhauers exposition fails systemically to distinguish between the kind of desire that belongs to the will to life and the kind of desire that opposes it and longs for salvation from it. But I have argued that this distinction is implicit in his discussion, and that it can help to restore coherence to his message. Schopenhauer contrasts two routes: the route of happiness and the route of salvation. When happiness occurs, it is the fulfilment of desires that have to do with the well-being or satisfaction of the individual living being whose essence is will to life. The will to life manifests itself in each individual as a succession of desires, all of which are aimed at specific objects. We saw that an act of will without an aim is an impossibility for Schopenhauer. But whatever satisfaction of its desires this will to life attains in one of its individual empirical manifestations, for it there can never be a final goal or end. None of its satisfactions is such as to stop active desires for more satisfactions: happiness attained never stops us striving for more objects of desire. The only state that is free of suffering is absence of will. This is admittedly the most desirable state, and is a state that we desire, but it is not the final goal of the will to life. It is not attainable by any effort of striving towards the individuals well-being and satisfaction. So, to return to the question from which we started, the unattainable nature of lasting satisfaction and the negativity of all happiness is explained by the claim that the will is a striving without aim and without end in the following sense. Attainable happiness is the satisfaction of desires relating to individual well-being, but no act of will that succeeds in satisfying such desires is the attainment of a final aim, in that none brings about a conscious state in which the subject experiences no more such desires. Will-lessness is the ultimate goal of existence, in Schopenhauers view, but happiness does not provide a route along which it can be attained. References Works by Schopenhauer Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1969a. The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, translated by E.F.J. Payne. New York: Dover (WWR 1 (Payne)). Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1969b. The World as Will and Representation, vol. 2, translated by E.F.J. Payne. New York: Dover (WWR 2). Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1978. Gesammelte Briefe, edited by Arthur Hbscher. Bonn: Bouvier (GB). Schopenhauer, Arthur. 1988. Smtliche Werke, edited by Arthur Hbscher (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988), vols. 17 (Werke) Schopenhauer, Arthur. 2009a. Prize Essay on the Freedom of the Will. In The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, translated by Christopher Janaway, 3112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (FW). Schopenhauer, Arthur. 2009b. Prize Essay on the Basis of Morals. In The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics, translated by Christopher Janaway, 113258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (BM). Schopenhauer, Arthur. 2010. The World as Will and Representation, vol. 1, translated and edited by Judith Norman, Alistair Welchman and Christopher Janaway. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (WWR 1). Schopenhauer, Arthur. 2015. Parerga and Paralipomena, vol. 2, translated and edited by Adrian del Caro and Christopher Janaway. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (PP 2). Other works Cartwright, David E. 1988. Schopenhauer on Suffering, Death, Guilt, and the Consolation of Metaphysics. In Schopenhauer: New Essays in Honor of his 200th Birthday, edited by Eric von der Luft, 5166. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press. Fernndez, Jordi. 2006. Schopenhauers Pessimism, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73: 64664. Hannan, Barbara. 2009. The Riddle of the World: A Reconsideration of Schopenhauer's Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press. Janaway, Christopher. 1999. Schopenhauers Pessimism, in The Cambridge Companion to Schopenhauer, edited by Janaway, 31843. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Migotti, Mark. 1995. Schopenhauers Pessimism and the Unconditioned Good, Journal of the History of Philosophy 33: 64360. Reginster, Bernard. 2006. The Affirmation of Life: Nietzsche on Overcoming Nihilism. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Soll, Ivan. 2012. Schopenhauer and the Inevitability of Unhappiness, in A Companion to Schopenhauer, edited by Bart Vandenabeele, 30013. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.  See, e.g. Werke 2: 3767/WWR 1, 3456; Werke 3: 65962 /WWR 2, 5757). References to Schopenhauers published works cite the volume and page number of Smtliche Werke, ed. Arthur Hbscher (Mannheim: F. A. Brockhaus, 1988), vols. 17 (Werke), followed by page numbers of English translations as listed below under References. Note that quotations from Schopenhauer embedded in passages by other secondary authors retain Paynes translation of The World as Will and Representation, Volume 1.  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Werke 2: 231/WWR 1, 219; Werke 2: 367/WWR 1, 338.  Here I retain the Payne translation of these extracts, as used by Fernndez.  Apparent inattention to this point has led one commentator (Hannan (2009), 12) to the remarkable statement that Schopenhauer himself does not always consistently follow this convention i.e. that of distinguishing between will and Will, a convention which he could not have had.  See, e.g., letter to Johann August Becker 10. December 1844 (GB, 220); Werke 3: 698/WWR 2, 608; Werke 6: 328/PP 2, 279.  Reginster quotes from Paynes translation, WWR 1 (Payne), 362, and all the bracketing is his. The same passage is quoted more fully from the Cambridge translation immediately below.  See Werke 2: 365, 376, 427/WWR 1, 336, 345, 389.  For examples see Werke 2: 442, 448, 461, 464/WWR 1, 401, 406, 417, 419.  See Werke 2: 428/WWR 1, 389 (wahre Willenslosigkeit); Werke 2: 448/ WWR 1, 406 (gnzliche Willenslosigkeit).  I am grateful to two anonymous reviewers for the journal, and to David Woods for discussions that advanced my understanding of this aspect of Schopenhauer.     PAGE  PAGE 20         & + ? D V W X           B C D E V [ ^   ۺۯۤۏۇujۇuh]h%zmH sH h ,h%zmH sH  h ,h%zh ,h%z6)h1Brh%zB*PJmH nH phsH tH h-9h%zmH sH hh%zmH sH h $h%z6mH sH hh%z6mH sH h%z6mH sH h%zmH sH h%zjh%z0J*U h~^JhC2h~^J%                                         ù h=.h .hLV0J5mHnHuh%z h%z0J5jh%z0J5UjhUUhUhLVjhLV0J*Uh,Qh>*h,h6B*php0hQ h6 hQ hhjh0J*Uh}%dh%zmH sH (                   7d^7`1h]hgdV. 1&`#$gdV.9 01h:pV.BP. A!n"n#$%nn 21h:pE3|. 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