Xiagang
| Xiagang | |||||||
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Former site of Minquan County Winery, the nation's first state-owned winery. It went bankrupt in 2005 due to severe losses and subsequent layoffs. | |||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 下崗 | ||||||
| Simplified Chinese | 下岗 | ||||||
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Xiagang (Chinese: 下岗 'step down from the post') is a Chinese term first utilised in 1995 by the Government of the People's Republic of China to describe the mass layoffs of state-owned enterprise (SOE) employees during the second half of the 1990s, when China was experiencing drastic transition from its socialistic planned economy centered around egalitarianism and social welfare, to a capitalistic market economy characterized by radical privatization and competition. More than a quarter of the nation's SOE employees were laid off in the span of just four years, and by the end of 1999, over 24.4 million workers had lost their jobs and livelihood and been left to seek new livings by themselves, particularly in the once-prosperous industrial regions of Northeast and North China, and the numbers only continued to rise over the following years.[1]
The sudden increase of an unemployed/underemployed labor force in the wake of xiagang also led to growing economic inequality (especially between the southern coastal provinces and the inland rust belt provinces), mass internal migration of peasant workers and talent exodus to the wealthier first- and second-tier cities, notable increases in unregulated (and often unqualified) tradespeople and street merchants, significant rises in homelessness, extortion scams, crimes, mass incidents and social unrests, and subsequently huge surge in the costs for stability maintenance by law enforcement and urban management.
Xiagang is a form of unemployment unique to China wherein workers aren't necessarily fired, but remain de jure employed while not working and thus not paid proper salary, retaining only minimal benefits (if any) from their work units. While initially encompassing workers from merged, bankrupted or downsized SOEs, its meaning has gradually broadened to include those whose salary has been reduced or suspended, or who await reassignment within SOEs.[2]
Process
[edit]Origin
[edit]
Upon establishing the People's Republic of China in 1949, the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) transitioned the country towards a planned economy where essentially all economic activities were placed under state control, and private sector was officially non-existent. Under this economic system, SOEs were intended to be not merely an organization for production but danweis (单位) tasked with providing lifetime employment to urban populations,[3][4] while guaranteeing most of basic necessities its members needed from cradle to grave. This Maoist mode of egalitarianism, combined with the traditional Chinese belief in collectivism, was therefore colloquially coined as the "Iron Rice Bowl" (铁饭碗), in which staff and workers employed in such enterprises not only enjoyed better pay and social status, but also feelings of genuine pride in their working-class identity.[5]
However, the state's commitment to providing complete social care was materialized largely at the cost of economic efficiency. By treating overstaffing as an obligation, China has managed to provide jobs to an enormous labor force about 29% of the world labor supply, and almost twice as large as the total work forces from all developing countries.[6] The consequence was endemic stagnation and low wages. From 1950 to 1973, China's GDP per capita grew at a rate of 2.9% per year on average, placing it far below the rate of growth achieved by neighboring countries and regions such as Japan, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan ruled by the rivaling Republic of China (ROC) during the same period.[7]
Start of Reform
[edit]| History of the People's Republic of China |
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After the Death of Mao Zedong, in order to salvage the nation's stagnant economy, the CCP leadership centered around Deng Xiaoping decided in 1979 to initiate an intense period of economic liberalisation under the policies of Reform and Opening Up. State officials vigorously promoted market-based employment systems to increase labour productivity and cost effectiveness within SOEs. They drew stark attention to what they framed as the inefficiencies of overstaffed workers (fuyu zhigong, 富余职工)—who made up 10% of the SOE labour force.[8] Initially, beginning in 1982, most workers were reassigned to other units within their enterprise through labour consolidation reforms before further changes implemented a bidding system to fill positions between 1987 and 1992. These inevitably only increased the number of surplus workers.[9][10]
Since the 1990s, SOEs have increasingly failed to generate revenues, and by the middle of the decade, as many as 63% of all SOEs were either operating at a deficit or incurring losses.[2] The state therefore began distancing itself from the hiring and firing process, instead diverting its attention to cutting job-training programmes, hiring agencies, and unemployment insurance.
Unfolding of Layoffs
[edit]Backed by the government's popular rhetoric and its retreat from staffing decisions, employers began mass layoffs, insisting they were necessary to boost productivity.
As a result, public perception of Xiagang changed—from something driven by government policy to a consequence of market pressures that left employers with little choice. From 1993, millions of employees were subsequently laid off each year. Between the mid-1990s to early 2000s,[11][12] the height of the Xiagang era, the total number of layoffs ranged from 27 to 35 million. By 1998, 67.84% of SOE employees were retrenched;[13] by 1999, 13.2% of the urban labour force had been fired.[14] The layoffs, combined with unemployment numbers, resulted in the urban unemployment rate reaching an average of 10.9% between 2002 and 2009, more than double official state reports.[15] Not all SOE workers were at high risk of retrenchment. Men, the higher educated, CCP members and those in higher-skill jobs were less likely to be fired. Conversely, women and individuals in poor health faced greater risk of layoffs.[16]
It is important to differentiate between Xiagang layoffs and unemployment (shiye, 失业). While the latter denotes unemployed people entitled to government support, the former refers only to the urban SOE workers who became unemployed or semi-unemployed in the 1990s who received minimal benefits: one-third from the state and two-thirds from their previous employers.[17] This differentiation served various purposes. It lessened the burden on the welfare system and government purse,[18] softened the connotations and impact of layoffs, concealed the real unemployment numbers, and divided the working class, preventing unified action between the unemployed.[19]
Responses
[edit]Civil Response
[edit]In response to the mass Xiagang layoffs, many took to the streets to protest. Although there are no accurate counts of their numbers, it is estimated that thousands of demonstrations occurred, attended by millions of retrenched workers.[20][21] Protests were characterised by their brevity, limited turnout, and poor communication and coordination between groups from different enterprises.[22] Although protests were individually affected by both regional politics and economic factors, protest regulations from the central government shaped all of their demands and behaviours.[23] Instead of directly opposing the government's market and employment reforms when they were denied the contractual, unemployment, or pension benefits they were entitled to, demonstrators petitioned the state to interfere on their behalf.[24] Instead of voicing anger or political grievances, protesters largely expressed hunger, despair, and desires to meet basic needs.[25] Moreover, protesters utilised their "nuisance value" to demonstrate their strength while never denouncing their allegiance with the state, consciously acting within the complainant boundaries designed by the state.[26]
Consequently, the government was pressured to respond to protests with tolerance and openness to avoid appearing repressive towards the working class and risking solidarity between protest groups.[20] The state thus deemed the demonstrations unthreatening, ensuring the continued legality of the protests and granting their organisers the opportunity for negotiation. As a result, demonstrations occasionally won a number of small concessions that improved their everyday lives.[27] However, no real institutional change developed. [28]
Policy Response
[edit]
The Chinese government addressed the impacts of Xiagang through two major policies. From 1993 to 1997, layoffs were relatively rare and temporary. Individual enterprises and local governments were held responsible for supporting workers, and informal remedies were encouraged—including ad hoc benefits and temporarily relocating workers to other jobs.[29] This was part of a market approach that pushed propaganda encouraging workers to seek new jobs in the non-state sector, which was allegedly expanding rapidly in the early 1990s;[30] this claim has since been challenged.[31]
The statist approach consisted mostly of Re-employment Service Centres (RSCs) to process laid off workers, which individual companies were required to build in 1998.[30][32] RSCs provided living allowances, social security, job training, and health insurance,[33][34] assuming many of the responsibilities previously funded by the state. These centres became central to developing Chinese social security infrastructure, providing a means for SOEs to offload surplus workers and increase efficiency, while ensuring that the retrenched were cared for.[35] A documented example of these reemployment initiatives was a city-wide job fair held at Shenzhen Stadium in 1998, where large numbers of xiagang workers sought new employment opportunities following SOE layoffs. However, by 2000, the central government viewed RSCs as a failure, due to uneven participation, lack of funding within firms, and abuses of the system by workers and officials. Ultimately, the RSCs were closed and Xiagang workers were transferred directly into the open labour market without benefits or transitional support.[36]
The coverage and associated benefits of the statist approach have varied significantly, due largely to uneven implementation.[37] Some Xiagang workers report having received effective assistance to ease their transition into new employment, whereas others expressed that government intervention had “come to nothing.”[38] The quality of unemployment support in each region was determined by the quantity and severity of layoffs in that area, company funding, and availability of local government resources.[39]
Legacies
[edit]Social Legacy
[edit]As one of the most drastic episodes in China's transition towards a market economy, the layoffs that occurred during Xiagang have left a lasting imprint on Chinese society, causing widespread disruptions to individual lives.[40] Trade unions were ineffective in countering the new local managers tasked with implementing the state's Xiagang policies at their own discretion.[40] Largely unsupervised, corruption was rampant among local authorities. According to the Chinese Federation of Labor Unions survey, only 5% of the laid off workers received the full amount of financial support they were entitled to, and a 1997 Survey of the Status of Chinese Staff and Workers further reveals that only half of the laid off workers received any monthly financial assistance.[41]
Although the RSCs were obliged to assist the Xiagang workers' search for new work, a majority of those retrenched were older than 35 and had less than nine years of formal education, limiting their re-employment prospects.[42] Job opportunities for retrenched workers were further restricted by the influx of rural migrants into cities seeking higher wages. Desperation for re-employment forced both the largely urban Xiagang workers and rural migrants to compete over menial, poorly paid, roles.[42] A survey of 54,000 retrenched workers showed that only 18% found new employment; meaning most were forced to endure a substantial loss of social status.[43] An anonymous laid off worker said:
"Our generation got a socialist education. We were taught that it was our duty to serve our country and our people. No matter what kind of work we did we were all serving the people. There was no such idea as high or low [status]. But suddenly this seems to be all wrong. How come I suddenly fell from the superior working class to become someone's slave? I can't make sense of this. I can no longer tell which side is wrong, me or the society."[44]
Xiagang workers, once seen as "the vanguard of China's workforce", were eventually redefined as a "new crowd of the dispossessed."[45] [46]Laid off and limited in future job prospects, workers' social status rapidly declined and they felt their social contract with the Socialist government had been violated. This sparked widespread working class anger which challenged the legitimacy of the CCP.[46]
Economic Legacy
[edit]The economic consequences of Xiagang have reshaped modern Chinese society. As Xiagang workers were unlikely to resume gainful employment, the majority were only able to find temporary or hourly positions.[47] By 2011, those who were retrenched between 1998 and 2000 are estimated to have individually lost 17,000 RMB ($2,368), while those laid off between 2001 and 2004 saw an even greater 18,800 RMB ($2,909) loss.[48] As a result, the percentage of urban citizens living on a wage below the national average increased to 21% in 2013, up by 8% in 1995.[49] While market reforms caused millions of former SOE workers to suffer, they have benefitted the Chinese economy by contributing to the rapid expansion of the private sector. Specifically, by influencing citizens to take lower wages from private enterprises and not rely on work from SOEs (among other factors), China was allowed entry into the World Trade Organisation (WTO).[50] Afterwards, China began to attract foreign investment from corporations looking to capitalise on the country's cheap labour force.[51]
Thus, the Chinese economy took off as total exports increased from $266 billion in 2002 to $2.2 trillion in 2013.[51] SOEs also profited from Xiagang policies—their newfound ability to fire inefficient employees, combined with the fear that they would be outperformed by rival corporations, produced a more competitive environment. This significantly improved Total Factor Productivity across the Chinese Industrial sector.[52]Since China entered the WTO, urban unemployment has fallen to an average of 4–4.3% as of October 2025, a decline from 11.1% in September 2002, and only a slight increase from 3.9% during the 1988–1995 transition era.[53] [54] Essentially, Xiagang was a necessary step for the development of the Chinese economic miracle.
Political Legacy
[edit]Though many Xiagang protests were apolitical, their claims did pose a direct challenge to the Constitution of the Chinese Communist Party, which claims that the party is led by the working class. To deal with this criticism and maintain stability, the government utilised a mix of force and concessions, instructing local officials to avoid coercion when possible.[55] [56]
The organisers of unequivocally political protests against Xiagang policies were subject to selective arrests and detentions, such as Yao Fuxin in Liaoyang.[55] Having failed to protect these protesters, the official, state run All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) was widely criticised by workers, both for lacking independence and for its ineffectiveness in defending workers's rights. Protesters have since perceived the ACFTU as a conduit of the Party's goals to preserve stability, failing to truly fulfill its duty to protect workers.[55]
In Popular Culture
[edit]The era of Xiagang has been a recurring subject in contemporary Chinese literature and cinema. Critically acclaimed films such as The Piano in a Factory (钢的琴, 2010), So Long, My Son (地久天长, 2019), and the television dramas of A Lifelong Journey (人世间, 2022) and The Long Season (漫长的季节, 2023) explore in depth the hope and despair experienced by working-class families in the aftermath of large-scale layoffs from SOEs. These cultural depictions reflect the profound psychological and social consequences of China's economic reforms in late-1990s.

Omnipotent Youth Society (万能青年旅店), formed in Shijiazhuang, a city whose once-prominent pharmaceutical and heavy industrial base was severely affected by state-owned enterprise reforms[57], has been widely interpreted as reflecting the social atmosphere of post-industrial Northern China following mass layoffs of the xiagang period. Their lyrics frequently depict economic stagnation, unemployment, and the erosion of traditional working-class identities, all of which common consequences of SOE restructuring in cities across the Northeast and North China Plain. Although the band does not reference xiagang explicitly, critics have described their music as capturing the dislocation and disillusionment experienced by a generation during and after the layoffs.[58]
See also
[edit]- Danwei
- Iron Rice Bowl
- State-Owned Enterprises of China
- Reform and Opening Up
- Economic Inequality in China
- Corruption in China
References
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External links
[edit]
Media related to Economic history of China at Wikimedia Commons