Jump to content

Insects in ethics

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A common fruit fly (Drosophila melanogaster), a widely used model organism in scientific research

Insects in ethics concerns ethical views about the moral status and treatment of insects, including whether humans have obligations to avoid harming or killing them. The topic is discussed in religious teachings about non-violence and compassion, in historical writing on attitudes towards harming insects, and in modern debates in animal ethics and animal welfare about insect sentience, pain, and consciousness.

Some traditions, including Jainism and Buddhism, describe practices intended to reduce accidental harm to insects. In contemporary ethical discussion, writers disagree about what can be known about insect subjective experience and how moral duties, if any, should apply in practice, including in scientific experimentation, pest control and the use of insecticides, and products that involve killing insects, such as silk.

The subject is also represented in literature and idiom, including claims of sympathy for insects in early modern drama and poetry, and expressions such as "wouldn't hurt a fly" and "wouldn't hurt a flea".

Religious views

[edit]
See also: Insects in religion

Jainism

[edit]
A Jain monk carrying a broom to move insects out of the way and wearing a mouth covering to avoid accidentally inhaling flying insects

Jain monks take precautions to avoid, including unintentionally, harming living beings, including insects.[1] In Jain ethics, breaches of the principle of Ahimsā (non-violence) are held to have negative effects on karma, especially when life is destroyed through carelessness. Violence against insects is generally treated as less karmically serious than violence against "five-sensed" beings, reflecting a hierarchy of beings classified by the number of senses they are considered to possess. Within this scheme, insects may be assigned different numbers of senses; for example, worms are described as having two senses, ants three, and flies four, with corresponding differences in the karmic consequences of harming them.[2][3]

Buddhism

[edit]

In Buddhist ethics insects, insects are treat as sentient beings and are therefore not to be harmed or killed.[4] The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism describes a tradition in which the Buddha instructed monks to suspend their travels during the monsoon season in order to avoid killing worms and insects on muddy roads.[5] Buddhist monastic practice has also been described as including the use of strainers when drinking water to avoid killing small animals.[1]

Taoist and Chinese moral texts

[edit]

In The Extended Circle, Jon Wynne-Tyson cites the Tai-shang kan-ying p'ien as instructing readers to maintain compassion towards all creatures, including insects. Wynne-Tyson also attributes to Wen Ch'ang, in the Yin-chih-wen, an instruction to watch one's step for ants and insects and to avoid building outdoor fires so as not to kill them.[6]

Judaism

[edit]

The Sefer Hasidim, a medieval Hebrew work, has been described as instructing against inflicting pain on animals, including insects, and as discouraging the killing of wasps or flies.[7]

Christianity

[edit]

In the 18th century, the English MP and writer Soame Jenyns argued that people should not "wantonly" take life from even "the meanest insect" without sufficient reason, since all creatures receive life from the same divine source and therefore have a right to enjoy it.[8] William Ellery Channing wrote in a letter that he would not kill an insect, and argued that insects had been granted a right to life by God and that killing them would spoil God's creation.[9]

According to Rod Preece, the children's book Insects and their Habitations: A Book for Children, published by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in 1833, taught that unnecessarily harming insects was a sin against God and that children should assist insects they encountered in distress rather than harming them.[10]: 241 

Historical writing

[edit]

al-Ma'arri

[edit]

The 11th-century Arab poet and philosopher al-Ma'arri described releasing a flea from his hand as an act of compassion, and wrote that it was kinder than giving money to a human in need. He compared the flea and the human as both taking precautions against death and seeking to continue living.[11]

Lewis Gompertz

[edit]

Lewis Gompertz has been described as an early animal rights activist and a vegan.[12] In Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes (1824), Gompertz discussed silk production in dialogue form. One speaker objects to depriving living silkworm grubs of their silk and censures the common practice of killing them during processing, describing "the usual mode of baking them to death in an oven". The same passage acknowledges that some silkworms die naturally while enclosed in their silk and states that using silk may be permissible when it comes from those deaths, while still objecting to deliberate killing for production. When another speaker suggests that breeding silkworms brings more insects into existence than would otherwise exist, Gompertz responds that humans are not authorized to destroy or prevent life, but argues that life is not so desirable that it should be produced solely for that purpose.[13]

Modern ethical debate

[edit]

Sentience, pain, and moral status

[edit]
See also: Ethics of uncertain sentience and Animal sentience precautionary principle

The entomologist Jeffrey A. Lockwood argues that empirical evidence supports the view that insects can feel pain and are conscious of their sensations. He writes that, if insects experience pain, they have an interest in avoiding it, and that killing insects can frustrate their immediate goals as conscious beings. Lockwood therefore proposes a "minimum ethic" in which people should avoid actions that are reasonably expected to kill insects or cause non-trivial pain where doing so has no, or only trivial, costs to human welfare.[14]

Philosopher Peter Singer contends that, because there is still uncertainty about whether insects are capable of subjective experience, campaigning for "insect rights" is premature.[15]

Justifications for killing insects

[edit]
See also: Insect euthanasia

In a discussion of when it is morally acceptable to kill harmful animals (excluding killing for meat production or product testing), the philosopher Evelyn Pluhar argues that killing may be permissible under certain conditions, including when animals pose "innocent threats" to human life, serve as "innocent shields" to threats to human life, or where humans and animals are in a "lifeboat" situation in which not all can survive.[16]

In these cases, Pluhar writes that an animal's prima facie right to life can be overridden. In the same discussion, Pluhar does not treat insects as having a prima facie right to life, and discusses agricultural ethics largely in relation to harmful mammals (such as predators and herbivores) and disease vectors (such as rats). Pluhar also treats insect killing primarily in relation to ecological effects associated with insecticide use, and describes the killing of a single insect as negligible when considered in isolation.[16]

Cultural depictions

[edit]

Literature

[edit]

Rod Preece has argued that Shakespeare expressed sympathy for insects in his 1604 play Measure for Measure, where Isabella compares the suffering of a "poor beetle" that is trodden upon to that of a dying giant.[10]: 99–100 

In the poem "On Cruelty", John Clare describes breaking a spider's web to free flies that have been caught in it.[17]

Idioms

[edit]

The idiom "wouldn't hurt a fly" refers to a person who is gentle and unlikely to cause harm or injury.[18] The related expression "wouldn't hurt a flea" is used with the same meaning, referring to someone seen as unlikely to harm even the smallest creature.[19]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Keown, Damien (2005). Buddhist Ethics: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. p. 15. ISBN 978-0-19-280457-0.
  2. ^ Shah, Harendra; Shah, Bhavna. "Jiva and Ajiva (Soul & Lifeless Substances)". Retrieved June 8, 2025.
  3. ^ Dundas, Paul (2002) [1992]. Hinnells, John; Smart, Ninian (eds.). The Jains. Library of Religious Beliefs and Practices (2 ed.). New York City: Routledge. pp. 95, 161–163. ISBN 0-203-39827-0.
  4. ^ Heirman, Ann (2020-11-30). "Protecting Insects in Medieval Chinese Buddhism: Daoxuan's Vinaya Commentaries". Buddhist Studies Review. 37 (1). doi:10.1558/bsrv.18495. ISSN 1747-9681.
  5. ^ Buswell, Robert E.; Lopez, Donald S. (2014). The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism. Princeton University Press. p. 968. doi:10.1515/9781400848058. ISBN 978-1-4008-4805-8.
  6. ^ Wynne-Tyson, Jon (1985). The Extended Circle: A Dictionary of Humane Thought. Fontwell: Centaur Press. p. 56. ISBN 978-0-900001-22-2.
  7. ^ Lerner, Pablo; Rabello, Alfredo Mordechai (2006). "The Prohibition of Ritual Slaughtering (Kosher Shechita and Halal) and Freedom of Religion of Minorities". Journal of Law and Religion. 22 (1): 1–62. doi:10.1017/S0748081400003210. ISSN 0748-0814. JSTOR 27639037.
  8. ^ Jenyns, Soame (1793). Cole, Charles Nalson (ed.). The Works of Soam Jenyns. Vol. 3 (2nd ed.). London: T. Cadell. p. 190.
  9. ^ Unti, Bernard (2002). The Quality of Mercy: Organized Animal Protection in the United States 1866-1930 (PhD thesis). American University. p. 34.
  10. ^ a b Preece, Rod (2003). Awe for the Tiger, Love for the Lamb: A Chronicle of Sensibility to Animals. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-203-49180-5. OCLC 437055953.
  11. ^ Nicholson, Reynold Alleyne (1921). Studies in Islamic Poetry. Cambridge University Press. p. 202.
  12. ^ Renier, Hannah (March 2012). "An Early Vegan: Lewis Gompertz". London Historians. Retrieved 2020-04-22.
  13. ^ Gompertz, Lewis (1992). Moral Inquiries on the Situation of Man and of Brutes. Fontwell: Centaur Press. p. 110.
  14. ^ Lockwood, Jeffrey (1988-07-01). "Not to Harm a Fly: Our Ethical Obligations to Insects". Between the Species. 4 (3): 207. doi:10.15368/bts.1988v4n3.10.
  15. ^ Singer, Peter (2016-05-12). "Are Insects Conscious?". Project Syndicate. Retrieved 2021-03-22.
  16. ^ a b Pluhar, Evelyn B. (1988-09-01). "When is it morally acceptable to kill animals?" (PDF). Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics. 1 (3): 211–224. Bibcode:1988JAEE....1..211P. doi:10.1007/BF01833410. ISSN 1573-322X. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 August 2017.
  17. ^ Clare, John (1820). Poems Descriptive of Rural Life and Scenery. London: Taylor & Hessey. p. 112.
  18. ^ "wouldn't hurt a fly". Cambridge Dictionaries (Online). Cambridge University Press. n.d. Retrieved 2025-12-16.
  19. ^ "not hurt a fly". Dictionary.com Unabridged (Online). n.d. Retrieved 2025-12-16.

Further reading

[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Insects_in_ethics&oldid=1331213350"