Jump to content

Historical materialism

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
For the journal, see Historical Materialism (journal).

Historical materialism is a theory of history and sociological methodology, first articulated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, which focuses on human societies and their development over time. It posits that history is the result of material conditions rather than ideas. It is a materialist conception of history which holds that, as Marx put it, "the mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life".

At the heart of the theory is the concept of the mode of production, which is a specific combination of the forces of production (the means of production, such as tools, technology, and raw materials, and human labour power) and the social relations of production (the class-based relationships that people enter into as they produce and reproduce their means of life). The precise definition and relationship of these concepts are themselves a matter of scholarly debate. Marx argued that the economic structure of society, or the economic base, forms the "real foundation" on which a legal and political superstructure arises, along with "definite forms of social consciousness". Historical change is driven by a fundamental contradiction in the mode of production: at a certain stage, the developing productive forces come into conflict with the existing relations of production. These relations, which were once forms of development, turn into "fetters" on the productive forces, initiating an "era of social revolution" that transforms both the economic base and the superstructure.

Though Marx never used the term himself, his theory was dubbed "the materialist conception of history" by Engels, who developed it after Marx's death. Historical materialism offers a scientific methodology for the study of history, providing a basis for selecting and interpreting evidence that distinguishes it from both traditional empiricist historiography and later postmodernist approaches. The theory was further elaborated by Marxists in the Second and Third Internationals, leading to influential works of history by figures such as Leon Trotsky and the British Marxist historians. A central and ongoing debate within the field concerns the relationship between structure and agency, particularly the tension between seeing history as determined by objective structures and seeing it as the product of human action.

Foundations in Marx and Engels

[edit]
Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

The materialist conception of history was first fully formulated in The German Ideology (1845), where Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels contrasted their new approach with the idealism of Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the Young Hegelians. They asserted that "in contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven".[1] Their project was to reorient the study of history away from abstract ideas and toward the real, material activities of human beings. This intellectual move represented a break from the Hegelian tradition, which sought the "reconciliation of idea and reality"; for Marx, the goal was the "transformation of reality" through a "critical theory" that fused philosophy with revolutionary action.[2]

Production, human nature, and consciousness

[edit]
Title page of The German Ideology (1845; first published 1932), in which Marx and Engels first formulated their materialist conception of history

The foundational premise of historical materialism is that "men must be in a position to live in order to be able to 'make history'".[1] The theory begins with the first historical act: the production of the means to satisfy basic human needs like eating, drinking, and shelter. Marx and Engels argue that humans "begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce their means of subsistence".[1][3] This productive activity is social and historical; in satisfying their original needs, humans create new needs and new forms of social relations.[4] Labour is a process of interaction between humanity and nature which changes not only the external world but humans as well.[5]

This approach historicizes the concept of human nature. While there is a transhistorical "nature of man" (basic biological needs), it is constantly modified by a historically specific "human nature" shaped by the social conditions of each epoch.[4] As Marx argued in his critique of Utilitarian thinker Jeremy Bentham, one cannot understand what is useful for humans by reference to an abstract, ahistorical "normal man", but must analyse "human nature in general, and then with human nature as modified in each historical epoch".[6][4][7]

Consciousness and ideas, in this view, are not the primary movers of history. Instead, they are products of material activity and social intercourse. Marx and Engels stated that "the production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life... Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence."[8] Social being is primary in relation to social consciousness; it is social being that ultimately determines consciousness, not the other way around.[9] Language itself arises from the "need, the necessity, of intercourse with other men" and is a form of "practical consciousness".[8]

Forces, relations, and modes of production

[edit]

Marx identified two key components of material production: the forces of production and the relations of production. Together, they constitute a specific mode of production.

  • The forces of production include the means of production (tools, machinery, factories, land, raw materials) and human labour power.[10] This encompasses the technical and material capacities of a society, including not only physical instruments but also skills, scientific knowledge, and the co-operation required in the labour process.[11][12][13] According to a more critical interpretation, productive forces are not simply "things" but are conceived as the collective productive powers of social labour. Social relations, such as the forms of co-operation in the production process, can therefore be considered productive forces. In The German Ideology, for instance, Marx and Engels state that "a certain mode of co-operation... is itself a 'productive force'".[14][15]
  • The relations of production are the social relations that individuals necessarily enter into to produce and reproduce their material lives. These are primarily class relations, defined by "effective control" over the means of production rather than simply legal ownership.[16][17] They are the mutual relations people form in the course of production and the disposal of its products, which become conscious as property relations.[18] In this view, "the social relations within which individuals produce" constitute society itself.[19]
Title page of Marx's A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (1859), whose Preface outlines the relationship between the forces and relations of production, and between the base and superstructure

In his 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, Marx provided the most famous summary of his theory. He argued that the totality of the relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the "real foundation" on which the legal and political superstructure is built. The mode of production of material life "conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life".[20] Historical change occurs when the productive forces, which tend to develop over time, come into conflict with the existing relations of production. These relations, which previously facilitated the development of the productive forces, become "fetters". This contradiction leads to a period of social revolution that transforms the social relations to accommodate the new level of productive forces.[20][21] Marx identified, "in broad outline", a succession of "epochs marking progress in the economic development of society": the Asiatic, ancient, feudal, and modern bourgeois modes of production.[12][22][23]

The propositions outlined in the Preface are not axioms of a complete theory but are better understood as hypotheses constituting a "guiding thread" for historical investigation.[24][25] The relationship between base and superstructure is not one of simple, mechanical determinism. The basis is the system of economic relations, while the superstructure is the system of "ideological" social relations—consciously created institutions such as the state—that arise upon this basis.[26] The "base" is not a purely economic level separate from the superstructure; in pre-capitalist societies, for instance, these relations were not confined to the "economic" sphere but encompassed the totality of social relations that made production possible, including kinship, political, and religious ties. The separation of the economic from other social spheres is a historically specific feature of capitalism.[27][28] Engels, in letters written after Marx's death, clarified this point, stressing that while the economic element is "ultimately determining", the various elements of the superstructure—political forms, legal systems, philosophical theories, and religious views—also "exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles and in many cases preponderate in determining their form."[29] The economic movement asserts itself as necessary "amid all the endless host of accidents".[29]

Some commentators argue that Marx viewed society through two primary models: the well-known base-superstructure model and a more comprehensive "organic totality" model, which sees society as a complex, hierarchical whole of internally related parts.[30] In this view, elements typically assigned to the superstructure, such as science, law, and the state, are understood as interpenetrating the economic base. Scientific and educational institutions, for example, are crucial for producing the skilled labour power that is a key productive force, while the legal system is integral to maintaining the relations of production through the enforcement of property rights.[31] Another interpretation holds that the base-superstructure model is not a theory of discrete social "levels" but is part of Marx's critique of ideology. The superstructure is understood as the ideological form of appearance (Erscheinungsform) of the underlying relations of production. The separation of the political state from civil society, for example, is an ideal form that obscures the state's real function as an essential component of capitalist class relations.[32]

Class struggle and social evolution

[edit]

Marx and Engels argued that class societies emerged from the development of the division of labour, particularly the division between mental and manual labour, which allowed a non-producing class to appropriate the surplus produced by others.[33][34] For Marx, a class is an objective relationship defined by one's position within the system of social production, primarily in relation to control over the means of production.[33] Class is not synonymous with "income groups" or social strata arising from the division of labour, but is defined dynamically by property relations, which themselves are subject to technological change.[35] The form of rule in pre-capitalist societies was typically based on personal domination and subordination, as with lords and serfs ruling as legally defined 'estates'. By contrast, the bourgeoisie is the first class in history to rule impersonally 'as a class' through the abstract and alienated medium of property and the market.[36] Class conflict "is essentially the fundamental relationship between classes involving exploitation and resistance to it, but not necessarily either class consciousness or collective activity in common".[33]

Title page of Engels's The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), a famous application of historical materialism

The theory of history is thus intertwined with the history of class struggles. In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State (1884), Engels drew on the work of Lewis H. Morgan to trace the historical origins of class society, patriarchy, and the state. He argued that these were not universal features of human existence but emerged at a specific point in history when the productivity of labour created a social surplus, making exploitation possible.[37][38] The rise of private property and the patriarchal family, he contended, marked the "world historical defeat of the female sex" and the first great cleavage of society into classes of masters and slaves, exploiters and exploited.[39] The state then arose as an instrument of the ruling class to moderate class conflict and maintain the system of exploitation.[40][41]

While Marx and Engels admired Charles Darwin's work, their theory is distinct from social Darwinism. Engels sharply rejected attempts to reduce history to a "feeble variety of the 'struggle for existence'".[42] Whereas biological evolution operates through random variation and natural selection, social evolution involves "the common material of conscious human agency". Innovation and social change are purposeful, even if their outcomes are often unintended.[43] Marxism rejects fatalism; social laws operate not as predetermined inevitabilities but as tendencies whose realization depends on the conscious activity of social classes. As Engels argued, freedom consists not in an imagined independence from natural and social laws, but in the knowledge of these laws and the ability to make them work towards definite ends.[44]

Similarly, Marx did not subscribe to a rigid, unilinear model of historical progress. In response to the Russian populist Vera Zasulich, who asked whether Russia would have to pass through a capitalist stage, Marx stated that his "sketch of the origins of capitalism in Western Europe" was not a "historical-philosophical theory of a universal movement necessarily imposed upon all people".[45][46] His later writings on the Russian peasant commune, for example, suggest that societies might follow different paths of development and that backward nations could potentially "leap across" historical stages under favourable international conditions.[47][48]

Development after Marx

[edit]

Following the deaths of Marx and Engels, historical materialism was adopted as the official philosophy of the socialist parties of the Second International. This period saw both the systematisation of the theory and the emergence of debates over its interpretation, particularly concerning the degree of determinism it implied.

The Second International: Evolutionism and its critics

[edit]
Karl Kautsky
Antonio Labriola

During the late 19th and early 20th centuries, many Marxists, most notably Karl Kautsky, interpreted historical materialism through the lens of Darwinian evolution.[49][50][51] This "orthodox" reading, made possible by Marx's own aphorisms and his 1859 Preface, often presented socialism as the inevitable outcome of economic laws that operated with the force of nature.[51] In the view of some critics, this represented a significant shift from Marx's "critical theory", which viewed history as a process to be shaped by revolutionary practice, to a "scientific" doctrine of a causally determined process analogous to biological evolution.[50] Kautsky, the leading theorist of the Social Democratic Party of Germany and the Second International, synthesised Marxism with biological evolution, though his historical work was often more flexible than his theoretical statements suggest.[52] For instance, in 1906 he rejected the idea of a single "classical model" of development, arguing that the complex pattern of global capitalism contradicted any "ready-to-hand model, and not a method of inquiry".[52] This inevitabilist strand was fueled not just by theory but also by the "confidence drawn from the persistent growth of the workers' movement".[51]

A more sophisticated critique of mechanical interpretations came from the Italian philosopher Antonio Labriola. In his Essays on the Materialist Conception of History (1896), Labriola rejected the "theory of factors"—which treated the economic, political, and legal spheres as separate, interacting variables—in favour of an "organic conception of history".[53] He argued that the different "factors" were not independent but were interwoven moments of a single, complex social totality, structured by the underlying process of production. While the productive base was the "whole inner essence of modern history", it did not mechanically determine the superstructure.[53] The Russian Marxist Georgi Plekhanov praised Labriola's work as a "synthetic view of social life" that offered a powerful alternative to both crude economic determinism and pluralist eclecticism. Plekhanov argued that while society was a structured hierarchy, with the state of the productive forces as its foundation, the relationship between its different levels was one of complex interaction, not one-way causation.[54]

Lenin, Trotsky, and the Russian Revolution

[edit]
Vladimir Lenin
Leon Trotsky

The Russian Revolution provided a major practical and theoretical test for historical materialism. The leading figures of the Bolsheviks, Vladimir Lenin and Leon Trotsky, developed the theory to address the specific problems of a revolution in a backward, semi-feudal country.

In The Development of Capitalism in Russia (1899), Lenin conducted a detailed empirical analysis to argue that capitalism, despite Russia's backwardness, was already dissolving the old feudal relations from within.[55] He defined classes as large groups differing by their place in the system of social production, their relation to the means of production, their role in the organization of labour, and the mode by which they acquire their share of social wealth.[56] While he accepted that Russia was heading for a bourgeois revolution, he argued, against the more mechanical Marxists, that the bourgeoisie was too weak and conservative to lead it. The task would therefore fall to the proletariat in alliance with the peasantry.[57] Although Lenin and Trotsky's political practice represented a profound break with the passivity of the Second International, their underlying historical theory remained rooted in a form of productive force determinism. Lenin continued to recommend Plekhanov's work, and as late as 1906 Trotsky wrote that "Marxism teaches that the development of the productive forces determines the social-historical process".[58]

Trotsky developed this analysis further with his theory of permanent revolution, underpinned by the law of uneven and combined development.[59] Trotsky argued that backward countries like Russia did not simply replicate the history of advanced nations. Instead, under pressure from the world market, they were compelled to "make leaps", adopting the latest technology and forms of industrial organisation without passing through the intermediate stages. This "amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms" created sharp social contradictions.[60] In Russia, it produced a highly concentrated and militant proletariat in a society still dominated by a feudal autocracy. As a result, Trotsky concluded, the Russian proletariat would be forced to take power, accomplish the tasks of the bourgeois revolution (such as land reform and democratisation), and proceed directly to the tasks of the socialist revolution.[61] Trotsky's magnum opus, The History of the Russian Revolution (1932), is considered a landmark of Marxist historiography, combining structural analysis with a powerful narrative of mass agency, illustrating his thesis that a revolution is the "forcible entrance of the masses into the realm of rulership over their own destiny".[62]

Stalinism and Western Marxism

[edit]
Joseph Stalin

Under Joseph Stalin, historical materialism was codified into a rigid, deterministic, and unilinear dogma known as "dialectical materialism" or "diamat". In his 1938 essay of the same name, Stalin outlined a universal law of history where all societies must pass through five stages: primitive-communal, slave, feudal, capitalist, and socialist.[63][64] This unilinear model, propagated in official Soviet manuals, contradicted Marx's own multilinear and organic theory of history,[65] and served as an ideological justification for the policies of the Soviet state, with Marx's critical method transformed into "hysterical and diabolical materialism" that could be used "to excuse almost any irrationality".[66] Nuanced concepts like the Asiatic mode of production, which contradicted the unilinear model, were suppressed.[67] The Stalinist interpretation has been criticised for misrepresenting the concept of the superstructure by including social consciousness (political, legal, and philosophical views) within it, whereas Marx had distinguished between the two.[68] Some scholars argue that much of what became "traditional historical materialism"—even in non-Stalinist contexts—relies on a "fetishism" of Marx's concepts, universalizing the phenomenal forms of capitalism (such as the separation of the economic and political spheres) into ahistorical axioms.[69]

Despite the ossification of theory in the Soviet Union, creative historical work continued. One influential example was Boris Hessen's 1931 paper, The Social and Economic Roots of Newton's Principia, which argued that Isaac Newton's scientific breakthroughs were a response to the technical problems posed by the rise of merchant capitalism (e.g., in navigation, ballistics, and mining).[70] Thinkers such as Antonio Gramsci and those of the Frankfurt School also rejected crude economic determinism in favour of more complex interpretations.[71] In the 1930s, the Comintern's shift to the Popular Front policy encouraged the development of "people's history", which focused on the progressive and revolutionary traditions of the common people. This led to the formation of the highly influential Communist Party Historians Group in Britain after World War II, which included historians such as Maurice Dobb, Christopher Hill, Rodney Hilton, Eric Hobsbawm, and E. P. Thompson. They produced seminal works on the transition from feudalism to capitalism and the history of working-class struggles, moving away from Stalinist reductionism and emphasising the role of class struggle and human agency.[72]

Central debates

[edit]

The relationship between objective social structures and subjective human agency has been a central and persistent debate within historical materialism, particularly in the post-war period.

Structure and agency

[edit]
See also: Structure and agency

The foundational text for this debate is Marx's statement in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte: "Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past."[73] Post-war debates tended to polarise between those who emphasised agency and those who emphasised structure.

  • Jean Paul Sartre
    Louis Althusser
    Existential Marxism, most prominently associated with Jean-Paul Sartre, reacted against the determinism of Stalinism by placing the free, conscious "project" of the individual at the center of history. In his Critique of Dialectical Reason (1960), Sartre sought to establish historical materialism on the basis of "individual praxis", arguing that social structures were the "practico-inert"—the alienated and unintended consequences of human action.[74] Sartre's "metaphysical individualism" and his transhistorical concepts of 'scarcity' and 'counter-finality' have been criticised for struggling to explain collective action and social structure.[75][76]
  • Structural Marxism, developed by Louis Althusser, was a reaction against the humanist and historicist trends in Marxism.[77] Althusser redefined history as a "process without a subject", driven by the structural contradictions between modes of production.[78] He argued for a radical "epistemological break" between the young, humanist Marx and the mature, scientific Marx, a view contested by those who argue for the continuity of Marx's humanist concerns with alienation throughout his work.[79] For Althusser, "the true 'subjects' [of history] are... the relations of production".[78] Society was seen as a complex totality of relatively autonomous levels (economic, political, ideological) "overdetermined" by the economic structure "in the last instance". While influential, Althusser's approach was criticised for its theoretical abstraction and for leaving little room for conscious human agency.[80]
E. P. Thompson's The Making of the English Working Class (1963) was a landmark study that defined class as a historical relationship and process, shaped by human experience and agency.

A powerful counter-argument to structuralism came from the British historian E. P. Thompson. In his masterpiece The Making of the English Working Class (1963), Thompson defined class not as a "structure" or a "category", but as a "historical relationship" that "happens... in human relationships".[81] He argued that class is an active process of self-making, where "class experience is largely determined by the productive relations", but "class consciousness is the way in which these experiences are handled in cultural terms".[81] By focusing on the lived experience, culture, traditions, and struggles of working people, Thompson sought to rescue human agency from what he famously called the "enormous condescension of posterity".[81][82] This perspective is supported by interpretations of Marx that stress "real, living individuals" as the "true and only subjects of history", who are obscured by the "authorless theatre of fetishism".[83]

In the late 20th century, theorists attempted to move beyond the structure-agency dualism.

  • G. A. Cohen's Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence (1978) offered a rigorous but controversial defence of "orthodox historical materialism", a "technological determinist" interpretation in which the development of productive forces holds primacy. He argued that the relations of production are functionally explained by their tendency to promote the growth of the productive forces.[84][85][86] This approach, a key text of Analytical Marxism, was criticised by thinkers like Jon Elster for its use of functional explanation without specifying a causal mechanism, and by historians like Robert Brenner for its transhistorical "Development Thesis", which downplayed the specific dynamics of different modes of production.[87]
  • Other theorists, such as Alex Callinicos, have proposed a synthesis that seeks to reconcile structural explanation with intentional understanding.[88] Drawing on thinkers such as Anthony Giddens and the philosophy of critical realism, this approach views social structures as both the "ever present condition" and the "continually reproduced outcome of human agency".[89][90] Structures are seen as not just constraints but also as enabling, providing the "causal powers" or "structural capacities" that agents use to make history. This allows for a non-reductive understanding of the relationship between structure and agency, where structures are irreducible to the actions of individuals, yet are dependent on them for their existence.[91][92]

Historiographical method

[edit]

Historical materialism provides a distinct methodology for historical research. It is best understood not as a single, all-encompassing theory, but as a method for producing specific, concrete analyses of social formations, a "scientific guide to revolutionary practice" rather than a "ready-made pattern" or "lever for construction".[93][94][95] A key part of this method is the "historicity of concepts", a recognition that theoretical categories (such as 'the state' or 'labour') are themselves products of specific historical conditions and may systematically misrepresent reality by universalizing historically specific phenomena. Historical materialism must therefore begin with a critique of its own analytical tools.[96] Following the practice of Galileo Galilei, Marx's method can be divided into a method of inquiry (analysis or "resolution") and a method of presentation (synthesis or "demonstration").[97]

The method of inquiry begins with the appropriation of both factual and conceptual material and proceeds through analysis.[98] Like Galileo, who revealed the self-contradiction in the Aristotelian concept of falling bodies through conceptual analysis, Marx's method critically examines existing concepts.[99] For example, by analyzing the concept of the "value of labour" used by classical economists, Marx exposed a contradiction, which he resolved by developing the new concept of "value of labour power".[100] Alongside conceptual analysis, inquiry involves what Marx called the "force of abstraction". The investigator starts with the "chaotic conception of the whole" (e.g., the complex reality of a specific country) and mentally isolates the most essential features, abstracting away contingent factors like geography or specific population characteristics to lay bare the underlying "relations of material production".[101] To analyse the laws of historical development, the dialectical aspect of the method seeks to identify "mutually exclusive relations" within a social formation—such as the requirement that commodities be both qualitatively different (as use-values) and qualitatively equal (as values)—and traces their "resolution" through the emergence of new social relations, like the development of money.[102]

The method of presentation is the inverse process. It moves from the simple, abstract concepts isolated during inquiry and synthetically reconstructs the "rich totality of many determinations and relations".[103] This method of "successive approximation" does not generate the concrete reality but reproduces it in thought as a concrete totality.[104] The structure of Capital is a prime example: Volume I begins with the most abstract analysis of capitalism's "ideal average", assuming a "purified" society of only capitalists and workers. Subsequent volumes progressively reintroduce more concrete elements (merchant capital, interest, rent) to explain the complex forms of appearance of capitalist society.[105]

This methodological approach distinguishes historical materialism from other historiographical traditions:

  • Against empiricism: Traditional historiography, in the mould of Leopold von Ranke, often claims to show the past "as it really was" by accumulating facts from primary sources. Marxists argue that this approach is naive because it lacks a rational basis for selecting and interpreting facts.[106] Historical materialism offers a theoretical framework, rooted in the centrality of production, that provides a coherent basis for historical enquiry. It does not simply describe events but seeks to explain them by locating them within a wider social totality and its underlying dynamics.[29] The laws of historical materialism do not apply to specific individuals, whose actions are treated as "contingent" or "accidental"; rather, they apply to the development of social relations.[107] It seeks to display an "internal logic where each successive stage is seen to arise as a matter of necessity, and not just of fact", a goal that distinguishes it from the mere causal sequencing of empiricist historians.[108]
  • Against postmodernism: Postmodernist historiography, influenced by the linguistic turn, often argues that there is no accessible reality outside of discourse and that all historical accounts are merely competing narratives or "stories".[109] Marxists counter this by defending a materialist ontology and epistemology. Drawing on thinkers like Valentin Voloshinov, they argue that language is not a self-contained system but a form of social practice rooted in material conditions.[8] The method of "rising from the abstract to the concrete" allows for a move from the chaotic appearance of social life to an understanding of its underlying "real relations".[110] This method is not neutral; Marxists argue that a true, scientific understanding of the historical totality is possible only from the "standpoint of the proletariat", the class whose position at the heart of the capitalist production process gives it a unique vantage point from which to comprehend the system's contradictions and the potential for its transcendence.[111]
  • Against its critics: Contemporary historical sociology has challenged historical materialism for its alleged inability to explain the role of state power, military competition, and nationalism. Historians and theorists such as Theda Skocpol and Michael Mann argue that the state and military rivalries represent an "analytically autonomous" level of reality irreducible to class relations.[112] In response, Marxists such as Robert Brenner have argued that these phenomena can be explained from within the framework of historical materialism. Brenner contends that the military conflicts of pre-capitalist societies were driven by "political accumulation"—the drive by a fragmented ruling class to build up its means of coercion to extract surplus from the peasantry and compete with rival lords—precisely because the existing relations of production limited the potential for productivity-enhancing investment.[113] This method seeks to explain the "fusion" of economic and political power in pre-capitalist modes and the historical emergence of modern state competition from the logic of the prevailing class relations, rather than treating them as autonomous forces.[114]

See also

[edit]
Wikiquote has quotations related to Historical materialism.

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c Blackledge 2006, p. 34.
  2. ^ Lichtheim 1961, pp. 28, 258.
  3. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 5.
  4. ^ a b c Blackledge 2006, p. 35.
  5. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 16.
  6. ^ Rader 1979, pp. 21, 49.
  7. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 132.
  8. ^ a b c Blackledge 2006, p. 21.
  9. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 36.
  10. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 85.
  11. ^ Rigby 1987, pp. 17–18, 23–24.
  12. ^ a b Blackledge 2006, p. 39.
  13. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 44.
  14. ^ Sayer 1987, pp. 26–28.
  15. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 45.
  16. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 39–40.
  17. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 47.
  18. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 93.
  19. ^ Sayer 1987, p. 142.
  20. ^ a b Blackledge 2006, p. 38.
  21. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 28.
  22. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 111.
  23. ^ Rigby 1987, p. 156.
  24. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, p. 32.
  25. ^ Sayer 1987, p. 13.
  26. ^ Lorimer 1999, pp. 112–114.
  27. ^ Sayer 1987, pp. 70, 73–75.
  28. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 203–204.
  29. ^ a b c Blackledge 2006, p. 37.
  30. ^ Rader 1979, pp. xvii, 84.
  31. ^ Rader 1979, pp. 33–41, 59–60, 64–67.
  32. ^ Sayer 1987, pp. 91, 109, 111.
  33. ^ a b c Blackledge 2006, p. 40.
  34. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 140.
  35. ^ Lichtheim 1961, p. 406.
  36. ^ Sayer 1987, p. 105.
  37. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 46.
  38. ^ Rigby 1987, pp. 44–45.
  39. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 46–47.
  40. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 47.
  41. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 164.
  42. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 48.
  43. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 49.
  44. ^ Lorimer 1999, pp. 31–34.
  45. ^ Rader 1979, pp. 130, 158.
  46. ^ Rigby 1987, p. 17.
  47. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 41–42.
  48. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 124.
  49. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 69.
  50. ^ a b Lichtheim 1961, p. 259.
  51. ^ a b c Rigby 1987, p. 69.
  52. ^ a b Blackledge 2006, p. 70.
  53. ^ a b Blackledge 2006, p. 74.
  54. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 76.
  55. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 78–79.
  56. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 143.
  57. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 79.
  58. ^ Rigby 1987, p. 76.
  59. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 81–82.
  60. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 82.
  61. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 81.
  62. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 83.
  63. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 109.
  64. ^ Rigby 1987, pp. 75–76.
  65. ^ Rader 1979, pp. 129, 157.
  66. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 90.
  67. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 122.
  68. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 114.
  69. ^ Sayer 1987, pp. 141, 143.
  70. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 91.
  71. ^ Rader 1979, p. 71.
  72. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 94–95.
  73. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 165.
  74. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 70–73.
  75. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 168–169.
  76. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 73–74.
  77. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 2.
  78. ^ a b Blackledge 2006, p. 175.
  79. ^ Rader 1979, pp. 6–7, 100, 118–119, 147.
  80. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 178.
  81. ^ a b c Blackledge 2006, p. 183.
  82. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 274.
  83. ^ Sayer 1987, p. 136.
  84. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 184.
  85. ^ Rigby 1987, p. 20.
  86. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 58–59.
  87. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 60–61, 65–67.
  88. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. ix.
  89. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 189.
  90. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 100.
  91. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 26, 189.
  92. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 94–96, 274–275.
  93. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, pp. 28, 32–33.
  94. ^ Lorimer 1999, p. 199.
  95. ^ Rigby 1987, p. 112.
  96. ^ Sayer 1987, pp. 126–128, 140.
  97. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, p. 81.
  98. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, pp. 81–82.
  99. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, pp. 45, 83–84.
  100. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, pp. 84–88.
  101. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, pp. 89–92.
  102. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, pp. 97–102.
  103. ^ Rader 1979, p. 170.
  104. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, p. 116.
  105. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, pp. 117–118.
  106. ^ Blackledge 2006, pp. 15, 36.
  107. ^ Witt-Hansen 1960, p. 131.
  108. ^ Lichtheim 1961, p. 164.
  109. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 18.
  110. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 26.
  111. ^ Blackledge 2006, p. 24.
  112. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 182–183.
  113. ^ Callinicos 2004, p. 186.
  114. ^ Callinicos 2004, pp. 186–187.

Works cited

[edit]
  • Blackledge, Paul (2006). Reflections on the Marxist Theory of History. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-6957-4.
  • Callinicos, Alex (2004). Making History: Agency, Structure, and Change in Social Theory. Historical Materialism Book Series (2nd ed.). Leiden: Brill. ISBN 978-90-04-13627-6. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help)
  • Lichtheim, George (1961). Marxism: An Historical and Critical Study. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. ISBN 978-0-7100-4635-7. {{cite book}}: ISBN / Date incompatibility (help)
  • Lorimer, Doug (1999). Fundamentals of Historical Materialism: The Marxist View of History and Politics. Chippendale, NSW: Resistance Books. ISBN 978-0-909196-92-3. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help)
  • Rader, Melvin (1979). Marx's Interpretation of History. New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-502475-5. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help)
  • Rigby, S. H. (1987). Marxism and History: A Critical Introduction. Manchester: Manchester University Press. ISBN 978-0-7190-2255-0. {{cite book}}: Check |isbn= value: checksum (help)
  • Sayer, Derek (1987). The Violence of Abstraction: The Analytic Foundations of Historical Materialism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ISBN 0-631-15318-7.
  • Witt-Hansen, J. (1960). Historical Materialism: The Method, the Theories. Exposition and Critique. Book One: The Method. Copenhagen: Munksgaard. OCLC 420314.

Further reading

[edit]
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Historical_materialism&oldid=1354223418"