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EU Security and Defence Funding Framework

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It is difficult to address security and defence at the European Union (EU) level, as defence remains primarily a national competence of the Member States. Over time, however, the Union has formalised a framework for cooperation through the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), which brings together policies, instruments and missions aimed at crisis management, security cooperation and defence-related coordination.[1][2][3]

At the same time, defence spending and strategic decisions have continued to be taken mainly at the national level, reaffirming the intergovernmental nature of this policy area. Nevertheless, the EU has progressively developed mechanisms that allow it to support and finance defence-related activities indirectly, including through extra-budgetary instruments and industrial programmes, sometimes described as funding defence “through the back door”.[4]

Despite the gradual expansion of the EU’s role, budget and institutional relevance in security and defence, NATO continues to act as the primary provider of collective defence for most EU Member States.[5][6] This continued reliance reflects the legal and constitutional limitations of the EU in the field of defence, including Treaty constraints, unanimity requirements and the preservation of national sovereignty.[7][8][9]

Historical Development

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Before the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, European security and defence cooperation developed slowly and remained largely intergovernmental, with defence spending and military capabilities primarily under national control. Early attempts at supranational defence integration date back to the proposal for a European Defence Community (EDC) in the early 1950s, promoted by France with the aim of establishing a common European army. The project ultimately failed when the French National Assembly refused to ratify the treaty in 1954.[10][11]

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) formally introduced the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), providing a legal framework for cooperation in foreign and security policy while preserving its intergovernmental nature.[12][13] Following the end of the Cold War and the conflicts in the Western Balkans, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) strengthened the CFSP by creating the role of High Representative and incorporating the Petersberg Tasks into EU law.[13][14][15]

A further step came with the Treaty of Lisbon (2009), which introduced the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), established the European External Action Service (EEAS) and added the mutual assistance clause (Article 42.7 TEU).[16][17][18] Despite these developments, defence budgets, procurement and military capabilities continued to be decided at national level.

A gradual shift began after 2016 with the publication of the EU Global Strategy, which called for greater strategic autonomy and a stronger European defence industrial base. This was followed by the introduction of new instruments such as Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Fund (EDF) and, later, the European Peace Facility (EPF).[19][20][21][22]

However, it was only after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 that defence began to shift, albeit modestly, from being a predominantly national responsibility towards greater EU-level policy coordination and spending. This shift was marked by the adoption of the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, approved in March 2022. The war accelerated the development of new industrial and procurement initiatives, including the European Defence Industry Reinforcement through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), the Fund to Accelerate Defense Supply Chain Transformation (FAST), and the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), as well as proposals for a European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) and Security Action for Europe (SAFE).[23][21]

Moreover, defence spending within the European Union has reached unprecedented levels.[24] While defence expenditure traditionally remained under national control, recent years have seen the emergence of new EU-level financial instruments designed to coordinate and complement national efforts. The creation of the European Defence Fund (EDF), the European Peace Facility (EPF), and proposals such as the European Defence Industry Programme (EDIP) reflect a potential slow and gradual erosion of long-standing budgetary taboos surrounding the use of common resources and debt for military purposes.[24][21]

The growing allocation of EU funds to military research, joint procurement and industrial resilience illustrates the willingness of the EU to work on such topics,[24] in spite of the ambiguity in official EU competences.[21]

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The question of the EU’s legitimacy in defence needs to be addressed. It has its roots in a structural tension between the broad articles offered by the Treaties and the limitations imposed from Member States to preserve their sovereignty.

The Treaty of Lisbon established a Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). [18][25][26] Moreover, some relevant Articles were presented to enhance the legal possibilities of the EU:

  • Art. 42(1) TEU: allows the EU to conduct civilian and military crisis-management missions.
  • Art. 42(2) TEU: allows the EU to develop a common defence (LIMIT: need for unanimity).
  • Art. 42(3) TEU: use the European Defence Agency (EDA) to support capability development, defence research, procurement coordination, and armaments cooperation.
  • Art. 42(7) TEU: Mutual assistance clause. It represents the legal basis for military support between Member States in case of armed aggression.
  • Art. 42(6), 46 TEU & Protocol 10: establish Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) → binding commitments for willing states to jointly develop capabilities (26/27).
  • Art. 43 TEU: The EU can launch humanitarian, peace-keeping, military advisory, and stabilisation missions.
  • Art. 173 TFEU: allows the EU to support the defence industry as part of industrial policy.
  • Arts. 182–188 TFEU: allows the EU to fund defence research and innovation under its R&D competences. (e.g., EDF, EDIP).
  • Art. 346 TFEU: Clarifies when states may use national security exemptions; creates legal certainty on the boundaries of EU action.

However, the Treaty also highlights that defence remains the competence of the Member States, de facto limiting the EU role to a coordination and facilitation one.

  • Art 4(2) TEU: “National security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.”
  • Art. 41(2) TEU: Prohibits using the EU budget for military operations. Defence spending must rely on national budgets or extra-budgetary tools.

The complexity of this framework can be explained through a number of structural constraints. A key limitation on EU budgetary intervention in the field of defence is that defence remains a national competence of the Member States, as recognised in Article 4(2) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), and that the EU is prohibited from financing military operations directly through its budget under Article 41(2) TEU.[27][28]

Moreover, the EU cannot command armed forces or impose defence commitments on its Member States, and any harmonisation in the field is pursued through voluntary cooperation programmes such as the European Defence Agency (EDA) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO). These constraints significantly limit the Union’s influence; in particular, the EDA’s role is restricted by its modest budget and by the absence of legal powers to oblige Member States to participate in common projects.[29][30][31]

Furthermore, common defence requires unanimity a political requirement that is extremely hard to meet due to diverging national opinions. This particular limitation helped reinforcing the centrality of NATO as the main security guarantor for most EU Member States, whose collective defence clause and integrated military structures remain the cornerstone of European territorial defence and deeply influence how EU defence competences are interpreted and exercised.[18][25][26]

These provisions produce an ambiguous legal scheme, characterised by expansive potential, restrained by the necessity of unanimity, together with national sovereignty in defence matters, and clear constitutional limits on the use of the EU budget.[21][18][25][26]

Therefore, following the Treaties and the EU competences, the EU can support and partially fund defence capabilities, but it cannot command armed forces, finance military operations through the EU budget, or impose defence obligations on its Member States without their consent.[21][18][32][25][26]

Instruments

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Because of the legal constraints in the Treaties, especially Article 41(2) TEU, the EU cannot use its normal budget to finance military activities directly. Therefore, a coherence and willingness to collaborate is needed among the EU27, while acknowledging national sovereignty on this topic and limited EU competence.[33] This limitation has pushed the EU to develop other ways to finance defence and security, combining instruments that are outside the EU budget with tools that fit under civilian or industrial competences.[21]

Defence spending could not be charged to the EU budget under Article 41(2) TEU; developing a GNI-based financing mechanism allowed Member States to support armaments cooperation through a parallel structure.[21] Off-budget instruments, which are financed directly by the Member States and do not fall under the EU’s financial rules, were therefore developed. The first example was the ATHENA mechanism (2004–2021), which covered the common costs of EU military operations (See Council Decision 2004/197/CFSP of 23 February 2004). It was replaced by the European Peace Facility (EPF) in 2021, an off-budget fund financing military assistance, including the supply of weapons and ammunition to partner countries.[21]

An example of hybrid financing is the European Defence Agency (EDA). The EDA is mainly financed through Member State contributions (off-budgetary measures), but its financial rules also allow it to receive limited support from the EU budget for specific defence research and technology projects.[21]

To support defence while respecting the Treaties, the EU also started using its industrial and research competences. The first step was the Preparatory Action on Defence Research (PADR) in 2017, the first time EU budget money was used for defence research. This was followed by the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP) and by the European Defence Fund (EDF) under the 2021–2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. All these programmes focus on research and innovation, therefore, are allowed under EU budget.[21]

A similar solution lies under the civilian–military dual use. Taking the example of the TEN-T, the EU has used the civilian Trans-European Networks for Transport (TEN-T) to fund “dual-use” military mobility infrastructure, reinforcing logistics networks for troop movement under a civilian transport legal basis.[21] The dual-use is used to justify funding through civilian programmes.[33] For example, under the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF), the EU supports “military mobility” projects by upgrading civilian transport networks that can also be used for military purposes. [33]


Overall, because the Treaties limit direct EU-level defence spending, the Union has developed a set of alternative financing methods: combining off-budget instruments, EU-budget programmes for research, and industry and dual-use infrastructure, showing the EU ability to adapt its financial tools to support defence while staying inside legal boundaries.

Member States Spending and NATO's role

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Member States Spendings

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The new strategic orientation of the European Union in the fields of defence and security has been preceded and strongly stimulated by a significant and unprecedented increase in national defence budgets. After several decades characterised by limited investment and long-term budgetary restraint, EU Member States have substantially increased their military expenditure. Between 2021 and 2024, overall defence spending in the European Union rose by more than 31%.[34]

This upward trend shows little indication of slowing. For 2025, defence spending within the EU is expected to reach approximately €381 billion, with around €130 billion allocated to investment expenditure.[35]

At the same time, most European countries are attempting to meet NATO defence spending requirements. Several EU Member States already allocate a significant share of their gross domestic product (GDP) to defence, including Poland (4.12%), Estonia (3.43%), Latvia (3.15%) and Greece (3.08%).[36] However, it remains the case that approximately one third of EU Member States do not yet meet the 2% GDP benchmark set within NATO.[37]

NATO's Targets

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These increases did not emerge in isolation. Beyond the broader geopolitical context, European countries have faced sustained pressure from NATO to increase their defence spending.

In 2006, NATO members committed to spending at least 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defence.[38] Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO heads of state and government agreed that those Allies already meeting the 2% benchmark should continue to do so, while those below the threshold should reach it by 2024.[38]

The war in Ukraine further confirmed Europe’s dependence on NATO, and, by extension, on the United States, for collective defence.[39][40][41] Although NATO did not play a direct combat role in the conflict, its restrained posture contributed to reinforcing its central position within the European security architecture.[39]

This evolving context shaped debates at successive NATO summits. At the Madrid Summit in 2022, some Allies already considered the 2% GDP benchmark insufficient.[42] The 2% commitment was subsequently reiterated at the Vilnius Summit in 2023.[38]

The debate intensified further in the following years. At the NATO Summit held in The Hague in 2025, Member States committed to a historic increase in defence spending, endorsing a long-term target of 5% of GDP by 2035.[42]

As a result, burden-sharing has become a recurring theme in transatlantic discussions. Several United States officials have repeatedly underlined that higher European defence spending constitutes a “non-negotiable” objective.[43]

Furthermore, according to Pentagon officials, the United States has expressed the expectation that European Allies should assume responsibility for most of NATO’s conventional defence capabilities, including intelligence, logistics and missile systems, by 2027.[44] The same sources indicated that Washington remained dissatisfied with the pace of European capability development and warned that failure to meet this deadline could result in a reduced US role in certain NATO defence coordination mechanisms.[44]

Faced with sustained pressure from the United States and concerns over a potential American disengagement from NATO,[36] European leaders have increasingly aligned themselves with these spending targets and strategic objectives.[43]

5% Tartget Implications

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The 5% of GDP target requested by NATO implies, in concrete terms, that Member States commit to spending 3.5% of GDP on military capabilities in the strict sense, based on the Alliance’s common definition of defence expenditure, and to reaching this objective by 2035.[45][38]

The remaining 1.5% of GDP would correspond to broader categories of expenditure, including infrastructure, cybersecurity, network protection, civil preparedness and resilience, as well as other items considered to be indirectly related to defence.[42]

This distinction has encouraged some Member States to engage in what has been described as an emerging practice of “defence washing”, whereby the scope of defence-related expenditure is broadened in order to include major civil or infrastructure projects, or even climate-related spending, within defence budgets.[46][47]

A frequently cited example of this trend concerns Italy’s proposal to classify the planned €13.5 billion bridge over the Strait of Messina as strategic defence infrastructure, on the grounds that it could facilitate NATO military mobility, despite the fact that the area is not included in the Alliance’s officially designated mobility corridors.[46]

Reaching a defence spending level of 5% of GDP would represent a major fiscal and political shift for European countries. As noted, approximately one third of NATO members do not currently meet the existing 2% GDP benchmark.[37] Increasing defence spending from 2% to 3.5% of GDP by 2035 alone would require an additional €254 billion per year across European states.[45] Moving to a full 5% target would imply annual defence expenditure in Europe exceeding €850 billion, approximately two and a half times current spending levels.[43]

Such substantial increases in defence expenditure have raised concerns regarding their potential impact on welfare systems and social spending.[42] An effort of this magnitude would require difficult political trade-offs, particularly at a time when climate change is accelerating,[48] contributing to both insecurity and inequality,[43] while Europe is also facing demographic ageing and structural challenges related to competitiveness and innovation.[43]

Ways to Increase Defence Spending for Member States

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Limited National Budgetary Spending

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The ambition to substantially increase defence spending in European countries, to levels of 3.5% or even 5% of the GDP, is constrained by very limited national budgetary margins. The public finances of European Union Member States are already weakened by significant fiscal imbalances.[49]

In 2024, the average budget deficit in the European Union reached 3.1% of GDP, approaching the 3% reference value set under the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).[50][51] Eleven Member States, including France, Poland and Hungary, recorded deficits above the 3% threshold.[50]

Against this backdrop of constrained public finances, absorbing an increase in military expenditure to 5% of GDP would represent a major fiscal challenge.[52] National budgetary margins are widely considered insufficient to finance such an effort on their own.[53]

Historical precedents suggest a recurring pattern in the financing of major military build-ups, namely a reliance on public debt. Periods characterised by rapid and substantial increases in defence expenditure have almost systematically involved large-scale debt issuance as the primary mechanism for mobilising resources.[54] In such contexts, national fiscal rules that are normally regarded as restrictive have often been suspended or relaxed during periods of major crisis or perceived existential threat.[54]

As a result, if European states are to meet their defence spending targets, a significant share of the financing is likely to rely on increased borrowing. This may take several forms. At the European Union level, common borrowing instruments have already been introduced, such as the Security Action for Europe (SAFE) mechanism, adopted in May 2025.[55] SAFE provides for a lending capacity of €150 billion to support the joint procurement of military equipment by Member States.[56]

Additional funding may come from national budgets, although Member States’ room for manoeuvre remains limited due to high deficit levels and the constraints imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact.[57] In this context, the national escape clause provided for under the Stability and Growth Pact was activated in 2025,[58] allowing Member States to increase defence investment without these expenditures being fully taken into account in the calculation of their public deficits.[59]

Relaxation of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP)

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The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which establishes the European Union’s budgetary rules, particularly with regard to public deficits, has recently been relaxed in order to facilitate an increase in national defence spending, which had been constrained by the budgetary situation of several Member States.[57]

The general deterioration of Member States’ public finances,[60] combined with the need for substantial investment in defence, led the Council of the European Union to activate the national escape clause on 8 July 2025 for fifteen Member States: Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia and Slovenia.[59]

Announcing the decision, the Danish Minister for Economic Affairs, Stephanie Lose, stated that “at this critical juncture, investment in our defence capabilities must remain our top priority. Today’s activation of the national escape clause will allow Member States to increase defence spending while maintaining sustainable public finances.”[59]

The activation of the national escape clause allows participating Member States a maximum budgetary flexibility of up to 1.5% of their GDP for a period of four years.[58] Under this arrangement, the European Commission and the Council may decide not to initiate an excessive deficit procedure against Member States that have activated the clause, even if they exceed their established expenditure paths, provided that the excess results from increased defence spending.[59]

Spend More, Spend Better, Spend European

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The magnitude of these national efforts, together with the recognition that further action is required, has created a structural opportunity for the European Union to act as a catalyst for coordination and efficiency.[61] In this context, the notion of “spend more, spend better, and spend European” has gained prominence, encapsulating the ambition to enhance collective capability development, reduce the fragmentation of demand, and foster industrial cooperation at the Union level.[62][61][63]

Instruments such as joint procurement schemes, cross-border research programmes and coordinated capability planning are increasingly presented as mechanisms to ensure that rising national defence budgets translate into strengthened European strategic autonomy.[64][63][61]

Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)

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Within this broader evolution, the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021–2027 constitutes a significant milestone. For the first time, the EU budget integrates defence and security expenditures on a scale that reflects both the geopolitical context and the political will to deepen cooperation in these domains.

The European Union’s investment in security and defence has increased substantially across successive MFFs, particularly after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which highlighted the importance of investing in defence and military capabilities.[65] Under the 2014–2020 MFF, EU defence-related expenditure remained limited, with no dedicated budget heading for security and defence.[66] Funding during this period was mainly channelled through preparatory actions, selected industrial cooperation instruments, and external crisis-management missions.[66][65]

In the 2021–2027 MFF, Heading 5, “Security and Defence”, appeared for the first time, consolidating security- and defence-related programmes into a single envelope of €13.18 billion, corresponding to approximately 1.2% of the total MFF in 2018 prices.[65] This envelope included €7 billion for the European Defence Fund (EDF), €1.7 billion for the Internal Security Fund, and €1.5 billion for the Military Mobility programme, marking an important recognition of defence as an autonomous EU budgetary priority.[65] The 2021–2027 package thus represented the first explicit elevation of defence within the EU’s long-term budgetary planning and financial architecture.

In July 2024, as part of the European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS), the European Commission proposed a more ambitious framework for the 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework.[67][68] The proposal calls for a five-fold increase in EU-level defence industrial funding, rising from approximately €6–7 billion in the 2021–2027 period to around €32 billion across different programmes in the next MFF.[67][68]

Moreover, when broader security-related instruments, such as military mobility, the European Peace Facility and crisis-response tools, are taken into account, the total allocation under the “Security and Defence” heading would reach approximately €130.7 billion for the 2028–2034 period, representing an almost tenfold increase compared to the previous MFF.[67][68]

In parallel with the increase in national defence expenditure, the EU budgetary architecture has undergone a gradual transformation. Earlier initiatives, such as the EDF, primarily functioned through direct subsidies supporting research, development and industrial innovation. More recent instruments, however, indicate a shift towards mechanisms enabling joint procurement and acquisition on behalf of Member States. The emergence of new financial tools dedicated to interoperability, capability convergence and common purchasing illustrates an evolution in the nature of EU action: support is no longer limited to the defence industrial base, but extends to the very process of military acquisition, which may now be coordinated, pooled or partially financed at the European level.

This evolution signals not only a quantitative expansion of defence-related spending, but also a qualitative redefinition of the Union’s role. The 2028–2034 Multiannual Financial Framework remains under negotiation, and significant changes may still occur before its formal adoption; past experience suggests that the final envelope will likely be smaller than the initial proposal.[69] Nonetheless, defence has clearly emerged as a major budgetary priority at EU level. This development reflects a growing political determination to reinforce the Union’s security posture, while simultaneously raising questions concerning the legal boundaries of EU competences and the financial mechanisms available for defence cooperation.

Evolution of EIB's Approach

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Since the mid-2020s, the European Investment Bank (EIB) has undergone a significant change in its lending policy in the field of security and defence.[70][71]

Created in 1957 by the Treaty of Rome and owned by Member States according to their economic weight, the EIB is often described as the main “financial arm of the European Union”.[72]

Although the Bank long refrained from financing military projects because of its internal rules on excluded activities and the constraints associated with bond market financing, it has gradually revised its approach in response to evolving security needs and political priorities.[71]

Widening the Scope of Eligibility for Funding

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Since 2018, the EIB has deployed approximately €5.5 billion for security and defence projects, primarily focused on dual-use activities.[71] In 2022, it launched the European Strategic Security Initiative, initially endowed with €6 billion and increased to €8 billion in 2023.[70]

This momentum was further reinforced in 2025 with the creation of an Office for Security and Defence and the adoption of a revised lending policy, which broadened eligibility for financing across European security and defence industries and infrastructure.[70][73] Under the revised framework, excluded activities were narrowed to those strictly related to the production of arms and ammunition, while military but non-lethal equipment, infrastructure and enabling technologies became eligible for EIB financing.[74]

Under this new policy framework, the EIB may support large-scale projects such as land border protection, military mobility, critical infrastructure, de-mining and de-contamination, space and cybersecurity programmes, anti-jamming technologies, military equipment and facilities, drones, bio-hazard protection, seabed infrastructure protection, critical raw materials and research activities.[74] Equipment with limited or no plausible civilian use, including helicopters, radars and military installations, also became eligible for financing.[74]

Increase in Financial Power

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The European Investment Bank (EIB) Group plans to allocate around 3.5% of its annual budget, approximately €3.5 billion in 2025, to financing security and defence projects.[73] Its 2026–2028 operational plan further increases this amount to around €4.5 billion per year.[75] In addition, through the European Investment Fund (EIF), the Bank is establishing an equity mechanism for the defence sector, with €175 million to be invested between 2024 and 2027, with the objective of mobilising around €500 million in private capital for funds dedicated to dual-use technologies.[73]

Beyond its direct financial contribution, the EIB’s evolving role is also intended to send a signal to European financial markets. According to several European officials, the inclusion of security and defence among the Bank’s public policy objectives, alongside cohesion and sustainable development, has contributed to repositioning the sector as a legitimate public good.[74] This normalisation is expected to reduce concerns related to reputational risk and to encourage greater participation by private financial institutions.[76]

In 2024–2025, for example, the EIB tripled its intermediated financing to support small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the defence supply chain, increasing the volume from €1 billion to €3 billion.[77] An initial agreement was signed with Deutsche Bank, providing for €500 million in EIB loans and enabling the mobilisation of up to €1 billion for SMEs active in the defence sector and for military and police infrastructure.[77] Such partnerships illustrate the EIB’s strategy of using guarantees and lending instruments to leverage private capital in a sector that has long been affected by structural financing constraints.[76]

Criticism

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Scholars and policy analysts have raised several criticisms regarding the European Union’s role in security and defence, particularly in relation to its legal framework, funding structure and strategic autonomy.

  • The EU’s action in security and defence remains constrained by its fragmented legal and funding framework.[21] Defence spending continues to rely primarily on national budgets, complemented by a complex mix of EU research programmes, industrial instruments[21] and civilian–military dual-use funding.[33]
  • The Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 exposed the EU’s limited readiness and accelerated the development of new initiatives.[24][21] These measures marked a step forward; however, they remain part of the fragmented funding and implementation EU system.
  • The war in Ukraine further highlighted the EU’s continued dependence on NATO for collective defence.[39]
  • NATO defence spending requirements of 5% of GDP have generated additional pressure on EU Member States.[78][36]
  • Europe operates a more deeply fragmented weapons system than the United States (178 vs 30),[79] limiting interoperability, increasing maintenance costs and reducing economies of scale.[80]
  • Europe also faces significant dependencies on external suppliers for raw materials, components and technologies, including reliance on U.S. systems subject to ITAR regulations and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) arrangements.[80]

Taken together, these challenges have strengthened calls for deeper internal cooperation, harmonisation and coordination at the EU level. This aims to reduce external dependencies and improve the effectiveness of European security and defence efforts. Harmonisation, cooperation and cohesion should work on the legal, funding and industrial side, to equip the EU with stronger defence policies and overall strategies, which would allow the EU to reduce external dependencies and internal fragmentation.

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