This was a big week to get more afraid about nuclear weapons.
Russian President Vladimir Putin announced the testing of a new nuclear-capable missile.
President Donald Trump responded by calling for the US to resume the testing of nuclear weapons.
Neither country has tested nuclear weapons since the ‘90s, and Russia was quick to clarify that Putin did not announce new nuclear testing. During a trip to Asia, Trump did not meet with North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un, who has rejected demands that his country denuclearize.
North Korea is one potential villain in a fictional movie about nuclear war on Netflix, Kathryn Bigelow’s “A House of Dynamite.” It is a “Rashomon”-style thriller about the concept of mutually assured destruction that the filmmakers mean to be a wakeup call for nuclear powers.
The Pentagon felt the need to draw up a memo responding to the film’s depiction of US missile defense systems as inherently flawed – like “trying to hit a bullet with a bullet” is the line repeated throughout the movie.
The film’s writer, Noah Oppenheim, told CNN’s Jake Tapper that he welcomes the criticism, since the movie’s intention was “to invite a conversation about an issue which we think is tremendously important and doesn’t get enough attention, which is the fact that we have all these nuclear weapons that exist in the world and that pose a great threat to all mankind.”
There’s more talk of nuclear weapons to come. A treaty between the US and Russia to limit the size of nuclear arsenals expires in February and there’s currently no movement to extend it.
The Trump administration’s strikes against Iran’s nuclear facilities set back its nuclear capabilities, but likely did not completely destroy them.
There’s new tension this week between India and Pakistan, both nuclear powers.
I went back to Matthew Fuhrmann, a professor at Texas A&M University who has written extensively about nuclear weapons and disarmament, including in the books “Influence Without Arms: The New Logic of Nuclear Deterrence” and “Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy” with Todd S. Sechser. We last talked around the time of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, when nuclear threats were also in the news.
Our conversation about the developments this week, conducted by email and edited for length and style, is below:
What do Putin and Trump mean by ‘nuclear test’?
WOLF: Both Trump and Putin referred to nuclear tests this week, but neither the US nor Russia is supposed to have tested nuclear weapons since the ‘90s. What did you make of Russia’s test and the US response? Is this the kind of coercive diplomacy you’ve written about or something else?
FUHRMANN: It’s firstly important to clarify what we mean by a “nuclear test.” Russia has tested missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. But, in the traditional sense, a nuclear test is a denotation of a nuclear explosive device. Think of the July 1945 Trinity test in the New Mexico desert that you may have seen depicted in the 2023 film “Oppenheimer” (although after the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963, most nuclear explosive tests were done underground rather than in the atmosphere). This is not what Russia has done, and I don’t believe this is what the US is threatening to resume, either.
There are two main reasons why countries test military technologies. The first is to see whether a weapon works as designed. The second is to send a political message to other countries. I think there’s a certain amount of signaling attached to Russia’s recent missile tests. Although it’s difficult to decipher Moscow’s intentions, in testing these technologies, the Kremlin may be implicitly saying to the United States and NATO: Back off in Ukraine — look what we might do if you continue to interfere.
More worried about a nuclear crisis today than four years ago
WOLF: Do you generally think the threat of a nuclear standoff has increased in recent years?
FUHRMANN: I’m more worried about the possibility of a serious nuclear crisis today than I was at the end of 2021. This is in large part because of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the possibility that Moscow may continue to brandish its nuclear arsenal to help it prevail in that war. But it’s not just that. The possibility of a US-China nuclear standoff over Taiwan is not trivial, especially if one side misinterprets the other’s resolve to fight. North Korea’s nuclear capabilities are expanding too, and there is the potential for disaster on the Korean Peninsula arising from an accident or miscalculation. Not to mention the perennial possibility of a nuclear-tinged crisis between India and Pakistan. This doesn’t mean that the probability of a standoff is high. Actually, I still think it’s relatively low. But given the stakes involved, even a small increase in the risk — say, 2% — is cause for concern.
Do US missile defenses work?
WOLF: Coincidentally, there’s a movie on Netflix about the 30 minutes it would take for an intercontinental ballistic missile to reach the US and the difficulty of intercepting such a missile. The Pentagon felt the need to produce a memo responding to the film. Are missile defense systems any better than the coin toss suggested by the movie?
FUHRMANN: I haven’t seen the movie yet. I’ll leave that question to technical experts who understand the intricacies of missile defense systems better than I do. I will say that, from a strategic standpoint, there’s value in convincing your adversaries that your missile defense systems are impenetrable. This can strengthen deterrence: If adversaries believe their missiles won’t get through, they may be less likely to fire them.
Would Trump’s Golden Dome solve the nuclear threat?
WOLF: Trump (taking cues from Project 2025) has called for a new “Golden Dome” missile defense shield. Is it worth the cost and would that do anything to solve the nuclear threat?
FUHRMANN: That’s a complicated question. On the surface, missile defense sounds great – and in some ways it is. Consider, for example, the relatively high rate at which Israel successfully shot down missiles fired by Iran in their war over the summer. However, in the long run, developing these systems can encourage your adversaries to develop technologies that circumvent your defenses, or to develop missile defenses of their own. In the end, you may get a costly arms race that leaves both sides worse off. The United States and the Soviet Union recognized this during the Cold War, which is one reason they agreed to the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty.
Will the expiring Obama-era nuclear treaty be renegotiated?
WOLF: The US and Russia have a nuclear arms treaty that expires in February. New START, negotiated during the Obama administration, limits the size of the countries’ nuclear stockpiles. Will it be renegotiated?
FUHRMANN: The prospects currently look bleak. As long as there is tension over the war in Ukraine, it’s hard to imagine Russia agreeing to a new arms control deal with the United States. If that tension is alleviated, the prospects for a deal would improve.
What about China?
WOLF: Should China or other countries be a part of that process?
FUHRMANN: Many US policymakers would like to include China as part of an arms control deal with Russia. The problem is that China’s nuclear capabilities currently lag behind Russia and the United States. Countries usually don’t like to negotiate from a position of weakness. As China’s nuclear arsenal expands — a trend that is happening — a trilateral deal becomes more likely, especially if Beijing achieves parity with the other two countries.
Bring back the test ban treaty?
WOLF: Bill Clinton helped negotiate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the 1990s but failed to get the US Senate to ratify it. Trump isn’t talking about reviving it, but if he could get the handful of nuclear powers that have likewise not ratified the test ban treaty — including China, Russia, North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel — to ratify it, would he be a shoo-in for the Nobel Peace Prize?
FUHRMANN: The US Senate vote on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1999 was a setback for global nonproliferation. There are obstacles to bringing the CTBT into force in the current political environment. If the Trump administration was able to get this done, it would be a major foreign policy achievement.