Papers by Jessica Woolley
BRAD WRAY Kuhn's Evolutionary Social Epistemology
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 2012
Brad Wray revisits Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in light of Kuhn’s later essays... more Brad Wray revisits Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions in light of Kuhn’s later essays to offer a novel reading of Kuhn’s account as a ‘evolutionary social epistemology’ and, in so doing, provides a useful overview of the interpretive debates surrounding Kuhn’s work, defends Kuhn successfully against critics, and suggests interesting future directions for sociology and philosophy of science. Wray starts by summarizing three common criticisms of Kuhn’s account in Structure: (i) the various scientific changes that Kuhn regards as ‘revolutionary’ are not aptly grouped into one class; (ii) these changes are not different in kind from ‘normal science’; and (iii) the bivalent distinction between ‘normal’ and ‘revolutionary’ is inadequate for understanding the variety of changes occurring in science. Proponents of the first criticism include McMullin ([1993]) and Bird ([2000]], who argue that not all of the changes Kuhn identifies as ‘revolutionary’ affected scientists and scientific practice to the same degree, and Andersen et al. ([2006]) who argue that some scientific changes are ‘local’ and that there are grades of ‘revolution’ and of ‘incommensurability’ accompanying scientific change. Proponents of the second and third include McMullin ([1993]), Popper ([1970/72]), Toulmin ([1970/72]), Bird ([2000]), and Mayr ([2004]), who either deny that there are any changes in science which are properly termed ‘revolutionary’ (Toulmin) or argue that ‘normal science’ and ‘revolutionary science’ lie on a continuum (McMullin, Popper, Bird, Mayr). Brit. J. Phil. Sci. 64 (2013), 659–664
Wittgenstein in Exile by James C. Klagge (review)
Journal of the History of Philosophy, 2013
Wittgenstein against ‘Positivist' Approaches to International Relations: Replacing the Anti‐Representationalist Objection
Over the past few decades, a number of prominent scholars have attempted to apply Wittgenstein’s ... more Over the past few decades, a number of prominent scholars have attempted to apply Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the study of International Relations (IR). These applications have taken diverse forms and directions; nevertheless, many involve using Wittgenstein’s philosophy to criticise certain purportedly ‘scientific’ approaches to studying IR that have conventionally been labelled as ‘positivist’ within the discipline. One popular line of objection that is pursued in this context argues that ‘positivist’ approaches to IR are committed to a problematic representational view of language – called the ‘mirror’ or ‘picture’ view – which Wittgenstein decisively criticised in his later work. While many IR scholars and interpreters of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy would be sympathetic to the overall aim and direction of this line of argument, I contend that there are some problems with it which have the result that it does not support the conclusions that it is meant to. I therefore use t...
Some interpretive notes on Merleau-Ponty's discussion of language in 'The Phenomenology of Percep... more Some interpretive notes on Merleau-Ponty's discussion of language in 'The Phenomenology of Perception' which may be useful to someone. Please credit if used.
Journal of the History of Philosophy, Jul 2013
Wittgenstein, Therapy and Changing your Philosophical Attitudes
British Journal of Undergraduate Philosophy, Jan 1, 2006
Thesis Chapters by Jessica Woolley
Over the past few decades, a number of prominent scholars have attempted to apply Wittgenstein’s ... more Over the past few decades, a number of prominent scholars have attempted to apply Wittgenstein’s philosophy to the study of International Relations (IR). These applications have taken diverse forms and directions; nevertheless, many involve using Wittgenstein’s philosophy to criticise certain purportedly ‘scientific’ approaches to studying IR that have conventionally been labelled as ‘positivist’ within the discipline. One popular line of objection that is pursued in this context argues that ‘positivist’ approaches to IR are committed to a problematic representational view of language – called the ‘mirror’ or ‘picture’ view – which Wittgenstein decisively criticised in his later work. While many IR scholars and interpreters of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy would be sympathetic to the overall aim and direction of this line of argument, I contend that there are some problems with it which have the result that it does not support the conclusions that it is meant to. I therefore use the identification of these problems as the starting point for developing an alternative application of the relevant aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy to IR, which can replace the anti-representationalist objection and provide a more sophisticated way to criticise ‘positivist’ IR scholars that overcomes the problems identified.
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Papers by Jessica Woolley
Thesis Chapters by Jessica Woolley