If the worries in this post work, then the argument in this one needs improvement.
Suppose there are two groups of people, the As and the Bs, all of whom have headaches. You can relieve the headaches of the As or of the Bs, but not both. You don’t know how many As or Bs there are, or even whether the numbers are finite or finite. But you do know there are more As than Bs.
Obviously:
- You should relieve the As’ headaches rather than the Bs’, because there are more As than Bs.
But what does it mean to say that there are more As than Bs? Our best analysis (simplifying and assuming the Axiom of Choice) is something like this:
- There is no one-to-one function from the As to the Bs.
So, it seems:
- You should relieve the As’ headache rather than the Bs’, because there is no one-to-one function from the As to the Bs.
For you should be able to replace an explanation by its analysis.
But that’s strange. Why should the non-existence of a one-to-one function from one set or plurality to another set or plurality explain the existence of a moral duty to make a particular preferential judgment between them?
If the number of As and Bs is finite, I think we can do better. We can then express the claim that there are more As than Bs by an infinite disjunction of claims of the form:
- There exist n As and there do not exist n Bs,
which claims can be written as simple existentially quantified claims, without any mention of functions, sets or pluralities.
Any such claim as (4) does seem to have some intuitive moral force, and so maybe their disjunction does.
But in the infinite case, we can’t find a disjunction of existentially quantified claims that analysis the claim that there are more As than Bs.
Maybe what we should say is that “there are more As than Bs” is primitive, and the claim about there not being a one-to-one function is just a useful mathematical equivalence to it, rather than an analysis?
The thoughts here are also related to this post.