TRISHUL

What Is Going On???

2023-12-07T04:06:00.011+05:30

In a significant move aimed at reducing tensions, the Indian Army (IA) and Pakistan Army (PA) on February 25, 2021 announced that they would cease firing across the Line of Control (LoC) while recommitting themselves to a 2003 ceasefire agreement. According to India’s Union Ministry of Home Affairs, there were 2,140 ceasefire violations (CFV) by Pakistan in 2018, 3,479 in 2019, and 5,133 in 2020. In 2021, there were only 664 incidents as of June 30. Of those 664 violations, almost all occurred prior to February 25. In contrast, only six violations were reported from February 25 to June 30, 2021.

July 17, 2019: Hafiz Saeed, chief of the banned Jamaat-ud-Dawah (JuD), gets arrested on July 17, 2019 in terror-financing cases. The Saeed-led JuD is the front organisation for the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), which was responsible for carrying out the 2008 Mumbai attack that killed 166 people, including six US citizens. The US Department of the Treasury has designated Saeed as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist. He was listed under UN Security Council Resolution 1267 on December 10, 2008.

February 2020: Hafiz Saeed is sentenced to 11 years in jail by an anti-terrorism court in two terror-financing cases.

December 24, 2020: Hafiz Saeed is sentenced to 15-and-a-half years in jail by an anti-terrorism court in Lahore for another terror-financing case.

Just six days after his re-arrest on January 2, 2021, Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi was sentenced to three concurrent five-year sentences on terror financing charges on January 8, 2021. The speed with which the wheels of justice turned in Pakistan in the case of Lahkhvi’s terror-financing case are in sharp contrast to the years he remained charged in the 26/11 Mumbai attack case, in which he was eventually bailed out. Lakhvi had been listed as a global terrorist by the UN on December 10, 2008. Also designated as global terrorists were Haji Muhammad Ashraf, its chief of finance; and India-born Mahmoud Mohammad Ahmed Bahaziq, described as a financier for the group who served as its chief in Saudi Arabia. He was first arrested in Muzaffarabad on December 7, 2008 and jailed in 2009. Six years later he hit the headlines again when an anti-terrorism court in Pakistan trying him for the Mumbai killings ordered his release on bail. In April 2015 he walked free from prison.

February 2, 2021: At a hearing in the capital Islamabad, the court ordered that British citizen Ahmed Omar Saeed Sheikh be moved from death row to a government-run “rest house”, where he is to be kept under a form of house arrest. Sheikh, along with three others, was accused of kidnapping Daniel Pearl, who was reporting a story for the AWSJ newspaper on armed religious extremist groups in the southern Pakistani city of Karachi in January 2002, months after the 9/11 attacks and the US-led invasion of Pakistan’s northwestern neighbour, Afghanistan. Sheikh, who was arrested in 2002 and convicted later that year, had already served his seven-year sentence on the kidnapping charge. Sheikh was indicted in the US in 2002 for hostage-taking and conspiracy to commit hostage-taking, which resulted in the murder of Pearl, as well as for the 1994 kidnapping of another US citizen in India. Following his acquittal, the US Justice Department said that it was ready to take custody of Sheikh and try him. But he remains inside Pakistan till this day.

June 23, 2021: An IED explodes outside Hafiz Saeed’s Lahore residence. In retaliation, the LeT conducts two drone-strikes on the high-security technical area of the Indian Air Force (IAF) Station Jammu on the intervening night of June 26-27, 2021.

April 8, 2022: Hafiz Saeed is given a 21-year jail sentence to be served at the Kot Lakhpat Jail, Lahore for his conviction in four terror-financing cases.

January 13, 2022: The Anti-Terrorism Court (ATC) Lahore awards the death sentence to Eid Gul of the banned Tahreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Peter Paul David, Sajjad Shah and Ziaullah on nine counts. Another suspect Ayesha Bibi was handed down five years imprisonment. Eid Gul had installed explosives in the car used in the blast near Hfiz Saeed’s Lahore residence. The car belonged to Peter Paul David and other three--Sajjad Shah, Ziaullah and Ayesha--were facilitators.

May 2022: 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks planner Sajid Mir is sentenced by a Pakistani anti-terrorism court in Lahore on terror-financing charges in a speedy 20-minute trial completed just three weeks after he was arrested, three days before a US-Pakistan ministerial meeting and a month before the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Plenary session that gave Pakistan a reprieve by removing it from the FATF’s grey-listing. Mir was sentenced to eight years in prison on charges of terror-financing and a fine of Rs.4.2 lakh was also been imposed on him. In September 2022, Beijing had put a hold on a proposal moved at the UN by the US and co-supported by India to designate Sajid Mir as a global terrorist.

March 1, 2022: Mistry Zahoor Ibrahim (alias Zahid Akhund) of Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM), considered the deadliest of the five hijackers of Kathmandu to Delhi Flight IC-814 (1999), is killed in Karachi.

February 20, 2023: Bashir Ahmed Peer (alias Imtiaz Alam), a Hizbul Mujahideen commander, is shot dead by unidentified gunmen in Pakistan’s capital Islamabad.

February 26, 2023: Syed Khalid Raza of al-Badr Mujahideen is killed in Karachi.

March 4, 2023: Syed Noor Shalobar of ISIS-Khorasan is assassinated on by unknown gunmen in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa area of Pakistan. Shalobar was responsible for recruitment and spreading terror in the Kashmir Valley.

May 6, 2023: Paramjit Singh Panjwar, Pakistan-based chief of Khalistan Commando Force’s (KCF), accompanied by two armed guards, Panjwar was taking a walk in the early hours in a park inside Sun Flower Housing Society in Lahore’s Johar Town when the two assailants struck. One of them shot him in the head, fled towards the complex’s entrance gate, and then drove off on a motorcycle along with his accomplice.

July 15, 2023: Mullah Sardar Hussain Arain, a leading figure of Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD), the frontal organisation of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), came under an attack allegedly by the Sindhudesh Revolutionary Army (SRA) in Qazi Ahmed town of Shaheed Benazirabad District (formerly known as Nawabshah District) in Sindh. He died on August 5.

September 8, 2023: Riaz Ahmad (alias Abu Qasim), among the masterminds of the Dhangri terror attack, was shot at point-blank range and killed in a mosque in PoJK’s Rawalkot district.

September 13, 2023: Maulana Zia ur Rehman of LeT is killed at a park in in Karachi’s Gulistan-e-Jauhar neighbourhood.

September 19, 2023: Laal Mohammad alias Mohammad Darji, reportedly an ISI agent and supplier of fake notes, is killed in Kathmandu. He reportedly used to get fake Indian currency notes from Pakistan and Bangladesh and bring them into India. Mohammad was also involved in providing logistical support for the ISI, and facilitated asylum for other agents.

September 29, 2023: 30-year-old Mufti Qaiser Farooq, a former member of LeT and a close associate of Hafiz Saeed, is killed near a religious institution in Karachi’s Samanabad area. Farooq suffered bullet wounds in the back and was shifted to a hospital where he died during treatment. A 10-year-old boy was also wounded in the attack.

October 11, 2023: Shahid Latif, a former JeM operative and allegedly the mastermind of the 2016 Pathankot Air Force Station attack, is shot dead by three unknown men riding a motorcycle in Sialkot’s Pasrur area. An associate of Latif is also killed and another associate injured in that attack.A resident of Gujranwala in Pakistan, Latif had built an extensive network while he was in prison in Jammu from 1994 to 2010, and that helped him run his network and operations across the border. He was known as a “master infiltrator”.

October 20, 2023: Dawood Malik is shot dead by unknown assailants in Mir Ali Pakistan's North Waziristan. The attack occurred at a private clinic. Malik was the founder of Lashkar-e-Jabbar and a close aide of one of India's most wanted terrorists, Masood Azhar.

On November 5, 2023 Khwaja Shahid, also known as Mian Mujahid, is purportedly kidnapped and later discovered beheaded near the Line of Control in PoJK. Shahid was a prominent LeT figure and one of the masterminds of the 2018 terrorist attack on an Indian Army Cantonment in Sunjuwan that had claimed seven lives.

November 9, 2023: Former LeT terrorist Akram Khan, alias Akram Ghazi, head of LeT’s recruitment cell, is shot dead in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Bajaur tribal district.

November 10, 2023: LeT cadre Mohammed Muzamil and his associate Naeemur Rahman were shot dead by unknown gunmen in Pakistan's Punjab province's Chowk Khokhran in Sialkot district. Police in Pakistan’s Punjab province has branded the incident as an aftermath of a fake land dispute case.

November 12, 2023: Maulana Raheem Ullah Tariq, a JeM leader and close associate of Maulana Masood Azhar, is shot dead by unknown men in Karachi.

December 3, 2023: LeT terrorist Hanzla Adnan, the mastermind of the deadly attack on a BSF convoy in Udhampur on August 5, 2015 and the attack on a CRPF camp at Pampore on June 25, 2016, gets shot by unknown gunmen outside his house in Karachi’s Nizamabad area. He succumbed to his injuries on December 5. Recently, Hanzla Adnan had shifted his operations base from Rawalpindi to Karachi and was a member of the Milli Muslim League, a front of the LeT.

From the above listings of select prosecutions and targetted killings, it becomes evident that both India and the US have adopted the FATF route to compel Pakistan to come down heavily upon the LeT/JuD, with limited success being achieved thus far. But much more needs to be done. For instance, China on October 19, 2022 put a hold on a proposal by India and the US at the UN to blacklist Pakistan-based Hafiz Talah Saeed, the son of Hafiz Saeed, in the second such move within two days to designate Pakistan-based terrorists as global terrorists under the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee of the UNSC. China also put a hold on a joint India/US proposal at the UN to list LeT leader Shahid Mahmood as a global terrorist. Mahmood has been a longstanding senior LeT member based in Karachi and has been affiliated with the LeT since at least 2007. As early as June 2015 through at least June 2016, Mahmood served as the vice chairman of Falah-i-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), a humanitarian and fundraising arm of LeT. Earlier in June 2022, China had put a hold, at the last moment, on a joint proposal by India and the US to blacklist Pakistan-based terrorist Abdul Rehman Makki under the 1267 Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee of the UNSC. Makki is a US-designated terrorist and brother-in-law of Hafiz Saeed. Then in August 2022, China again put a hold on a proposal by the US and India to blacklist Abdul Rauf Azhar, the senior leader of Pakistan-based JeM. Azhar, born in 1974 in Pakistan, had been sanctioned by the US in December 2010. He has served as JeM’s acting leader in 2007, and as one the JeM’s intelligence coordinator. In 2008 Azhar was assigned to organise suicide attacks in India. He was also involved with JeM’s political wing and has served as a JeM official involved with terrorist training camps.

Then there is the case of Dawood Ibrahim Kaskar, whose existence inside Pakistan has never been acknowledged by Islamabad. Dawood was designated as a global terrorist by the UN under the UNSC Resolution 1267 and he is listed in al-Qaeda sanction list on November 3, 2003 and the UNSC had also issued a special notice in his name on April 6, 2006. Yet another high-profile terrorist whose existence inside Pakistan continues to be denied is Masood Azhar Alvi, who as the leader of JeM, was designated as a global terrorist by the UN under the UNSC Resolution 1267 on May 1, 2019. All in all, therefore, both the US and India have chosen to target the wanted terrorists through legal means, and not through extra-territorial assassinations.

Thus, the ‘crown jewels’ of Pakistan-based ‘Jihadi’ tanzeems continue to be treated as strategic assets and enjoy state patronage and sanctuary. Those terrorists that have been killed since March 2022 are primarily the ‘runners’ or ‘executors’ at the ground-level who are not responsible for command-n-control of terror-strikes. And the only conceivable reasons why the killings have taken place is that these entities have gone rogue and have challenged the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) Directorate’s diktats to refrain from violating the ceasefire along the LoC and refrain from engaging in fund-raising activities aimed at financing cross-LoC terror-strikes.

It is also now evident that the PA wants to stay focussed primarily on its western borders along the 2,670km-long Durand Line, astride which the Pakistani provinces of Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are now facing a steadily worsening internal security situation and which require an increased deployment footprint by the PA. Small wonder therefore that since taking over as the PA’s COAS on November 29, 2022, Gen Syed Asim Munir has visited troops deployed along the LoC only twice thus far: on December 3, 2022 and April 6, 2023. In contrast, his predecessor Gen Qamar Javed Bajwa visited forward areas along the LoC on January 22, 2018; June 16, 2018; October 25, 2018; November 21, 2018; December 28, 2018; February 22, 2019; June 5, 2019; August 12, 2019; September 6, 2019; April 29, 2020; May 24, 2020; August 1, 2020; October 21, 2020; December 22, 2020; June 2 and 12, 2021; and December 24, 2021.

(to be concluded)

Hermes 900 MALE-UAVs, aka Drishti-10, Arriving Early Next Year for IA & IN

2023-11-09T03:41:00.016+05:30

It was on March 2, 2021 that Israel’s ELBIT Systems had announced that it had received a US$300 million contract from an undisclosed Asian customer to supply and deliver Hermes 900 Starliner MALE-UAS. The contract also requires ELBIT Systems to provide MRO services for those MALE-UAVs. That customer has turned out to be India, with six each of the UAVs and one each of the ground-based control stations going to the Indian Army and Indian Navy.

All 12 Hermes 900s will be licence-assembled by Adani Defence & Aerospace, through its Adani-Elbit UAV Complex subsidiary, located at the Adani Aerospace Park in Hyderabad. Adani Defence & Aerospace had first exhibited the Hermes 900 during the Aero India 2017 expo in Bengaluru. Thereafter, the $15 million Adani-Elbit UAV Complex was inaugurated in December 2018, where most of the composites-based aerostructures for the Hermes 900 are fabricated.

The Hermes 900 has a payload capacity of 300kg, service ceiling of 9,100 metres (30,000 feet), a cruise speed of 112kph (60 Knots), and an endurance of 36 hours at cruise speed. The payload includes either a synthetic aperture radar for ground target-mapping, or a maritime surveillance radar as well as the standard optronic sensor, plus an electronic surveillance system and the automatic identification system (AIS) for maritime surveillance. Eyeing India’s long coastline, ELBIT notes that maritime patrol aircraft could not possibly cover the country’s 200-mile offshore economic exclusion zone (EEZ) without the benefit of cross-cueing from a wide-area surveillance system such as the Hermes 900.

Elbit claims that the Hermes 900 could fly as far as 1,000nm offshore thanks to SATCOM communications, and make frequent descents from higher altitude so that the optronic sensor could identify vessels. The command-and-control system is housed in a single shelter that can allow it to be carried by warships. ELBIT has teamed with another Israeli company, MARINT, to offer advanced maritime analytical software that can exploit data from multiple sources. Vessel behaviour is analysed to detect anomalous and suspicious behaviour that differs from routine maritime patterns.

It is believed that the IN’s and IA’s Hermes 900s will be equipped with the Leonardo Group’s Gabbiano X-band TS-80 PLUS multi-mode radars, weighing 44kg, which offers a set of surveillance capabilities such as high-resolution synthetic aperture radar (SAR) and inverse synthetic aperture radar (ISAR) for patrol and surveillance operations. The radar integrates improved solid-state technology that offers similar performance of the earlier Gabbiano T200 radar and reduces its weight by 25kg, while escalating its mean-time-between-failure (MTBF) rate to 2,500 hours. The radar integrates the 360° antenna group with wide-elevation scan (+20°/-55°); a one metre-wide flat antenna plate as well as 80W of power that enables it to offer effective long-range surveillance. Furthermore, the Gabbiano TS-80 PLUS comes with the Gabbiano family mode suite, including air-to-sea surveillance with track-while-scan (TWS); high-resolution ground mapping (Spot/Strip-SAR); ship target imaging and classification with ISAR mode, and navigation with ground mapping and weather avoidance.

All three armed services of India have a combined MALE-UAV requirement for 155 MALE-UAVs.

It may be recalled that Adani Enterprises Ltd had in December 2018 announced the acquisition of Alpha Design Technologies Pvt Ltd for Rs.400 crore in an all-cash deal. Alpha Design in turn has had a joint venture (JV) involving ELBIT Security Systems (ELSEC). And it was this JV that in September 2021 received a contract for supplying the IA with 100 SkyStriker loitering attack drones worth around Rs.100 crore.

The SkyStriker, which is launched through an automatic pneumatic launch platform, can reach a distance of 20km in less than 10 minutes. The total range of this attack drone is around 100km. According to ELBIT, it can loiter and pursue a target for up to 2 hours with a 5kg warhead or up to 1 hour with a 10kg warhead. At maximum speed (100 Knots), the SkyStriker can reach a distance of 20km within 6.5 minutes, reducing the loitering time by 15 minutes.

When preparing to strike, it navigates based on its optronic “lock” on the target. During the strike phase, SkyStriker can dive at extremely high speeds of up to 300 Knots and can withstand winds of up to 20 Knots.

Adani Defence & Arospace is also in the process of bagging two more orders: one for additional HAROP attack drones (to add to the 12 that were procured early in the previous decade) to be procured by the Indian Air Force (IAF), and another for upgrading the IAF’s existing stockpile of 40 HARPY anti-radar attack drones.

Required: ATGM-Armed UGVs & UAS, Not Light Tanks

2023-10-09T23:51:00.004+05:30

It is now fairly established that the actions of China’s PLA Ground Forces (PLAGF) in eastern Ladakh in mid-2020 were part of its evolution of an “Active Defence” posture, defined as a focus on “rapid mobility and concentrating offensive capability to destroy an adversary’s retaliatory capacity”. And with the current infrastructure improvements in the region, China has ensured that it can move forces quickly to respond to any perceived threat posed by India. Added to this are the PLAGF’s ongoing efforts to deploy of family of wheeled armoured vehicles and unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) armed with a variety of anti-tank guided-missiles (ATGM) that are now undergoing field-trials along eastern Ladakh.

It may be recalled that with the completion of development of the Type 96 main battle tank (armed with 125mm smoothbore cannon) by 1998, the mechanised infantry regiments of the PLAGF’s Xinjiang Military Region (XMR) finally began replacing the older one Regiment of Type-59 MBTs and two Regiments of Type-88A MBTs (200 of them, equipped with L7 rifled-bore cannons). Together, they equipped the XMR’s four Divisions, which included the 4 Mechanised Infantry Division (located at Aksu), 6 Mechanised Infantry Division (at Hotan), 8 Mechanised Infantry Division (at Tacheng), the 11 Mechanised Infantry Division (at Urumqi), a Special Operations Brigade (at Kashgar), 2 Artillery Brigade (at Urumqi) and an Air-Defence Brigade (at Urumqi). Till mid-2020, the total mechanised force of the XMR against the Indian Army (IA) was about four armoured Regiments and two Light infantry regiments. The first-line force was about 372 MBTs and 248 infantry combat vehicles (ICV). In addition, reinforcements were available from the Western Theatre Command’s 76 Group Army (at Xining City, Qinghai Province), which included the 17 Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade (using ZTZ-99A MBTs); 56 Light Combined-Arms Brigade; 62 Heavy Combined-Arms Brigade (using ZTZ-99A MBTs); 149 Medium Combined-Arms Brigade (using ZTZ-96A MBTs); 182 Light Combined-Arms Brigade; 76 Special Operations Brigade; 76 Army Air Force Brigade; 76 Artillery Brigade; 76 Air-Defence Brigade; 76 Brigade of Engineering & Chemical Warfare; and the 76 Service Support Brigade. By late 2020, the XMR had established a three-tier MBT system: 39.5-tonne ZTQ-105 MBTs have since equipped two Aksu-based new light high-mobility infantry Brigades (acting as a fast reaction force), while the Hotan-based armoured Brigades have both 44.5-tonne ZTZ-96A and ZTZ-96B MBTs, and the 76 Group Army at the rear has been equipped with 58-tonne ZTZ-99As (see FORCE July 2021, pages 38-39)

However, the PLAGF, since February 2021, concluded that MBTs were not ideal solutions to its “Active Defence” posture, especially in the forbidding heights above 15,000 feet above sea-level, and consequently a considerable effort has been made in the development of high-mobility 4 x 4 armoured vehicles like the DongFeng Mengshi CTL-181A that can be armed with up to four 10km-range AFT-10 Red Arrow-10B ATGM, and 4 x 4 UGVs carrying up to four TL-4 ATGMs. This, in turn, has made the IA examine similar options, some of which are explained below.

In addition, the PLAGF has also deployed in estern Ladakh a family of fire-support weapons all mounted on the 6 x 6 DongFeng Mengshi CTL-181A LAMV chassis, with all these being employed for rapid deployment/quick reaction kinetic actions.

Back in December 2022 the IA had procured a limited number of Estonia-based Milrem Robotics’ Tracked Hybrid Modular Infantry System (THeMIS) tracked UGVs for logistics support missions. THeMIS can be configured to be used for logistics, combat, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) or explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). The UGV has a payload capacity of 750kg with an open architecture. THeMIS is a small, tracked unmanned vehicle that is 7.8 feet long and 3.75 feet high. Hence, it can be fitted with a variety of payloads depending upon the demands of operations. It may be used for normal cargo, mortar or CASEVAC, a platform for rapid evacuation and in a combat role; the payload offerings include cannons, ATGMs, counter-unmanned aerial system (UAS) systems and even loitering munitions. It has a maximum speed of 20kph and a maximum payload capacity of 1,250kg, and is equipped with advanced sensors that allow it to perform tasks with a high degree of autonomy and navigate challenging terrain. It is powered by a hybrid-electric drive system that combines an internal combustion engine with an electric motor, providing a range of up to 15 hours on a single tank of fuel. THeMIS is also designed to be highly rugged and durable, with a reinforced steel and aluminium body that can withstand rough terrain and extreme weather conditions. The latest variant of this UGV comes armed with up to six MBDA-built SL-Brimstone ATGMs.

Germany’s Rheinmetall has developed the Mission Master XT (Extreme Terrain) 4 × 4 UGV that demonstrated its sub-zero capabilities during Arctic mobility trials in Finland last March, navigating icy rivers and climbing slippery banks in -30° Celsius temperatures. Weighing in at 2,217kg, this powerful A-UGV can carry a 1,000kg payload, allowing troops to transport special equipment to hard-to-reach locations. The diesel-powered engine allows it to travel 750km without refuelling, while internal batteries enable up to 6 hours of silent watch operations. The Mission Master XT can be armed wit up to four SL-Brimstone ATGMs.

General Dynamics Land Systems–UK (GDLS–UK) has developed a TRX heavy tracked UGV with SL-Brimstone ATGM launchers, which was unveilled at the DSEI 2023 exhibition held in London between September 12 and 15. This UGV has two pods with four SL-Brimstone ATGMs each and two remotely-operated weapon stations, one with a MAG 7.62mm machine gun and the other with an M2 12.7mm machine gun. A GDLS–UK representative explained that his company is proposing a concept of operations to deploy a scout/recce tracked vehicle with one or more TRX wingmen with ATGMs on its flanks that could target threats identified by the former. GDLS-UK developed the TRX for the US Robotic Combat Vehicle-Medium competition, but GDLS–UK sees the integration of mission fits as dictated by any end-user. This includes intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), lethality, battlefield engineering, direct-fire and loitering munition mission packages, as well as autonomy, communications systems, and human-machine teaming applications to make an integrated system.

UK-based Hydra Drones Ltd has developed the Hydra-400 new generation of high-altitude heavy-lift drone using hybrid propulsion technology. Compact and portable, the drone can be transported in the back of a Toyota Hilux or similar and assembled ready for flight in six minutes. The drone is powered by single-spool jet turbines, producing 50kg thrust and providing a maximum lift of 400kg. A single-spool core means that all rotating components in the compressor and the gas generator are on one shaft and rotate at the same speed. In contrast, a dual-spool core splits the compressor into two independently spinning rotors that are each powered by a separate gas generator turbine on concentric shafts.

There are also ICV-based solutions available, from which inspiration can be drawn by the IA for developing similar innovative solutions by private industry.

For instance, the Kestrel 8 x 8 APC can be modified to carry packs of HELINA (anti-armour variant with tandem shaped-charge warhead) or Dhruvastra (IAF variant of HELINA but with thermobaric and PCB warheads) or the SANT millimetre-wave guided anti-armour missile. For target acquisition, an electro-hydraulic raisable mast containing the TATA-developed LORROS sensor and the active phased-array antenna now used by the DRDO-developed and BEL-built Counter-UAS system can well be used for target acquisition/engagement.

Such a solution will be far better than the sub-optimally engineered NAMSIS system.

Taiwan's Hai Kun (SS-711) SSK Explained

2023-09-30T06:36:00.000+05:30

The Republic of China (Taiwan) attained a significant national security milestone o September 28 when its first of eight domestically built diesel-electric submarines, the Hai Kun (SS-711), was rolled out at the Chia Shipbuilding Corp’s (CSBC) shipyard in the southern port-city of Kaohsiung. Costing US$1.54 billion, the SSK was built under the Indigenous Defence Submarine (IDS) programme, codenamed Project 1168. Taiwan launched its IDS programme in 2014. Following which the RoC Navy (RoCN) and CSBC signed a construction contract in May 2016. Keel-laying took place on November 24, 2020. Admiral Huang Shu-kuang, Taiwan’s Chief of the General Staff and convener of the IDS programme, revealed that the harbour acceptance tests of this SSK will start on October 1 and should end on April 1, 2024. The next stage will be sea-acceptance trials, but said there is no fixed timeline for this phase as it is Taiwan's first locally-produced SSK. Present plans call for the SSK to be delivered to the RoCN in 2025.

Hai Kun SS-711 has a domestic material content of 40%. 25 technologies involved in manufacturing the SSK are divided into three categories: red zone, yellow zone, and green zone. Taiwan has only mastered 10 of them (the green area is equipment that can be produced by itself), 9 items have difficulties (yellow area, the technology is difficult to obtain, but there are parts with self-made potential), and the remaining 6 items are core technologies In the red zone, there is no self-research ability, and it was necessary to seek external assistance technology). The hull-design comes from The Netherlands’ DAMEN Shipyards.

The SSK is about 70 metres long, 8 metres wide, and has an underwater displacement of 2,500 tons. It uses a single-hull design that features an X-shaped tail rudder. The hull is made of HSLA-80 CRHS56 steel supplied by ArcelorMittal. The SSK is powered by MTU Series 12V 4000 diesel engines that drives a 7-blade propeller. MTU also supplied the electric generators. The lead-acid batteries were supplied by a Taiwanese company. The submarine can dive to a depth of 420 metres. The SSK has six Germany-supplied 533mm torpedo tubes that can launch Honeywell Mk.48 Mod 6AT heavyweight torpedoes, as well as UGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles.

All the US-sourced hardware was ordered through TECRO, the “Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States”. Lockheed Martin Naval Electronics & Surveillance Systems–Undersea Systems is the prime systems integrator, while Northrop Grumman has supplied the bow-mounted active and passive cylindrical sonar array, wide-aperture passive arrays on the flanks, and high-frequency active arrays on the keel and fins. Raytheon has supplied a derivative of the CCS Mk.2 combat management system and a derivative of the AN/BYG-1 combat control system. L-3 MAPPS has supplied the integrated platform management system (IPMS), communications system and battle damage control system, while L-3 KEO has supplied all the masts and periscopes. A Sperry Marine AN/BPS-16(V)4 navigation radar, operating at I-band, is fitted as well. Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science & Technology developed a Torpedo Countermeasure System and integrating it into the SSK with two 6-shot cannisters mounted on each side of the submarine, enabling the SSK to counter active and passive homing torpedoes with soft kill capability.

Yes To Temporary Disengagement & De-Escalation, But Permanent De-Induction Ruled Out

2023-08-26T02:40:00.005+05:30

Analysis of satellite imagery around the Indian Union Territory of Ladakh reveals that while the disengagement and de-escalation by the opposing military ground forces of China and India remains a possibility in future, de-induction of such forces will remain impossible, thanks to the PLA Ground Forces’ (PLAGF) unabated construction of permanent habitats and related ammunition storage facilities in areas close to southern, central/eastern and northern Ladakh.

To the south (see above slides), the PLAGF has erected permanent habitats and related ammunition storage facilities at Zhaxigangxiang (32.526563 N, 79.633600 E).

In the central/eastern areas (see above slides), permanent habitats and related ammunition storage facilities now exist at Rutog (33.396564 N, 79.786035), with a new heliport now coming up at 33.654 N, 80.449 E. In addition, a PLAGF synthetic combined-arms brigade is now located at Khurnak (33 45 25 N, 78 59 50 E).

To the north, in an area spread over 250 hectares and located 65km to the east of Burtse/Daulat Beg Oldie (35.275994 N, 78.760580 E), permanent habitats and related ammunition storage facilities are being at a hectic pace, along with a PLAGF heliport at Tianwendian (35.246275 N, 79.542584 E).

There at least 11 portals or shafts bored into the rockface on both banks of the river-valley. The images show massive construction activity over the last few months and are a likely attempt to protect heavy weaponry and soldiers from Indian air-strikes and extended-range artillery. By establishing underground facilities and developing subterranean infrastructure in such proximity to the border, PLAGF strategists seem to be aiming to counter-balance the current advantage held by the Indian Air Force in Aksai Chin. In the years since the Galwan clash of June 2020, the Indian Army has effectively scaled up its offensive fire vectors, especially long-range tube and rocket artillery. The PLAGF decision to carve into hillsides is directly linked to greater Indian offensive capability. The massive construction activity, including hardened shelters, bunkers, tunnels, and the widening of roads is being done to mitigate this clear and present danger which the Indian Army & Indian Air Force have imposed on the PLAGF deployment doctrine in Tibet. It is clear that China is hardening its military presence in Ladakh against possible artillery and air-strikes in the event of a full-scale military escalation. We can see what are likely reinforced command positions and underground equipment storage facilities. Such facilities greatly enhance the PLAGF’s ability to continue operations and limit attrition if an armed conflict were to break out in Ladakh. Multiple berms and revetments of the site in December 2021 indicate that the location had been identified as a key staging point during the height of the India-China faceoff in Ladakh when PLAGF forces had made multiple incursions into the Indian territory along the LAC. This same area has now been completely transformed with massive, ongoing construction activity. The new images, from August 18, indicate the presence of four reinforced personnel bunkers constructed along the valley face, along with three tunnel areas, with two and five portals or tunnels at each site, carved onto the hillside. Heavy earth-moving machinery can be seen in multiple locations. A primary road, which cuts across the valley, has been substantially widened. The images also show that the earth has been raised around the personnel bunkers to provide additional protection from direct attacks. Entry and exit areas have a distinctive fork design meant to dissipate the impact of pressure from bombardment and feature raised earth berms.

Updates On RCI-Developed RF Seekers For Missiles

2023-08-21T22:06:00.004+05:30

Heron-2 MALE-UAV & Its Archer-NG Clone Explained

2023-08-14T04:02:00.007+05:30

Although Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) had been offering its Super Heron HF MALE-UAV to India since 2015 (it even brought this UAV to the Aero India 2015 and 2017 expos in Bengaluru), both the Indian Army (IA) and Indian Air Force (IAF) opted for the less capable Heron-2 MALE-UAS in January 2021, when IAI announced on 25 January that it had inked two contracts comprising one lease and one sale of its Heron-2s. The systems included four Heron-2s and their related ground-control stations purchased by the IAF and four Heron-2s and related ground-control stations leased by the IA.

The Heron-2 retains the same dimensions and general performance specifications as the earlier Heron-1, with improvements including SATCOM data-linking that allows beyond-line-of-sight command-n-control of the MALE-UAV out to a distance of 1,000km, and a widened fuselage pod for a greater number of sensors and/or more powerful mission avionics and small-diameter precision-guided munitions (SD-PGM).

It also boasts a new propulsion configuration comprising the fully certified Rotax-915iS 1,352cc turbocharged four-stroke engine, which has a time-before-overhaul (TBO) rating of 1,200 hours and which produces up to 135hp at maximum continuous power (offering a cruise speed of 277kph) while coupled to a three-bladed variable-pitch pusher propeller, compared to 115hp of the Rotax-914 engine on the older Heron-1.

The Super Heron HF, on the other hand, is powered by an Austro-330EP 177hp engine that allows the MALE-UAV to attain a service ceiling of more than 30,000 feet and reach a speed of 150 Knots. The most important update, however, and the main driver behind development of the Super Heron HF, is the adoption of a heavy-fuel (diesel) engine. Heavy-fuel engines offer a number of benefits to the user. Maintenance requirements are reduced, and the fuel offers significant commonality with many other battlefield systems. Primarily, though, it is a much safer liquid to transport in the support of field deployments.

IAI evaluated four different heavy-fuel engine types for the Super Heron HF before adopting a DieselJet FIAT engine from Italy that develops 200hp. The extra power compared to the original engine not only helps to overcome a rise in maximum takeoff weight from 1,250kg to 1,450kg, as well as improving rate of climb. At 30,000 feet and 45 hours, service ceiling and endurance are the same as for the Heron-1. The Super Heron HF has triple-redundant avionics installed, and greatly expanded flexibility for new payloads and smarter interfaces. The aircraft comes with an impressive array of sensors, including the MOSP-3000-HD optronics turret with laser rangefinder/designator and ELM-2055D SAR/GMTI radar. Antennae and pods for various electronic warfare and intelligence-gathering systems are also available.

In late September 2022, as part of its ISR capability enhancement in Arunachal Pradesh beyond the Tawang sector, the IA began deploying two of its leased Heron-2s at the IAF’s Missamari AFS, and at Leh AFS in Ladakh.

In a separate tri-services endeavour, known as ‘Project Cheetah’, about 70 existing Heron-1s belonging to the IA, IAF and Indian Navy (IN) will be jointly upgraded to Heron-2 configuration by IAI and the MoD-owned Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) and will be known as the Archer-NG.

However, this MALE-UAV variant will be powered by a 177hp Austro-330EP diesel engine and will contain flight and mission avionics that were originally developed by the DRDO’s LRDE and DARE laboratories for the ADE-developed Tapas-BH MALE-UAV.

GIDS Exhibits At IDEF'23 Originate From China & South Africa

2023-07-31T02:45:00.014+05:30

IDEF’23, the 16th International Defence Industry Fair held between July 25 and 28, 2023 at Istanbul, Turkiye, saw Pakistan’s state-owned Global Industrial & Defence Solutions (GIDS) exhibiting several of its products that were clearly of China-origin. This should not come as a surprise, as such a practice has been in existence since the mid-1990s. For instance, the Hatf-9/Nasr MBRL is in essence the WS-32 400mm, 4-tube MBRL, while the Fatah-1 MBRL is the eight-tube WS-35 302mm MBRL.

These MBRLs were developed by China’s Chengdu-based Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corp, but were marketed by China’s state-owned ALIT and China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corp (CPMIEC).

China’s cruise missile design, research, development, and manufacturing are now concentrated in a single business division within one of two state aerospace conglomerates, the China Aerospace Science & Industry Corporation (CASIC) Third Academy. One of seven design academies under CASIC—which has more than 100,000 employees—the Third Academy—is China’s principal R & D and manufacturing entity for all types of cruise missiles. Established in 1961, the Third Academy has been involved in the design and development of 20 types of cruise missiles, including the indigenous Haiying- and Yingji-series and their export versions. Today, it boasts of 10 research institutes and two factories, with 13,000+ employees, including 2,000 researchers and around 6,000 technicians.

Hongdu Aviation Industry Group (formerly Nanchang Aircraft Manufacturing Co), under Aviation Industry Corporation of China, produces FL- and TL-series of anti-ship cruise missiles for export. Finally, for three decades China has marketed a wide range of indigenously produced cruise missiles (and other weapons systems) through the China Precision Machinery Import & Export Corp (CPMIEC), the CASIC Third Academy’s export management branch. Established in 1980, CPMIEC is a member of the Xinshidai Group and jointly owned by CASIC and the Chinese Aerospace Science & Technology Corp (CAST).

It was CASIC that in August 2001 succeeded in smuggling out of Kiev all relevant production engineering data packages of a LACM called Korshun, which had by then been developed by Ukraine’s Dnipropetrovsk-based Yuzhnoye State Design Bureau, with production tooling being built by the Yuzhnoye Machine-Building Production Association, or Yuzhmash. The Korshun’s powerplant was a redesigned RD95-300 turbofan that bore a strong resemblance to the 36MT engine developed by Russia’s NPO Saturn.

Dimensions of the Korshun included a wingspan of 3.1 metres, length of 6.3 metres, diameter of 0.514 metres, and a mass of 1,090kg. Range of the LACM was then claimed to be 600km when carrying a 500kg warhead. in 2002, China created a consortium of state-owned R & D institutes and companies (called the Xi’an Sicong Group) that included the Shanghai Institute for Optics & Fine Mechanics, China North Opto‑Electro Industries Corporation (OEC), Changchun Institute of Optics & Fine Mechanics, and Luoyang Opto-Electro Technology Development Centre.

These entities had earlier obtained vital optronic technology inputs from Ukraine’s TOCHNOST. By late 2003, the CASIC Third Academy (also known as China Haiying Electro-Mechanical Technology Academy or CHETA) and 8359 Research Institute had, along with the Beijing University for Aeronautics & Astronautics, Shanghai Jiaotong University, China State Electronics Systems Engineering Corp, Sichuan Aerospace Industry Corp and the Tianjin Institute for Power Sources, had completed fabrication of the first six prototypes of the 1,500km-range DH-10A LACM variant of the Korshun, and in August 2004 the first test-firings were conducted at an instrumented offshore range in the Bohai Sea.

CASC’s Beijing Xinghang Electromechanical Equipment Factory (159 Factory) is the final assembly facility for the DH-10A, while Beijing Hangxing Machine Building Factory (239 Factory) and the Xinxin Factory in Shanghai produce the various on-board components.

The LACM and its AKD-20 ALCM variant carries a range of different 770lb or 1,100lb warheads. The GLCM variant has a length of 7 metres, launch mass of 1,350kg, warhead mass of 300kg, and cruise speed of 0.9 Mach. The GLCM variant has since been sold to Pakistn as the Babur and Harbah cruise missiles.

China’s PL-12 BVRAAM is equipped with active radar-homing seeker developed by Ukraine’s Radionix. It uses a dual-thrust solid rocket motor and can exceed Mach 4 and endure 38 G. The missile’s omnidirectional sensors are accurate to within 1 metre. Its active radar seeker is the Ka-band ‘Onix’ from Radionix, which has a range of 25km, search area of +/-40 degrees in azimuth and elevation and offers “fire-and-forget” capabilities. It has a 24kg warhead and uses a radio proximity fuse. Initial versions of the PL-12 had used the Russia-origin Agat/Istok 9B-1350E Ku-band seekers.

A ground-launched variant of the PL-12 is the Faaz BVRAAM and its Faaz-SL variant from GIDS.

China’s latest PL-15 BVRAAM, under development since 2009, was first test-fired on September 15, 2015. The missile, which too uses the Onix seeker, weighs 210kg, has a range of 145km and uses a dual-pulse, smokeless solid-propellant rocket motor for extended range (two fuel chambers and one exhaust nozzle) that was originally developed by South Africa’s DENEL Dynamics for the ‘Marlin’ BVRAAM. For long-range engagements the first pulse fires and the missile glides towards its target before the second pulse fires at a later point in time. For shorter engagements, both pulses can be fired almost simultaneously. Top speed is close to Mach 4. Flight control is by servo motor controlled fins. The PL-15’s airframe can sustain 30 G and its leading edges can function in temperatures of both -50 degrees Celsius and + 900 degrees Celsius once launched.

The Faaz family of BVRAAMs shown by GIDS at IDEF’23 is, in reality, the Umkhonto family of BVRAAMs developed by South Africa’s Dynamics.

The Shahpar-3 UAV from GIDS is, in reality, the FH-95 UAV from the China Aerospace Science & Technology Corporation. Its MTOW is 1,000kg, maximum payload weight is 250kg, service ceiling of 42,000 feet and a flight endurance of 24 hours.

The Tipu 155mm GPS-guided projectile is, in reality, NORINCO of China’s GP-155B projectile.

The range-extension kits (REK) emanating from GIDS too come from China.

The Burq ASM is in reality the AR-1 ASM from China.

Finally, the Taimur ALCM showcased by GIDS is, in reality, a souped-up variant of the TS-20 PGM developed by Tengden of China, which will be powered by China-origin turbojets.

The latest PGM to be imported by the PAF from China is shown below.

Indian Army Begins Limited Upgrade Of T-90S MBTs

2023-07-26T19:18:00.003+05:30

The Indian Army has begun the process of upgrading four regiments of its T-90S main battle tanks by ordering about 400 units each of the following hardware.

The upgraded T-90S MBTs will be deployed with the Indian Army's Combat Group formations in Ladakh and Sikkim. The E-LynX SDRs will replace the existing TADIRAN CNR-900M vehicular high-power radios.

And the following are two of the 12 fast interceptor craft that Goa Shipyard Ltd is delivering to the Indian Army for deployment in Panggong Tso Lake.

BARC & ECIL To Co-Develop PWR Control-Systems For Indian Navy's Six Projected SSNs

2023-07-13T02:30:00.005+05:30

A tripartite memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between the Indian Navy (IN), BARC and Hyderabad-based ECIL on July 10, 2023 in the presence of VADM Dinesh K Tripathi, FOC-in-C, Western Naval Command, and Dr Ajit Kumar Mohanty, Secretary Dept of Atomic Energy. The MoU aims to facilitate indigenous development and production of 11 types of control-systems and their multifunctional display/control consoles for the IN’s projected six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN). These include those used by the 90mWt pressurised water nuclear reactors. Such systems were earlier imported from Russia’s JSC Concern Avrora SPA for the S-2, S-3 and S-4 SSGNs of the IN. Trial-batches of the indigenously-developed and built control-systems will be delivered to the IN’s Hyderabad-based Defence Machinery Design Establishment (DMDE) for type-certification, following which formal procurement contracts will be inked. This step would go a long way towards furthering and augmenting self-reliance within the IN.

HAL Attains A Critical Milestone In Rotorcraft Development & Manufacturing

2023-07-05T06:37:00.000+05:30

Following 18 years of hardwork, state-owned DPSU Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd on July 4 received 'restricted' type-certification (for flight operations up to medium-altitudes) from the Brussels-based European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) for the Dhruv ALH twin-engined 5.5-tonne helicopter. Dr D K Sunil, Director (Engineering, R & D) of HAL received the type-certification documentation in the presence of Filip Cornelis, EASA Director for Aviation, Directorate-General Transport & Mobility; Luc Tytgat, Strategy & Safety Management Director of EASA; S K Mishra, Joint Secretary of India’s Ministry of Civil Aviation; and Vikram Dev Dutt from India’s Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA). HAL had begun work for obtaining such type-certification back in July 2005.

The EASA type-certification establishes that: 1) HAL is capable of designing helicopter platforms meeting the stringent European airworthiness certification requirements. 2) HAL-developed manufacturing processes for the Dhruv meet the stringent European airworthiness certification requirements. 3) All the Dhruv ALH-related type-certification documentation prepared by the DGCA over the years has worldwide endorsement from EASA. 4) Civilian variants of the Dhruv ALH will from now on be able to compete on par with its global counterparts worldwide. 5) Domestic rotorcraft operators will from now on be able to obtain hull insurance for the Dhruv ALH civilian variants from commercial insurance companies, which was impossible before.

This now sets the stage for HAL to obtain similar airworthiness type-certification for the civilian variant of the single-engined Light Utility Helicopter (LUH), now being series-produced at the greenfield HAL facility at Tumakuru; and for the Hindustan-228 STOL twin-turboprop commuter aircraft.

No More A Fence-Sitter

2023-06-23T04:04:00.013+05:30

When India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh and US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J Austin III met in New Delhi on June 5 this year, many were wondering what was the reason why the two had indulged in what can be termed as ‘over-hugging’ before and after the delegation-level talks. The answer came on June 15 when the Indian Ministry of Defence’s (MoD) Defence Acquisition Council approved the off-the-shelf procurement of 31 General Atomics-built MQ-9Bs (15 MQ-9B Sea Guardians for the Indian Navy and 16 Sky Guardians—eight each for the Indian Army and Indian Air Force) from the US Navy and US Army through the government-to-government Foreign Military Sales (FMS) route. And the numbers of these MALE-UAVs itself was the giveaway to another reality—India definitely will have a critical role to play in the maritime awareness domain in the event of military hostilities breaking out between the US-Japan combine on one hand and China on the other in the event of a full-scale military invasion of Taiwan by China.

This should put to rest all doubts to the contrary that were aired over the past 30 days by the likes of Ashley Tellis and Daniel Markey, which can be viewed here:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JIN7stDcfmk&t=3s

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OlEmF0sQ9jc&t=3s

Simply explained, India as the nett provider of security within the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) stretching from the Bab-el-Mandeb in the Red Sea right up to the Malacca Strait, will do her bit in providing persistent ISR support to the navies of not just the US, but also to those of Japan, Australia and Singapore, all of which always deploy their warships within the IOR. Hence, one can safely infer that the MQ-9B Sea Guardians will also be operating from the Indian Navy air bases at Karwar and Kochi.

Interestingly, India is the only country that has operational interactions with three US theatre commands--Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), Central Command (CENTCOM) and African Command (AFRICOM). Providing such ISR support is not new, since under OP Sagittarius between late 2001 and mid-2002 the Indian Navy’s AOPVs had escorted high-value cargo of the US Navy and Marines, which meant for sustaining military operations in Afghanistan for OP Enduring Freedom, across the Malacca Strait, known for its high density of shipping traffic and incidents of piracy.

For all the four countries of the QUAD Grouping, filling the persistent ISR void within the IOR had acquired a sense of urgency due to the widespread belief that China is expected to militarily invade Taiwan latest by 2027.

But most importantly, military-industrial activities have commenced on a project that calls for: 1) laying of an undersea optical fibre-optic cable from Chennai to Port Blair; and 2) the construction of an undersea network of seabed-based surveillance sensors stretching from the tip of Sumatra right up to Indira Point and from there to India’s southeastern seaboard; and another similar network stretching from India’s southwestern seaboard right up to the entrance to the Red Sea (near Socotra). Once completed, this network will be an integral part of the existing US-Japan ‘Fish Hook’ sound surveillance (SOSUS) network that will play a pivotal role in constantly monitoring all submarine patrols mounted by China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) in both the South China Sea and the IOR. This network will in turn be networked with the Indian Navy’s high-bandwidth National Command Control and Communications Intelligence network (NC3I), which has been set up under the IN’s National Maritime Domain Awareness (NMDA) project at a cost of Rs.1,003 crores. At the heart of the NC3I is the Gurgaon-based, Rs.453 crore Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC), whose systems integration software packages were supplied by Raytheon and CISCO.

However, it is also a fact that if India were to play a critical role in support of a combined US-Japan counter-attack against China, the PLA’s Rocket Force’s (PLARF) DF-17 and DF-27 ballistic missiles (BM)—both equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV)—will definitely target the Indian Navy’s MALE-UAV operating bases in India’s south-eastern seaboard (INS Rajali) and air bases at Port Blair and Campbell Bay. It now remains to be seen whether the US provides assured protection against the PLARF’s HGV-armed BMs by stationing its THAAD interceptor batteries and related AN/TPY-2 fire-control radars in such operating bases of the Indian Navy.

Another area of cooperation between the US and India that can be expected s the co-development of a cheaper and scaled-down version of the X-band SBX floating radar, which, in India’s case, can be a ship-mounted X-band fire-control radar fabricated in India with US military-technical assistance.

Updates from Vizag, Bhuj & Naliya

2023-06-19T06:08:00.003+05:30

Construction of SBC-2, the second final-assembly line for the Indian Navy's six-boat SSN project, should be completed by the end of 2024. Thus, it can be concluded that the various hull-sections fabricated by Larsen & Toubro at its Hazira industrial facility will start arriving at SBC-2 from early 2025 onwards. This in turn implies fabrication of hull modules have already commenced at Hazira with the DMR-292A/292B steel that is being produced by SAIL.

US INDOPACOM’s Integrated Deterrence Strategy & Its Indian Component

2023-05-29T04:26:00.014+05:30

Two retired senior Indian Navy veterans in the recent past have passionately made the case for fortifying the Andaman & Nicobar Islands for very good reasons. First and foremost is the China factor.

China currently receives 95% of its energy imports by sea, with approximately 80% of it passing through the Malacca Strait. Most of those supplies comes from the Middle East. Myanmar’s location on the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) presents a money-saving alternative route and strategic geopolitical advantage by avoiding the Malacca Strait, a major international shipping lane dominated by both the Indian Navy and US Navy. Energy resources can be shipped through the Andaman Sea and Bay of Bengal and transported to China from Myanmar through pipelines, cutting off 3,000km, reducing transport time by five to six days, and avoiding a potential confrontation with the US. China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) operates the Kyaukpyu liquids storage terminal, which is located in Rakhine in Myanmar. This liquids storage terminal became operational in 2013 and is owned by CNPC. The terminal, which is accessible by pipeline and sea, primarily stores crude oil. Myanmar also is a potential energy source for China, thereby reducing dependence on energy from the Middle East.

Presently, two of China’s top three countries for energy supplies are Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Myanmar boasts the most diverse energy resources among ASEAN members, with a total of 104 oil and natural gas blocks, 51 of them on land with the rest in the sea. According to 2017 data, Myanmar controls 0.3% (139 million barrels) of known world oil reserves, in the Salin Basin and in the seaside Yetagun Field. In addition, according to 2019 data, Myanmar has 0.6% (1.2 trillion cubic metres) of the proven natural gas reserves in the world. These reserves are located primarily in the Yadana, Yetagun and Zawtika areas in Moattama on the west coast of the country and the Shwe area in Rakhine. In addition, Myanmar has the potential to help China decrease its dependence on liquefied natural gas imported from the Middle East. According to 2019 data, China is second in the world in LNG imports. LNG is more costly than natural gas. Shipping also presents potential dangers from bad weather, pirates, and accidents. Currently, China imports natural gas through a pipeline connecting Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In 2016, subsidiaries of China’s CITIC Group Corp, including China Harbour Engineering Company won contracts for two major projects in Kyaukpyu—the dredging of a deep-sea port and the creation of an industrial area in an accompanying special economic zone. A US$7.3 billion deep-water port and $2.7 billion industrial area is now being built in a special economic zone at Kyaukpyu along the coast of the Bay of Bengal. The strategic town is the terminus of a $1.5 billion oil pipeline and parallel natural gas pipeline running to Kunming in China’s Yunnan Province.

Secondly, the projected International Container Transhipment Port (ICTP) at Galathea Bay of Great Nicobar Island of Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal has adequate space available for the berthing of warships belonging to the navies of the QUAD Grouping and offering them logistical support. It will thus fill a vital gap that now exists between Singapore and the eastern Indian seaboard and Trincomalee.

The ICTP will have the capacity to handle 16 million containers per year. Phase one of the proposed project will be commissioned in the year 2028 and will handle a capacity of 4 million TEUs. The project is expected to be complete with an investment of Rs.41,000 crore (US$5 Billion). The proposed facility is envisaged to be developed in four phases. When completed, the ICTP will be able to handle 16 million TEUs. The estimated cost for Phase 1 of the proposed transshipment port is around Rs.18,000 crore which includes the construction of breakwaters, dredging, reclamation, berths, storage areas, building and utilities, procurement and installation of equipment and development of port colony with core infrastructure is going to be developed with the government support. The new port to be set up at an estimated cost of Rs.18,308 crore in the first phase. The ICTP will be situated at a strategic location midway between existing transhipment terminals (Singapore, Klang, Colombo etc.) and feeder ports. Around 40 nautical miles away from the Malacca Strait international shipping channel, which handles about 35% of the annual global sea trade, the new location offers a huge opportunity for setting up of deep draft container transhipment terminal at the Galathea Bay. With a natural depth of over 20 metres, the port could handle transhipment cargo from Indian east coast ports, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

However, it is highly likely that in the event of military hostilities between the US and China due to a Chinese military invasion of Taiwan, the naval enclave of the ICTP at Galathea Bay could will be at the receiving end of the PLARF’s DF-27 IRBMs carrying hypersonic glide-vehicles (HGV). The only defence against such a threat then will be either the Indian Navy’s projected NG-DDGs armed with endo-atmospheric LR-SAM interceptors optimised for ballistic missile defence (BMD), or land-based AAD interceptor missiles.

US INDOPACOM’s Integrated Deterrence Strategy & Its Indian Component

To fully understand what this all means, one requires an understanding of the sequential chain of events, as detailed below.

April 2020: China’s latest Sky Map or digital maps showed parts of Arunachal Pradesh within its international borders. Sky Map is operated by Beijing’s National Surveying and Mapping Geographic Information Bureau. China’s earlier Sky Map was based on the 1989 edition. Since then China’s external boundaries changed following the border settlements with Russia and Central Asian countries. The last border settlement was with Tajikistan in 2011 when China got 1,158 square km east of the Sarekole Mountains. The area was added into Tashkurgan County in the Kashgar Prefecture of Xinjiang Province. (Tashkurgan was formally an Indian territory—a part of Shakgam Valley).

October 28, 2020: The 3^rd India-US 2 + 2 Ministerial Dialogue was held, on the sidelines of which India and the US inked the BECA, the last of four foundational agreements for strategic ties. BECA stands for Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geo-Spatial Cooperation. BECA, along with the two agreements signed earlier—the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA, signed on August 30, 2016) and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA, inked on September 6, 2018 on the side-lines of the inaugural India-US 2 + 2 Dialogue)—completes a troika of “foundational pacts” for deep military cooperation between the two countries.

February 3, 2021: The USAF B-1B's first India turn came, for a fly-by on the inaugural day of Aero India 2021, escorted by the IAF’s Tejas Mk.1 L-MRCA, from the USAF’s 8th Air Force & Joint Global Strike Operations Center's 34th Expeditionary Bomb Squadron out of Ellsworth AFB, South Dakota. The USAF’s bomber forces integrated and operated with the IAF for the very first time.

May 3, 2021 The US Indo-Pacific Command (US INDOPACOM) unveilled its Integrated Deterrence Strategy. It includes having the best weapons systems and the latest technologies that make adversaries think twice. This includes development of tools that make use of artificial intelligence and quantum computing, for example. Integrated deterrence also includes new concepts of operation, the elimination of stovepipes between services and their capabilities, and coordinated operations on land, in the air, on the sea, in space and in cyberspace.

October 9, 2021: US Army Gen. James Dickinson, US Space Command commander, met with Ajay Kumar, India’s Defence Secretary, to discuss advancing US-India space cooperation in critical topics such as space situational awareness and responsible behaviour in space. Kumar received briefings on a variety of topics whilst at Peterson-Schriever Garrison, including current threats to the space domain by Brig Gen Gregory Gagnon, US SPACECOM Intelligence Director, and how the US partners with nations globally to develop a common understanding of the space domain and develop a space warfighting culture by Master Gunnery Sgt Scott Stalker, US SPACECOM command senior enlisted advisor. Kumar’s visit was the second recently by an Indian official. Gen. Bipin Rawat, India's Chief of Defence Staff, met with Lt Gen John Shaw, US SPACECOM Deputy Commander, on September 30.

December 2021: China's Ministry of Civil Affairs announced that it had standardised in Mandarin characters, Tibetan and Roman alphabet the names of 15 places in Zangnan, the Chinese name for Arunachal Pradesh. Compared with the first batch, the Ministry covered more places this time, including residential areas, rivers and mountain passes. The eight residential places in the second batch are Sªngkªzong and Daglungzong in Cona County of Shannan Prefecture, Mani'gang, Duding and Migpain in Medog County of Nyingchi, Goling, Damba in Zayu County of Nyingchi, and Mªjag in Lhunze County of Shannan Prefecture. The four mountains are Wamo Ri, Dªu Ri, Lh¼nzhub Ri and Kunmingxingzª Feng. The two rivers are Xªnyogmo He and Dulain He, and the mountain pass is named Sª La, in Cona County.

April 13, 2022: Rajnath Singh reached Hawaii on April 12, 2022 for a visit to the HQ of US INDOPACOM. On his arrival from Washington DC, Singh was received by Commander, US INDOPACOM Admiral John Aquilino. The US INDOPACOM and Indian military have wide-ranging engagements, including a number of military exercises, training events and exchanges. Singh visited the US INDOPACOM HQ, and the Pacific Fleet and the training facilities in Hawaii on April 13, 2022, before returning to India. He also laid a wreath at National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific and visited the HQs of US Army Pacific and Pacific Air Forces, during his brief stay in Hawaii. In Washington DC, US President Joe Biden held a virtual meeting with Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi in the presence of Rajnath Singh, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken and US Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin. Later, the Raksha Mantri and External Affairs Minister had co-chaired with their US counterparts the 4th India-US Ministerial 2 + 2 Dialogue on April 11, 2022. A Joint Statement was issued after the dialogue. Before the 2 + 2 Dialogue, Rajnath Singh held a bilateral meeting with the US Secretary of Defence separately in the Pentagon.

May 19, 2022: US Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues Uzra Zeya met the Dalai Lama at his official residence at McLeod Ganj in Dharamshala. She visited the Central Tibetan Administration and held discussions with its leadership. She also visited the Tibetan Parliament-in-Exile.

September 26, 2022: US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J Austin III welcomed Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar to the Pentagon today, following the Secretary’s productive phone-call with Rajnath Singh earlier this month. Secretary Austin and Minister Jaishankar exchanged perspectives on a range of issues of shared interest, spanning recent developments in East Asia, the Indian Ocean Region, and the global reverberations of the Ukraine crisis. Against this backdrop, the two leaders reviewed priority lines of effort to deepen bilateral defence cooperation, as the US and India progress toward a more advanced stage in their partnership. Secretary Austin and Minister Jaishankar committed to expanding information-sharing and logistics cooperation to drive deeper operational coordination between the US and Indian militaries, i.e. make India an integral part of the US INDOPACOM’s Integrated Deterrence Strategy. They also discussed new opportunities for bilateral defence industrial cooperation in support of India’s contributions as a regional security provider, including the launch of a new defence dialogue later this year as the US and India work more closely together across space, cyber, artificial intelligence, and other technology areas. The two leaders underscored the value of the deepening collaboration between the US, India, Australia, Japan, and European partners.

January 30, 2023: in order to launch the next milestone in the US-India strategic technology and defence collaboration, Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajit Doval was welcomed by his US counterpart Jake Sullivan at the White House. Doval arrived in Washington DC to attend the first formal talks on the Initiative for Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET). Doval discussed the iCET with his US counterpart Jake Sullivan at the White House. The NSA was accompanied by a high-powered delegation that included five prominent individuals: the Principal Scientific Adviser of India, the Chairman of ISRO, the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister, the Secretary of the Department of Telecommunications, and the DG, DRDO. Doval and Sullivan formally launched the iCET in Washington DC. The US and India concluded the US-India iCET meeting and also decided to launch a new Innovation Bridge. The Indian Embassy in the US said in a tweet that the iCET reflects India-US convention of strategic, commercial & scientific approaches in the field of technology. The White House said in a statement that Innovation Bridge will connect both countries' defence startups. It said: both countries affirm that the ways in which technology is designed, developed, governed, and used should be shaped by our shared democratic values and respect for universal human rights. According to the statement, the two sides discussed opportunities for greater cooperation in critical and emerging technologies, co-development and coproduction, and ways to deepen connectivity across our innovation ecosystems. Also signed was the Implementation Arrangement between India’s Dept of Science & Tech and the US National Science Foundation.

What was not revealed was that Doval and Sullivan had agreed to evolve a ‘NATO + 6’ arrangement under which India would join the existing ‘Five Eyes’ grouping (that now comprises the US, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand) that will enable the collection and dissemination of SIGINT/ELINT data emanating from China in a seamless manner.

To this end, a chain of SIGINT/ELINT data collection sites will be established in Ladakh, Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh, with India’s NTRO and the US National Security Agency (NSA) becoming the principal stakeholders. That was the reason why Ajit Doval had met with Senator Mark Warner and Senator John Cornyn, Chair & Member of the Select Committee on Intelligence and co-chairs of the India Caucus, at India House in Washington DC.

March 15, 2023: A bipartisan resolution was introduced in the US Senate to recognise the McMahon Line as the international boundary between China and Arunachal Pradesh. The bipartisan Senate Resolution sees Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India. It also “commits the US to deepening support and assistance to the region, alongside like-minded international partners and donors.” The US Senate commended the Government of India for taking steps to defend itself against aggression and security threats from China. Some of the Indian steps mentioned in the resolution include securing the telecommunication infrastructure, re-examining its procurement processes and supply chains and expanding its cooperation with Taiwan in public health and other sectors. The resolution said its purpose was to further strengthen the US-India bilateral partnership in defence, technology, economics and people-to-people ties. It also aims to promote US cooperation with India through the Quad, the East Asia Summit along with ASEAN and other international fora.

April 3 to 5, 2023: Bhutan’s King Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuk visited India and held formal talks with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi on April 4. India and China had “in 2012 reached an agreement that the tri-junction boundary points between India, China and third countries will be finalized in consultation with the concerned countries”. Further, point 12 of the 2012 ‘understanding’ stated that the 1890 convention was the “basis of alignment” of the India-China border in the Sikkim sector. However, China interpreted this to mean that the trijunction point had been settled, while India claimed that the phrase ‘basis of’ meant that the final settlement had not been reached. Just two years ago, Bhutan and China signed a ‘three-step roadmap’ for expediting talks to demarcate their land boundary. In his March 25 interview with the Belgian newspaper La Libre, Bhutan PM Lotay Tshering said that India, China and Bhutan were three “equal” parties to the negotiations for the trijunction. During that same interview, Tshering had also significantly said that the talks with China over demarcating the other sections of its boundary were at an advanced stage and could be finished soon. Now, Bhutan’s prime minister stated that they were close to demarcation. “After one or two more meetings, we will probably be able to draw a line,” he said. Since 1984, the officials of the two sides have held 24 rounds of talks over their disputed border. In the past, the Chinese have offered 495 sq km of territory in the northern part of the Himalayan nation to Bhutan. In return, they insisted that Bhutan give China 269 sq km of the disputed territory in the west—an area of rich grazing pasture, central to the livelihood of Bhutanese pastoralists. The Chinese have claimed four areas in western Bhutan: Charithang, Sinchulimpa, the Dramana pasture land and Doklam, the present bone of contention. Bhutan and China had the 11th Expert Group Meeting (EGM) on their boundary issues in Kunming, China, from 10 to 13 January 2023. Dasho Letho Tobdhen Tangbi, Secretary of the International Boundaries of Bhutan, led the Bhutan delegation whilst the Chinese delegation was led by Hong Liang, Director-General of the Department of Boundary and Ocean Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Early April 2023: China released a third set of names in Mandarin, Tibetan and pinyin characters for Arunachal Pradesh, including two land areas, two residential areas, five mountain peaks and two rivers.

April 5, 2023: The US reacted after China renamed 11 places in Arunachal Pradesh, which it claims as Southern Tibet. In a statement, the White House said that the US has recognised Arunachal Pradesh as an integral part of India and strongly opposes any unilateral attempts to advance territorial claims by renaming localities. This was a signal meant for Bhutan and an assurance to Thimpu that the US will be ready to militarily cooperate with India in repelling any Chinese territorial aggression against both Bhutan and India.

April 10, 2023: EX Cope India 23, a bilateral Air Exercise between the IAF and the USAF, commenced at Air Force Stations Arjan Singh (Panagarh), Kalaikunda and Agra. The exercise aimed to enhance mutual understanding between the two air forces and share their best practices. The first phase of exercise focussed on air mobility and involved transport aircraft and special operations forces assets from both the air forces. The USAF fielded an MC-130J of 1st SOS from Kadena, as well. The exercise also included the presence of Japanese Air Self-Defence Force aircrew, who participated in the capacity of observers. USAF participants included the 374th Airlift Wing’s 374th Operations Group, 374th Maintenance Group, and the 374th Mission Support Group from Japan’s Yokota air base.

April 13, 2023: The next phase of EX Cope India 23 commenced at Air Force Station Kalaikunda. This segment of the exercise witnessed the participation of USAF B-1B bombers of the 28th Bomb Wing’s 34th Bomb Squadron from the Ellsworth AFB in South Dakota. F-15E Strike Eagles from the 336th FS from Japan’s Kadena air base joined the exercise subsequently. The IAF element included Su-30MKIs, Rafale, Tejas Mk.1 and Jaguar IS/DARIN-2 combat aircraft. The exercise was supported by aerial refuellers and AEW & CS aircraft of the IAF. The exercise concluded on April 24, 2023. This marked the first time that a B-1B Lancer has participated in an exercise with India, second time being in India in the last two months, and third time in two years that the 34th BS has flown and landed in India. The principal aim of this exercise was to convince Bhutan that the US will be ready to militarily cooperate with India in repelling any Chinese territorial aggression against both Bhutan and India.

Late May 2023: In a significant development ahead of Indian PM Narendra Modi’s visit to the US starting June 22, a powerful US Congressional Committee has recommended strengthening NATO + by including India. Currently, the NATO + 5, is a security arrangement that brings together NATO and five aligned nations—Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Israel, and South Korea—to boost global defence cooperation. Bringing India on board would facilitate seamless intelligence-sharing between these countries and India would also be able to access the latest military technology without much of a time lag. The House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition between the US and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), led by Chairman Mike Gallagher and Ranking Member Raja Krishnamoorthi, overwhelmingly adopted a policy proposal to enhance Taiwan’s deterrence, including through strengthening NATO + to include India. “Winning the strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party and ensuring the security of Taiwan demands the United States strengthen ties to our allies and security partners, including India. Including India in NATO + security arrangements would build upon the US and India’s close partnership to strengthen global security and deter the aggression of the Communist Party of China across the Indo-Pacific region,” the Select Committee recommended. An initiative of the Republican leadership, the Select Committee is popularly called the China Committee. Indian-American Ramesh Kapoor, who has been working on this proposal for the past six years, said this is a significant development. He hoped that the recommendation would find a place in the National Defense Authorization Act 2024 and finally end up becoming a law of the land.

US Secretary of Defense Lloyd J Austin III will visit India in early June to advance discussions on bilateral defence cooperation. During his visit, he is expected to sign on to the formal ‘NATO + 6’ agreement under which India would join the existing ‘Five Eyes’ grouping (that now comprises the US, Canada, the UK, Australia and New Zealand) that will enable the collection and dissemination of SIGINT/ELINT data emanating from China in a seamless manner. To this end, a chain of SIGINT/ELINT data collection sites will be established in Ladakh, Uttarakhand and Arunachal Pradesh, with India’s NTRO and the US National Security Agency (NSA) becoming the principal stakeholders.

Also expected to be inked is an agreement between Boeing and India’s Economic Explosives Ltd under which both companies will co-develop a ‘desi’ version of the 150km-range Boeing/Saab Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb (GLSDB), which will navigate towards the target with INS navigation that is supported by a highly jamming-resistance GPS (NavIC receivers to be used). Since the system does not need a ballistic path toward the target it is possible to launch the GLSDB from a container, and engage targets 360 degrees without moving the launcher. GLSDB has the ability to fly non-ballistic trajectories and it manoeuvres to strike targets that cannot be reached by conventional direct fire weapons, such as reverse slope engagement.

While in New Delhi on June 5, US SECDEF Lloyd J Austin III and his Indian counterpart signed off on three agreements, including one that is an annexe to the LEMOA agreement under which Indian shipyards like L & T’s Kattupali and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilding & Engineering will undertake the servicing of US Navy warships serving with both the US Indo Pacific Command and the US Central Command. This has been a long process, with many ups and downs since the first modest steps were taken with the end of the Cold War three decades ago. The 1991 Kicklighter proposals (Lt Gen Claude Kicklighter was the then Army Commander at the US Pacific Command) suggested establishing contacts between the three armed services of both to promote exchanges and explore areas of cooperation. An Agreed Minute on Defence Cooperation was concluded in 1995 instituting a dialogue at the Defence Secretary-level together with the setting up of a Technology Group, which had then suggested that the US Navy make use of Indian shipyards for its warship repair requirements.

The second agreement was about extending the US ‘Fish Hook Undersea Defense Line’ SOSUS network to both the eastern and western seaboards of India. Within the IOR, the SOSUS network presently stretches across the Java Sea from Kalimantan to Java, across the Sunda Strait between Java and Sumatra, and from the northern tip of Sumatra along the eastern side of India’s Andaman and Nicobar island chain. Real-time information-sharing between the US and Japan joins the undersea defence line-up, effectively drawing a tight arc around Southeast Asia, from the Andaman Sea to Japan. The latest extension of the SOSUS network will bring vast swathes of the Bay of Bengal and the southwestern portion of the Indian Ocean under the SOSUS surveillance envelope.

Under the third agreement, the US Marine Corps and US Navy will share expertise with the Indian Navy and Indian Army on seaborne expeditionary warfare tactics and operations through a series of joint exercises.

US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan will arrive in Delhi on June 13 for a two-day visit to finalise details of the GE-414 turbofan’s co-production by HAL’s Koraput-based Engine Division and GE Aero Engines, finalise the multilateral agreement concerning the ‘Six Eyes’ grouping and the NATO + 6 grouping, and finalise the bilateral agreement concerning the construction of SIGINT/ELINT data collection sites all along the China-India border areas. Most importantly, under the auspices of the initiative on critical and emerging technologies (iCET) and the related Defence Industrial Cooperation roadmap, the US is putting together a military-industrial grouping of the US, Israel and India that will together co-develop and series-produce a new-generation solid-fuelled rocket-launched hypersonic cruise missile capable of both land attack and naval strike.

INS Delhi After Undergoing Mid-Life Refit; Data-Links on IAF MRCAs & Combat-Support Platforms

2023-05-10T00:44:00.011+05:30

VHF/UHF/L-Band Tactical Data-Links on IAF MRCAs

VHF/UHF/L-Band Tactical Data-Links On IAF Combat-Support Aircraft

Decoding A 1980s-Era Espionage Operation

2023-04-01T03:37:00.009+05:30

Thus far, only one senior Indian Air Force (IAF) has gone public (see below) with a much-publicised espionage operation that had been mounted by the US in the early 1980s inside India.

In March 1983, India’s Intelligence Bureau (IB) finally had the proof it wanted. Singh was approached by AVM (Ret’d) Kenneth Larkins on March 20 and asked whether he would consider passing on classified manuals of USSR-supplied MiG-23MFs and MiG-25Rs in the Indian Air Force (IAF) inventory. On March 24, Singh informed AVM Raghavendran that the approach had been made and that Larkins had promised him Rs.30,000 for each manual. Singh was instructed to pass on a classified manual on the MiG-23MF’s avionics suite, which he did when Larkins visited him in his office at IAF Headquarters on April 3. On April 5, Larkins returned the manual along with a preliminary payment of Rs.10,000. When shown the details of the surveillance, Frank Larkins quickly confessed. His 10-page confession led to the arrest of two more members of the spy ring, Jaspal Singh Gill, a Delhi-based businessman and his employee, Lt Col (Ret’d) Jasbir Singh. He was recruited by a CIA operative who was an Attache at the US Embassy. He in turn recruited the Larkins brothers who were asked to recruit more people. The original CIA operative had left India in 1982 and handed over the network to Harry L Weatherbee, the CIA man named in Larkins' confession who was given 24 hours to leave India after the spy ring was busted in early November. On November 3, 1983 a posse of officers from the Special Branch of Delhi Police accompanied by IB sleuths quietly arrested Maj Gen (Ret’d) Frank Larkins from his Vasant Vihar house. AVM Kenneth Larkins was picked up simultaneously from his hometown of Lucknow just one week before he was scheduled to emigrate to Australia where his daughter lives.

However, it is now possible to connect two separate but related operations together, thanks to this book (see above) that was published early during the previous decade. From the contents of this book, one can safely infer that the wealth of information being supplied to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) since 1978 by Adolf Tolkachev, the Leading Systems Designer for the Scientific Research Institute for Radio-Engineering (Phazotron NIIR), was found to be too good to be true and consequently the CIA required a second source for confirming the authenticity of all the data that Tolkachev was providing. And that was the precise reason why the CIA launched a covert data-gathering operation in India by targetting those very weapon systems of USSR-origin that were then beginning to enter service with the Indian Air Force and Indian Army.

Over a six-year period (1978-1985), Tolkachev met with his CIA handlers 21 times on the streets of Moscow. Documentation supplied by Tolkachev by late 1983 had included: complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of Phazatron NIIR’s Phazotron NIIR's N-003 Sapfir-23 X-band pulse-Doppler radar for the MiG-23MF, the 385kg N-019 Rubin RPLK-29/Sapfir-29 X-band pulse-Doppler radar with twist-cassegrain antenna and its successor, the NO19MP Topaz—both meant for the MiG-29B-12 and MiG-29B-13; complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of JSC V Tikhomirov Scientific Research Institute of Instrument Design’s N-001 Myech/RPLK-27 X-band pulse-Doppler radar with twist-cassegrain antenna for the Su-27SK; complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of the Zaslon RP-31/N-007 X-bnd PESA radar on-board the MiG-31; complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of the Shmel 3-D radar for the Beriev A-50 AEW & CS from NPO Vega; and complete sets of engineering and technical data-packages of both 2K12 Kub MR-SAM family and the Buk-М1 MR-SAM. The Soviet news agency TASS announced on October 22, 1986 that he had been executed.

Detailed presentations on Adolf Tolkachev's espionage activities:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pOe8rTGYVlM

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_jmJDXZVhVQ

Aero India 2023 Expo Highlights

2023-02-12T20:37:00.012+05:30

On-site hospitality, HAL-style!

Shown above are the AAM sub-systems that the IAF has been hawking since 2017 for indigenisation. No industrial takers of such offers as yet.

The above (generating 46kN thrust) is presently undergoing high-altitude tests at Zhukovsky in Russia. If a suitable afterburner can be developed, then this turbofan can become a likely candidate for powering the HLFT-42 LIFT.

HAL had to undertake a major re-design of the HTFE turbofan, which has resulted in developmental delays. The engine core will now be ready for high-altitude flight-tests by mid-2025. In contrast, development of the much more complex HTSE-1200 turboshaft engine (below) has made significant progress, including the commencement of high-altitude flight-tests of the engine core late last year.

The SAFRAN Aneto-1K turboshaft engine that has been selected for powering the IMRH. That was the reason why this engine was exhibited at the SAFRAN booth.

Below are the new HAL-developed products.

Shown below are some BEL-built products.

Shown below is the PG-HSLD precision-guided munition.

Bharat Dynamics Ltd stupidly labelled the anti-helicopter laser-guided CLGM as an ATGM.

Munitions shown by Bharat Dynamics Ltd.

CATS Project Poster.

Tejas Mk.1 maintenance training simulator.

Cooling system for the twin wingtip-mounted HBJ pods of the Su-30MKI.

MRF-built aircraft tyres.

The above missile is not a BVRAAM, but is a surface-launched supersonic aerial target.

Notice the changed configuration of the rocket nozzle? Even the twin lateral thrusters of HELINA removed to save the launch-helicopter airframe from damage.

However, the booth of Bharat Dynamics Ltd (BDL) continued to pass off the NAG as HELINA (see above) to all visitors, including official foreign delegations and senior Indian military officials! Perhaps, this was because the CMD of BDL is a former naval Commodore and hence is unable to distinguish between the NAG and HELINA!!!

Nose-mounted S-band AESA antenna is a new feature for the AEW & CS Mk.2 platform.

Above are the PGMs being produced by Adani Defence & Aerospace.

Adani-produced artillery ammunition rounds (above).

ELBIT Systems-developed SDR Manpacks built by Alpha Technologies/Adani Defence & Aerospace for the Indian Army.

HAL-built ALH Mk.3 of ICGS with nose-mounted ELTA-supplied EL/M-2022H search radar.

Helicopter-mounted low-recoil machine gun.

HAL is re-designing and upgrading the PTAE-7 turbojet to boost its fuel capacity for the CATS WARRIOR loyal wingman.

QR-SAM exhibits shown at the booth of Bharat Dynamics Ltd.

Guidance kits for artillery munitions shown at the IDEX pavilion.

Astra-1 BVRAAM and DARE-developed HBJ pod mounted on Tejas Mk.1 L-MRCA.

Tejas AF Mk.2 MWF

The ADA-designed TEDBF was shown as an insignificant exhibit.

DRDO-developed family of weapons ejector racks for a wide variety of MRCAs.

NUKON Aerospace-built quad-launcher (above) for the SAAW PGM. Shown below are the exhibits of the DRDO/Centre for Airborne Systems.

Pralay SS-BSM Poster.

DRDO-developed AESA RF seeker (left) and electro-mechanical RF seeker for BVRAAMs, QR-SAM, VL-SR-SAM and Akash-NG.

Below are posters of indigenous RF seekers. Presently, the solid-stated TWTs are being imported from JSC Agat of Russia. Indigenously developed solid-state TWTs are presently undergoing advanced flight-tests.

Shown below are posters of the Akash-NG E-SHORADS meant for the Indian Air Force. The RF seeker originally developed for the Astra-1 BVRAAM also serves as the baseline design for RF seekers developed for the Akash-NG E-SHORADS, QR-SAM and VL-SR-SAM.

MAREEM AIP Plug-In Module For Indian Navy's INS Kalvari S-21 CM-2000 Scorpene SSK

2023-01-24T20:22:00.000+05:30

As expected, the first MAREEM fuel cell-based Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system designed and developed by the DRDO’s Ambarnath-based Naval Materials Research Laboratory (NMRL) and built by an industrial consortium led by Larsen & Toubro (L & T), will be retrofitted to INS Kalvari S-21, starting from 2025. An agreement to this effect was signed between senior officials of NMRL and France-based Naval Group in Mumbai on January 23, 2023 to extend cooperation (meaning such cooperation had already been underway, but was kept under wraps) to enter into the detailed design phase (lasting 12 months) of the MAREEM AIP module for integration with the pressure-hull of the CM-2000 Scorpene. While the retrofit activities (starting in late 2024 and lasting till 2026) will be undertaken by Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd in cooperation with L & T. Naval Group will certify the AIP design for integration. INS Kalvari is then expected to re-enter service by 2028 after completing the mandatory sea-trials of both the MAREEM AIP module and its yet-to-be-selected on-board Lithium-Ion batteries that will replace the existing lead-acid batteries.

https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1893096

https://www.naval-group.com/en/drdos-fuel-cell-based-air-independent-propulsion-system-soon-be-fitted-onboard-ins-kalvari

Detailed data on the MAREEM AIP module can be found here:

http://trishul-trident.blogspot.com/2019/12/explained-mareem-aip-plug-in-module-for.html

Evolution of IAF's OTRs & Future Priorities

2022-12-22T18:33:00.006+05:30

Meanwhile, At Kochi...

2022-11-17T18:33:00.006+05:30

To Enter Service In Future...

India-Japan Military-Technical/Military-Industrial Cooperation Takes Off

2022-10-16T03:53:00.002+05:30

The first-ever military-technical/military-industrial cooperation projects between India and Japan have now entered the negotiations stage, after being green-lighted by the second Japan-India 2 + 2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo on September 8, 2022 (held between Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, Yoshimasa Hayashi, Minister of Defense of Japan, Yasukazu Hamada, Minister of Defence of India, Rajnath Singh and Minister of External Affairs of India, Dr S Jaishankar), with the Sixth India-Japan Joint Working Group on Defence Equipment and Technology Cooperation also being held concurrently.

The principal cooperating agencies from the two sides will be India’s Defence R & D Organisation (DRDO), the Indian Navy’s (IN) Weapons & Electronics Systems Engineering Establishment (WESEE) and Japan’s Japan's Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA). Together, the two will mentor and handhold the concerned military-industrial entities of both countries that will cooperate in developing two customised products: an integrated mast for the IN’s future principal surface combatants; and a new-generation Combat Information Centre (CIC) making widespread use of augmented reality technologies.

These two end-products will find application on board the IN’s projected seven Project17AU upgraded FFGs worth Rs.25,000 crore, five projected NG-DDGs worth Rs.50,000 crore and eight NGCs worth Rs.33,000 crore. The NORA-50 UNIted COmbined Radio aNtenna (UNICORN) integrated mast, which is already on board the 30FFM FFGs (22 to be procured) of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, features a bar-shaped dome that houses the antennae for tactical data-links, tactical air navigation system (TACAN), communications suites and ESM/EW/ELINT suites. The UNICORN has a shape designed to reduce the radar cross section (RCS), which makes it stealthy.

The ‘Advanced Integrated CIC’, developed by Mitsubishi Electric Co (MELCO), contains the OYQ-1 combat management system (CMS) and OYX-1-29 information display & processing system (IDPS). It features a circular arrangement and comprises an outer rim, with 14 multifunction consoles (plus two extra seats), all facing the wall; and three rows at the centre of the circular arrangement comprising a central helm station, four additional multifunction consoles (likely for the commanding officer and his XO), and two large horizontal tactical tables likely for cooperative mission planning and navigation purposes. According to MELCO, the 360° giant screen can be used to display the direct surroundings of the FFG by fusing the feed and data from the many on-board optronic and radar sensors.

Such augmented reality technology will greatly assist the crew in the field of navigation, asymmetric warfare and even in the phase of launch and recovery of unmanned surface vehicles. In addition, the ‘video wall’ can display any and all information typically displayed on multifunction consoles. For instance, information from the engine control room, and typically displayed as part of the integrated platform management system (IPMS), can now be displayed in the CIC thanks to the video wall. Also, tasks such as engine control, damage control and fire-fighting control can now be undertaken from inside the CIC. The two large tables with built-in monitors and touch-screen controls will prove useful for examining digitised navigational charts (ECDIS) and other situational awareness data collaboratively.

From Japan’s side, the principal military-industrial players will be Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) and its MELCO subsidiary, and Mitsui Engineering & Shipbuilding. From the Indian side, the principal military-industrial players will include the MoD-owned Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (which has to date built integrated masts for the IN’s three Project 15A DDGs and four Project 15B DDGs and is building four more for the under-construction Project 17A FFGs), and the MoD-owned Bharat Electronics Ltd.

Western FMBTs Profiled

2022-10-11T19:47:00.015+05:30

The General Dynamics Land Systems AbramsX MBT features an autoloader, unmanned turret, hybrid electric powerpack that gives 50% more fuel efficiency, and reduced weight for improved mobility. It weighs about 62 metric tonnes and has a power-to-weight ratio of 25 hp/tonne.

Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) has been co-developed by Rheinmetall and KNDS, a joint venture consisting of Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) and Nexter Systems. The MGCS weighs 61.5 metric tonnes and has a power-to-weight ratio of 25 hp/tonne.

Another option from the same Franco-German OEM partnership is the E-MBT (above), which has a four-man crew concept (2-man turret, two-person chassis). The turret hosts a 30mm RCWS for shooting down UAVs. In addition, the E-MBT is ready for the integration of ASCALON (140mm smoothbore cannon) and other turrets in the future.

The 59-metric tonne Rheinmetall Panther KF-51 MBT with 130mm L-52 smoothbore cannon has a power-to-weight ratio of 27 hp/tonne.

Nexter Systems’ Leclerc MBT Scorpion/XLR weighs 57 metric tonnes and has a power-to-weight ratio of 27.52 hp/tonne.

The 48-metric tonne Mitsubishi Type-10 MBT (below) is powered by a 1,400hp diesel engine and has a power-to-weight ratio of 27 hp/tonne.

From the above, the following can be inferred: 1) The Heavy-MBTs are here to stay at least for the foreseeable next 20 years. 2) Thanks to High-Nitrogen Steel (HNS), weight reduction of Heavy-MBTs is now possible, with as much as 8 metric tonnes being reduced. This in turn has resulted in new-generation MBTs weighing not more than 60 metric tonnes, and this in turn enables them to achieve favourable power-to-weight ratios required for high mobility on the battlefields. 3) The Heavy-MBTs’ new-generation turrets will become totally unmanned, with the tank crew being accommodated in the hull. 4) The principal armament will be 120mm or 130mm or 135mm smoothbore cannons, while the turret-mounted RCWS will contain 30mm HMGs (capable of shooting down mini-/micro-UAVs) that will replace the existing 12.7mm HMGs. 5) The turret-mounted ammunition autoloaders will be designed for handling only unitary rounds of various types, thereby doing away with the rotating carousels carrying two-unit rounds. 6) The content of vectronics will increase on account of the incorporation of see-through-armour suites, active protection suites, all-electric gun-control/turret traverse systems, and health-and-usage-monitoring suites. 7) The 1,500hp diesel engine coupled to an automatic transmission will continue to be the favoured powerpack. 8) Lastly, the turrets will be able to accommodate launchers for both mini-UAVs for battlefield surveillance and for short-range loitering PGMs.

New-generation Light Tanks, weighing not more than 35 metric tonnes and powered by 1,200hp powerpacks, will have high power-to-weight ratios as well, but they will be employed as part of mechanised Battalion-sized quick-reaction combined-arms integrated battle groups capable of dominating high-altitude mountain passes and river-valleys over mountainous terrain. However, they will have to be accompanied by 8 x 8 vehicles armed with anti-armour guided-missiles like the helicopter-launched RAFAEL Spike-NLOS missiles.

GDLS MPF Light Tank

BAE Systems M-8 Buford Light Tank

NORINCO VT-5/ZTQ-105/Type 15 Light Tank

Hägglunds-Bofors-BAE Systems CV-90-120T Ghost

Hanwha K-21 Light Tank

Boxer Light Tank

PL-01 Light Tank

CVRDE-Designed ZORAWAR Light Tank

PRACHAND LCH Is Defenceless...As Of Now

2022-10-04T02:09:00.007+05:30

In March 2020 the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS), which met under the Chairmanship of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, had approved procurement of 15 Limited Series Production (LSP) variants of LCH at Rs.3,887 crore along with infrastructure sanctions worth Rs.377 crore. Of the 15 helicopters, 10 are for the Indian Air Force (IAF) and five for the Indian Army (IA). Eventually, the IA plans to procure 97 LCHs and the IAF 65.

The IA raised the 351 Army Aviation Squadron on June 1, 2022 in Bengaluru and received its first three LCHs on September 29. The fourth LCH is expected by the last week of October, after which the 351 Army Aviation Squadron will move to Missamari by the month’s end. The fifth LCH is expected to be delivered by late November. Presently, the Army Aviation Corps has three Brigades at Leh, Missamari and Jodhpur, and operates around 145 Advanced Light Helicopters (ALH), 75 of which are the Dhruv WSI/Rudra weaponised variants. Another 25 ALH Mk.3s are on order, which will be inducted within two years. The IA will also start receiving six AH-64E Apache attack helicopters in early 2024, which had been contracted under an estimated US$800 million deal with Boeing in February 2020. In addition, the IA is also pushing a case for 11 more Apaches, for which negotiations are under way.

The Indian Air Force (IAF) had formally inducted four ‘Prachand’ LCHs into 143 Helicopter Unit ‘Dhanush’ at Jodhpur Air Force Station on October 3.

Back in 2015 during the Aero India expo at Bengaluru, HAL Chief Test Pilot Retired Wg. Cdr. Unnikrishnan had told me that the RWR, LWR and MAWS sensors would most probably be installed along the twin stub-wings of the LCH. As of now, neither the IA LCHs nor the IAF PRACHANDs have an on-board self-protection suite comprising radar warning receivers, laser warning receivers, missile approach warning systems and countermeasures dispensers--all of which exist on board the IA and IAF Dhruv WSI/Rudra helicopter gunships. To make matters worse, the HELINA/Dhruvastra anti-armour guided-missile suite remains elusive as well for both the Dhruv WSI/Rudra and the LCH! Will IA HQ and IAF HQ both claim that all such suites will find their way on board the SP-series LCHs? We shall see. In addition, both the IA HQ and IAF HQ should be asked if any other army or air force in the world is flying attack helicopters that are devoid of self-protection suites. If not, then what pleasures do the two armed services HQs derive from being the global exception to the norm. Or will both LCH variants cruise only within friendly airspace during wartime? This is highly embarrassing, to say the very least.

IAF's Project Eagle Eye, Plus IA's Battlespace Digitisation Efforts For IBGs & China's Perception of Friction Points In Eastern Ladakh

2022-09-08T22:37:00.008+05:30

Dhruti Radar Warning Receivers on IAF

Su-30MKI H-MRCAs

IA's Battlespace Digitisation Efforts For IBGs

AVision is a JV between Israel-based UVision Air Ltd & Hyderabad-based Aditya Precitech Pvt Ltd that is offering the PALM family of loitering PGMs.

https://www.avisionsystems.com/tactical-systems/

China's Perception of Friction Points In

Eastern Ladakh

Recalling History

The climate in Tibet is dry and healthy and troops require no protection against rainfall. Road-making and building of air strips are simple processes and miles and miles of road can be laid out simply by demarcating the alignment with stones. The ground is hard and generally smooth and so motor vehicles can be driven sometimes over hundreds of miles without undertaking any heavy engineering work. Similarly, air strips can be laid out at many places. And, once the roads and air strips are laid, there is hardly any wear and tear caused by climatic conditions as there is little rainfall and very little snow due to the absence of humidity. Whereas it was an extremely difficult engineering job to build even 10 miles of roads in NEFA and Sikkim and even in UP, and the roads often had to pass over high snow-clad mountain ranges in Ladakh and Himachal Pradesh, China was sitting pretty on a high plateau (roof of the world) where the only effort it required in even laying down hundreds of miles of roads was to mark out the direction by flags or pieces of stones on both sides. Only an occasional digging or filling or blasting had to be done. The surface was generally so hard that it could take heavy military traffic without any deterioration and required no metalling or tarring. Compared to this, in the soft hillsides of NEFA even the best road just melted away and disappeared during the rains. No means had till then been found of circumventing the deep layer of snow on all the passes, which stopped communications between Kashmir and Ladakh for the better part of the year. That India’s frontier roads were not ready by the time the conflict with China started is no reflection on Indian road-builders. India’s was an incomparably more difficult task than what the Chinese faced. Simultaneously with developing road communications toIndia’s frontier areas, China also extended its administrative control in such areas like Pemako, Chimdru, Migytun and Tsona, which it had previously left uncontrolled except by sending occasional parties. Thus, by the end of 1958, China's control over Tibet was complete.

The Govt of India accepted the legacy of the British and drew a boundary starting from the trijunction of' India, China and Afghanistan through Kilik Pass, Mintaka Pass, Kharchanai Pass, Parpik Pass and Khunjerab Pass. These were all taken as the boundary of Hunza State. From Khunjerab the boundary crossed the Muztagh River and came to the Aghil Mountains and then on to the Aghil watershed and to Marbo Pass and Shaksgarn Pass to tile Karakoram Pass. A little to the east of this pass the main Karakoram Range takes a southerly direction and no longer forms the boundary. But from the point the Karakorain Range turns south, another range of mountains, known as the Akhtagh Range, takes off and this forms the watershed between Shyok coming to the Indus system and the watershed of Yarkand. This was taken as the boundary east of Karakoram Pass, going through Qara Tagh Pass, crossing the Karakash River and then joining with the Kuen Lun Mountains. Thereafter the boundary went through Yangi Pass along the crest of the mountains separating the Yurungkash Basin fom those of the lakes in Aksai Chin. Leaving the crest of the Kuen Lull Mountains, the boundary running south-westwards passed along the watershed separating the basins of Amtogar and Sallg Jilganang Lakes in lndia f5rom those of Leighten and Tsoggar Lakes in Tibet and finally came down to Lanak La. This boundary, which was accepted by the Government of lndia and was put on the map, followed the natural high watcrshed principle throughout and was also the natural boundary of'the area up to which the Ladakhis had from times immemorial exercised the right of pasture and collection of salt. It is true that north of this line, which was a no-man's-land, the Ladakis did not normally go. Through it lay the trade routes between Yarkhalid and Leh and also between Yarkhand and Gartok.

But between the northern boundary of Ladakh as claimed by lndia and the southern boundary of Sinkiang as claimed by China there were 16,000 sq. miles of territory which was uninhabited. Through this lay three trade routes; (1) through Karakoram Pass via Panamik or Shyok to Leh, (2) via Haji Langar and passing through Shinglung, Shamul Lumpka, Tsogatsalu, Phobrang to Leh and (3) from Haji Langar through the eastern end of Aksai Chin, past Amtogar Lake to Rudok and then to Gartok. There were some good pastures between Pangong Lake and Lanak La, which the people of Phobrang and other neighbouring villages in Ladakh utilised during summer. Similarly the Amtogar Lake was used for collection of salt. Some enthusiastic shikaris travelled in this area in quest of mountain goats or bears and, besides the traders who used to come from Khotan (Hotien) to Leh, the only other parties who visited this area were the patrol and survey parties sent by the Kashmir Government. There was no need for any effective administrative occupation of this territory as it was uninhabited.

In late 1949, the first joint IB-IA checkpost was set up at Panamik/Shyok to cover the route from Karakoram and an Intelligence post was opened at Leh. The scheme, which was sanctioned by the GoI in 1950, consisted of 21 checkposts, excluding the one already established in Ladakh, and these were all set up by the beginning of 1951. Some further increases were made after the receipt of the Himmatsinghji Committee Report, and by the end of 1952, 30 checkposts were in operation in the frontier, of which 7 were in Ladakh, 4 in Punjab-Himachal Pradesh, 6 in UP, 5 in Sikkim and 8 in NEFA. In 1958, 14 posts were added in NEFA bringing the total to 22. By 1960 the total number of posts had risen to 69 in Ladakh, 9 in Himachal Pradesh-Punjab, 17 in UP, 10 in Sikkim and 22 in NEFA, the total staff employed being 1,334. Re-adjustments and further strengthening were taking place all through this troublesome period and by 1962 the number of posts had risen to 77 employing 1,590 personnel. Every year since 1958 IA patrol parties set out from Leh and trekked along the northern route towards Karakoram, the north-eastern route to Aksai Chin, Lingzithang, etc. and the eastern route to Lanak La, etc. The patrol parties were often out of communications with Leh for over three months as they had no wireless sets.

Immediately after the Chinese Communist forces "liberated" Sinkiang, it was reported by us that with the help of Russian engineers the Chinese were developing road communication in Xinjiang. Chou En-lai had claimed in 1960 that Chinese troops had entered Western Tibet as early as October, 1950, by the Aksai Chin Road. But in this he was pulling a fast one. Unfortunately, without verifying Chou En-lai's claim, some writers have accepted this assertion true. There was irrefutable evidence that the PLA did not enter Gargunsa in western Tibet till June, 1951. These troops came not through Aksai Chin but from Khotan (Hotien) via Keriya, Nurmat Langar, Polur, Aqsu, Khizil Pass, Baba Hatim, Kokyar Pass, Altoon Pasha, Yashil Tso, Ibrahim Kol, Jawaza, Dung Ming, Zama Mangbo, Mense to Gargunsa. This route at no point passed within 100 miles of the north-eastern frontier of Ladakh. China had first tried to open this route to motor traffic but encountered many engineering difficulties. Soon after their arrival at Gargunsa, the PLA’s surveyors started prospecting for a direct route to Gartok via Rudok from Sinkiang along an old silk route which existed part of the way. The surveyors were noticed near Rudok surveying the possibility of opening this route for motor traffic in October, 1951. The first mule caravan using this route arrived at Rudok from Xinjiang in April, 1952. Then the PLA decided to discard the Hotien-Keriya-Polur-Dun Ming-Gargunsa road and decided to go all out for this shorter route via Aksai Chin. After this the regular change-over of troops from Yarkhand to Western Tibet started through this route though the movements were yet on foot or animals as the motor road had not yet been constructed. In November, 1952, the IB reported that the PLA had engaged 2,000 labourers to develop this route into a jeep track and they planned to complete the construction by 1953.

In December 1952, the IB reported that the jeep-track from Xinjiang to Lake Amtogar had been completed and the PLA was working to bring the road to Rudok. In 1953, the IB reported that the jeep track to Rudok had been completed and regular jeep traffic had cornmenced. It was because of these troop movements and the road-building activity that China had refused to allow a trade mart to be opened at Rudok. All through 1953-1954 the PLA was improving and constructing the road from Xinjiang to the Ladakh border (Haji Langar). There were two routes, both starting from Yarkhand. The route was the same up to Karghalik where it bifurcated. One branch went direct east to Hotien and then came down south, crossed the Kuen Lun mountains at Yangi Pass and came into Ladakh border at Haji Langar. The other branch first took a southernly direction from Karghali k, then turned east, passed through Kengshewar, entered north Ladakh near Qarakash river and joined the first route at Haji Langar. It was the second route, which was used mostly for traffic between Xinjiang and western Tibet. The Indian Trade Agent at Gartok reported in July and again in September 1955 that he had been told by China’s Vice-Chief of the Foreign Bureau of Ngari (Western Tibet) that China was going to construct the Xinjiang-Gartok road via Rudok as it was shorter than the Lhasa-Rudok road. He again reported in September, basing himself on the same source, that China had started work on this road. It was also in that year that a Chinese Transport Officer had told the Tibetans that Gartok would be linked with Xinjiang within two years and that the work on this road had been started from the summer of 1955. In January, 1956, IB sources reported the working of survey parties between Rudok and Gartok and it was learnt that this was for connecting Yarkhand with Gartok. By June 1956, it was learnt that the road from Hotien up to Karnang, north of Yangi Pass, had been completed. In July it was reported that the road from Xinjiang to Gartok was near completion. In March, 1957, China first announced the completion of the Xinjiang-Tibet Highway (G-219) without mentioning the alignment. In August the Indian Trade Agent at Gartok reported that the Gartok-Rudok road was almost complete and China hoped to run a through motor service from October onwards and that it laid great importance on this road as being vital. On October 6, 1957, the Xinjiang-Gartok road was formally opened with a ceremony at Gartok and 12 trucks on a trial run from Yarkhand reached Gartok. The road was reported to be 1,170km long. In January 1958, the New China News Agency (NCNA) reported that the Xinjiang-Tibet highway had been opened two months earlier and the road was being fully utilised. In February 1958, the IB reported that troops were being utilised to widen and improve this road.

One must, however, admit that though the IB’s informants, and even its staff, had personally visited the road from Gartok to Rudok and up to a point parallel to Lanak La, i.e. more or less the point at which the road entered Aksai Chin from the south, no Police party had actually traversed the portion of the road within the Aksai Chin itself. There were three ways how this could be done. The easiest would be to cross Lanak La into western Tibet, which was indisputably Chinese territory, strike the road some miles east of that pass and then travel north along the road. The party ran the almost certain risk of encountering the PLA. The second alternative was to go up to Haji Langar in the northern end where this road entered Aksai Chin from the Hotien side and travel southwards. The party would have to come back by the same route but again would run the certain risk of encountering the PLA and being captured. The third would be to strike direct east from Shamul Lungpa, cross two mountain ranges and come to the fresh water lake, Sarigh Jilganang Kol. Going further east, the party would strike this road. Travelling south and then north, the whole of this route could be traversed without at any point going beyond Indian territory. But on this occasion also the party would run the risk of encountering the PLA, though in India’s own territory. The easiest was the first course and this was the route the Ladakhis had taken for decades to go to Lake Amtogar to collect salt. But as explained above a part of this route would lie through indisputably Chinese territory. Regarding the other two routes, in those days the available resources did not permit us to do the trek up to Haji Langar and then along this road to Lake Amtogar, back to Haji Langar and then back to Leh, or to go from Shamul Lungpa to Salig Jilganang Kol and then traverse the road north and south and come out again by the way of Shamul Lungpa. Though the iB had a good idea on the map about the alignment of this road as the two ends were known and the IB had traced it in its maps, no member of the IB staff had actually traversed this part of the road. Only sources had travelled a few miles from the Lanak La side to fix the southern entry point. However, enough information was available about the construction of the G-219 right from 1951 to 1957, when the road was formally declared open. But though it was also known that the Chinese laid great stress on the construction of this road, which they considered to be vital, its implications to India's security in the Ladakh region were not properly comprehended at any level. All through these years no questions were raised by either IA HQ or the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) about this road.

Year after year the IB used to send its patrol parties during the summer to check infiltrations. Excepting the north-eastern Aksai Chin area, which the patrol parties had not visited, no sign of Chinese infiltration was noticed anywhere up to 1956. In fact, a patrol party going to Lanak La in June 1956, found that the Indian flag put up there by a party in 1954 was still flying though very much battered due to weather. But on August 29 that year, for the first time, the patrol party saw signs of a Chinese survey party having come up to Mebdo La, about two marches from Lanak La, in Indian territory. Actually the Chinese had not come from Lanak La but from the Niazi and Dambuguru side and had claimed Khurnak Fort to be in their territory though it was undisputedly Indian. In September 1956 unmistakable signs of a Chinese survey party having camped earlier at a nala called Zulung Khongma were found. Further on similar marks were found at Chhuzungpo Kongma. It was not yet clear whether the Chinese were trying to fix their boundary with Ladakh or were surveying for opening a road through Lanak La or Niazi towards the west, probably up to Hot Springs or Shamul Lungpa. Alarmed by this sign of China’s penetration in Indian territory, next year the IB made more elaborate arrangements for patrols to go to the frontier in all directions. The IB built up an advance post at Hot Springs, two marches from Phobrang, and the party went to Shamul Lungpa, Dehra Compass, Shinglung, Sumdo, then along the Qara Kash River to Malik Shah almost 40 miles inside Xinjiang. Tell-tale signs of fresh Chinese intrusion were found at Dehra Compass, Khizil Zilga and north and south of Khizil Zilga, Shinglung and between Shinglung and Sumdo. Signs were also found near the Qarakash River of an area having been marked on the dry bed of the river apparently for small aircraft to land. This was serious because the southern-most intrusion had taken China over 70 miles inside Indian territory. When judged against the intrusion noticed the previous year, it also became apparent that Chinese surveyors were trying to find a route from Haji Langar through Sumdo, Shinglung, Dehra Compass and Shamul Lungpa to link up with a road from Lanak La via Khongka La to Shaniul Lungpa. This road would go parallel to the claimed Chinese boundary deep within lndian territory. The report of the 1957 patrol party was available in early 1958, and the IB reported this to the GoI in March 1958, and recommended that a protest should be lodged with China against this serious trespass. The IB also recommended that in future at least two expeditions should be sent every year over this area—one by the IA and the other by the ITBP with IB officers attached to each. The IB also recommended that a proper map of the area should be made from the reports of the various expeditions which had been sent by the IB, that shacks should be constructed at camping places for accommodating officers and men who would be out on patrol and who had no place for halting; that the Phobrang frontier post should be strengthened and a summer post should be opened at Hot Springs as the IB felt that this would be more or less the link-up point between the possible routes coming from Lantrk La in the east and from Haji Langar in the north. On its own the IB left secret caches of food, kerosene, fuel and other indestructible material at Hot Springs to serve as the spring-board for its operations next summer. This report was discussed in the MEA with the IA’s CGS present. The line taken by the MEA was that the exact boundary of this area had not yet been demarcated and so in any protest we lodged we could not be on firm grounds. Probably the infiltrations had been made by over-zealous survey officers and did not indicate anything more serious. Moreover, as we were not physically controlling this area it would be useless to make any formal protest. The Chinese were sure to reject it and claim the territory as their own. The IA’s attitude was that it could send an occasional patrol but it was in no position to open and hold any posts in this area. Moreover, the G-219 road was not of any strategic importance and it would be difficult to oust the PLA from this region. In any case, the IA was in no position to make that effort because of the limited resources available at Leh and of the non-existence of any road communications from Leh to these parts. The conclusion was that India should intensify her patrols and also try to open one post north of Phobrang at Tsogatsalu to check Chinese infiltration. It was suggested that from this advance post we should do more effective patrolling of the Lingzi Tang area in summer.

One serious difficulty faced by the IB was that starting from Leh our patrols would have to cross three successive mountain ranges both towards Lingzi Tang and towards Karakoram and these passes did not open till July, so the patrol could be sent only in the second half of the year. The Chinese coming from Xinjiang into Lingzi Tang had no snow-clad passes to cross and could come to Indian territory, do the survey and go back before the IB patrol party could get into that area. In the meantime, a report had been received from India’s Embassy in Beijing about the completion of the G-219 road. The IB had also earlier reported it. So in June, 1958, another meeting was held in the MEA. This was attended by the IA’s CGS also. The Foreign Secretary maintained that neither the Embassy report nor the IB report conclusively proved that the Xinjiang-Western Tibet highway actually passed through Indian territory and no Indian party had actually traversed this route and so before any protest was lodged we should be sure of our ground. Hence it was decided that two patrol parties would be sent to traverse the G-219 road and see it on the ground if it passed through Indian territory. One would be of the IA and the other of the ITBP. The IA chose the known route from Hot Springs via Shamul Lungpa, Dehra Compass, Shinglung to Haji Langar to see the road from the northern end. The ITBP was left with either the route going through Lanak La into admittedly Chinese territory in Tibet or traverse an uncharted route direct east from Shamul Lungpa crossing two mountain ranges up to 18,000 feet high and land at Sarigh Jilganang Kol Lake. The IB chose the second route, as going via Lanak La it would be impossible to avoid the Chinese. The IB had foreseen a commitment of this type and had laid its stores the previous year at Hot Springs, which it now moved to Shamul Lungpa. The IA team was led by Lt. Iyengar. At Haji Langar this party encountered a PLAGF patrol and was taken prisoner and removed to a fort in Xinjiang where the members were detained for two months till a protest was lodged. Though this team had a wireless set, it went out of order and so the team remained out of touch with its HQ from the very beginning. The ITBP team was led by Karam Singh. He stuck to the route charted out on the map prepared by the IB and reached Sarigh Jilganang Kol. Numerous heavy tyre marks were seen on the bank of the lake. From these and other marks, it was clear that the Chinese had halted at this place and that Chinese trucks were taking water from the lake. The party went further east crossing the G-219 road up to Ladakh's boundary and planted the Indian tricolour. It came back to the road and traversed it both north and south up to Lake Amtogar. The party members saw a Chinese convoy but managed to hide themselves effectively and to take photographs of the convoy. Karam Singh took out one of the wooden pegs demarcating road miles in Chinese. This hazardous trip undertaken by Karam Singh confirmed without any doubt that the so-called G-219 road really cut across Indian territory from Haji Langar in the north to Amtogar in the south. The Govt of India then made a protest to Beijing about this road and also enquired if Lt Iyengar was being held by them. Lt Iyengar's party was then released, but not at Haji Langar where it had been captured, but at the Karakoram Pass, which was the only point where there was no dispute about the lie of the frontier. The Chinese summarily rejected the protest about the road.

Earlier, another patrol party of the IB going to the Karakoram Pass from Panamik had found signs of Chinese infiltration near Daulat Beg Oldi from the Qara Kash side. With regard to the Chinese infiltration in Lingzi Tang, Aksai Chin and Soda Plains, the IB recommended that the checkpost at Phobrang should be raised to a Company HQ and Police posts should be opened at Tsogatsalu, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. The IB also recommended that the IA should establish posts at Sarigh Jilganang Kol in the east and Palong Karpo in the north to be near the two ends of the G-219 road. Our argument was that if we could not prevent the Chinese from using and further developing the G-219, we could at least stop them from extending their road system further within our territory and the signs were that they were trying to connect Haji Langar with Shamul Lungpa and join it up with thc projected Lanak La-Sharnul Lungpa road. The IB’s recommendation was discussed in January, 1959, at a meeting in the MEA with Gen Thimayya, Chief of the Army Staff, present. Thimayya quite categorically stated that he did not consider that the G-219 road was of any strategic importance nor was he willing to open any posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol because he felt that small IA posts would be of little use and in any case he had no means of maintaining them from his base at Leh. When the IB argued that the Chinese were using this road to bring reinforcements to western Tibet whence they could threaten eastern Ladakh and so this road was of much security importance to India, Gen Thimayya agreed but expressed his inability to do anything about it. The Foreign Secretary also agreed with the IA’s COAS and felt that posts at Shamul Lungpa, Shinglung, etc. would be of no use to stop Chinese infiltration. They might even provoke the Chinese into making further intrusions. The IB was informed by the Foreign Secretary after some days that the Prime Minister had approved of his views and no posts need be opened in this area. Against this decision the IB protested in February 1959, and maintained that even if the IA could not open posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilgnang Kol the IB should be allowed to open posts there. The IB also argued that it should be allowed to open the posts at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. It would keep Police at these places not for the purpose of fighting the Chinese but to prove India’s possession so that the Chinese might not claim that area and quietly occupy it. The IB also recommended that the posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol could be fed by air and the other posts would be maintained by animal transport. Shortly after receiving the IB’s note of February 16, the Prime Minister passed orders that whilst we should not open posts at Palong Karpo and Sarigh Jilganang Kol, because they would be too near the G-219 road and might create tensions, the other posts recommended by the IB should be opened at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Shamul Lungpa and Shinglung. Out of them only the Tsogatsalu and Hot Springs posts could be opened in October 1959 but before the others could be opened the Chinese came in and occupied the area.

IA HQ knew that the Army was in no position to prevent the Chinese from constructing this road across Aksai Chin. According to the IA, it was physically impossible for it even to maintain posts at these places in the prevailing state of communications from Leh. Even the road from Srinagar to Leh was subject to interruptions for seven months in the year. Gen Thimayya knew the strength and the capability of the PLA. He had seen it at close quarters in Korea where the PLA had very nearly defeated the Americans. He knew that the IA in those days was in no position to engage the PLA in a big war. He was expressing this view even as late as 1962. And at such a remote place, where there was no means of sustaining the force, his troops would have suffered severe reverses at the very outset and he would be in no position to retrieve the situation. He was not to be lured into an area where he was in no position to defend himself. So he tried to play down the importance of the G-219 road and throw doubts on IB reports about its existence. If he admitted its importance from the security point of view, he might have been forced by Indian public opinion to engage in an unequal fight, the adverse result of which he clearly foresaw. The attitude of the MEA was that this part of the territory was useless to India. Even if the Chinese did not encroach into it, India could not make any use of it. The boundary had not been demarcated and had been shifted more than once by the British. There was an old silk route which was a sort of an international route. The Chinese had only improved it. It would be pointless to pick up quarrels over issues in which India had no means of enforcing her claims. These were all valid arguments and their validity seems to be more acceptable to the people at large and even the Opposition than it was in those days. The PM was no doubt inhibited by the same considerations and his knowledge about the weakness of his Army vis-a-vis the PLAGF and its inability those days to effectively prevent Chinese encroachment in Indian territory. Aksai Chin was the only part of Indian territory in which so far the Chinese had been able to make an entry. Ousting them from this area, he knew, was well-nigh impossible. So he was even willing to allow the Chinese the use of this road for civilian purposes.

All through these years the Chinese continued their road construction programme in all parts of Tibet relentlessly—engaging large numbers of Tibetans as labourers and treating them worse than slaves. By the end of 1958 the Chinese had completed the following arterial highways linking China with Tibet from north-east, east and west. The most important was the Sining (rail-head)-Gormo-Nagchuka-Zamsar-Lhasa roadand this carried most of the heavy traffic and practically all the patrol. Another road starting from Sining led to Nagchuka and Lhasa via Jyekundo and Chamdo. From the Chengtu side on the east a road led to Kanting and then connected with Chamdo via Kantse. From Kanting another road took off in a westerly direction and going via Markhang, Drokhang, Shugden, Chomo Dzong and Gianda terminated at Lhasa. Thus Lhasa was connected with China from the north-east and the east. From Lhasa a highway to the west passed through Shighatse, Lhatse, Saka, Tradom and Parkha and terminated at Gartok where it met the G-219 highway passing through Aksai Chin. A direct route was also built from Nagchuka along the northern steppes to Thokjalung and ending at Tashigong where it met the Gartok-Xinjiang highway. A road parallel to the Nepal border was constructed starting at Gyantse and passing through Khamba, Sekhar Dzong, Tingri, Dzongka Dzong and meeting the Lhasa-Gartok highway at Tradom. Besides these arterial roads, numerous roads were constructed towards India, Sikkim and Nepal borders, the more important of which were Drowa to Rima, Gyantse to Phari, Parkha to Taklakot and Gartok to Tholingmath. A road ran parallel to the south bank of the Tsangpo and from this radiated roads to Tsona and Lhuntze on the NEFA border and Lakhang Dzong on the Bhutan border. China had therefore carefully laid out both arterial and radial roads in Tibet and was no longer dependent on getting supplies from India to maintain the PLAGF in Tibet. China had also carried out, as the reports of Karam Singh's patrol parties showed, extensive surveys in the years 1956 and 1957 to the depth of nearly 70 to 80 miles within Indian territory south of Haji Langar and west of Lanak La. This also could not have been due to the ignorance about the exact position of the Chinese frontier. After having blatantly grabbed a part of Aksai Chin by the end of 1957, the Chinese by 1958 felt bold enough to occupy or claim other parts of Indian territory as they could then talk of maintaining the status quo as a handle to force the Govt of India to come to the negotiating table and dictate terms to the latter. So the time according to them was now ripe for a discussion of the frontier. This they did not indicate by adopting normal diplomatic procedures but applying pressure tactics of first deliberately creating incidents on the border and then questioning the validity of the entire frontier.

India's boundaries had been clearly marked in all Indian maps since 1954, which showed the whole of Aksai Chin, Soda Plains and Lingzi Tang, the Chang Chenmo Valley, etc. to be a part of Ladakh. Similarly, the whole of NEFA south of the McMahon Line as well as all territory up to the watershed of the Himalayas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh was within Indian boundaries. Similarly the northern boundaries of Sikkim and Bhutan were also clearly shown in these maps. So there was no shade of doubt about what India claimed to be her boundary. On the other hand, the Chinese maps were in small scale, the boundary was indefinite and varied in different maps and, except the fact that they included considerable parts of Indian territory in China, they did not help to determine the actual Chinese frontier. Nor did the frontier follow any internationally recognised principles such as watershed, high ranges, etc. In the China Pictorial of July 1958 (a Chinese official publication), a map of China showed practically the whole of NEFA, large areas in Ladakh, considerable areas in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh and even large areas of Eastern Bhutan as part of China. The publication of this map in an official journal meant clearly that the Chinese Communist Govt now openly claimed this frontier though it had previously not claimed the correctness of the old maps. Naturally the Government of India protested and, in a note on August 21, 1958, it pointed out the absurdity of the claim over Indian territory made in the Chinese map as published in the China Pictorial. The Chinese reply came on November 3, 1958. The old platitudes were repeated and it was again mentioned that this was a reproduction of old maps. But then followed the alarming statement that the Chinese Government had not till then undertaken a survey of the Chinese boundaries, and had not held consultations about them with the countries concerned. In other words, it was for the first time that China was openly questioning the entire boundary of Tibet not only with India but also with Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim and Burma. This was completely contrary to what Chou En-hi had stated earlier when he had practically accepted the & facto position and the validity of the McMahon Line, though not convinced of its legality; and when he had said that there were disputes only about small bits of territory in other sectors. China, therefore, was now about to lay claim to nearly 52,000 sq. miles of Indian territory.

During the months of May to September 1959, there were several cases of intrusions by PLA troops in NEFA, in Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. The Chinese were obviously trying to pick up quarrels and also find holes in the Indian security arrangements. Though in some cases Chinese troops remained in our territory for several weeks, these were temporary intrusions and on our protest the Chinese finally withdrew. But in eastern Ladakh they were following different tactics. Here they came for good and would not withdraw. They first occupied Khurnak Fort and a hill overlooking Chushul and posted a picket at Rezang La. They prevented Ladakhi graziers from going into their large traditional pastures of Nyagzu and Dambuguru. These were not mere cases of frontier violations but in some places of fairly deep penetration within Indian territory. In Nyagzu the penetration was as deep as 30 miles. When an Indian Police patrol went towards Khurnak Fort, it was captured and kept under detention for over a month and ultimately released. A serious violation occurred between Mygitun and Longju in NEFA. The border passed between Mygitun and Longju, but the Chinese claimed Longju to be a part of Mygitun and killed three Assam Rifles soldiers on the border and then came and surrounded Longju, which the Indians had to vacate as they were greatly outnumbered and there was no other alternative. The Chinese later withdrew from Longju but remained in force at Mygitun. The Indians could not re-occupy Longju and had to be content with a post at Maja, a few miles south of it. It was over this Longju incident that China did not get the complete support of Soviet Russia much to her chagrin. Protest notes from one side making allegations of violation and replies refuting the allegations from the other flowed endlessly-the despatches progressively becoming more acrimonious. From July 1959, China commenced further roadbuilding and penetration in Lingzi Tang further west of the G-219 road in right earnest. By September 1959, China had sent PLAGF troops into Chang Chenmo Valley and Lingzi Tang. In a statement made by Chen Yi, the Foreign Minister of China, before the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on September 13, 1959, he accused India of drawing her maps in such a way as to cut 38,000 sq km deep into Chinese territory along the Xinjiang-Tibet-Ladakh section, of invading Parigas, Chuva, Chusa, Shipki Pass, Puling Sumdo, Sangoha and Lapthal along the Tibet-Punjab-Uttar Pradesh frontier and annexing 90,000 sq km of Chinese territory along the Assam-Tibet frontier.

Why, in the face of Chinese construction of the Aksai Chin road and the fact that they had conducted surveys to connect Haji Langar with Lanak La via Shamul Lungpa, did the Govt of India not take immediate steps to secure their position over the rest of Aksai Chin and Lingzi Tang which the Chinese had till then not occupied? In January 1959, the IA's COAS considered that the road was of no strategic importance to India, though he admitted that it was through this road that the Chinese were bringing to western Tibet reinforcements which might threaten eastern Ladakh. In view of this assertion by the COAS, the MEA’s Foreign Secretary was inclined to soft-pedal the issue particularly as, according to him, the road was an improvement of the old silk route and the territory through which it passed was disputed. The IB’s suggestion to open posts at Tsogatsalu, Hot Springs, Kongka La, Shamul Lungpa, Shinglung, Palong Karpo and Saligh Zilganang Kol was considered to be impracticable and unnecessary and in effect provocative. The IB had moved the Union Home Ministry (MHA) to spare a company of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) to be moved into this area to open the posts. But surprisingly for the first time the MHA too turned unsympathetic to our request. The MHA first questioned the need for opening the posts in an area where "not a blade of grass grew" and then raised various administrative difficulties and said that, as the CRPF was fully committed, a new company would have to be raised and this could not be got ready for at least two to three years. Wazir Mehra. the Inspector General of Police, Jammu & Kashmir, was next approached for assistance. He had a battallon of the CRPF in the valley, which was not deployed for any immediate work as the valley was then quiet and peaceful. With the concurrence of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed, the Prime Minister of Jammu & Kashmir, he agreed to release one company out of this battalion for use in Ladakh. The IB then started negotiating with the IAF to lift the company with all its equipment to Leh. This took over a month, because the carrying capacity of the IAF was very limited those days and this was a new commitment which it had not provided for. But as was usual with the IAF it rose to the occasion and ultimately by the end of September 1959, the company landed at Leh. The Tsogatsalu post was opened on October 17, and the post at Hot Springs on October 19. Earlier, in June, Karam Singh's patrol had gone right up to Lanak La and had met no Chinese at either Kongka La or at Lanak La. On October 20, one patrol consisting of a local man and a constable was sent towards Kongka La, because the idea was to open the next post at that place. This patrol did not return. So on October 21, Karam Singh with 20 men and a small rear guard moved towards Kongka La in search of the missing patrol. He found hoof marks on the way, which indicated that some Chinese horsemen had come into that area and probably they had arrested the two Indians. Two miles west of Kongka La, near the bank of the Chang Chenmo river, Karam Singh's party of 20 was ambushed by two Chinese pickets, one perched on a hill top on the flank of the route by which the Indian party was advancing and another located in front on the other side of the river. This was cold-blooded murder and eight of the policemen lay dead in a few minutes. But the rest succeeded in taking some cover and fought till their ammunition ran out. They had killed at least one Chinese officer and injured some others. The party could not return as their retreat was cut off by the Chinese picket on the hill top. They could not escape along the river-bed as this was guarded by the Chinese picket on the other bank. At about dusk the Chinese brought some reinforcements from Kongka La and 12 policemen, including Karam Singh, some of them badly wounded, were taken prisoners. They were taken to Kongka La at the point of bayonets carrying their injured comrades. One constable, who was badly injured, had to be left behind and was killed by the Chinese. At Kongka La they were held in a largish Chinese camp, which the enemy had earlier established. Here Karam Singh and other prisoners were made to undergo severe indignities and tortures and they were constantly threatened to confess that they had trespassed into Chinese territory. The Govt of India very strongly protested and ultimately the Chinese released the prisoners and returned the dead bodies on November 14 on the bank of the Silung Barma river, which they claimed was the western frontier of Tibet. The Silung Barma river was only three miles east of Hot Springs, whereas the traditional frontier for centuries had been at Lanak La, which was 40 miles further east. Karam Singh had gone with a patrol up to Lanak La via Hot Springs and Kongka La only four months earlier. He had not met any Chinese on the way, so there was no doubt that the Chinese trespass in this area occurred after June 1959. If the IB had opened the posts in June, it could have forestalled the Chinese. They could, of course, come in force and throw the Indians out as they had done at Longju; but they could not have claimed the absence of any Indian posts as evidence of their own possession over this territory as they did later.

On September 23, 1959 when the facts of this outrage came to be known, the PM Pandit Nehru held a meeting which was attended by the Defence Minister, the COAS and officers from the Ministries of MEA, Home and Defence. The IA demanded that no further movements of armed CRPF should take place on the frontier without its clearance. In complete command of his facts, the IB fought tenaciously and effectively countered all accusations. But placed as he was, the PM had to give in to the IA’s demand. The result was that the protection of the border was thereafter handed over to the IA and all operations of the CRPF were made subject to prior approval of the Army Command. The COAS had even demanded that all the IB posts and their communications should be placed under his control. One would not blame the Army for this attitude in this matter. It was in no position at that time to guard the frontier effectively or keep units at the checkposts which the lightly equipped CRPF were holding. The logistics in Ladakh were against the concentration of any sizeable force in the Aksai Chin area. It was for these reasons that Gen Thimayya had earlier opposed the opening of any Indian posts in this area. If the Police got into any trouble with the Chinese, the IA would necessarily be drawn into it though it would be quite unprepared for it. As the IA could not yet fight at these places, it would prefer the disputes to be settled at diplomatic levels rather than at rifle point. Moreover, in this difficult region the Army would rather let the Chinese occupy the territory up to their claimed frontier than put up opposition which they were afraid they could not sustain. But the result was that thenceforward the IB could not take any initiative in opening posts in areas which were yet unoccupied and which were indisputably within Indian frontiers as the IB had been doing during the previous eight years. The Army was also not in a position to do so for quite sometime yet. Security of the frontier by the Army only remained on paper, because no additional army units were moved to the frontier till a year later. The units which continued to remain on the frontier were only the CRPF and the Assam Rifles. Over-zealous local junior Army officers even tried to interfere with the work of the Intelligence posts. All further consolidation of the frontier, which the IB had started in 1952 under the express orders of the Prime Minister, stopped and the northern frontier of India was frozen at the points which had been secured by the IB with the help of the CRPF, the State Police units and the Assam Rifles up to October 21, 1959. Not one square mile of territory could be added to India’s effective possession after that date. This immobilisation of India’s forward patrols was taken advantage of by the Chinese immediately. Unhindered, the Chinese rapidly completed the circular Haji Langar-Shamul Lungpa-Lanak La Road of which the G-219 was roughly the same diameter. This enabled the Chinese to occupy quietly another 8,000 sq. miles of Indian territory, whilst carrying on a verbal fusillade against the Govt of India. Though the IB went on reporting this further road-building activity, it could only helplessly look on with no means of redress at its disposal. Kongka La incident had taken place on October 21, 1959.

Pandit Nehru maintained that the entire border between India and Tibet had been there for centuries and had been determined by history, geography, custom and tradition. He logically upheld the validity of every treaty which had been entered into by the earlier governments of Tibet and/or China and the British Govt of lndia or other Indian authorities and pointed out that some of' these treaties were more than a century old and the boundary agreed to had remained peaceful and had been recognised as the international boundary (IB) for a very long time. He admitted that the boundary, though defined, was not demarcated and, therefore, there might be minor disputes about the actual location of the IB at some places. Nehru mentioned that though India had given full details of the IB, the Govt of India did not know with any precision where the frontier claimed by the Chinese lay. It was all a matter of surmise based on small-scale Chinese maps in which the frontier varied from year to year. Therefore, there could be no possible observance of status quo as the facts concerning the status quo were themselves disputed. Instead of the status quo he suggested the following measures: lndia would withdraw all her personnel to the west of the line which the Chinese government had shown as the IB in its 1956 maps. And similarly, the Chinese government would withdraw its personnel to the east of the IB which had been described by the Govt of India in its earlier notes and correspondence and shown in its official maps. Since these two lines would be separated by long distances, there would not be the slightest possibility of clashes between the forces of either side. As the area was entirely uninhabited, it would not be necessary to maintain administrative personnel in that area.

Chou En-lai's reply was received on November 7, 1959. Whilst postponing the consideration of the Indian PM’s detailed letter to a future date, he proposed, as an interim measure, that in the eastern sector both Chinese and Indian troops should withdraw to a depth of 20km from the so-called McMahon Line. In the western sector, similarly they should withdraw up to a depth of 20km from the line up to which each side exercised actual control. He suggested that the civil administrative machinery, however, might be left behind. The most charitable interpretation which could be put on this letter was that China was trying to equate the actual control of India in NEFA up to the McMahon Line, which had existed for decades, with the actual control which China had secured in some parts of north-east Ladakh during the previous two years and which she was trying to extend forcibly, as a result of which the massacre of October 21 at Kongka La had taken place. But this proposal was not so simple as it looked on the surface. Acceptance of this suggestion would mean the acceptance by lndia of the claims of China to the territory of north-east Ladakh which she had illegally seized and was still in the process of seizing and also throwing open the entire Indo-Tibetan boundary to question even in areas of Uttar Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh. Moreover, once the checkposts were withdrawn it would be impossible to prevent further Chinese intrusion and seizure of those areas which they would later claim as having always been under Chinese control. Actually, there were no Indian troops within 20 miles of the frontier at this time anywhere along the entire Sino-Indian border. There were only units of CRPF or the Assam Rifles, which was a normal complement of every civil administration in any part of India. It was necessary to maintain these armed police units in these inaccessible areas with very poor means of communications, particularly when large bands of armed Tibetans were crossing into India every month and they had to be disarmed, taken charge of and escorted to the plains. Moreover, Pandit Nehru had trusted Chou En-lai's words in all good faith too long and he had been badly bitten. He was not going to be duped once again. He had declared even as early as 1950 that the McMahon Line was India's frontier, maps or no maps. He was not going to give in on the frontier issue over which the Chinese had kept quiet from 1950 to 1959. Once the Chinese claim that the frontier was not defined was conceded, it would start a process of interminable discussions with no prospect of agreement on any issue as the previous negotiations on Barahoti had shown. In all their correspondence the Chinese never defined what they meant by the line of actual control (LAC). The Chinese had surreptitiously grabbed certain parts of the Indian territory in Ladakh. But there was no continuous line of occupation. The first time that the Chinese clearly laid down on paper what they meant by the LAC was when they provided in December 1962, to the Colombo Powers the map showing the delineation of the territory claimed by them which they said they controlled-a control which the Chinese had gained at least in some areas by their aggression.

About the demilitarisation of a 20km belt on each side, the IB strongly objected to this procedure. As explained earlier, all through the frontier except at a few places in NEFA and in the north-eastern Ladakh we were occupying checkposts almost right on the frontier and commanded all the important passes and many of the important tracks from Tibet into India. Our withdrawal to a depth of 20km from the frontier would have meant in most cases in NEFA the IA coming down from heights of 10,000 feet to 3,000 feet, losing all its tactical locations and coming to areas where tracks and passes lost their significance, and in the dense forests it would be no longer possible to check infiltrations even in large numbers. The Chinese withdrawal of 20km from the border would mean nothing to them. First of all they were not yet in occupation of so many posts on the frontier as India was and there were still large gaps which were not under their administrative control. Their withdrawal would not involve climbing down from the heights, because they would still remain at practically the same height as on the frontier. In the barren plateau of Ladakh, infiltrators could be as easily checked at the frontier as at distances of 20km from it. Thus, by this withdrawal only the Indian side would lose a great deal whereas the Chinese would give away very little. There was the additional danger that the people on the Indian side of this so-called demilitarised zone would be subjected to large-scale Chinese subversion. Even according to the proposal made by Pandit Nehru regarding Ladakh, India would have lost all her frontier posts at Chumar, Demchok, Koyul, Dungti, Chushul, Tsogatsalu, Hot Spring, Murgo and Daulat Beg Oldi, because these were either on the frontier claimed by India or within 20km of the Chinese-claimed frontier. It would leave the whole of the Shyok and the Chang Chenmo valleys open to Chinese penetration and as India’s routes were longitudinal, she would even lose the route to the Karakoram Pass. Of course, the compensation here was that the Chinese would withdraw east of Aksai Chin and would have to leave the G-219 and also give up the areas like Kongka La, Shinglung, etc. where they had made further intrusions. So, though in south-east Ladakh India would stand to lose unilaterally, in north-east Ladakh the losses would be more or less counterbalanced by the loss suffered by the Chinese, who. in addition, would have to give up the Aksai Chin territory.

That Pandit Nehru was right in suspecting a trap in the Chinese Premier’s proposals dated September 7, from which he had adroitly disentangled himself, was proved by the cute proposals which Chou En-lai made on December 17 in reply to Pandit Nehru’s letter. Whilst expressing his readiness to accept the proposal that the armed personnel of both the countries should withdraw from Longju, he demanded that the same convention should be followed in case of Khinzemane. Sangcha and Lapthal (Nilang-Jedang), Chuba, Chuze. Puling Sumdo (Barahoti), Sung Sang, Shipki Pass, Parigas (Demchok), all of which he alleged the Indian troops had occupied after the 1954 Agreement. Regarding Pandit Nehru’s proposal that patrols should not be sent forward, Chou En-lai agreed but made a condition that this should be observed in the Ladakh sector also. In other words, as the Indian patrols would no longer be able to go to Lingzi Tang, Aksai Chin and Soda Plains, etc., it would enable the Chinese to quietly occupy them as they were doing after the stoppage of the forward patrols by the CRPF in October 1959. Whilst characterising the Priine Minister’s proposal regarding Ladakh as unfair, he claimed that Aksai Chin had always been a part of Xinjiang Province and also made the false claim that as far back as the latter half of 1950 it was along the traditional route in the area that units of the PLA had entered western Tibet. (This was a false claim, because the PLA came from Hotien-Keriya and it did not pass within 100 miles of the north-eastern extremity of Aksai Chin. The first Chinese group to travel across Aksai Chin was a mule caravan which came in September 1952, along an old silk route, which partly existed in this area.)

The Chinese raised several questions and purported to give the answers. The first question was: “Has the Sino-Indian boundary been formally delimited?” The reply questioned the authenticity of all the treaties, the right of the contracting parties, and stressed the indefinite nature of the borders indicated in the treaties, and finally claimed that the fact that the entire Sino-Indian boundary, whether in its western, middle or eastern sector, had not been delimited was incontestable. In all their correspondence and arguments contesting the basic principles of boundary alignment on which the Indian case was built, the Chinese deliberately confused the use of the words “definition”, “delimitation”, “delineation” and “demarcation”. They invariably sought to exploit the absence of actual physical demarcation on the ground to create the impression that the border did not even have juridically recognizable definition (verbally) or delineation (in maps).

China’s hand also fell heavily on the working of the Indian Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok. The Chinese interfered in the construction work of the Gyantse Agency building, which had been destroyed by floods. They arrested the Tibetan servants of these Agencies on false pretexts. A primary school run by the Agency at Yatung was prevented from taking Tibetan pupils. A doctor and a dentist attached to the Agency were prohibited from attending to Tibetan patients even though there was no other medical facility available there. All contacts between these Trade Agencies and Tibetans were stopped. The Trade Agent at Gartok was refused permission even to go to recognised trade marts. Pilgrim traffic to Kailash and Mansarovar was interfered with on the plea of disorder by the Khampas and was ultimately stopped altogether. The Indian Consul at Lhasa was not allowed to move more than 2 miles outside his Consulate. The doctor there was not allowed to treat Tibetan patients. No Tibetan visitor to the Consulate was allowed. The Chinese tried to brain-wash a large number of Kashmiri Muslims at Lhasa by forcing them to attend indoctrination classes and would not admit any right of the Indian Consul to intercede on their behalf. Several restrictions were also imposed on trade by Indian merchants in Tibet. They were not allowed to send remittances to India, were forced to open accounts in the China Bank and had to account for every item and commodity sold or purchased in Tibet to the Chinese authorities. Thus the working of the Trade Agreement was also brought to a standstill. It was clear that China’s aim was to make it impossible for the Indian Consulate at Lhasa and the Trade Agencies at Gyantse, Yatung and Gartok to function normally, to stop all cultural and personal intercourse between the Indians and the Tibetans, to stop trade unless carried through Chinese official agencies and even prevent pilgrimage by Indians to Tibet. Thus all cultural and trade rights of India in Tibet were more or less denied not in words but in deeds. All this time, China went on abusing the privileges which her Consulate and Trade Agencies enjoyed in a free country. The China Bank cornered all trade with Tibet and also trade by the considerable Chinese population in Calcutta, Bombay and Assam; the Consulate officials made frequent journeys to Assam, Darjeeling and all over the country; the Chinese population in Calcutta and Bombay were coerced into denouncing the KMT and supporting the Communist regime; the Consulate officials maintained regular contacts with members of the CPI and other opponents of the Government of India; and the NCNA carried full-length criticisms of the Govt of India by reproducing statements of Chinese leaders or newspaper editorials. The China Review, published in Calcutta, started open vilification of the Govt of India. Ultimately the Govt of India was forced to take reciprocal measures-though even these were taken rather haltingly. Restrictions were placed on the visitors to the Chinese Trade Agency at Kalimpong. Both the NCNA and the China Review were severely warned; some recalcitrant and trouble-making Chinese were deported; and the Reserve Bank of India started a check on the activities of the China Bank, which was rightly suspected of spending money for espionage purposes.

On January 29, 1960 at the conclusion of Burmese Gen Ne Win’s visit to Peking, a border agreement and a treaty of friendship and non-aggression between China and Burma were signed. The border agreement laid down that a joint committee would be set up to survey and demarcate the boundary. Burma agreed to part with certain parts of Burmese territory, Hpimaw, Gawalum, etc in favour of China and in return got the Namwan tract. Burma also agreed to hand over the areas inhabited by Panhung and Panlao tribes. In any case, the Burmese had no effective control over these areas. But Burma’s traditional boundary in the north with Tibet as defined by the McMahon Line, was recognised and the watershed principle was accepted though not mentioned in so many words. The only point left undecided was the trijunction of India, Burma and Tibet. The Chinese claimed this to be at Diphu Pass, which was 5 miles south of Talu Pass, which was till then recognised as the trijunction. It should be mentioned here that talks with Burma had been going on for several years and had bogged down due to the intransigence of the Chinese who had made claims over large tracts of Burmese territory. So the fact that during the height of its dispute with India, China suddenly changed its attitude, showed a spirit of accommodation and reason and conceded to Burma practically all that the latter had demanded showed that this was done to spite India and to prove to the world how reasonable China was and that it was India and not China that was motivated by big power chauvinism.. But this border agreement in no way stopped the PLAGF from frequently making deep incursions inside Burmese territory and this continued year after year. So the agreement was entered into as a matter of convenience to suit China’s interests at that time.

Another agreement was signed with Nepal during the Nepalese PM B. P. Koirala’s visit to Beijing on March 21, 1960. The agreement provided for economic aid to Nepal and the establishment of embassies on a reciprocal basis. It also mentioned that a treaty of friendship would be signed during Chou En-lai’s return-visit to Kathmandu between April 26 and 29. B. P. Koirala was asked to sign a non-aggression pact to which, however, he did not agree. Koirala was informed that China was building roads to Nepal’s frontier. A mass paradropping exercise was held to impress upon Koirala and S. P. Upadhyaya, who had accompanied him, that China could at any moment capture Kathmandu and India could not do anything to prevent it. Every attempt was made to convince Nepal that she need no longer depend on India for her development and defence. The agreement on the border said that the conflicting parties had decided to determine concretely the boundary between the two countries in the following ways: in sections where the delineation of the boundary line between the maps of the two countries was identical, the boundary would be fixed according to the identical delineation. In sections where the delineation varied, but the actual jurisdiction was undisputed, the actual jurisdictional boundary would be accepted; and where the delineation of the boundary and the actual jurisdictions both varied, adjustments would be made working on the principles of equality, etc. A joint survey team would be sent out by the joint committee to carry out this survey. In this case, also, China was making a deep dent in an area of undoubted Indian influence, which had lasted for over a century. India and Nepal differed from each other only politically. Otherwise by culture, religion and language (both Hindi and Nepali springing from Sanskrit), trade, marriage and social intercourse there had been eternal affinity between these two countries and there was no need to have this set out in a formal treaty. There was no passport system between these two countries and thousands of Nepalese enjoyed the same freedoms of employment and movement in India as any other Indians. Indeed, the Gurkhas formed a strong section in the IA and the Indian Armed Police or armed guards. Just as there was a large population of Indian origin in Nepali Terai, similarly there was a large population of Gurkhas in Darjeeling district, South Sikkim, South Bhutan and in Assam and even in the tea gardens of North Bengal. In the past whenever the colonial British government was in trouble, Nepal had always sent a symbolic force to India to assist the British government to prove her solidarity with British India; and, of course, the famous Gurkha battalions fought in both the world wars not only in Burma and South-East Asia but in West Asia, Ethiopia, North Africa and even in Italy. So this was the first breach which China was making in India’s traditional and centuries-old friendship and unity with Nepal by offering a treaty of friendship and economic aid and by a show of generosity in settling the border without making too big a claim on Nepal. Indeed, China even went so far as to concede that Mount Everest was in Nepal, though previously it had stoutly contested this point.

(To Be Concluded)

A Silent Industrial Player

2022-08-15T03:56:00.005+05:30

Neither Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co Pvt Ltd nor its subsidiary Godrej Precision Engineering have participated in expos like Aero India and DEFEXPO to date. Instead, both have chosen to be low-key when it comes to military-industrial achievements. Now, for the first time, a corporate booklet of Godrej Precision Engineering (shown below) outlines its military-industrial achievements over the years.