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view doc/security.txt @ 8575:b1024bf0d9f7
feature: add nonceless/tokenless CSRF protection
Add tokenless CSRF protection following:
https://words.filippo.io/csrf/
Must be enabled using use_tokenless_csrf_protection in config.ini. By
default it's off. If enabled the older csrf_* settings are ignored.
The allowed_api_origins setting is still used for Origin comparisons.
This should also improve performance as a nonce isn't required so
generating random nonce and saving it to the otks database is
eliminated.
doc/admin_guide.txt, doc/reference.txt doc/upgrading.txt
doc updates.
roundup/configuration.py
add use_tokenless_csrf_protection setting.
move allowed_api_origins directly after
use_tokenless_csrf_protection and before the older csrf_* settings.
It's used by both of them.
Rewrite description of allowed_api_origins as its applied to all
URLs with tokenless protection, not just API URLs.
roundup/anypy/urllib_.py
import urlsplit, it is used in new code.
urlparse() is less efficient and splits params out of the path
component.
Since Roundup doesn't require that params be split from the path. I
expect future patch will replace urlparse() with urlsplit() globally
and not need urlparse().
roundup/cgi/client.py
add handle_csrf_tokenless() and call from handle_csrf() if
use_tokenless_csrf_protection is enabled.
refactor code that expires csrf tokens when used with the wrong
methods (i.e. GET) into expire_exposed_keys(). Call same from
handle_csrf and handle_csrf_tokenless. Also improve logging if this
happens including both Referer and Origin headers if available.
Arguably we dont care about CSRF tokens exposed via
GET/HEAD/OPTIONS in the tokenless case, but this cleans them up in
case the admin has to switch back. At some future date we can
delete all the nonce based CSRF from 2018.
Update handle_csrf() docstring about calling/returning
handle_csrf_tokenless() when enabled. Call
expire_exposed_keys(method) if token is supplied with wrong method.
roundup/cgi/templating.py
disable nonce generation/save and always return "0" when
use_tokenless_csrf_protection enabled.
| author | John Rouillard <rouilj@ieee.org> |
|---|---|
| date | Sun, 19 Apr 2026 20:50:07 -0400 |
| parents | c7a2e01793cd |
| children |
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.. meta:: :description: Documentation on how to report security issues with Roundup. Index to recent security related (CVE) descriptions in other Roundup documentation. How to verify distribution using gpg. .. index:: single: Reporting Security Issues single: CVE announcements single: Security Issues, Reporting single: Security Issues, Remediation single: Security Issues, CVE announcements ======================= Roundup Security Issues ======================= This page documents CVE's fixed starting with version 2.4.0, how to report security issues, and verify the signatures for Roundup source release tarballs. .. contents:: :local: :depth: 2 CVE Announcements ----------------- * `CVE-2025-53865`_ - :ref:`XSS security issue with devel or responsive templates <CVE-2025-53865>`. Fixed in release 2.5.0, directions available for fixing trackers based on these templates. * `CVE-2024-39124`_ - :ref:`classhelpers (_generic.help.html) are vulnerable to an XSS attack. <CVE-2024-39124>` Requires fixing tracker homes. * `CVE-2024-39125`_ - :ref:`if Referer header is set to a script tag, it will be executed. <CVE-2024-39125>` Fixed in release 2.4.0, directions available for fixing in prior versions. * `CVE-2024-39126`_ - :ref:`PDF, XML and SVG files downloaded from an issue can contain embedded JavaScript which is executed. <CVE-2024-39126>` Fixed in release 2.4.0, directions available for fixing in prior versions. .. _CVE-2025-53865: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2025-53865 .. _CVE-2024-39124: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-39124 .. _CVE-2024-39125: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-39125 .. _CVE-2024-39126: https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2024-39126 Reporting Security Issues ------------------------- Security issues with Roundup should be reported by email to: rouilj@users.sourceforge.net (John Rouillard) rsc@runtux.com (Ralf Schlatterbeck) If these fail, you can find rouilj on irc in channel #roundup at irc.oftc.net (see Contact_ for more directions and web interface). Methods listed at Contact_ are all public, so they should be used to contact somebody with the Roundup project for establishing a proper method of reporting the security issue. .. _Contact: https://www.roundup-tracker.org/contact.html Verify Source Tarball --------------------- .. index:: single: Distribution, verify with gpg single: Signature, verify If you download the source tarball using ``python3 -m pip download roundup`` or from https://pypi.org/project/roundup/#files you can verify the file using gpg. This is the information on the public PGP/GPG key used to sign Roundup distributions. It is used to sign the 1.6.0, 2.2.0, and newer releases. (Note that the @ sign in email addresses have been replaced with the word "at" to reduce spam directed at the mailing list.):: Key info: Roundup Team (signing key for roundup releases) <roundup-devel at lists.sourceforge.net> Expires: 2028-07-17 Key fingerprint = 411E 354B 5D1A F261 25D6 2122 1F2D D0CB 756A 76D8 Releases 1.6.1, 2.0.0 and 2.1.0 were accidentally signed with this key [1]_:: Key info: John Rouillard (Roundup Release Key) <rouilj+roundup at ieee.org> Expires: 2023-07-09 Key fingerprint = A1E6 364E 9429 E9D8 2B3B 2373 DB05 ADC4 2330 5876 .. [1] Use gpg to import this key from the keyserver pgp.mit.edu if you need to verify one of these releases. Use the gpg pgp.mit.edu keyserver example replacing the key fingerprint with the one starting A1E6. Importing the Public Key ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This only has to be added to your keyring once. You can import a key from pgp.mit.edu using:: gpg --keyserver pgp.mit.edu --receive-keys 411E354B5D1AF26125D621221F2DD0CB756A76D8 where the fingerprint (without spaces) is used to identify which key to receive. You can also extract and import the file ``tools/roundup.public.pgp.key`` from the download source tarball using:: tar -xzvf roundup-2.2.0.tar.gz -O \ roundup-2.2.0/tools/roundup.public.pgp.key > pub.key gpg --import pub.key Once you have loaded the public key, you need a detached signature for your release. Download Detached Signature and Verify ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ This needs to be done once for each release you wish to verify. The Python Package Index (PyPI) used to support uploading gpg detached signatures. However that is no longer supported and downloading existing signatures may not work in the future. As a result, the signatures for all Roundup final releases starting with 1.6.0 have been moved and are linked below: .. rst-class:: multicol * `2.5.0 <../signatures/roundup-2.5.0.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `2.4.0 <../signatures/roundup-2.4.0.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `2.4.0b2 <../signatures/roundup-2.4.0b2.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `2.3.0 <../signatures/roundup-2.3.0.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `2.3.0b2 <../signatures/roundup-2.3.0b2.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `2.2.0 <../signatures/roundup-2.2.0.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `2.1.0 <../signatures/roundup-2.1.0.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `2.0.0 <../signatures/roundup-2.0.0.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `1.6.1 <../signatures/roundup-1.6.1.tar.gz.asc>`_ * `1.6.0 <../signatures/roundup-1.6.0.tar.gz.asc>`_ To use the signature, download the correct versioned link and verify it with (note 1.5.7 is a dummy version, use the correct version number):: gpg --verify roundup-1.5.7.tar.gz.asc roundup-1.5.7.tar.gz You should see:: gpg: Signature made Wed 13 Jul 2022 12:24:14 AM EDT gpg: using RSA key 411E354B5D1AF26125D621221F2DD0CB756A76D8 gpg: Good signature from "Roundup Team (signing key for roundup releases) <roundup-devel at lists.sourceforge.net>" [unknown] gpg: WARNING: This key is not certified with a trusted signature! gpg: There is no indication that the signature belongs to the owner. Primary key fingerprint: 411E 354B 5D1A F261 25D6 2122 1F2D D0CB 756A 76D8 which verifies the tarball integrity. The WARNING is expected. The date should be close to the release date of the version of Roundup. As long as you see the output starting with "Good signature from" followed by the Key Info above, everything is OK. If something is wrong you will see:: gpg: Signature made Wed 13 Jul 2022 12:24:14 AM EDT gpg: using RSA key 411E354B5D1AF26125D621221F2DD0CB756A76D8 gpg: BAD signature from "Roundup Team (signing key for roundup releases) <roundup-devel at lists.sourceforge.net>" **do not use** the tarball if the signature is BAD. Email the mailing list: roundup-devel at lists.sourceforge.net if you have this happen to you.
