improve REST interface security When using REST, we reflect the client's origin. If the wildcard '*' is used in allowed_api_origins all origins are allowed. When this is done, it also added an 'Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true' header. This Credentials header should not be added if the site is matched only by '*'. This header should be provided only for explicit origins (e.g. https://example.org) not for the wildcard. This is now fixed for CORS preflight OPTIONS request as well as normal GET, PUT, DELETE, POST, PATCH and OPTIONS requests. A missing Access-Control-Allow-Credentials will prevent the tracker from being accessed using credentials. This prevents an unauthorized third party web site from using a user's credentials to access information in the tracker that is not publicly available. Added test for this specific case. In addition, allowed_api_origins can include explicit origins in addition to '*'. '*' must be first in the list. Also adapted numerous tests to work with these changes. Doc updates.

"""Exceptions for use across all Roundup components.
"""

__docformat__ = 'restructuredtext'


class RoundupException(Exception):
    pass

class LoginError(RoundupException):
    pass


class Unauthorised(RoundupException):
    pass

class RejectBase(RoundupException):
    pass

class Reject(RejectBase):
    """An auditor may raise this exception when the current create or set
    operation should be stopped.

    It is up to the specific interface invoking the create or set to
    handle this exception sanely. For example:

    - mailgw will trap and ignore Reject for file attachments and messages
    - cgi will trap and present the exception in a nice format
    """
    pass


class RejectRaw(Reject):
    """
    Performs the same function as Reject, except HTML in the message is not
    escaped when displayed to the user.
    """
    pass


class UsageError(ValueError):
    pass

# vim: set filetype=python ts=4 sw=4 et si