Mercurial > p > roundup > code
annotate doc/security-history.txt @ 8412:0663a7bcef6c reauth-confirm_id
feat: finish reauth docs, enhance code.
Decided to keep name Reauth for now.
admin_guide.txt:
add reference mark to roundup admin help. Used for template command
reference in upgrading.txt.
customizing.txt:
added worked example of adding a reauth auditor for address and password.
Also links to OWASP recommendations.
Added link to example code in design.doc on detectors.
glossary.txt:
reference using roundup-admin template command in def for tracker
templates.
pydoc.txt:
Added methods for Client class.
Added class and methods for (cgi) Action, LoginAction and ReauthAction.
reference.txt
Edited and restructured detector section.
Added section on registering a detector and priority use/execution order.
(reference to design doc was used before).
Added/enhanced description of exception an auditor can
raise (includes Reauth).
Added section on Reauth implementation and use (Confirming the User).
Also has paragraph on future ideas.
upgrading.txt
Stripped down the original section. Moved a lot to reference.txt.
Referenced customizing example, mention installation of
_generic.reauth.html and reference reference.txt.
cgi/actions.py:
fixed bad ReST that was breaking pydoc.txt processing
changed doc on limitations of Reauth code.
added docstring for Reauth::verifyPassword
cgi/client.py:
fix ReST for a method breaking pydoc.py processing
cgi/templating.py:
fix docstring on embed_form_fields
templates/*/html/_generic.reauth.html
disable spelling for password field
add timing info to the javascript function that processes file data.
reformat javascript IIFE
templates/jinja2/html/_generic.reauth.html
create a valid jinja2 template. Looks like my original jinja
template got overwritten and committed.
feature parity with the other reauth templates.
test/test_liveserver.py
add test case for Reauth workflow.
Makefile
add doc.
| author | John Rouillard <rouilj@ieee.org> |
|---|---|
| date | Wed, 13 Aug 2025 23:52:49 -0400 |
| parents | 485cecfba982 |
| children |
| rev | line source |
|---|---|
| 7092 | 1 .. meta:: |
| 2 :description: | |
| 3 Security mechanism implementation document for historical purposes. | |
| 4 | |
| 5 :orphan: | |
| 6 | |
|
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7 ============================= |
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8 Old Security Mechanisms Notes |
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9 ============================= |
| 3940 | 10 |
| 11 Current situation | |
| 12 ================= | |
| 13 | |
| 14 Current logical controls: | |
| 15 | |
| 16 ANONYMOUS_ACCESS = 'deny' | |
| 17 Deny or allow anonymous access to the web interface | |
| 18 ANONYMOUS_REGISTER = 'deny' | |
| 19 Deny or allow anonymous users to register through the web interface | |
| 20 ANONYMOUS_REGISTER_MAIL = 'deny' | |
| 21 Deny or allow anonymous users to register through the mail interface | |
| 22 | |
| 23 Current user interface authentication and controls: | |
| 24 | |
| 25 - command-line tool access controlled with passwords, but no logical controls | |
| 26 - CGI access is by username and password and has some logical controls | |
| 27 - mailgw access is through identification using sender email address, with | |
| 28 limited functionality available | |
| 29 | |
| 30 The web interface implements has specific logical controls, | |
| 31 preventing non-admin users from accessing: | |
| 32 | |
| 33 - other user's details pages | |
| 34 - listing the base classes (not issues or their user page) | |
| 35 - editing base classes | |
| 36 | |
| 37 Issues | |
| 38 ====== | |
| 39 | |
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40 1. The current implementation is ad-hoc, and not complete for all use cases. |
| 3940 | 41 2. Currently it is not possible to allow submission of issues through email |
| 42 but restrict those users from accessing the web interface. | |
| 43 3. Only one user may perform admin functions. | |
| 44 4. There is no verification of users in the mail gateway by any means other | |
| 45 than the From address. Support for strong identification through digital | |
| 46 signatures should be added. | |
| 47 5. The command-line tool has no logical controls. | |
| 48 6. The anonymous control needs revising - there should only be one way to be | |
| 49 an anonymous user, not two (currently there is user==None and | |
| 50 user=='anonymous'). | |
| 51 | |
| 52 | |
| 53 Possible approaches | |
| 54 =================== | |
| 55 | |
| 56 Security controls in Roundup could be approached in three ways: | |
| 57 | |
| 58 1) at the hyperdb level, with read/write/modify permissions on classes, items | |
| 59 and item properties for all or specific transitions. | |
| 60 2) at the user interface level, with access permissions on CGI interface | |
| 61 methods, mailgw methods, roundup-admin methods, and so on. | |
| 62 3) at a logical permission level, checked as needed. | |
| 63 | |
| 64 In all cases, the security built into roundup assumes restricted access to the | |
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65 hyperdatabase itself, through operating-system controls such as user or group |
| 3940 | 66 permissions. |
| 67 | |
| 68 | |
| 69 Hyperdb-level control | |
| 70 --------------------- | |
| 71 | |
| 72 Control is implemented at the Class.get, Class.set and Class.create level. All | |
| 73 other methods must access items through these methods. Since all accesses go | |
| 74 through the database, we can implement deny by default. | |
| 75 | |
| 76 Pros: | |
| 77 | |
| 78 - easier to implement as it only affects one module | |
| 79 - smaller number of permissions to worry about | |
| 80 | |
| 81 Cons: | |
| 82 | |
| 83 - harder to determine the relationship between user interaction and hyperdb | |
| 84 permission. | |
| 85 - a lot of work to define | |
| 86 - must special-case to handle by-item permissions (editing user details, | |
| 87 having private messages) | |
| 88 | |
| 89 | |
| 90 User-interface control | |
| 91 ---------------------- | |
| 92 | |
| 93 The user interfaces would have an extra layer between that which | |
| 94 parses the request to determine action and the action method. This layer | |
| 95 controls access. Since it is possible to require methods be registered | |
| 96 with the security mechanisms to be accessed by the user, deny by default | |
| 97 is possible. | |
| 98 | |
| 99 Pros: | |
| 100 | |
| 101 - much more obvious at the user level what the controls are | |
| 102 | |
| 103 Cons: | |
| 104 | |
| 105 - much more work to implement | |
| 106 - most user interfaces have multiple uses which can't be covered by a | |
| 107 single permission | |
| 108 | |
| 109 Logical control | |
| 110 --------------- | |
| 111 | |
| 112 At each point that requires an action to be performed, the security mechanisms | |
| 113 are asked if the current user has permission. Since code must call the | |
| 114 check function to raise a denial, there is no possibility to have automatic | |
| 115 default of deny in this situation. | |
| 116 | |
| 117 Pros: | |
| 118 | |
| 119 - quite obvious what is going on | |
| 120 - is very similar to the current system | |
| 121 | |
| 122 Cons: | |
| 123 | |
| 124 - large number of possible permissions that may be defined, possibly | |
| 125 mirroring actual user interface controls. | |
| 126 - access to the hyperdb must be strictly controlled through program code | |
| 127 that implements the logical controls. | |
| 128 | |
| 129 | |
| 130 Action | |
| 131 ====== | |
| 132 | |
| 133 The CGI interface must be changed to: | |
| 134 | |
| 135 - authenticate over a secure connection | |
| 136 - use unique tokens as a result of authentication, rather than pass the user's | |
| 137 real credentials (username/password) around for each request (this means | |
| 138 sessions and hence a session database) | |
| 139 - use the new logical control mechanisms | |
| 140 | |
| 141 - implement the permission module | |
| 142 - implement a Role editing interface for users | |
| 143 - implement htmltemplate tests on permissions | |
| 144 - switch all code over from using config vars for permission checks to using | |
| 145 permissions | |
| 146 - change all explicit admin user checks for Role checks | |
| 147 - include config vars for initial Roles for anonymous web, new web and new | |
| 148 email users | |
| 149 | |
| 150 The mail gateway must be changed to: | |
| 151 | |
| 152 - use digital signatures | |
| 153 - use the new logical control mechanisms | |
| 154 | |
| 155 - switch all code over from using config vars for permission checks to using | |
| 156 permissions | |
| 157 | |
| 158 The command-line tool must be changed to: | |
| 159 | |
| 160 - use the new logical control mechanisms (only allowing write | |
| 161 access by admin users, and read-only by everyone else) | |
| 162 | |
| 163 |