God's surprisingness

God is very surprising. (a) Facts about God's nature are surprising. Who would have expected the being who is one and indivisible to also be a Trinity? (b) Facts about what God does are surprising. Who would have expected him to choose insignificant Israel, or... to die for us!?

Surprisingness isn't entailed by incomprehensibility. A text in a language I don't know can be utterly incomprehensible and utterly unsurprising. But on the other hand, insofar as God has surprises for us we do not comprehend him.

Surprisingness implies that not only are there facts about God that we can't figure out, but there are facts about God which our present evidence would lead us to deny--surprising facts. A focus on God's surprisingness may lead to a sceptical thought that we cannot expect to know anything about God. But that's not at all true. For mathematics is continually surprising, and yet is an area where we continue to know more and more. (And this is more than an analogy, since mathematics is a kind of branch of theology, if Augustine is right about mathematical objects existing in the mind of God.)

There some connection between God's holiness and God's surprisingness. God's surprises aren't just like particularly thoughtful birthday presents. They are the surprises of a mysterium tremendum. "Surprise" is thus too weak a word, yet it also correctly suggests a certain whimsy that is a part of God's nature if the whimsical surprises of mathematics and biology are a guide to the mind of God. Humor may be a form of theology, too.

How surprising is evil?

According to the argument from evil:

1. The evils of this world are much more surprising given theism than given atheism.

But if (1) were true, then we would expect:

2. Theists tend to be much more surprised by evil than atheists.

However, I do not think (2) is in fact observed, and this provides evidence against (1).

Objection 1: Theists are irrational, and irrational people may not be surprised by the objectively surprising.

Response: This proposed explanation of the non-occurrence of (2) would itself lead to a further prediction:

3. The more rational a theist, the more likely she is to be surprised by evil.

But (3) is definitely not observed. In fact, the contrary is probably the case.

Objection 2: This is a version of the problem of old evidence. In old evidence cases, one is not surprised by the evidence as one already knew it.

Response: Still, if (1) is true, we would at least expect:

4. Theists, and if not in general then at least the more rational ones, are significantly more surprised than atheists to learn of new and particularly heinous evils.

But I do not think this is actually observed.

None of this is a conclusive refutation of (1). But it does decrease the likelihood of (1).