Bayesian reasoning isn't our duty

Ought implies can. Most people can’t do Bayesian reasoning correctly. So Bayesian reasoning is not how they ought to reason. In particular, a reduction of epistemic ought to the kinds of probability fcts that are involved in Bayesian reasoning fails.

I suppose the main worry with this argument is that perhaps only an ought governing voluntary activity implies can. But the epistemic life is in large part involuntary. An eye ought to transmit visual information, but some eyes cannot—and that is not a problem because seeing is involuntary.

However, it is implausible to think that we humans ought to do something that nobody has been able to do until recently and even now only a few can do, and only in limited cases, even if the something is involuntary.

If Bayesian reasoning isn’t how we ought to reason, what’s the point of it? I am inclined to think it is a useful tool for figuring out the truth in those particular cases to which it is well suited. There are different tools for reasoning in different situations.

Induction and eccentricity

There is reason to be a conventional person. For the more conventional one is, the more accurate will be people's inductive arguments about one's behavior and character. Being understood by others is a good thing. It is good not only because it is good that people possess the truth, but it is good for one in that relationships with one are more likely to be based on truth.

Of course, there may be defeaters.