Surviving furlessness and inner earlessness

If we are animals, can we survive in a disembodied state, having lost all of our bodies, retaining only soul or form?

Here is a standard thought:

1. Metabolic processes, homeostasis, etc. are defining features of being animals.

2. In a disembodied state, one cannot have such processes.

3. Something that is an animal is essentially an animal.

4. So something that is an animal cannot survive in a disembodied state.

But here’s a parody argument:

5. Fur and mammalian inner ear bones (say) are defining features of being mammals.

6. In a furless and internally earless state, one cannot have such structures.

7. Something that is a mammal is essentially a mammal.

8. So something that is a mammal cannot survive in a furless and internally earless state.

I think 5-7 are no less plausible than 1-3. But 8 is clearly false: clearly, it is metaphysically possible to become a defective mammal that is furless and internally earless.

The obvious problem with 5, or with the inferences drawn from 5, is that what is definitory of being a mammal is being such that one should to have fur and such-and-such an inner ear. The same problem afflicts 2: why not say that being such that one should have these processes and features is definitory of being a mammal.

Our canine pets are animals, so we are animals

1. Our canine pets are primary bearers of their mental states.
2. Our canine pets are higher mammals.
3. So, some higher mammals are primary bearers of their mental states. (1 and 2)
4. Either (a) all higher mammals are primary bearers of their mental states or (b) no higher mammals are primary bearers of their mental states.
5. Human animals are higher mammals.
6. So, human animals are primary bearers of their mental states. (3, 4, 5)
7. We are primary bearers of our mental states.
8. If we are not human animals, then it is not both the case that we are primary bearers of our mental states and human animals are primary bearers of their mental states.
9. So, we are human animals. (6, 7, 8).

Premise 1 holds because the master-pet relationship to a canine pet while not being interpersonal (since dogs are not persons) has the kind of intimacy that requires the relata to be primary things with minds.

In correspondence, Jeff McMahan denied that our canine pets are animals. He held that our canine pets are not dogs but are rather constituted by dogs, much as he holds that we are not human animals but are rather constituted by human animals. So McMahan will deny premise 2. But I think premise 2 is obviously true.

The remaining controversial premise is 4, which holds that all higher mammals are on par with regard to whether they are primary bearers of their mental states. But I think 4 is highly plausible in light of the similarities between the brains and behavior of higher mammals.

I thank Allison Thornton for helping me work out this argument.

Animal consciousness

Sometimes I come up with an argument such that I can't tell for sure if it's more a joke or a really interesting argument. The following is a case in point:

1. (Premise) If some non-human earthly animals are conscious, all normal mammals are conscious.
2. (Premise) There have ever been several orders of magnitude more non-human mammals than humans.
3. (Premise, plausibly a consequence of 2) If all normal mammals are conscious, I should very strongly expect not to experience reality as a human.
4. (Premise) I experience reality as a human.
5. So, probably, not all normal mammals are conscious. (By 3 and 4)
6. So, probably, no non-human earthly animals are conscious.

As for (1), if some non-human earthly animals are conscious, a line must be drawn as to where consciousness is found. There are two main plausible places to draw such a line: (a) humans versus other animals, and (b) animals with sophisticated brains versus other animals. If we draw the line in the second place, all normal mammals will be conscious. As for (2), I don't have data as to how many mammals there are on earth. I saw an unreferenced "400 million" online, and a referenced somewhat smaller estimate for the number of birds (and I could run the argument with birds, too, I think). There are apparently roughly as many rats and mice in the world as humans. And there have been non-human animals for millions of years before there were humans.

I think the difficult philosophical question is whether (3) is true and what sense can be made of it.

I am more inclined to see this argument as a joke, or maybe as a challenge to figure out how anthropic arguments work.