The incoherence of Spinoza's mode ontology

According to Spinoza, I am a mode and God is the only substance. But I am not directly a mode of God. I am a mode of a mode of a mode of … a mode of God, with infinitely many “a mode of” links in between.

This is incoherent. It is an infinite chain with two ends, one being me and the other being God. But any infinite chain made of direct links has at most one end: it would have to be of the form 1:2:3:4:…, with one endpoint, namely zero. We can stick on another chain running in the other direction, like …:iv:iii:ii:i, and get the two ended sequence 1:2:3:4:…:iv:iii:ii:i. But this two-ended sequence is not a chain, because there is no connection between any of the arabic numbered nodes and any of the roman numbered nodes.

An infinite chain can't have two ends

Say that a chain C is a collection of nodes with the following properties:

1. Each node is directly connected to at most two other nodes.

2. If x is directly connected to y then y is directly connected to x (symmetry).

3. C is globally connected in the sense that for any non-empty proper subset S of C, there is a node in S and a node outside of S that are directly connected to each other.

(This is a different sense of “chain” from the one in Zorn’s Lemma.)

Fun fact: Every infinite chain has at most one endpoint, where an endpoint is a node that is directly connected to only one other node.

I.e., one cannot join two nodes with an infinite chain.

Corollary: We cannot join two events by an infinite chain of instances of immediate causation.

I've occasionally wondered if there is a useful generalization of transitive closure to allow for infinite chains, and to my intuition the fact above suggests that there isn't.