Movement

The following seem quite plausible:

1. It is possible for an object both (a) to have both a first and a last moment of its existence and (b) to be moving at every time during its existence.
2. It is not possible for an object (a) to exist at only one time and yet (b) be moving.

By (2), movement is not an instantaneous property: it is not a property an object has solely in virtue of how it is at one moment. By (1), however, movement is not a property defined in terms of the past and present states of an object (say, "an object moves at a time provided that it is a different location from where it was in the past"), since it can move at the first moment of its existence; nor is it a property defined in terms of the present and future states of the object since it can move at the last moment of its existence.

So what is movement? We could say that an object is moving at time t provided that there are arbitrarily close moments t* at which the object is in a different location. This would make sense of both (1) and (2). But this account falsifies the following intuition:

3. If a ball is thrown vertically into the air, then at the high point of its flight it is not moving.

(If it were moving, would it be moving upward or downward?) For at moments arbitrarily close to that top-point time, the ball is at different locations.

We could try to define movement in terms of there being a well-defined non-zero derivative of the position with respect to time, with the derivative being one-sided at the beginning and end of the object's existence. But then, given continuous time (which we need anyway to have time-derivatives), an object could continuously change location without ever moving, since there are continuous nowhere differentiable functions.

So what should we say? I think it is that the concept of "moving at time t" is underspecified, and specifications of it simply aren't going to cut nature at the joints. Being at different places at different times (at least relative to a reference frame) makes good and fairly precise sense. But moving (or changing) at a time does not. Zeno was right about that much.

Zeno's arrow, Newtonian mechanics and velocity

Start with Zeno's paradox of the arrow. Zeno notes that over every instant of time t₀, an arrow occupies one and the same spatial location. But an object that occupies one and the same spatial location over a time is not moving at that time. (One might want to refine this to handle a spinning sphere, but that's an exercise to the reader.) So the arrow is not moving at t₀. But the same argument applies to every time, so the arrow is not moving, indeed cannot move.

Here's a way to, ahem, sharpen The Arrow. Suppose in our world we have an arrow moving at t₀. Imagine a world w* where the arrow comes into existence at time t₀, in exactly the same state as it actually has at t₀, and ceases to exist right after t₀. At w* the arrow only ever occupies one position—the one it has at t₀. Something that only ever occupies one position never moves (subject to refinements about spinning spheres and the like). So at w* the arrow never moves, and in particular doesn't move at t₀. But in the actual world, the arrow is in the same state at t₀ as it is at w* at that time. So in the actual world, the arrow doesn't move at t₀.

A pretty standard response to The Arrow is that movement is not a function of how an object is at any particular time, it is a function of how, and more precisely where, an object is at multiple times. The velocity of an object at t₀ is the limit of (x(t₀+h)−x(t))/h as h goes to zero, where x(t) is the position at t, and hence the velocity at t₀ depends on both x(t₀) and on x(t₀+h) for small h.

Now consider a problem involving Newtonian mechanics. Suppose, contrary to fact, that Newtonian physics is correct.

Then how an object will behave at times t>t₀ depends on both the object's position at t₀ and on the object's velocity at t₀. This is basically because of inertia. The forces give rise to a change in velocity, i.e., the acceleration, rather than directly to a change in position: F(t)=dv(t)/dt.

Now here is the puzzle. Start with this plausible thought about how the past affects the future: it does so by means of the present as an intermediary. The Cold War continues to affect geopolitics tomorrow. How? Not by reaching out from the past across a temporal gap, but simply by means of our present memories of the Cold War and the present effects of it. This is a version of the Markov property: how a process will behave in the future depends solely on how it is now. Thus, it seems:

1. What happens at times after t₀ depends on what happens at time t₀, and only depends on what happens at times prior to t₀ by the mediation of what happens at time t₀.

But on Newtonian mechanics, how an object will move after time t₀ depends on its velocity at t₀. This velocity is defined in terms of where the object is at t₀ and where it is at times close to t₀. An initial problem is that it also depends on where the object is at times later than t₀. This problem can be removed. We can define the velocity here solely in terms of times less than t₀, as lim_h→0−(x(t+h)−x(t))/h, i.e., where we take the limit only over negative values of h.[note 1] But it still remains the case that the velocity at t₀ is defined in terms of where the object is at times prior to t₀, and so how the obejct wil behave at times after t₀ depends on what happens at times prior t₀ and not just on what happens at t₀, contrary to (1).

Here's another way to put the puzzle. Imagine that God creates a Newtonian world that starts at t₀. Then in order that the mechanics of the world get off the ground, the objects in the world must have a velocity at t₀. But any velocity they have at t₀ could only depend on how the world is after t₀, and that just won't do.

Here is a potential move. Take both position and velocity to be fundamental quantities. Then how an object behaves after time t₀ depends on the object's fundamental properties at t₀, including its velocity then. The fact that v(t₀)=lim_h→0(x(t₀+h)−x(t₀))/h, at least at times t₀ not on the boundary of the time sequence, now becomes a law of nature rather than definitional.

But this reneges on our solution to The Arrow. The point of that solution was that velocity is not just a matter of how an object is at one time. Here's one way to make the problematic nature of the present suggestion vivid, along the lines of my Sharpened Arrow. Suppose that the arrow is moving at t₀ with non-zero velocity. Imagine a world w* just like ours at t₀ but does not have any times other than t₀.[note 2] Then the arrow has a non-zero velocity at t₀ at w*, even though it is always at exactly the same position. And that sure seems absurd.

The more physically informed reader may have been tempted to scoff a bit as I talked of velocity as fundamental. Of course, there is a standard move in the close vicinity of the one I made, and that is not to take velocity as fundamental, but to take momentum as fundamental. If we make that move, then we can take it to be a matter of physical law that mlim_h→0(x(t₀+h)−x(t₀))/h=p(t₀), where p(t) is the momentum at t.

We still need to embrace the conclusion that an object could fail to ever move and yet at have a momentum (the conclusion comes from arguments like the Sharpened Arrow). But perhaps this conclusion only seems absurd to us non-physicists because we were early on in our education told that momentum is mass times velocity as if that were a definition. But that is definitely not a definition in quantum mechanics. On the suggestion that in Newtonian mechanics we take momentum as fundamental, a suggestion that some formalisms accept, we really should take the fact that momentum is the product of mass and velocity (where velocity is defined in terms of position) to be a law of nature, or a consequence of a law of nature, rather than a definitional truth.

Still, the down-side of this way of proceeding is that we had to multiply fundamental quantities—instead of just position being fundamental, now position and momentum are—and add a new law of nature, namely that momentum is the product of mass and velocity (i.e., of mass and the rate of change of position).

I think something is to be said for a different solution, and that is to reject (1). Then momentum can be a defined quantity—the product of mass and velocity. Granted, the dynamics now has non-Markovian cross-time dependencies. But that's fine. (I have a feeling that this move is a little more friendly to eternalism than to presentism.) If we take this route, then we have another reason to embrace Norton's conclusion that Newtonian mechanics is not always deterministic. For if a Newtonian world had a beginning time t₀, as in the example involving God creating a Newtonian world, then how the world is at and prior to t₀ will not determine how the world will behave at later times. God would have to bring about the initial movements of the objects, and not just the initial state as such.

Of course, this may all kind of seem to be a silly exercise, since Newtonian physics is false. But it is interesting to think what it would be like if Newtonian physics were true. Moreover, if there are possible worlds where Newtonian physics is true, the above line of thought might be thought to give one some reason to think that (1) is not a necessary truth, and hence give one some reason to think that there could be causation across temporal gaps, which is an interesting and substantive conclusion. Furthermore, the above line of thought also shows how even without thinking about formalisms like Hamiltonian mechanics one might be motivated to take momentum to be a fundamental quantity.

And so Zeno's Arrow continues to be interesting.